

EXPLAINING ESTONIAN CITIZENSHIP POLICY: A CASE STUDY IN POST-IMPERIAL RELATIONSHIPS*

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I use in this writing the expression "citizenship policy" in a very loose and imprecise way to denote briefly the whole complex of policies, concerned with citizenship, migration, language, ethnic minority rights, cultural autonomy, etc. While such use of the words "citizenship policy" fits my aims here, I of course agree that in other contexts the corresponding concepts should be employed in a more precise and specific way.

In terms of comparative triadic relationships, the Estonian case may illustrate how a nationalizing state (Estonia) chooses a strategy to limit the political influence of a post-imperial national minority in a nationalizing state, whereas this strategy is sharply criticized by the external homeland (Russia), and quite passively accepted by the national minority itself (Russians in Estonia).¹

The following is meant neither as justification, nor as condemnation of the Estonian citizenship policy. In what follows I attempt just to describe this policy and partially explain it. Admitting that any social research is inevitably somewhat value-loaded, I will at least try to minimize the evaluative dimension of my writing.

ESTONIAN CITIZENSHIP POLICY, 1991–94

In pre-Soviet times the population of Estonia was ethnically highly homogenous: in 1881, the share of Estonians in the population on the territory of today's Estonia was 89.8%, and in 1939 the corresponding number

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for the Republic of Estonia was 88.2%.² Because of the mass executions, deportations, Russification, organized and spontaneous migration³ during the years of the Soviet occupation, the share of ethnic Estonians had by 1989 fallen to 61.5 percent⁴, whereas the absolute majority of others were ethnic Russians. Most outside observers have noted that Estonian problems are in one or another way connected with rapid ethnodemographic changes. As Ernest Gellner has put it, Estonian problems spring "from labor migration under industrialism. The fairly recent in-migration of Russians to new industrial zones has left an intractable problem."⁵ Since there has been in 1990–94 a certain emigration of non-Estonians from Estonia, the share of Estonians has by 1994 probably again risen by a couple of percentage points.⁶

Table 1

Main Ethnic Groups in Estonia, 1959–1989

	1959		1989	
	number	percent	number	percent
Total	1,196,791	100.0	1,565,662	100.0
Estonians	892,653	74.6	963,269	61.5
Russians	240,227	20.1	474,815	30.3
Ukrainians	15,769	1.3	48,273	3.1
Belarusians	10,930	0.9	27,711	1.7
Finns	16,699	1.4	16,622	1.1
Jews	5,436	0.5	4,613	0.3
Latvians	2,888	0.2	3,135	0.2
Germans	670	0.1	3,466	0.2
Tatars	1,535	0.1	4,058	0.3
Poles	2,256	0.2	3,008	0.2
Lithuanians	1,616	0.1	2,568	0.2
Others	6,112	0.5	14,124	0.9

Source: Marje Joeste et al, eds, *Eesti A&O*, Tallinn: Eesti Entsüklopeediakirjastus, 1993, p. 96.

Estonia's independence was gained in 1991 on the restorationist model, i.e. from the point of view of the mainstream Estonian political forces, not a new state was created in 1991, but the pre-1940 Republic of Estonia was restored.⁷ Estonia's citizenship policy followed also this restorationist line and produced quick and deep changes in the ethnic composition of the electorate. The 1938 citizenship law was re-introduced in Estonia on February 26, 1992. According to this legislation, all those who were citizens of the Republic of Estonia on June 16, 1940 as well as their

descendants were granted citizenship, the others were considered to be foreign nationals or stateless persons, most of whom are eligible to apply for the Estonian citizenship through naturalization. The naturalization requirements are quite liberal: almost anyone who has resided in Estonia for two years (starting from March 30, 1990) may apply for the citizenship. The citizenship law went into effect in February 1992, so non-citizens who had already resided in Estonia two years before that, were able to begin applying for naturalization almost immediately. Applicants must take an oath of loyalty to the Republic of Estonia and its constitutional order, and demonstrate a knowledge of Estonian language. More than 33,000 persons had obtained Estonian citizenship under various forms of naturalization by April 1994.⁸

Unfortunately by the time of this writing the Estonian government has not published any exact data about the number and ethnic composition of Estonian citizens. But on the basis of various indirect calculations, it seems safe to say that in the spring 1994 the percentage of ethnic Estonians among citizens was over 90 percent. According to Estonian Citizenship and Migration Office, 575,477 Estonian passports were issued by June 20, 1994⁹, but this figure does not cover the actual number of citizens, since the passports were issued only to the persons over 16, and only part of the citizens have taken out their passports.

Generally speaking, the current Estonian citizenship law does not discriminate against anybody on formal ethnic grounds, and is more liberal than similar legislation of most other countries.¹⁰ But the immediate realpolitical effect of the citizenship law can be interpreted of course in ethnic terms: most ethnic Russian residents of Estonia were not eligible to vote in September 1992 elections. The approximate share of the voting-age citizens in the overall voting-age population can be determined, if we compare the numbers of registered voters for the March 1991 independence-referendum (when all the Soviet-era permanent residents were eligible to participate) and the September 1992 State Assembly-elections (when only Estonian citizens were eligible to vote). There were 1,144,309 registered voters for the 1991 referendum¹¹ and 689,319 registered voters for the 1992 elections¹² (i.e. about 60 percent of the 1991 level).

On July 8, 1993 the Estonian parliament passed the law on aliens, according to which all non-citizens, who enjoyed permanent residency in Estonia before July 1990, must apply for residency permits.¹³ Both the amended version of the citizenship law and the law on aliens contain a specific restriction, applied to categories like employees of the intelligence or security services of the foreign states and others. In other words, there are certain groups in Estonia (for example the non-citizen former KGB officers) who will probably not get residency permits and may be expelled from the country. Article 12 of the law on aliens stipulates that a residency permit shall not be issued to any alien:

*who is employed or has been employed by the intelligence or security service of a foreign country;

*who is in the active service of the armed forces of a foreign state, or to his or her family members;

*who has served in a career position in the armed forces of a foreign state or has entered the reserve forces or has retired from a career position in the armed forces, or to his or her family members, who have entered Estonia in conjunction with the service or retirement of a member of such armed forces.¹⁴

Following the adoption of the law of aliens, the Estonian government approved a number of regulations, specifying provisions of the law on aliens in a somewhat liberalizing manner. For example, on December 1, 1993, a regulation was adopted, allowing certain categories of the retired former career officers of the foreign armed forces to get residency permits. Among those categories were for example the old persons (born before January 1, 1930); persons married to Estonian citizens; persons whose "presence is necessary for the state of Estonia," etc.¹⁵ In other words, the retired ex-Soviet military officers got a chance at least to apply for a citizenship, although each case was judged on the individual basis. Another liberalizing move was the extension of the residency permits' application deadline for another year, i.e. until July 12, 1995.¹⁶ These and other similar moves corresponded to the cyclical pattern that was visible in the Estonian citizenship policy already since 1992: first, a relatively radical law was established, then certain liberalizing specifications were added to it, then another relatively radical law was adopted, then again certain liberalizing specifications were added, etc. The underlying longer trend in 1991–94 was – against all this cyclical background – toward making the citizenship policy more Estonian-centered and uncompromising.

