

TURNING-POINTS OF POST-COMMUNIST TRANSITION: LESSONS FROM THE CASE OF ESTONIA*¹

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In what follows I will attempt to identify some turning-points of post-communist democratic transition, focusing on the case of Estonia. More specifically I shall argue that the Estonian example allows one to identify some of the turning-points of post-communist democratic transition as the start of the revolution from above, the revolt of the intellectuals, the 'calendar riots', the emergence of the opposition mass movement, the transition to pluralist quasi-parliament, the symbolic destruction of the old regime, the first democratic constitution, the first democratic elections and the first reverse shift.

The list of those turning-points is obviously neither complete, nor universal. Although much more research is needed to assess the applicability of the proposed scheme to other instances of post-communist transition in the former USSR and in Eastern Europe, with certain modifications the scheme is also applicable to a number of other cases.

There are now informative descriptive accounts of the Estonian developments, available in English.² This is one of the reasons why I do not attempt here to offer a condensed chronicle of the most important events in Estonia. My primary interest is not description, but conceptualization. Let me stress also that the following scheme will focus on the turning-points of anti-communist revolution and democratic transition in Estonia, paying somewhat less attention to Estonia's transition to independence which I have tried to tackle elsewhere.³

TURNING-POINTS AND TRANSITIONS

I rely here mostly on the intuitive understanding of the expression 'turning-point'. In more explanatory terms, I assume that the turning-points are significant and relatively rapid changes, that mark the beginnings of some qualitatively distinctive periods – phases – in the development of political systems. Those turning-points are often identified

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as 'historic landmarks' or 'milestones', and they may be riots, elections, formations of the political parties and movements, important declarations, etc. It is certainly true that 'there were many turning points in the East European Revolution',⁴ and the same can be said also about events in the former USSR.

Alexander Motyl has argued that the vocabulary for the study of 'Sovietized nations' should include at least such words as 'empire', 'state', 'political economy', 'transition', and 'revolution'.⁵ Let me comment briefly on a couple of concepts from this list.

I use here the expression 'post-communist transition' to describe not only the developments after the collapse of communist regimes, but also to cover the changes that took place in the USSR under Gorbachev's perestroika, i.e. before the formal end of the CPSU-dominated government.⁶ 'Transition' is interpreted here as a generic term in relation to 'revolution': every revolution is a transition, but not every slow and gradual transition is a revolution.

There is an ample variety of definitions of social revolutions. Theda Skocpol understands revolutions as 'rapid, basic transformations of a society's state and class structures, accompanied and in part carried through by class-based revolts from below'.⁷ Some authors focus on more political variables and define revolution as a 'planned, organized, openly publicized attempt by a nonelite, predominantly civilian, armed group to overthrow a regime and assume state power',⁸ or as a 'destruction of an independent state by members of its own society and its replacement by a regime, based on new political principles'.⁹ Perhaps the best definition of revolution in political terms is offered by Charles Tilly for whom revolution is 'a forcible transfer of power over a state in the course of which at least two distinct blocs of contenders make incompatible claims to control the state and some significant portion of the population subject to the state's jurisdiction acquiesces in the claims of each bloc'.¹⁰

Like most other complex notions in social theory, the concept of revolution may be interpreted in many different and equally adequate ways. I use here the word 'revolution' in a quite narrow political sense, assuming that it is a relatively rapid transition from one type of state (or political regime) to another, accompanied by the exceptionally large-scale mass demonstrations, public meetings, and other forms of the unusually intensive direct participation of enormous masses of people in the overthrow of the old political order. Armed revolts and civil (as well as interstate) wars may also occur in the course of revolutions, but I do not consider the revolts and wars (or violence in general) to be the necessary conditions of revolutions.

The changes that are going on in Estonia since 1985 can be described as a generally non-violent, anti-communist and democratic revolution. This revolution is a relatively rapid transition from a communist totalitarian to a fragile democratic regime, accompanied by mass demonstrations and other manifestations of revolutionary change. Most of the main political institutions and principal political practices of the old Soviet Estonia (the Communist state-party system of government; rubber-stamp 'parliament',

nomenklatura-system of the 'cadres policy'; non-competitive 'elections'; KGB; severe restrictions on international movement of people; political censorship of the media, arts, and sciences; party-subordinated courts and trials of dissidents; etc.) disappeared or were very substantially transformed in the interval 1985–93.

