

FIGHTING FOR THE MINI STATE: FOUR SCENARIOS*¹

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Historically there was a competition to control Estonian territory primarily between Russia, Germany, Poland, Sweden, and Denmark, until this area was conquered in 1710 for two centuries by Imperial Russia.² In the 20th century, the only rival to Russia's (USSR's) domination over Estonia has been Germany. A Norwegian security analyst Oļav Knudsen says correctly that the Baltic states "fall outside all other geographical and political contexts than the Russian and to some extent the German one."³ As is known, Estonia was occupied by Germany in the course of the World Wars in 1918 and 1941–44.⁴ Generally speaking, the pre-1991 history of Estonia is a good case to prove that the survival of small states as independent powers is precarious, "depending on a multitude of factors over which they have little influence."⁵

Post-1991 Estonian security thinking⁶ denied that there could be any discernible threat from the West. As the Chief of the Headquarters of the Estonian Defense Forces Colonel Laaneots stated in 1992: there "is no danger from Germany."⁷ Russia was perceived in 1991–94 as the only tangible source of foreign threat by Estonian politicians and security experts. A leading official of the Estonian Defense Ministry, Hannes Walter, wrote in December 1993: "There is only one state in the world whose influential politicians have publicly threatened to eliminate the Republic of Estonia. To say bluntly that Estonia needs a defense against a Russian threat is not an unfriendly act, but an acknowledgment of reality."⁸ The primacy of the Russian threat was also pointed out in the Defense Ministry's document "The Fundamentals of National Defense" (discussed in parliament on March 15, 1993, but not officially accepted). The document stated that although the threats to the Republic of Estonia can be divided into internal and external ones, they were "all connected with political destabilization in Russia."⁹

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The Estonian threat perception corresponded more or less to what most prominent and shrewd Western analysts were saying. For example, Zbigniew Brzezinski has noted that whatever "its internal evolution, Russia will remain too large – and too "Eurasian" – to be fully integrated into Europe," and in "any case, the crisis of Russia's identity is unlikely to be resolved in an entirely peaceful manner."¹⁰

In what follows I argue that against the background of the 1991–94 situation, *we can identify at least four circumstances of crisis under which the use of the Estonian defense forces can be contemplated. I label them here as 1) the 1940 scenario; 2) the Trans-Dniestr option, 3) Russian disintegration, and 4) the Georgian case.* Although there may be some doubt over the need for armed forces under the first situation, it poses relatively little difficulty to see the need for Estonian defense structures in the second, third and fourth contexts. Needless to say, this list of projections is not meant to be complete: perhaps there are other possibilities of conflict that are not analyzed here. It is also obvious that the above-listed descriptions are not strictly independent of each other: they have overlapping elements.

THE EMERGENCE OF AN ESTONIAN DEFENSE POLICY

The Constitution of the Republic of Estonia, adopted on June 28, 1992, stated the interminability and inalienability of Estonian independence and sovereignty, the inseparability and indivisibility of the land area, of territorial waters and the integrity of the air space of the republic. It declared the duty of every Estonian citizen to be loyal to the constitutional system, to defend the independence of Estonia, and outlined the basic principles of national defense.¹¹

According to the "Fundamentals of National Defense" the Estonian policy should be based on the principle of total defense. The Estonian approach envisaged a build-up of Defense Forces, comprising the army, the Defense League, the border guard, interior-defense units, coast guard and rescue services, as well as the existence of mandatory military service and reserves. The total defense was defined in the document as a system of united actions to fend off possible danger to the structures of state, by the defense forces and by "the whole nation and its economic potential." The defense policy was understood as part of a wider "security system," involving also foreign policy means.¹²

In 1992–94 the Estonian government frequently expressed its support for the idea of universal compulsory military service for all men. For example, the Estonian Defense Minister Indrek Kannik, in an interview in January 1994, stressed the need for mandatory military service for all men, noting that students in higher education can choose the courses of the reserve officers training instead of going through active service.¹³ The Secretary-General of the Estonian Ministry of Defense, Hannes Walter, portrayed the Swedish model of total defense as something which may be a paradigm for Estonia.¹⁴