A MENU OF POLITICAL OPTIONS

The menu of competing approaches toward citizenship issues in Estonia can be grasped, looking at the statements by the main political parties and movements. Unfortunately, there is an inevitable element of confusion over how to define the parties and movements. For example, most parties participated in September 1992 parliamentary elections under the umbrella of various electoral blocs, some of whom disappeared in 1993–94, whereas the new umbrella organizations and political coalitions were emerging. The ruling center-right coalition broke up in June–July 1994, when liberal democrats left it. The parties themselves were in 1992–94 also constantly regrouping, disintegrating and new organizations were appearing. The Fatherland Party (i.e. the party of the Prime Minister Mart Laar) disintegrated in June–July 1994 into smaller groups. Some theoretically non-political organizations (like the Pensioners Union) were quite active in defending the rights of the corresponding interest groups and were usually included into opinion polls about electoral preferences.

In addition there were specific moments, connected with organizations, representing the interests of Russians and other similar ethnic minorities. Since the Estonian law allows only citizens to form political parties, a considerable Russian activity was going on within the framework of non-party or non-registered organizations. Russians were active also on the level of local governments (especially in city assemblies) since under Estonian Constitution non-citizens have the right to vote in local elections.¹⁷

The support for the most important parties and movements in Estonia in June 1994 is depicted in Table 2.

The September 1992 State Assembly elections in Estonia resulted in the victory of the right-wing nationalist parties that formed a ruling coalition with some centrist parties (social democrats and others) under the leadership of the new Prime Minister Mart Laar.¹⁸ The leading nationalist parties of *the ruling coalition* (Fatherland and Estonian National Independence Party) campaigned in the fall 1992 for a relatively tough citizenship policy, that "should guarantee the preservation of Estonians and their culture,"¹⁹ including measures like a very low annual naturalization quota, encouraging non-citizens to remigrate back to Russia, etc. Although Mart Laar's center-right government in 1992-94 generally tried to implement their pre-election promises, it showed also considerable flexibility and retreated from its original positions, when pressured by the Council of Europe or the representatives of the CSCE to liberalize its approach.

The Estonian *national radical opposition* was in the spring 1994 comprised of Estonian Citizens Union, Future Estonia Party, Central Union of Estonian Nationalists, National Progress Party, National Party, Farmers' Union; Greens, Lawful Owners' Union, i.e. a number of tiny parties that were usually quarreling with each other because of the personal conflicts of their leaders. Those parties accused Mart Laar's government of betraying the 1992 electoral promises to de-colonize and de-Sovietize Estonia. These small parties were often suspicious about the intentions of the Western governments and international organizations, favored firm citizenship policies, and wanted most Soviet-era colonists to leave Estonia. As those radical organizations in 1994 often stated, it is "impossible" to integrate more than half a million non-citizens into Estonian society.²⁰ The coalition "Better Estonia" (that was formed from some of the above mentioned tiny parties in the spring 1994) declared in April 1994 that "the colonists who arrived in Estonia as a result of [Soviet] occupation, and in violation of Estonian laws and against the will of its citizens, must leave Estonia."²¹

The main actors of the *center-right opposition* (Coalition Party, Rural Union, Royalist Party) targeted their criticisms usually against economic policy and corruption in the government; on citizenship and other ethnopolitical issues they were more or less supportive of the government's line, often even criticizing government for being too appeasing toward Moscow and the Russian community in Estonia.

Table 2

Support for Political Parties in Estonia, June 1994

	Citizens	Non-Citizens
Ruling Center-Right Coalition		
Fatherland Party	6	0
Estonian National Independence Party	2	1
Rural Center Party	2	1
Social Democratic Party	1	0
Liberal Democratic Party	2	3
Estonian National-Radical Opposition		
Estonian Citizens Union	4	2
Future Estonia Party	2	3
Central Union of Estonian Nationalists	0	0
National Progress Party	0	0
National Party	0	0
Farmers' Union	2	0
Greens	2	5
Center-Right Opposition		
Coalition Party	22	3
Rural Union	4	1
Royalist Party	5	1
Democratic Union	0	0
Centrist Opposition		
Center Party	9	10
Entrepreneurs' Party	5	3
Pensioners Union	5	5
Left Opposition		
Democratic Labor Party	3	10
Russian Groups		
Russian Democratic Movement	0	12
Russian National Union	0	1
Russian Community	0	5
Independent candidate	13	8
Do not know/no answer	13	27

Source: this is the author's interpretation, based on the data from the poll, conducted by the firm "Emor" in June 1994, and published in *Rahva Hää* 4 July 1994, p. 2.

Note: the respondents were asked whom they would vote if there were parliamentary elections tomorrow. The classification of the opposition parties/movements is constructed by the author for the limited purposes of this writing and is very tentative, since the political landscape of Estonia is still being formed.

The most important force in the *centrist opposition* in 1994 was the Center Party, led by Edgar Savisaar, who served as the Estonian Prime Minister in 1990–92. Savisaar and his associates were usually considered as the most Russian-friendly group among the mainstream Estonian political forces. In 1990–92 some members of that group even supported the idea to grant automatically Estonian citizenship to all Soviet-era residents. However, in the summer 1994, the Center Party concluded a formal alliance with the Estonian Entrepreneurs' Party, whose leader Tiit Made was known for his radical anti-Russian statements. It remains to be seen whether that alliance will change the Center Party's position on minority issues.

The *left opposition* in Estonia was in 1994 mainly represented by the ex-Communist Democratic Labor Party, led by Vaino Väljas, who was installed in his position in 1988 by Mikhail Gorbachev. Despite the continuing personal popularity of Väljas in the post-1991 Estonia, the DLP had very little support among citizens. However, since the DLP advocated for extremely liberal citizenship policy, it had a considerable number of followers among non-citizens.

There were several *Russian organizations* in Estonia in 1994. The Russian Democratic Movement, Representative Assembly and some others were exemplifying moderate trends, which were basically loyal to the Republic of Estonia, although often sharply critical of its citizenship and immigration policies. The more conservative Russian trends were represented by the Russian Community, the Russian National Union and similar groups that in 1993–94 sometimes demanded two state languages, and were nostalgic about the Soviet past. Finally, there were extremist Russian circles, like for example the Estonian wing of Zhirinovskiy's Liberal Democratic Party. In March 1994 Pyotr Rozhok, the representative in Estonia of that party, even called on retired Russian military to form armed units and use force against Estonian officials.²²

From the point of view of practically all Russian organizations, it is unfair to classify those people who have resided in Estonia for a number of years as foreigners, even if they moved to the country under the Soviet occupation. The Russian activists have also pointed out that many non-citizens are in fact born in Estonia.²³ Generally, the position of most Russian groups in 1994 was: those non-citizens who resided permanently in Soviet Estonia, should get the permanent residency permits practically automatically in the restored Republic of Estonia.²⁴ A similar "zero-option" approach to granting residency permits was in April 1994 also requested by the city assemblies of Narva and Sillamäe, i.e. two mostly Russian-populated towns in Estonia.²⁵

In 1994 the moderate Russian organizations in Estonia usually encouraged people to apply for Estonian citizenship and residency permits, i.e. to use actively legal ways to integrate into Estonian society. For example, at the annual meeting in Tallinn on May 21, 1994, the Representative Assembly called on the Russian-speakers to apply for Estonian citizenship, which, they believed, is the only way how they can influence the local politics.²⁶ At the same time, the more conservative and

pro-imperial Russian groups were often advocating boycott and protest tactics (i.e. not to apply for citizenship or residency permits but to demand the change of corresponding laws, threaten with strikes, appeal to Russian government, etc.)