It is easy to construct various types of revolutionary transitions, using just three symbols: T (totalitarian regime), A (authoritarian regime), D (democracy). We can depict various schemes of transition as T-D (from totalitarian to democratic regime); T-A (from totalitarian to authoritarian regime); T-A-D (from totalitarian to authoritarian and then to democratic regime); etc.¹¹ For example, it is possible to argue that in Turkmenistan the development in 1985–93 was close to a model T-T, i.e. practically no change occurred in the nature of the regime,¹² whereas in Kazakhstan the change corresponded more to a scheme T-A; i.e. a transition from communist totalitarianism to post-communist authoritarianism.¹³ As I indicated above, there seems to be no doubt that Estonia's revolution in 1985–93 can be characterized as a T-D transition, i.e. a shift from totalitarian to democratic political regime.

CENTRE AND PERIPHERY IN POST-COMMUNIST TRANSITIONS

By 'peripheral transitions' I mean transitions which occurred in the provinces and client states of the former Soviet empire. The Soviet bloc in general was a centralized empire,¹⁴ composed of various territorial 'circles' around the former 'metropolis' (Russian heartland). Those circles included 'old union republics' (like the Ukraine), 'new republics' (i.e. acquisitions from the Second World War, like the Baltic states), client states in Eastern Europe (Warsaw Pact countries), other communist client states (like Cuba or Vietnam) and client states of communist orientation (like Ethiopia).¹⁵ All the post-1985 transitions in the former Soviet bloc (with the possible exception of Russia itself) were clearly classic peripheral transitions. Even more, the over-centralized character of the communist empire created substantial peripheral elements even in the heartland – Russia – itself. During certain periods of Soviet disintegration – especially in its final phase in 1990–91 – the Russian Federation acted not like a metropolis, but as one of the many rebellious colonies of the Kremlin. This strange schism between Moscow and the Kremlin proved in the end to be fatal to the USSR.¹⁶

Peripheral transitions within the Soviet context had certain specific features. First of all they were unleashed by the centre (whether intentionally or because of the miscalculation does not matter here).¹⁷ In 1986–88 Gorbachev often encouraged democratic trends in the republics,¹⁸ distancing himself from the local conservative communist leaders, and leaving them at the mercy of the public hatred and pressures from below. By 1988 Gorbachev had already signalled quite clearly that he would not come to rescue the leaders of the republics' puppet regimes if they were in

trouble because of their continuing loyalty to the widely despised centralized Soviet Union. In those circumstances the republican communist elites chose the only option open to them: they tried to purge the most discredited and repugnant public figures from their ranks and legitimize themselves through supporting popular causes of autonomy or independence.

Since public opinion in Estonia in 1988–91 was strongly in favour of restoring an independent state outside the USSR, *the struggle for independence in Estonia largely coincided with the struggle for democracy*. Even more, the only serious counterforce to the drive to independence inside Estonia – the movement of ethnic non-Estonians – was largely anti-democratic and disparaged, because it was organized under the red banners of communism. As a result, the pro-USSR Russian organizations in Estonia alienated themselves not only from Western public opinion, but also from the democratic forces in Russia itself. It was only in autumn 1993 (i.e. two years after the collapse of the USSR) that a new and essentially non-communist (although not necessarily anti-imperial) Russian movement started to obtain real political strength in Estonia.

The peripheral character of Estonia's transition is further strengthened by a number of additional legal and cultural factors. Since the incorporation of Estonia and the other Baltic states into the Soviet Union in 1940 was not recognized by the international community at large, Estonia was never a Soviet republic in the legal sense; thus the independent Republic of Estonia continued its 'legal existence' after 1940.¹⁹ There are also important cultural distinctions. For instance, Samuel Huntington has recently emphasized that the Baltic states belong to Western civilization whereas most of the other former Soviet nations resemble Slavic-Orthodox or Islamic civilizations²⁰ – a point which very much corresponds to popular belief in the Baltic area itself.

REVOLUTION FROM ABOVE, REVOLT OF THE INTELLECTUALS, AND CALENDAR RIOTS

By *Revolution from above* I mean here radical reforms, introduced by the leaders of a centralized communist state, which initiate a profound transition in society: 'Perestroika is a major revolution initiated and carried out primarily from above.'²¹

The initial phase of perestroika was not very visible in Estonia: the new trends were at work quietly under the surface, whereas the Russification was even getting stronger. Some authors have even said that stagnation 'was deepening' in 1985–86 in Estonia.²² But however the final balance sheet will look, it seems that the change of leadership in Moscow was also a first major turning-point for Estonia, putting pressure on local communist authorities and creating preconditions for the next stage.

