Neuroscientific challenges to free will work on at least three levels: there is a metaphysical level, an epistemological level, and an empirical level. In this paper I discuss the main neuroscientific challenges on each of these three levels. Three fundamental conditions for free will can also be placed on these levels, and I briefly discuss how these conditions can be met in the context of the neuroscientific challenges. In conclusion I strongly doubt that neuroscientific evidence can show free will not to exist at all.
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