The differences of the attitudes of citizens and non-citizens in Estonia can be well illustrated with sociological data. In June 1994 a public opinion firm EMOR asked respondents whether the about 10,000 Russian military pensioners (who retired from the Soviet army before 1991, and live in the Estonia) should be given residency permits. The answers are depicted in Table 3, whereas most non-citizens in Estonia not surprisingly favored a generous treatment of the ex-Soviet officers, while citizens were quite conservative:

Table 3

Should Russian Retired Military (Rrm) Be Given Residency Permits, Poll in Estonia, June 1994

Opinion	Citizens	Non-citizens
	Percent	
All RRM should get residency permits	9	53
Most, but not all RRM should get residency permits	11	22
A small selected group of RRM should get residency permits	45	16
No RRM should get residency permits	33	5

Source: *Rahva Hääil*, 30 June 1994, p. 2.

In sum, we may say there were *two principal potential alternatives* to the 1991–94 citizenship policy in Estonia. The first alternative project – aiming to liberalize the policy – was offered primarily by the Russian organizations and the Democratic Labor Party. Another alternative approach, i.e. making the citizenship policy more uncompromising and Estonian-centered, was offered by the parties of the Estonian national-radical opposition. Judging from the opinion polls, neither of the alternative projects was likely to get substantial support from the political forces that hoped to win the March 1995 parliamentary elections. At the same time it seemed possible in 1994 that Estonia may introduce elements of liberalization into its citizenship policy because of the foreign pressures.

INTERNATIONAL ASSESSMENTS

There were at least four main actors that should be taken into account, when looking at the assessments of Estonian citizenship policy: 1) the mainstream Estonian political forces; 2) the Russian organizations in Estonia; 3) Russian government and political parties; 4) Western governments, political parties, experts, and the main interstate organizations. Since the viewpoints of the first two actors were briefly described already in the previous section, I will focus here on the Russian and Western assessments.

The Estonian citizenship and immigration policies have triggered harsh criticisms from Russia. Moscow's representatives have even called it "ethnic cleansing with velvet gloves."²⁷ President Boris Yeltsin, the Russian parliament, the Russian Foreign Ministry and other institutions have repeatedly charged Estonia with "gross violations" of the rights of Russians and Russian-speakers. One of the numerous occasions when the Russian President accused Estonia of "severe violations of the rights of Russians" was for example during the G-7 meeting in Naples on July 10, 1994.²⁸ The extremely critical approach by the Russian government was usually shared also by all the main political parties and movements in Russia. It could be said that by 1994 Estonia had lost almost all its friends in Moscow, even the most pro-Western and democratic figures in Russian politics considered the Estonian minorities treatment to be unjust.

In the light of this almost universal chorus of condemnation from Russia, it is interesting to look at the much more diversified message from the Western states.

At least on the general public level, the U.S. and other main Western governments in 1991–94 signalled about their cautious support to the basic principles of Estonian citizenship and immigration policy.²⁹ For example, the U.S. has emphasized that the independence of the Baltic states was in 1991 *regained*, i.e. has at least implicitly signalled that the most important premiss of the restorationist citizenship philosophy has some validity (I have here in mind the premiss that the Baltic states were for fifty years occupied by the Soviet Union and therefore from strictly legal point of view all Soviet-era colonists have illegally moved to Estonia and other Baltic states). As the Vice-President Al Gore put it in January 1994: "After a half-century of captivity, we have seen the Baltic nations regain their rightful independence."³⁰ At a public meeting in Estonia in April 1994, the U.S. Ambassador Robert C. Frasure told the audience that three years ago the USA "supported the decision by the government of Estonia that aliens, who moved into Estonia over the fifty years, should not get Estonian citizenship automatically."³¹ From Frasure's point of view, an applicant for the Estonian citizenship must "certainly pass a language test."³² The U.S. explicit support was especially important in 1991–92 when the basic principles of Estonian citizenship and immigration policies were formed. For example, it was an important signal, when in September 1992 the Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger advised the then Estonian

Foreign Minister Jaan Manitski that the US Administration has no objections to Estonia's handling of citizenship and human rights issues.³³

As reported in Estonian press, during his meeting with the Baltic heads of state in New York on September 27, 1993, President Clinton talked to the Baltic leaders about concerns raised by Russia "on the treatment of ethnic Russians in Latvia and Estonia," but he noted that "international observers had found no evidence of human rights violations in those countries."³⁴ According to the interpretations of Estonian officials, President Clinton was also quite supportive of Baltic positions during his visit to Latvia and meeting with the Baltic presidents on July 6, 1994. President Clinton urged the Baltic states to be "tolerant" with the ethnic Russian minorities, but did not voice any specific public criticisms about Estonian citizenship policy.³⁵ The Estonian Prime Minister Mart Laar commented that the American President has "a very constructive" approach to the minorities issue and the Baltic states "have always treated their Russian minorities in a tolerant manner."³⁶

In the summer of 1993, the U.S. Ambassador to Estonia expressed some concern that in preparing the law on aliens, the Estonian government had not consulted with the local Russian community. But he also stressed that "the law, which was adopted after changes and proclaimed by the President, is a genuinely good and acceptable law which corresponds fully to international norms."³⁷

Estonian officials have often taken pride in the fact that the annual human rights reports by the US State Department have been favorable to Estonia.³⁸ For example, in January 1994, the Estonian Foreign Minister Jüri Luik alluded to the activities of a dozen human rights organizations and monitoring delegations that have been unable to produce any evidence of abuses in Estonia. He cited in particular a January 1993 human rights report by the US State Department and a subsequent study, in September 1993, by a Congressional Commission of the CSCE. Luik stressed that in both cases, the findings indicated that "Estonia belongs to that group of free nations where human rights are not violated".³⁹ Already in March 1993, the then Estonian Foreign Minister Trivimi Velliste announced that Estonia "has won" the propaganda battle about the rights of Russian minority on the level of Western governments.⁴⁰ While the U.S. government has been basically supportive of Estonian citizenship and migration policies, it has also sent publicly some critical signals. For example, in November 1993, the Secretary of State Warren Christopher listed Estonia and Latvia together with Moldova, Georgia, Tajikistan, and Nagorno-Karabakh (i.e. together with the places of bloody violent strife), as areas where the "CSCE missions are moving to prevent conflict, stem its spread and halt open warfare."⁴¹ Testifying on March 23, 1994 before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott told that "the United States consider the political rights of Russians outside Russia to be a valid item on the agenda in our dialogue with the Baltic states and non-Russian NIS" and that "President Clinton has pressed the case for 'inclusive democracy' with the Baltic leaderships."

Speaking in Riga on October 27, 1993, after meeting his Baltic counterparts, the US Secretary of State Warren Christopher urged the Latvian authorities to adopt a "generous" stance on granting citizenship to the Russian immigrant population⁴² – message which was of course heard also in Estonia.

The explicit criticisms by the Western officials are often focused on distinguishing between Estonian laws (which are considered to be good) and their implementation (which is sometimes criticized as being clumsy and badly organized). The existence of such American position was explicitly noted by Estonian Ambassador to Washington Toomas H. Ilves. In an interview to an Estonian newspaper in September 1993 he said : "The USA has always confirmed that Estonian laws are okay. But I predict that probably we will start to hear criticisms that although the laws are *de jure* fine, *de facto* the aliens have problems with getting citizenship, even if everything is in order with their residency, loyalty and language requirements. Different US officials have told about this."⁴³ Washington has also signalled about its wish to help to solve the practical problems, connected with implementing Estonian citizenship requirements. For example, on April 11, 1994 the American Ambassador Robert C. Frasure and the Mayor of a mostly Russian-populated town of Sillamäe in North-East of Estonia signed an agreement, according to which the USA donated one million kroons (about \$77,000) to help to teach Estonian for Russians.⁴⁴

The reaction toward Estonian citizenship and immigration policy on the level of the Western human rights organizations, media, academics, etc. has been mixed, with quite significant segment of them strongly disparaging Estonian record.