In more practical terms, on September 3, 1991, the Estonian parliament adopted a decision to create a defense force,¹⁵ and on April 13, 1992, the Ministry of Defense was established.¹⁶ In March 1994, the Estonian parliament adopted a law on an 8–12 month mandatory military service for all male citizens who are 19–27 years old.¹⁷ In 1993 the Defense Forces comprised the Viru, Kalev and Kuperjanov infantry battalions, a training battalion, and other support units throughout Estonia.¹⁸ In addition to the regular army and reserves, there was also a voluntary para-military organization – the Estonian Defense League, which was originally created in November 1918,¹⁹ and reestablished on February 17, 1990.²⁰

In a highly symbolic pro-Western move, the Estonian parliament in May 1993 nominated a retired US Army Colonel (made Major-General in the Estonian army) Aleksander Einseln to Commander of the Defense Forces. The nomination created a controversy in the USA: while it was supported by the Pentagon, it was strongly opposed by the State Department (apparently because of possible Russian objections). Einseln was deprived of his US Army pension and there were warnings that he might also be stripped of his American citizenship. Since Einseln was able to garner support in the US Senate, his pension was restored on December 13, 1993.²¹

THE BUILD-UP OF THE ARMED FORCES

After the war of Independence (1918–1920) the Estonian army consisted of 86,000 men and 119,000 para-military Defense League members. By 1940 there were approximately 15,000 men serving in the Defense Forces and 105,000 reserves (of whom 43,000 belonged to the Defense League).²²

The current situation is quite different. On January 1, 1992, there were 85 recruits in Estonian defense forces, and on December 31, 1992, about 1,120.²³ In July 1993 the Estonian Defense Forces comprised about 2,000 men,²⁴ that is, the general number of Estonia's defense force was less than 0.1 percent of Russia's level.²⁵ For comparison, it may be said that the Ukrainian army was about 700,000 strong in 1992, and there were plans to cut it down to 220,000 by the end of the century. Similarly, the armies of Belarus and Kazakhstan will consist of roughly 90,000 and 45,000 soldiers, respectively. No other former Soviet republic will have a standing army of more than 25,000 (and most will be a good deal smaller).²⁶ In turn, the Estonian Defense League had about 6,500 members in 1993.²⁷ It should also be mentioned that the armed forces of the Baltic states are not covered by the CFE Treaty as was agreed by the parties to the Treaty in October 1991.²⁸

Table 1

The Manpower of Estonia's Defense Forces, 1920–1993

Year	Regular Forces	Defense League
1920, winter	86,000	119,000
1940, June	15,000	43,000
1992, 1 January	85	—
1992, 31 December	1,100	—
1993, July	2,000	6,500

Sources: Estonia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Headquarters of the Defense Forces.

FOUR SITUATIONS OF CRISIS

It seems obvious that the military dimension will inevitably play a minor role in Estonian security strategy, since the resources of the country are so small. Certainly Estonia seems to satisfy one of the basic conditions of the weak state, i.e., a state "which cannot defend itself against external threats with its own strength," and which has "high or total dependence on external help."²⁹ At the same time, Western experts have pointed out that the Baltic states (and the former Soviet republics) "should understand that the West is unlikely to take any military action to protect them in the face of Russian aggression."³⁰ To understand Russian options, it is important to keep in mind the events in former Yugoslavia. As has been said many times, Serbia's behavior in 1991–94 is a good illustration of how free in real-political terms even an insignificant power is when it resolves to ignore the world community and engage in old-fashioned aggression.³¹

It should be noted that Estonians in 1991–94 were themselves quite skeptical about any possible military help in the future. As Hannes Walter put it in December 1993, "We have to recognize that it is unlikely that we will get foreign help in the event of aggression." But Walter's conclusion from that recognition was not defeatist. He said that "if we do not try to defend ourselves, then it is absolutely certain that there will be no foreign help."³²

The Estonian Defense Minister Indrek Kannik has identified two main "battle scenarios": 1) an attack by some country; or 2) a "total chaos" in some "neighboring country" which will turn its armed forces into "marauding" gangs.³³ It is possible to spell out some of these in more specific terms. In other words, we can envisage at least four cases, when the use of Estonia's armed forces may be contemplated.

