ESTONIAN ACADEMY
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akadeemia kirjastus
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TRAMES cover
TRAMES. A Journal of the Humanities and Social Sciences
ISSN 1736-7514 (Electronic)
ISSN 1406-0922 (Print)
Impact Factor (2020): 0.5

DISABILITY AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY; pp. 156–167

Full article in PDF format | DOI: 10.3176/tr.2011.2.04

Author
Simo Vehmas

Abstract
This article offers an introductory analysis of the philosophical and empirical considerations having to do with the significance of psychopathy, intellectual disability and ADHD regarding one’s moral responsibility. Moral responsibility comes in degrees and is ultimately determined on social grounds. Whether a certain diagnosis and its under­pinning neuro-cognitive impairment affects one’s cognitive, emotional and moral conduct, depends also on social and relational factors.
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