For example, the 1993 annual report of New York-based Helsinki Watch stressed that "special considerations should be given to Russians and others who moved to the Baltic states at a time when the Soviet republics were all one country."⁴⁵ In addition, Helsinki Watch emphasized specifically that persons with established ties of residence to a former Soviet republic should be "presumptively eligible for citizenship in the state the republic has become, whether or not other criteria (such as *jus soli* or *jus sanguini*) would be met". This principle – according to Helsinki Watch – applies regardless of "whether one views the Soviet presence in the former republic as an illegal occupation."⁴⁶ From the point of view of Helsinki Watch the Estonian Citizenship Law "seems to violate several international conventions"⁴⁷ and a "representative democracy in which nearly forty percent of the population does not enjoy citizenship rights is far from representative."⁴⁸ Another U.S. based human rights organization Freedom House treated Estonia more favorably, listing it in its 1994 world survey as a "free nation," while in 1993 it had classified Estonia as "partially free."⁴⁹

Reactions from the mainstream Western academics and policy-analysts have also often been critical, sometimes neutral, but almost never explicitly supportive of Estonia's minorities treatment. For example, Francis Fukuyama claimed in *The New York Times* in December 1992 that

Estonia has passed and Latvia has proposed "discriminatory citizenship laws."⁵⁰ Charles William Maynes referred that Russians were "mistreated" in Estonia and Latvia.⁵¹ Jack Snyder did not exclude the rationality of threatening Estonia and Latvia with economic sanctions, "if they adopt ethnically biased citizenship criteria," noting that Russia should be simultaneously warned not to use force to settle the dispute.⁵² William D. Jackson wrote that Estonia "barred the vast majority of Russians and other resident minorities from participating in national elections" and this and other similar steps have "provoked intense resentment within the Russian communities in the Baltics."⁵³ Even those American experts who are otherwise very supportive of Estonia and other Baltic states, usually urge greater generosity in the treatment of Russian minority.

On the other hand, the more immediate people-to-people contacts between Estonia and the Western countries have often resulted in opposite kind of signals, requesting Estonia to adopt more uncompromising stance on citizenship and migration issues in order to build a *rahvusriik* (national state) and ensure the future of Estonian culture. Such message seems logical, given that the people-to-people contacts are dominated by emigre Estonians, most of whom fled from the Russian/Soviet Communism in the 1940s, and feel deep nostalgia for the pre-war ethnically homogenous Estonian society. Ethnic Estonians from the West figure prominently among the activists of the above mentioned Estonian national-radical parties, groups and movements, who were in 1994 pressing for tough measures in citizenship and immigration policies, like a very low naturalization quota for non-citizens, more strict eligibility requirements for citizenship applicants, etc.

A SELECTION OF EXPLANATORY FACTORS: 1940 AND THE COLLAPSE OF THE SOVIET UNION

In what follows I will list just some factors that might be useful in understanding *why Estonia has pursued the above depicted citizenship policy*. The following list includes a selection of conditions that, from my point of view seem relevant for understanding the formation and development of Estonian citizenship policy. My sketch below should be taken just as one among the possible approaches to a thorny issue of explaining Estonian citizenship policy.

The Estonian citizenship policy has been largely shaped by its relatively strong roots in international law. The 1940 occupation of the Baltic states was a result of a very clearcut case of unlawful aggression. It is very difficult to deny that the three Baltic states were in 1940 occupied and annexed by the Stalinist Soviet Union,⁵⁴ and in strictly legal sense the occupation ended only in 1991 (although some remnants of the ex-Soviet occupation army, now under the Russian command, in 1994 still remained in Estonia). Under the international law, the occupying country is not

allowed to settle its citizens on the occupied territories which makes the defense of the rights of the Soviet-era colonists difficult on strict legal basis, if the occupation presumption is accepted. Some Russian attempts to justify legally the Soviet era colonists' right for full citizenship have used dubious arguments like: "the Baltic states themselves wanted in 1940 to become part of the Soviet Union, and therefore the Soviet domination cannot be viewed as occupation."⁵⁵ At the same time, like the above presented Helsinki Watch argumentation shows, not all the lawyers agree with the Estonian citizenship policy, even if they accept that Estonia was occupied.

The Estonian citizenship policy got additional boost from the fact that the Soviet Union suffered a deeper and quicker catastrophe than most of the comparable empires: not only the state structure of the empire collapsed, but also its political regime, ideology, economic system, type of society – everything – was delegitimized and rejected as a deviation from the normal development of the humankind. Countless experts have stressed the exceptional and abnormal nature of the communist system in general, its qualitative difference from all the other social systems: "For seventy-five years they [i.e. Soviets – A.P.] have marched in a direction that has no economic rhyme or reason."⁵⁶ In the words of another commentator the USSR was "the world's longest-running and most colossal mistake."⁵⁷ Writing about East European post-communist societies, Piotr Sztompka says that these countries spent more than 40 years "on the road to nowhere" and that "our revolution is not in the name of some abstract preconceived ideal, but rather it attempts to *catch up* with prosperous and highly developed Western civilization."⁵⁸ Jean-Francois Revel puts a thought about the calamitous nature of communism in the following form: "In fact, it is the peculiarity of communism, its only achievement in history, to have destroyed everything that functioned in traditional societies – predemocratic and pre-industrial, or semi-democratic and semi-industrial societies – and to have eradicated at the same time all the potential for modern development that those societies would have had if they had not been sterilized by communism."⁵⁹ The abnormality of communism is perhaps best encapsulated in the title of Zbigniew Brzezinski's book: "the grand failure."⁶⁰ The only comparable case to the Soviet collapse may be the short-lived Nazi Third Reich – a comparison which only strengthens a perception that the USSR was an abnormal construction. The rejection of almost everything which was connected with the Soviet regime was in Estonian case easily extended also to the demographic/migration changes that occurred under the Soviet rule, making it easier to define the citizenship policy as a part of the return to the normal course of history. This impression was strengthened also by the fact that a more liberal citizenship policy in Estonia was requested by the ex-Communist party, suspected of being nostalgic about the Soviet past.

A SELECTION OF EXPLANATORY FACTORS: THE ROLES OF THE ETHNIC SELF-DEFENSE, NON-VIOLENCE, AND THE DECLINE OF ETHNIC TENSIONS

The Estonian citizenship policy reflected a self-defense reaction of Estonians, their fear of becoming extinct because of the rapid ethno-demographic changes in 1945–89.⁶¹ The relatively tough citizenship policy was in the Estonian political rhetoric often defended through the need to preserve the national identity. It seems that on one hand the share of Estonians in population declined enough to trigger an exceptionally strong defense reaction among Estonians, on the other hand, the critical mass of the Estonians was still preserved in order to make this defense reaction possible. One may speculate that had the share of Estonians in the population (like in Lithuania) stayed somewhere between 80–90 percent, the threat would have been perceived as small and the corresponding reaction would have been less intensive. Similarly, had the share of the titular ethnic group during the Soviet era declined, say, below the level of 10–20 percent (i.e. reached the level comparable to the predicament of Karelians and Finns in Karelia), the threat would have been perceived as too great to cope with, which would have probably excluded the attempts of Estonians to return to the pre-war republic. With that I do not want to say that there exists a universal clearcut link between the relative numbers of a given ethnic group and their resolve to fight for their rights. As the case of Abkhazians (who comprise less than 20 percent of Abkhazian population) demonstrates, even numerically very insignificant ethnic groups can be militarily and politically very active, if there are other necessary conditions (militant cultural traditions, support from certain neighboring states, etc.).