1) The 1940 scenario

First, there is what we may call the "1940 Scenario": an all-out conquest by Russia. As is generally known, the conquest of Estonia (and of the other two Baltic states) in 1940 was made extremely easy by the outbreak of the Second World War and by the collapse of the then existing international order. Included in the Nazi-Soviet agreements were secret protocols which allocated Estonia to the Soviet sphere of influence.³⁴ Estonia was forced in September 1939 to agree to accept Soviet military bases on its territory, but only after about 160,000 Red Army troops (a force more than ten times the size of the Estonian peacetime army) was massed at the Estonia border.³⁵ Less than a year later, on June 16, 1940, Molotov presented an ultimatum to Estonia. In this situation, with at least 25,000 Soviet troops already inside the country, the Estonian government surrendered, and on June 17 an agreement was signed, permitting the passage of Soviet troops into Estonia. As some 90,000 Soviet troops entered the country in the next two days (bringing the total to at least 115,000), Estonia came under full military occupation.³⁶ There have been some interesting disclosures recently of the technical preparation of the 1940 aggression. For example, the top secret directive of June 9, 1940 (signed by Marshals S. Timoshenko and B. Shaposhnikov), plus some accompanying documents put a special emphasis on sealing the Baltic states from the outside world, and, thereby not allowing the "evacuation of the governments of those states."³⁷

Historian Magnus Ilmjärv has appropriately pointed out that the pre-World War II Estonian military leadership quickly broke its earlier tough promises. Following the events in Czechoslovakia, the Commander of the Estonian Defense forces, General Johannes Laidoner, declared in March 1939 that the President of Czechoslovakia is an "ordinary traitor" and if "we display a 100,000-strong army," then adversary will need a force at least two or three times greater to defeat us, and if there are those "who hesitate, then their place is not in the army."³⁸ Only a few months later, in October 1939, after Estonia had allowed Soviet military bases on its territory, Laidoner told a Swedish diplomat that Estonia could not have defended itself against Russians "even for a week."³⁹ Finally, on June 17, 1940, Laidoner signed the agreement according to which the Estonian state was handed over to the Soviet Union without a single shot.⁴⁰

It should be especially stressed that the existence of sharp Estonian domestic (ethnic) tensions is not a necessary pre-condition of aggression in this case: the Estonian domestic situation was remarkably peaceful and stable before the 1940 conquest. It should also be noted that aggression at the end of the twentieth century is, from a military point of view, easier than fifty years before: modern high technology enables very specific objects to be targeted, and ground forces to be deployed extremely quickly.⁴¹ For example, it was estimated in 1993 that the paratroop division near Pskov "could invade Estonia on sixteen minutes notice."⁴²

Several security officials saw in 1991–94 an important role for the Estonian army even under this first set of circumstances, that is, in case of

a full-scale war between Estonia and Russia. The Head of the Parliamentary Defense Committee Rein Helme wrote in February 1994 that Estonia should resist aggression even "if we stand alone" – not helped by the West.⁴³ According to Helme's view, if a total defense policy is pursued, Estonia may in ten years time have a military reserve of about 80,000 men. An adversary would then have to have at least 250,000 men on the field to conquer Estonia. The application of such a force is (according to Helme's view) beyond the "material and political resources" available to Russia.⁴⁴ Helme's arguments may not sound very convincing to outside observers, but they demonstrate the mode of reasoning in Tallinn. Another dimension of possible full-scale aggression was identified by military expert Olev Raidla in March 1994. He said that the Estonian defense potential should be enough to compel a potential aggressor, prior to attack, to concentrate forces beyond the internationally allowed limits; in other words, coerce it visibly "to violate international agreements when in the preparatory phase" of an attack.⁴⁵

