In Islamic thought, the question “How does God know tensed facts?” has been thoroughly discussed over a tension between the attributes of omniscience and immutability. Avicenna and al-Ghazâlî, who give wide coverage to this problem in their studies, propose different solutions to eliminate this tension. Avicenna acknowledges that a being who knows tensed facts is subject to change, therefore he claims that God knows everything in a universal way and excludes tensed facts from the extent of omniscience. On the other hand, al-Ghazâlî claims that God knows tensed facts, but He does not undergo any real change by knowing them. In this study, I will argue that neither of these answers are convincing in generating a solution to the expressed tension.
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