In 1987–94 (i.e. from the first signs of national awakening under perestroika until the moment of this writing) Estonia has been able to avoid violence. Together with Ukraine, Belarus and Turkmenia, Estonia belonged in 1986–94 to the most peaceful areas on the territory of the former Soviet Union.⁶² In this respect, Estonia was even more lucky than Lithuania or Latvia, who faced their wave of bloody violence in 1991, when Gorbachev attempted a crackdown in the Baltics. According to estimates, 26 people were killed in 1991 in Lithuania and 5 people in Latvia by the Soviet forces.⁶³ The peaceful nature of Estonia's transition has significantly reduced possible pressures to liberalize the citizenship policy. After all, why change a policy which seems to be working reasonably well?

In 1991–94 (i.e. after transition to independence) Estonia was not only able to avoid violence, but even the existing non-violent domestic ethnic tensions showed signs of decline. It was even surprising, since the Estonian citizenship policy in this interval was generally getting tougher. In more specific terms, although the major steps toward making the citizenship rules more rigorous (like the 1992 renovation of the citizenship law or the 1993 adoption of the law on aliens) were followed

by the periods of relative liberalization, the overwhelming trend in 1991–94 was toward more strenuous policy. Ethnic controversy in Estonia intensified several times before Estonia's independence was officially recognized by Moscow: there were demonstrations or other public actions by the pro-USSR Russian-speakers in July 1988, February 1989, March 1989, August 1989, September 1989, May 1990, January 1991, etc.⁶⁴, while the period from September 1991 to 1994 was almost without such visible signs of the Russian protest. The 1991–94 decline of ethnic tensions has been also noted in sociological polls. According to one survey, in April 1992, 17 percent of Russians in Estonia said that ethnic tension is "rather high" or "very high" whereas the corresponding figure in February 1993 was 6 percent, and in June 1993 – 3 percent.⁶⁵

A SELECTION OF EXPLANATORY FACTORS: RUSSIA AND THE WEST

Estonia was able to pursue its citizenship policy because in 1991–94, as I described above, practically all major Western governments and interstate organizations directly or indirectly signalled about its support to it. The clearest example here was the behavior of the Council of Europe which supposedly accepts only democratic states. Despite Russia's protests, Estonia was accepted as its member in the wake of the 1992 parliamentary elections, where only citizens participated. At the same time the Council of Europe refused to accept Estonia earlier, i.e. when it still had the parliament that was elected in 1990 on a competitive basis but by all the Soviet-era residents. Quite vocal Baltic emigre groups in the USA and other Western countries were strongly in favor of Estonian citizenship policy. The Western circles who were critical about Estonia's citizenship policy (academics, selected human rights organizations, journalists) were usually either unwilling (or unable) to put noticeable pressure on the respective governments. At the same time in 1991–94 it was quite clear to the West that Estonian policy-makers and general public are extremely perceptive of the Western position: each time when the Western governments or international organizations voiced even moderate public criticisms over Estonian citizenship policy (like in the summer of 1993 over the law on aliens), the Estonian laws and regulations were liberalized.

The most important factor which should have made Estonia cautious in implementing its citizenship policy – the threat that such policy helps Russian nationalists to assume power in Moscow, which in turn may mean disaster to Estonia, seemed to have had almost no moderating effect in 1991–94 for Estonian voters or policy-makers. At the same time there was quite clear perception in Estonia that this tiny country is not able to resist, if a future Russian government decides to occupy Estonia again. It was also perfectly clear that neither NATO, nor any Western government will come to rescue Estonia in the event of a full-scale Russian aggression. As the Head of the Foreign Commission of the Estonian parliament Vello

Saatpalu stated in July 1994, Estonia is not naive enough to expect military help from the West in the case of a new occupation by Russia. "Estonia is not Kuwait and Russia is not Iraq,"⁶⁶ said Saatpalu.

There may be several reasons for such a negligible effect of the Russian threat. One may have to do with the limited empirical experience and general unpredictability. The period 1991–94 has been just too short to test different models of Tallinn's policy toward Moscow. Since the situation in Russia was in 1991–94 still quite unstable (take for example the October 1993 events) it was not easy for Estonian political parties to determine exactly how much the Estonian position may influence domestic developments in Russia.

Another factor may have been the recent experience that concessions to Moscow do not yield positive results, but may be dangerous to the author's political health. Most of the warnings by the moderate forces not to provoke the Kremlin proved to be wrong in 1987–94. In 1987–88 the Popular Front and other moderates in Estonia warned against provoking Gorbachev with the demands of full independence, only to see that the Kremlin retreated after each escalating demand for greater independence. By the fall 1989 the Popular Front itself changed its position and started to demand independence, being ridiculed by national-radicals who had always firmly demanded restoration of the independent state.⁶⁷ Similarly, the Popular Front and other centrist forces were in 1988–90 in favor of a liberal citizenship legislation, whereas by the end of 1991 (under pressures from the voters and because of the diminished threat from Moscow), they switched their support to the restorationist approach, i.e. to the position always offered by the national-radicals. In short, the firm and uncompromising national-radical position on citizenship and other issues marched in 1987–94 from one victory to another, creating an impression that concessions to Moscow are proposed only by political losers. References to the recent victorious march of uncompromising freedom-fighting were quite often used in Estonian political debates. For example, when the Head of the Foreign Commission of the Estonian parliament Vello Saatpalu in July 1994 proposed to make certain concessions to Moscow over the issue of military pensioners, he was criticized by a leading right-wing newspaper exactly in those terms: "Had the Estonian people believed in 1987–1991 that the Soviet Union would never let Estonia free, we could have raised our hands, and started to walk toward the graveyard."⁶⁸ Understandably, a simple extrapolation may not be the best way to design a long-term political strategy, but it at least may explain why the Estonian policy-makers in 1991–94 were reluctant to show more flexibility toward Moscow.

The Estonian–Russian relations lacked a gradual and flexible feedback. In 1991–94 Moscow often demonstrated its inability to reward small-scale liberal moves by the neighboring states, to engage in piecemeal deescalation of tensions. For example, in July 1994 prohibitive tariffs on agricultural imports were introduced against all three Baltic states, i.e. everybody was equally punished, although Lithuania and even Latvia showed before that much more conciliatory posture toward the

Kremlin than Estonia.⁶⁹ By the similar token, Russia kept its 14th army in Moldova and supported the rebellious Trans-Dniestr Republic, i.e. demonstrated that Moldova's liberal policy on citizenship and ethnic issues⁷⁰ does not deprive Moscow of pretext, if it wants to use force somewhere in the "near-abroad." So, for subjective or objective reasons, there was no clearcut feedback which would have demonstrated to Estonian policy-makers that each conciliatory gesture toward Moscow results in some tangible positive shift in Russian foreign policy.