2) Trans-Dniestr and Russian disintegration

This second potential situation refers to domestic unrest, connected with ethnic tensions and possible secessionist struggle. As Christopher Mitchell has said, "Civil wars and secessionist struggles are, of all the forms of large-scale, violent human conflict, notoriously the most difficult to terminate successfully."⁴⁶ In other words, the heavily Russian-populated north-eastern Estonia may attempt to secede or plunge into violence, creating an excuse for Russia's "peace-keeping" operation to intervene, under the pretext of saving the lives of Russian citizens. The possibility of such action is mentioned in 1993 Russian military doctrine.⁴⁷ A variation of this scenario may be a riot in Estonia instigated by a group of foreign agents, like the Comintern-inspired failed communist revolt of 1924.⁴⁸ As Louis Kriesberg has pointed out, conflicts that have their roots in inter-communal tensions may easily evolve from stages of "low-level violence" into "intense violence" and "protracted extensive violence."⁴⁹

In spite of all the deep legal, historical, geopolitical, ethnic, etc., differences between Estonia and Moldova, the Dniestr conflict in 1990–94 may offer some guidelines how something similar may also occur and develop in Estonia. Vladimir Socor has summarized the essence of the problem: "Moldova continued in 1993 to be the sole former Soviet republic to face the following combination of challenges: an insurgency by the Russian minority on part of its territory; the creation of a quasi-state within the state, supported economically and politically by power structures in the Russian Federation; and the entrenchment of Russian Federation troops stationed unlawfully in Moldova."⁵⁰ As is well known, the "Dniestr Moldavian Republic" was proclaimed in September 1990 on the left bank of Dniestr, and although by 1994 it was still not recognized by any state in the world, it continued *de facto* its existence, backed by the Russian 14th Army and the "Republic's" own armed forces.⁵¹

Estonian security experts have made explicit references to the Trans-Dniestr situation. For instance, in December 1993, Hannes Walter underscored the most likely scenario as "indirect aggression" which was – according to his view – "already applied" in Moldova, in the Caucasus, and in former Soviet republics in Asia. "It is possible to organize a riot and support it with Cossacks and arms. The agents can declare a counter-government and ask for help from Russia. It is possible to present itself in the guise of peacekeeper." ⁵²

3) Neighboring civil war

Thirdly, a civil war may break out in Russia and that country may disintegrate into quarreling "princdoms," i.e., something may happen close to what Henry Huttenbach has aptly labeled *Raspad 2*.⁵³ It is quite conceivable (as happened in fact in 1917–18) that in this case some remnants of the Russian army will deteriorate into gangs, indiscriminately pillaging towns and villages in Estonia and elsewhere.⁵⁴ The need for the Estonian army to be ready to cope with "armed groups," similar to the ones that emerged after the First World War, was explicitly mentioned at the press conference of the ruling parliamentary coalition in Tallinn in March 1994.⁵⁵ A commentator in a leading right-wing newspaper *Eesti Aeg* stated that since Estonia was unable to form its own efficient navy, air force, etc., to fight "a large-scale invasion," Estonia should think "only of how to defend its borders if domestic order were to collapse in Russia, and the Baltics threatened by lightly-armed, plundering gangs."⁵⁶

4) The case of Georgia

Georgia in 1991–94 was certainly one of the places where the fighting between various anti-communist para-military organizations (representing the same ethnic group but supported by different political factions) was extreme. The fighting between the Georgian factions themselves was also, of course, accompanied by inter-ethnic strife, but this is not the primary focus here.