Moscow's unwillingness to withdraw unconditionally its troops from Estonia also contributed to the firmness of Tallinn's citizenship policy. The unconditional removal of the remaining Russian troops from Estonia was demanded by all the main powers in the world. By linking (at least rhetorically) the troop presence to the rights of Russians in Estonia, Moscow strengthened the perception that the illegal presence of its troops in the foreign country against the will of the corresponding government (i.e. something which contradicts to the most elementary principles of international law) somehow belongs to the same category of problems as the issue of political rights of the ex-Soviet citizens. In more generalized terms we may say that in 1991–94 the former imperial heartland committed an error of diminishing the public relations value of its campaign against a citizenship policy of a nationalizing state by relating it to the highly unpopular issue of occupation troops.

The relative decline of Russia's power in world politics, economy, technology and science in 1991–94 (as well as the rapid Americanization of Russia itself) apparently contributed to the replacement of Russian with English as a main means of international communication in Estonia and other post-Communist countries. Since the role of the Russian language declined globally, it was easier for Estonia to resist pressures of the Russian radical groups who argued that Russian should be given a status of a second state language in Estonia. In that sense Estonia was different from a typical post-colonial country where the knowledge of the language of a former colonial metropol is often necessary to open the way to careers in international business and in the modern sector generally.⁷¹ As David Laitin has eloquently demonstrated, in the countries like Ghana, most Ghanaians are convinced that it is "necessary to learn English for getting a well-paid job in a modern sector," and that it "is clear that in Ghana (and indeed throughout Africa) the economic pay-offs for facility in a European language are far higher than could be generated in expert literacy in an African indigenous language."⁷² In Estonian case, similar modernization-related role is increasingly fulfilled by English (i.e. not by Russian which was the language of the former colonial empire).

There are no good statistical data to observe this process, but a small illustration can be provided by looking at the language-pattern of scientific publications. Take for example, the Institute of Economics of the Estonian Academy of Sciences, whose publications were partially oriented toward the local management/business community. As Table 4 illustrates, in 1989–93, the role of Russian was completely overtaken by English:

Table 4

**Language Pattern of the Scientific Publications, Institute of Economics,
Estonian Academy of Sciences, 1989-93**

Year	% of publications				
	Russian	English	German	Finnish	Scandin.
1989	49.7	11.4	1.6	2.2	0.0
1990	69.8	20.8	0.0	7.5	1.9
1991	14.6	31.7	3.7	0.0	0.0
1992	5.7	50.0	8.6	4.3	1.4
1993	2.3	50.0	2.3	2.3	0.0

Source: calculated by the author on the basis of the bibliography, compiled by the Estonian Academy of Sciences.

Note: "Scandin." denotes publications in Norwegian, Swedish and Danish.

A SELECTION OF EXPLANATORY FACTORS: ECONOMIC DIMENSION

Economic development has been traditionally viewed as a central concern in the Third World post-colonial settings⁷³, and it is the most important problem for the post-Communist policy-designers. The Estonian citizenship policy was encouraged by the country's relative economic success. Together with the Czech Republic, Poland, and perhaps Slovenia, Estonia was in 1993-94 considered to be one of the few post-Communist economic success stories.⁷⁴ During the visit of the Prime Minister Mart Laar to the USA in April 1994, Vice President Al Gore characterized Estonia as a country, which has been so successful that it is "exporting hope" to the world.⁷⁵ Paul A. Goble, who is probably the best US expert on Estonia, said in May 1994: "Estonia's success has been unbelievable. Everyone, who visited this state three years ago and comes here now, feels that he has arrived in a new country."⁷⁶

A reporter for *Washington Post* wrote from Tallinn: "In this seaside medieval city, grocery stores are filled with food, cafes actually serve coffee, buses run on time, and no one accepts U.S. dollars. A year and a half after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Estonia, the smallest of the three Baltic republics, is making it. As other former Soviet republics watch their currencies collapse, prices soar and governments tremble and fall, this newly independent state has become a model of stability and serenity. It seems more like its successful Scandinavian neighbors than its troubled former compatriots."⁷⁷ An op-ed page writer for *Financial Times* was

equally optimistic: "Estonia has assumed the pioneer position among the post-Soviet republics in implementing political and economic reforms."⁷⁸

It seems obvious that Estonia's economic accomplishments diminished the value of criticisms on citizenship issues. By and large it also meant that most immigrant Russians were interested to stay in Estonia, enjoying its relatively higher living standard, even if they do not have full voting rights. As a correspondent to *Time* put it: "The irony is that few Russians living in Estonia want to secede completely from the Baltic state. Compared with the rest of the old Soviet empire, the economic reforms that Estonia has carried out in the brief period of independence are nothing short of miraculous."⁷⁹ A similar feature has been noted also by the scholars. For example, John Dunlop writes that the standard of living in the Baltic states is "higher than in Russia, with the consequence that the large Russian populations of Estonia and Latvia are loath to leave."⁸⁰

The Estonian political forces felt greater freedom of action on citizenship issues also because the share of Russia in Estonian foreign trade declined in 1991–94 quite considerably, and therefore Tallinn (although it was interested to maintain a considerable economic cooperation between the two countries) concluded that it is less vulnerable to possible economic sanctions from Moscow. Although Estonia in 1994 was dependent on the import of natural gas and some other fuels from Russia, the degree of this dependency was considerably lower than in 1991. In 1991 more than half of Estonia's exports went to Russia, and almost half of imports came from there; in 1993 Russia's share in Estonia's exports was slightly above and in imports slightly below 20 percent.

Table 5

Russia's Share in Estonia's Exports/Imports, 1991–93

Year	Exports	Imports
1991	56.5%	45.9%
1992	20.8%	28.4%
1993 (Jan-Nov)	21.5%	17.2%

Source: *Statistical Yearbook, 1993* (Tallinn: Statistical Office of Estonia, 1993), p. 227; *Eesti statistika*, No. 12, 1993, pp. 109–112.

Estonia's record in minimizing its trade with Russia looks especially impressive, if compared with Lithuania. For example, during the first 9 months of 1993 the role of Russia in Lithuanian exports was 41 percent, and in imports – 75 percent⁸¹, i.e. Lithuania was clearly more dependent on Russia than Estonia.

The dramatic drop of Russia's share in Estonian foreign trade was paralleled with the equally spectacular rise of Finland's share. In 1991 Finland accounted for 2.3 percent of Estonian exports and 2.0 percent of imports. In 1993 (during the first 11 months) Finnish share in Estonian exports was 21.8 percent and in imports – 27.3 percent.⁸² According to the estimate of the Bank of Estonia, the Estonian exports in 1993 were 10,596.9 million and imports 11,967.5 million kroons, i.e. the balance was negative for 1,370.6 million kroons.⁸³ The main trading partners of Estonia in 1993 were Finland, Russia, Sweden, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Ukraine, Denmark and the USA.

Table 6

The Main Trading Partners of Estonia, 1993

Country	Turnover (mill. kroons)	Balance (mill. kroons)
Finland	6,564.9	-2,139.9
Russia	4,341.5	504.3
Sweden	2,098.1	-60.3
Germany	1,918.1	-210.8
Latvia	1,224.9	627.9
Lithuania	811.6	-14.4
The Netherlands	806.5	58.9
Ukraine	590.9	167.3
Denmark	569.8	-71.0
USA	524.4	-123.6

Source: Bank of Estonia; *Rahva Hää*, 2 February 1994, p. 5.

CONCLUSIONS

As I mentioned above, the Estonian case may illustrate how a nationalizing state (Estonia) chooses a strategy to limit the political influence of a post-imperial national minority in a nationalizing state, whereas this strategy is sharply criticized by the external homeland (Russia), and quite passively accepted by the national minority itself (Russians in Estonia).