Elizabeth Fuller has demonstrated that the existence of paramilitary forces that were subordinate to different mutually hostile political groups "played a key role in internal political developments" in Georgia.⁵⁷ The Georgian National Guard was divided and the rebel faction of the National Guard, together with the paramilitary *Mkhedrioni*, were the main actors in Gamsakhurdia's ousting in December 1991 to January 1992.⁵⁸ Another specific feature of the Georgian situation, according to the same analysis, was the close connection between the worlds of the paramilitary and crime: some of the "Mafia were reportedly working in league with the paramilitary, such as Ioseliani's *Mkhedrioni*, which acquired a virtual monopoly on gasoline supplies and were rumored to have misappropriated enormous sums in foreign humanitarian aid."⁵⁹

Given the differences in cultural traditions and geopolitical situations, it is inconceivable that anything on the scale of the 1991–94 Georgian events could happen in Estonia. At the same time, it is not completely impossible that some violence may occur, because some paramilitary or military units may refuse to take government orders, enjoying at the same time the support of some mainstream Estonian political factions. In other words – although not very likely – a violent domestic clash between various pro-Estonian political factions themselves cannot be completely ruled out.

In fact, Estonia was quite close to domestic violence in summer 1993 during the so-called revolt by the Läänemaa voluntary infantry unit based at Pullapää in north-west Estonia.⁶⁰ With fewer than one hundred members, this unit refused to take government orders to relocate at a new base, forcing the then Defense Minister Hain Rebas to resign.⁶¹ At the end of 1993 this unit was still defiant and – as a leading Estonian newspaper put it – no one was sure "whether the government had control over it."⁶² The above-mentioned Commander of Estonia's defense forces, Aleksander Einseln, called the rebellious Läänemaa unit a "gang" and likened it to "brown shirts" of Nazi Germany in the 1930s.⁶³

In 1991–94, some experts expressed doubts over the discipline and integrity of the paramilitary Defense League. A warning was given also by the Commander of the Defense League Major Johannes Kert himself, saying that politicization of officers poses a "mortal danger" to Estonian independence.⁶⁴ It was revealed in January 1994 that General Einseln has a plan to create a much smaller 2000-strong voluntary organization, modeled on the example of the US National Guard, to replace the Defense League, a plan which was received skeptically by the Defense Minister Indrek Kannik.⁶⁵

Some concern was also voiced early in 1994 over possible activation of nationalist right-wing forces who may resort to "death squad" methods to stop the growing crime wave and "restore order" in society. One centrist parliamentarian, Jaan Kaplinski, wrote in February 1994, "although the possibility of radical-national political terrorism in Estonia is not very great, that possibility should still not be ignored."⁶⁶

There were indeed some interesting developments in this respect at the beginning of 1994. For example, according to some newspaper reports, a meeting of the Central Union of Estonian Nationalists in Pärnu referred to Mussolini's success with fighting the Sicilian Mafia as something that could be emulated.⁶⁷ Describing the situation, speakers at the Central Union's meeting stressed that the police were corrupt and helpless, and 90 percent of entrepreneurs in Tallinn were forced to pay "taxes" to the Mafia.⁶⁸ Commenting on the activities of the above-mentioned ultra radical Union, Hellar Grabbi (himself quite a radical defender of Estonian national values) wrote in March 1994 that this Union seemed to be going in "an extreme national-radical direction, already transcending the limits of democracy."⁶⁹ Grabbi specifically warned that calls for "more authoritarian government" or the use of "state terror" against organized crime will "tarnish Estonia's international image."⁷⁰