While it may be a hopeless task to find a conclusive answer to the question why Estonia pursued the above depicted citizenship policy, at least a provisional list of explanatory factors can be provided.

In other words, *the Estonian citizenship policy in 1991–94:*

- *was largely shaped by its relatively strong roots in international law;
- *got an additional boost from the fact that the Soviet Union suffered a deeper and quicker disintegration than most of the comparable empires;
- *reflected a self-defense reaction of Estonians, their fear of becoming extinct because of the rapid ethno-demographic changes in 1945–89;
- *demonstrated its capacity to avoid violence;
- *was accompanied with the decline of the existing non-violent low-level domestic ethnic tensions
- *garnered support practically from all the major Western governments and interstate organizations;
- *was developed without paying almost any attention to the warnings that such policy may help Russian nationalists to assume power in Moscow, which in turn could mean disaster for Estonia. There may be several reasons for such negligible attention to this possible threat: a) the limited empirical experience of policy-makers and the general unpredictability of the post-Soviet situation; b) most of the warnings by the moderate forces not to provoke the Kremlin proved to be wrong in 1987–94; c) in 1991–94 Moscow often demonstrated its inability to reward small-scale liberal moves by the neighboring states, to engage in piecemeal deescalation of tensions;
- *was encouraged by Estonia's relative economic success, and the dramatic decline of Russia's share in Estonian foreign trade.

It needs more research to determine whether this combination of factors (international law; the depth and speed of the imperial disintegration; the intensity of the fear to become extinct, expressed by the dominant ethnic group of a nationalizing state; the ability to avoid violence and reduce non-violent domestic ethnic tensions in a nationalizing state; the degree of support of a nationalizing state by the major powers and interstate organizations; a nationalizing state's ability to ignore the threat that its unyielding policy may help the revengist forces to ascend to power in the former imperial heartland; the relative economic success of a nationalizing state which reduces its dependence on the former imperial heartland and makes it more appealing to the corresponding national minority) has a wider relevance in comparative post-imperial arrangements. But already now it seems likely that should some of the above mentioned factors change (for example, should the Western support decline, the threat from Moscow become more tangible, or Estonia's economic success be reversed) it would be more difficult for Tallinn to pursue its citizenship policy.

- ¹ I rely here on the terminology ("national minorities," "nationalizing states," "external homelands") developed by Rogers Brubaker.
- ² Marje Jõeste & et al, eds, *Eesti A & O* (Tallinn: Eesti Entsüklopeediakirjastus, 1993), p. 96; Marje Joeste et al, eds, *The Baltic States. A Reference Book* (Tallinn: Estonian Encyclopaedia Publishers, 1991), pp. 15–15; Toivo U. Raun, *Estonia and the Estonians* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1991), p. 247.
- ³ University of California Professor Rein Taagepera, himself an ethnic Estonian, has recently again chronicled the facts of the Soviet genocide in Estonia in his highly emotional book. See: Rein Taagepera, *Estonia: Return to Independence* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), pp. 77–111.
- ⁴ Marje Jõeste et al, eds, *Estonia. A Reference Book* (Tallinn: Estonian Encyclopaedia Publishers, 1991), p. 9.
- ⁵ Ernest Gellner, "Ethnicity and Faith in Eastern Europe," *Daedalus*, Vol. 119, No. 1, Winter 1990, p. 294
- ⁶ Aksel Kirch estimates that in 1994 ethnic Estonians comprised 65 percent of Estonia's population. See: Aksel Kirch, "From a Change of Evaluations to a Change of Paradigms: Estonia, 1940–1993," in: Marika Kirch & David Laitin, eds, *Changing Identities in Estonia: Sociological Facts and Commentaries* (Tallinn: Estonian Academy of Sciences, 1994), p. 9. It should be noted that over the last years there has been a considerable net migration from other former Soviet republics to Russia. See: John Dunlop, "Will the Russians Return from the Near Abroad?" *Post-Soviet Geography*, Vol. 35, No.4, 1994, pp. 204–215.
- ⁷ I have described the Estonian citizenship policy before June 1993 in: Andrus Park, "Ethnicity and Independence: The Case of Estonia in Comparative Perspective," *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 46, No. 1, 1994, pp. 69–87.
- ⁸ Source: Estonian Office of Citizenship and Migration.
- ⁹ *Rahva Hääl*, 30 June 1994, p. 1. (*Rahva Hääl* is an Estonian-language daily, published in Tallinn, Estonia).
- ¹⁰ Cf. the text of the Estonian citizenship law in *Riigi Teataja*, No. 2, 1938, pp. 1339–1343. The citizenship law implementation decision is published in *Riigi Teataja*, No. 7, 5 March 1992, pp. 175–176. (*Riigi Teataja* is an official publication, printing Estonian laws and government resolutions).
- ¹¹ *Riigi Teataja*, No. 8, 8 March 1991, p. 189.
- ¹² *Rahva Hääl*, 26 September 1992, p. 2.
- ¹³ See the text of the law in: *Legal Acts of Estonia*, No. 3, 27 August 1993, pp. 59–66.
- ¹⁴ *Legal Acts of Estonia*, No. 3, 27 August 1993, p. 62.
- ¹⁵ *Riigi Teataja*, No. 78, 1993, p. 2175.
- ¹⁶ *Päevaleht*, 30 June 1994, p. 3. (*Päevaleht* is an Estonian-language daily, published in Tallinn, Estonia).
- ¹⁷ Estonia had local government elections in October 1993 which were marked by considerable success for Russian groups in Narva, Sillamäe, Kohtla-Järve, Tallinn, and other cities. See: Andrus Park, "Turning Points of Post-Communist Transition: Lessons from the Case of Estonia," *Government and Opposition*, June 1994 (forthcoming).
- ¹⁸ See: Andrus Park, "Ideological Dimension of the Post-Communist Domestic Conflicts," *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, Vol. 26, No. 3, September 1993, p. 274.
- ¹⁹ Georg Sootla, "Prospects of Estonia's Development in the Programmes of Pre-Election Coalitions," *The Monthly Survey of Baltic and Post-Soviet Politics*, October 1992, p. 12.
- ²⁰ See: *Hommikuleht*, 11 May 1994, p. 5. (*Hommikuleht* is an Estonian-language daily, published in Tallinn, Estonia).
- ²¹ Quoted from a newspaper survey of a press conference by "Better Estonia" leaders: *Päevaleht*, 21 April 1993, p. 3.
- ²² *The Baltic Independent*, 11–17 March 1994, p. 3.
- ²³ See for example an appeal of the Slavic cultural and educational societies in Estonia: *Estoniya*, 26 April 1994, p. 1. (*Estoniya* is a Russian-language daily, published in Tallinn, Estonia).
- ²⁴ See information about the appeals by two Russian factions of the Tallinn City Assembly in various Russian-language newspapers, published in Estonia: *Estoniya*, April 23, 1994, p. 1; *Molod'yevzh Estonii*, 20 April 1994, p. 2; *Vechernii Kur'yer*, 22 April 1994, p. 3.
- ²⁵ See information in Russian-language newspapers, published in Narva and Sillamäe: *Narvskaya gazeta*, 23 April 1994, p. 1; *Sillamyaeski vestnik*, 23 April 1994, p. 1.
- ²⁶ *The Baltic Independent*, 27 May – 2 June 1994, p. 3.
- ²⁷ See a review of the letter by the Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations: *Russkaya gazeta*, 30 November 1993, p. 1 (*Russkaya gazeta* is a Russian-language newspaper, published in Tartu, Estonia).