CONCLUDING REMARKS

In summing up, let me again stress that this list of four possible scenarios is neither strict nor exhaustive. If a major violent crisis erupts in or around Estonia, it will most probably reflect some combination of the above-mentioned cases. At the same time, consideration of these or other future possibilities may offer some rationale for the build-up of an Estonian mini-army. While it may be more difficult to grasp the logic of those who see a meaningful role for an Estonian army under the "1940 Scenario," it is relatively clear there is a need for armed forces in the second, third and fourth situations. Estonian armed forces may be successfully used at the beginning stages of the last three types of crises to curb further escalation of violence. Whether the use of an Estonian army in those cases will be successful is, of course, something which, hopefully, will never be tested in practice. For the time being, we can only note that the resolute manner of Estonian security thinking in 1991-94 has adhered closely to a basic assumption of a theory: if a small state takes part in a confrontation with a larger power, it is likely that the core interests of the former are "at stake, which in turn yields high levels of resolve."⁷¹

NOTES

- ¹ I would like to thank Mare Haab for her illuminating analytical comments and for sharing with me some of her unpublished research materials. Needless to say, I am responsible for all the factual statements and conclusions in this article.
- ² For the Imperial Russian conquest, see Toivo Raun, *Estonia and the Estonians* (Stanford, Hoover Institution Press, 1991), pp. 33-38. The struggle over the Baltic area is well depicted in Allen F. Chew, *An Atlas of Russian History: Eleven Centuries of Changing Borders*, revised edition (New Haven: Yale University Press), 1970, pp. 2-104; and in Edgar Mattisen, *Eesti-Vene piir* (Tallinn: Ilo, 1993), pp. 5-126.
- ³ Olav F. Knudsen, "The Foreign Policies of the Baltic States: Interwar Years and Restoration," *Cooperation and Conflict*, Vol. 28, No. 1, 1993, p. 48.
- ⁴ Rein Taagepera, *Estonia: Return to Independence* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), pp. 41-48; 68-71.
- ⁵ Eric Stern and Bengt Sundelius, "Managing Asymmetrical Crisis: Sweden, the USSR, and U-137," *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 36, 1992, p. 234.
- ⁶ This article covers developments until March 1994.
- ⁷ Quoted from Jaan Laas, ed., *Eesti kroonika, 1992* (Tallinn, Esintell, 1992), p. 46.
- ⁸ *Rahva Hää!*, 28 December 1993, p. 2.
- ⁹ "Fundamentals of National Defense," a manuscript of the document, compiled by the Ministry of Defense and discussed in parliament on March 15, 1993, p. 2.
- ¹⁰ Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Out of Control: Global Turmoil on the Eve of the Twenty-First Century* (New York, A Robert Stewart Book, 1993), pp. 141, 215.
- ¹¹ See: *Eesti Vabariigi Põhiseadus* (Tallinn: Olion, 1992), pp. 6, 18, 40-41.
- ¹² "Fundamentals of National Defense," a manuscript of the document compiled by the Ministry of Defense and discussed in Parliament on March 15, 1993, pp. 5-6.
- ¹³ *Rahva Hää!*, 27 January 1994, p. 2.
- ¹⁴ *Rahva Hää!*, 17 February 1994, p. 2.
- ¹⁵ Jaan Laas, *Eesti kroonika 1992* (Tallinn: Esintell, 1992), p. 57.
- ¹⁶ *The Baltic Independent*, 6-12 November 1992, p. 6.
- ¹⁷ *Päevaleht*, 11 March 1994, p. 1.

- 18 Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs press release, July 1993.
- 19 August Traksmaa, *Lühike Vabadussõja ajalugu*, second printing (Tallinn: Olion, 1992), p. 250.
- 20 "Kaitseleidu organisatsioon," *Kaitse Kodu*, Vol. 17, No. 1, 1993, p. 59.
- 21 See an interview with A. Einseln in *Päevaleht*, 15 March 1994, p. 14.
- 22 Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs press release, July 1993. See slightly different figures in Marje Jõeste *et al*, eds, *Eesti A&O* (Tallinn: Eesti Entsüklopeediakirjastus, 1993), pp. 154–155.
- 23 Märt Tiru, "Eesti Kaitsevägi," manuscript by an officer of the Headquarters of the Estonian Defense Forces, Tallinn, 1993, pp. 1; 6.
- 24 Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs press release, July 1993.
- 25 For various estimates of the size and prospects of Russian Armed Forces, see John W. R. Lepingwell, "Is the Military Disintegrating From Within?" *RFE/RL Research Report. Special Issue: Post-Soviet Armies*, Vol. 2, No. 25, 18 June 1993, pp. 9–16; Stephen Foye, "The Armed Forces of the CIS: Legacies and Strategies," *RFE/RL Research Report*, Vol. 3, No. 1, 7 January 1994, pp. 18–21.
- 26 Mark Kramer, "The Armies of the Post-Soviet States," *Current History* (October 1992), p. 330.
- 27 Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs press release, July 1993.
- 28 Urmas Salo, "Euroopa tavarelvajõudude leping," *Sõdur*, No. 4, 1993, pp. 16–21.
- 29 Michael Handel, *Weak States in the International System* (London, Frank Cass, 1990), p. 53.
- 30 Paul Goble, "Russia and Its Neighbors," *Foreign Policy*, No. 90, Spring 1993, p. 86.
- 31 For a good analysis of former Yugoslavia in the context of the post-Cold War international system, see Fred Halliday, "Sleepwalking Through History," *London School of Economics. The Centre for the Study of Global Governance. Discussion Paper*, No. 4, 1993, pp. 1–17.
- 32 *Rahva Hääl*, 28 December 1993, p. 2.
- 33 *Rahva Hääl*, 27 January 1994, p. 2.
- 34 The story of the Nazi-Soviet secret protocols is one of the most clear-cut cases of lying in political history. As it appears from the top secret *spravka* of the General Department of the CPSU Central Committee from July 10, 1987 (presented to Mikhail Gorbachev and other CPSU leaders and made public in 1992), the originals of the secret protocols were deposited in the CPSU Central Committee archive on October 30, 1952 (see publication of the relevant documents: *Voprosy istorii*, No. 1, 1993, pp. 3–22). On July 8, 1975, copies of the secret protocols were sent to Andrei Gromyko for personal reading (*Ibid.*, p. 16). Yet, in his memoirs, Andrei Gromyko denied the existence of the protocols and called them "forgeries" (Andrei Gromyko, *Memoirs* (London: Hutchinson, 1989, p. 38)). Mikhail Gorbachev and Aleksandr Yakovlev, in 1989, acknowledged the existence of the secret protocols, but made the Soviet parliament believe that the "originals of the protocols are not to be found either in the Soviet nor in the foreign archives" (*Vestnik MID SSSR*, 31 January 1990, p. 13), although the 1987 top secret *spravka* to CPSU leadership specifically mentioned that the CPSU Central Committee archive has the originals of the documents, copies of some of which were published in 1948 in the USA (*Voprosy istorii*, No. 1, 1993, pp. 16).
- 35 Toivo U. Raun, *Estonia and the Estonians*, second edition (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1991), pp. 140–143.
- 36 *Ibid.*, p. 144.
- 37 Tsentral'nyi gosudarstvennyi arkhiv voenno-morskogo flota SSSR, fond R-92, delo 671, pp. 1–2; fond R-92, delo 672, p. 171.
- 38 *Postimees*, 22 January 1994, p. 2.
- 39 Magnus Ilmjärv, *Nõukogude Liidu ja Saksamaa vahel: Balti riigid ja Soome 1934–1940* (Tallinn: Estonian Academy of Sciences, 1993), p. 80.
- 40 *Postimees*, 22 January 1994, p. 2.
- 41 In spite of all the profound differences between the USA and Russia, some strategic and technological lessons of the Gulf War may be useful in this respect. About the American achievements and limitations in the Gulf War, see: Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Out Of Control: Global Turmoil at the Eve of the Twenty-First Century* (New York: A Robert Stewart Book, 1993), pp. 88; 99–100; 124; 150; 162.
- 42 Mare Haab, "Russian Troops in Estonia: A Menace to Security," manuscript (Tallinn, 1993), p. 2.
- 43 *Rahva Hääl*, 7 February 1994, p. 2.
- 44 *Ibid.*
- 45 *Päevaleht*, 10 March 1994, p. 6.
- 46 "Conflict Resolution and Civil War: Reflections on the Sudanese Settlement of 1972," *George Mason University. Center for Conflict Analysis and Resolution. Working Paper*, No. 3, 1989, p. 2.
- 47 *Rahva Hääl*, 12 March 1994, p. 3.