- 28 *Eesti Sõnumid*, 11 July 1994, p. 1. (*Eesti Sõnumid* is an Estonian-language daily, published in Tallinn, Estonia).
- 29 About the West European reactions, see: Andrus Park, "Ethnicity and Independence: The Case of Estonia in Comparative Perspective," *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 46, No. 1, 1994, pp. 82–84.
- 30 Vice President Gore, "Forging a Partnership For Peace and Prosperity," Address before a conference sponsored by the Institute of World Affairs at the University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, January 6, 1994, *U.S. Department of State Dispatch*, Vol. 5, No. 2, January 10, 1994, p. 14.
- 31 As reported in an Estonian daily: *Postimees*, 22 April 1994, p. 4. (*Postimees* is an Estonian-language daily, published in Tartu, Estonia).
- 32 *Postimees*, 22 April 1994, p. 4.
- 33 About Eagleburger's comments, see: *Postimees*, 24 March 1993, p. 10.
- 34 *The Baltic Independent*, 1–7 October 1993, p. 1.
- 35 See also: "Clinton Asks Baltic Peoples for Tolerance Toward Minorities," *Wireless File. U.S. Information Service*, EUR302, 6 July 1994.
- 36 *Päevaleht*, 8 July 1994, p. 1.
- 37 See an interview with the U.S. Ambassador in Estonian newspaper *Postimees*, 23 July 1993, p. 2.
- 38 About the 1993 report, see: *The Baltic Independent*, 12–18 February 1993, p. 10.
- 39 *The Baltic Independent*, 21–27 January 1994, pp. 1; 5.
- 40 *Rahva Hääl*, 5 March 1993, p. 1.
- 41 Secretary Christopher, "The CSCE Vision: European Security Rooted in Values," Statement at the Plenary Session of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Rome, Italy, November 30, 1993, *U.S. Department of State Dispatch*, Vol. 4, No. 50, December 13, 1993, p. 861.
- 42 *The Baltic Independent*, 29 October – 4 November 1993, p. 1.
- 43 *Päevaleht*, 6 September 1993, p. 5.
- 44 *Postimees*, 13 April 1994, p. 2.
- 45 *Human Rights Watch World Report 1993* (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1992), p. 218.
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- 49 *The Baltic Independent*, 7–13 January 1994, p. 4.
- 50 *The New York Times*, 19 December 1992.
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- 52 Jack Snyder, "Nationalism and the Crisis of the Post-Soviet State," *Survival*, Vol. 35, No. 1, Spring 1993, p. 21.
- 53 William D. Jackson, "Imperial Temptations: Ethnicity Abroad," *Orbis*, Vol. 38, No. 1, Winter 1994, p. 5.
- 54 See for example: William J. H. Hough, III, "The Annexation of the Baltic States and Its Effect on the Development of Law Prohibiting Forcible Seizure of Territory," *New York Law School Journal of International and Comparative Law*, Vol. 6, No. 2, Winter 1985, pp. 303–533.
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- 56 Richard Ericson, "Economic Reform and Republican Integration," *Nationalities Papers*, Spring 1991, vol. XIX, No 1, p. 37.
- 57 *The Washington Post*, December 15, 1991, p. C2.
- 58 Piotr Sztompka, "The Intangibles and Imponderables of the Transition to Democracy," *Studies in Comparative Communism*, vol. 24, 1991, p. 296.
- 59 Jean-Francois Revel, "Resurrecting Democracy in Eastern Europe," *Orbis*, Summer 1991, p. 323.
- 60 Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Grand Failure: The Birth and Death of Communism in the Twentieth Century*, New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1989. See also: Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Out of Control: Global Turmoil on the Eve of the Twenty-First Century* (New York: A Robert Stewart Book, 1993), pp. 7–44.
- 61 About the demographic changes and resulting ethnic tensions, see: Toivo U. Raun, *Estonia and the Estonians* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1993), pp. 233–239.
- 62 See for example the annual reviews of events in the former Soviet bloc: *RFE/RL Research Report*, Vol. 2, No. 1, 1 January 1993, pp. 1–118; Vol. 3, No. 1, 7 January 1994, pp. 1–143.
- 63 *The Baltic Independent*, 17–23 January 1992, p. 5.
- 64 Marje Jöeste & et al, eds, *Eesti A & O* (Tallinn: Eesti Entsüklopeediakirjastus, 1993), pp. 125–131.

- 65 Aksel Kirch, "Estonian and Russian National Identities in Comparative Perspective," in: Marika Kirch & David Laitin, eds, *Changing Identities in Estonia: Sociological Facts and Commentaries* (Tallinn: Estonian Academy of Sciences, 1994), p. 37.
- 66 *Homnikuleht*, 12 July 1994, p. 4.
- 67 See also: Rein Taagepera, *Estonia: Return to Independence* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), p. 161.
- 68 *Eesti Aeg*, 20 July 1994, p. 3. (*Eesti Aeg* is an Estonian-language weekly, published in Tallinn, Estonia).
- 69 See about how Moscow tried to use the economic leverage against the Baltic states: *The Baltic Independent*, 15–21 July 1994, pp. 1; 5. It should be noted that historically most attempts by the great powers to punish their small neighbors through punitive tariffs or other similar measures have failed and in fact resulted in the increasing degree of economic independence of those weak states. See for example: Michael Handel, *Weak States in the International System* (London: Frank Cass, 1990), pp. 236–249.
- 70 Speaking about Moldova's human and ethnic rights record, Vladimir Socor mentioned that even the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet "found no serious cause for complaint against Moldova on this score." (Vladimir Socor, "Moldova: Democracy Advances, Independence at Risk," *RFE/RL Research Report*, Vol. 3, No. 1, 7 January 1994, p. 50.)
- 71 The diversity of the former USSR should be also mentioned. Apparently in the Soviet Empire Russian played greater role in the areas that were economically less advanced or more dependent on Russia. Compare: David D. Laitin, Roger Petersen, and John W. Slocum, "Language and the State: Russia and the Soviet Union in Comparative Perspective," in: Alexander Motyl, ed., *Thinking Theoretically About Soviet Nationalities* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), p. 152.
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- 73 See for example: James Mayall, *Nationalism and International Society* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 116–117.
- 74 Some of the Western appraisals of Estonian economic success were well summarized in an article by a government's counsellor Ardo Hansson in: *Postimees*, 11 May 1994, p. 2.
- 75 As reported in: *Päevaleht*, 21 April 1994, p. 1.
- 76 Quoted from Paul A. Goble's interview to an Estonian newspaper: *Eesti Sõnumid*, 16 May 1994, p. 3.
- 77 Margaret Schapiro, "Estonia Hums After Rebirth of Freedom," *The Washington Post* (21 June 1993), p. A1.
- 78 Lucja Swiatkowski Cannon, "Estonia Draws up Reformers' Blueprint," *Financial Times* (13 July 1993).
- 79 John Kohan, "Aliens in the Land They Call Home," *Time*, 19 July 1993, p. 41.
- 80 John Dunlop, "Will the Russians Return from the Near Abroad?" *Post-Soviet Geography*, Vol. 35, No. 4, 1994, p. 211.
- 81 *The Baltic Independent*, 14–20 January 1994, p. B2.
- 82 Calculated by the author on the basis of: *Statistical Yearbook*, 1993 (Tallinn: Statistical Office of Estonia, 1993), pp. 225–227; *Eesti statistika*, No. 12, 1993, p. 109.
- 83 *Rahva Hääl*, 2 February 1994, p. 5.