- 48 Toivo U. Raun, *Estonia and the Estonians* (Stanford, Hoover Institution Press, 1991), p. 115.
- 49 Louis Kriesberg, "Preventive Conflict-Resolution Of Inter-Communal Conflicts," *Syracuse University. Program on the Analysis and Resolution of Conflicts. Working Paper*, No. 29, September 1993, pp. 12–15.
- 50 Vladimir Socor, "Moldova: Democracy Advances, Independence at Risk," *RFE/RL Research Report*, Vol. 3, No. 1, 7 January 1994, p. 47.
- 51 An interesting analysis of the Dniestr conflict is presented in Pal Kolsto and Andrei Edemsky with Natalya Kalashnikova, "The Dniestr Conflict: Between Irredentism and Separatism," *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 45, No. 6, 1993, pp. 973–1000.
- 52 *Rahva Hää*, 28 December 1993, p. 2.
- 53 Henry Huttenbach, "Raspad 2. Whither the Russian Federation?" *Analysis of Current Events, Association for the Study of Nationalities*, Vol. 4, No. 6, April 1993, pp. 1–3; Henry Huttenbach, "A Post-Soviet Challenge to Post-Sovietologists: To Be Or Not To Be? Can the Russian Federation Hold Together?" *Analysis of Current Events*, Vol. 5, No. 5, 1 October 1993, pp. 1–3.
- 54 About how the disintegrating Russian army plundered Estonia in 1917, see Eduard Laaman, *Eesti iseseisvuse süünd*, Vol. 2, third printing (Tallinn: Faatum, 1992), pp. 155–56.
- 55 *Päevaleht*, 11 March 1994, p. 1.
- 56 *Eesti Aeg*, 16 March 1994, p. 3.
- 57 Elizabeth Fuller, "Paramilitary Forces Dominate Fighting in Caucasus," *RFE/RL Research Report*, Vol. 2, No. 25, 18 June 1993, p. 74.
- 58 Elizabeth Fuller, "Paramilitary Forces Dominate Fighting in Caucasus," *RFE/RL Research Report*, Vol. 2, No. 25, 18 June 1993, pp. 80–81.
- 59 Elizabeth Fuller, "The Transcaucasus: War, Turmoil and Economic Collapse," *RFE/RL Research Report*, Vol. 3, No. 1, 7 January 1994, p. 57.
- 60 About the Pullapää crisis see *RFE/RL News Briefs*, 26 July–6 August 1993, p. 23.
- 61 *The Baltic Independent*, 13–19 August 1993, p.1.
- 62 *The Baltic Independent*, 17–23 December 1993, p.8.
- 63 *Rahva Hää*, 28 January 1994, p. 1; *Eesti Ekspress*, 4 February 1994, p. A2.
- 64 Johannes Kert, "Kuhu lähed, Eesti ohvitser?" *Kaitse Kodu*, Vol. 17, No. 1, 1993, p. 44.
- 65 *Rahva Hää*, 27 January 1994, p. 2.
- 66 *Hommikuleht*, 7 February 1994, p. 2.
- 67 *Op. cit.*, 14 March 1994, p. 5.
- 68 *Ibid.*
- 69 *Eesti Aeg*, 16 March 1994, p. 7.
- 70 *Ibid.*
- 71 Eric Stern and Bengt Sundelius, "Managing Asymmetrical Crisis: Sweden, the USSR, and U-137," *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 36, 1992, p. 217.