The cause of democracy and human rights in Estonia was, for years before perestroika, upheld by a brave group of dissidents (some of whom, like Jüri Kukk, died in the prison camps and many others spent years in them).²³ The struggle for human rights and independence under Soviet rule undoubtedly contributed to the final fall of the totalitarian system, but without Gorbachev the downfall of the system could have come ten or twenty years later. Boris Yeltsin has rightly said that had Gorbachev chosen Chernenko's way, 'the country's natural resources and the people's patience would have outlasted his lifetime, long enough for him to have lived the well-fed and happy life of the leader of a totalitarian state'.²⁴

The next milestone may be identified as a *revolt of the intellectuals*. It designates the activization of opposition not only in the dissident and semi-dissident circles, but in the official mainstream cultural organizations of a communist society ('creative unions' of writers, composers, filmmakers, academies of sciences and universities), in intellectual journals, and also in the general media. This stage is marked by conferences and publications, where the previously loyal and obedient communist writers, painters and scientists (many of them decorated by the state awards and enjoying privileges of *nomenklatura*) started suddenly to distance themselves from the most awkward practices of the system.

The course of such intellectual revolt in Estonia can be well charted by the publication of the liberal monthly *Vikerkaar*, which first appeared in July 1986, and started to print anti-establishment articles.²⁵ The revolt of the intellectuals was also marked by the actions like the proposal of September 1987 to achieve economic autonomy for Estonia within the framework of the USSR and the joint meeting of the creative unions of writers, artists, journalists, etc. on 1–2 April 1988, where the hardline leadership of the Estonian branch of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was openly challenged.²⁶

The appearance of relatively large-scale anti-communist public political demonstrations can be taken as another major turning-point in the democratic transition. Very often these were the so-called *calendar riots*, public meetings to mark some 'forbidden dates' of history: past declarations of independence, invasions, deportations, etc. The first important 'calendar riot' occurred in Estonia in August 1987 to mark the anniversary of the 1939 Nazi-Soviet Pact, and was organized by a group of former dissidents and other radical pro-independence activists.²⁷ It should be mentioned also that some less politicized forms of public protest (for example connected with environmental issues) had appeared already in Estonia at the beginning of 1987 and even earlier.²⁸

OPPOSITION MASS MOVEMENT AND REORIENTATION OF THE RULING ELITE

One of the ingredients of post-communist transition is the establishment of *opposition mass movements*. In Estonia the first truly mass opposition movement was the Popular Front which emerged in the

spring of 1988 and had its first congress in the fall of the same year.²⁹ The Estonian Popular Front (like its counterparts in other Baltic states) was able to mobilize a surprisingly high percentage of the population for mass rallies. For example, in tiny Estonia with its 1.6 million residents, the rallies on 17 June 1988 and 11 September 1988 were attended by 150,000 and 300,000 people respectively.³⁰ On 23 August 1989 more than a million people formed a human chain extending from Tallinn to Vilnius to mark the anniversary of the 1939 Nazi-Soviet pact.³¹

Reorientation of the ruling elite means that the communist *nomenklatura* becomes open to pressures from below, because the traditional feedback and repression mechanisms stop working, for reasons already described. There were many signs of such reorientation of local Estonian party/state bureaucracy in 1988, but perhaps the most visible peak of this process was in November 1988, when the Supreme Soviet of the Estonian SSR ('elected' in February 1985,³² i.e. before the start of perestroika) adopted a sovereignty declaration by a vote of 258 for, 1 against, 5 abstaining.³³ The Estonian Supreme Soviet challenged the Kremlin by declaring 'the supremacy' of the laws of the Estonian SSR over the legislation of the USSR.³⁴

PLURALIST QUASI-PARLIAMENT AND SYMBOLIC DESTRUCTION OF THE OLD

By *transition to pluralist quasi-parliament* I understand here the emergence of a legislature which (for the first time after long rule by communist dictatorship) is formed through relatively free competitive elections with the active, open participation of opposition candidates. I call it 'quasi-parliament' because the electoral process is not free in the classical democratic sense: it is to a considerable extent constrained by the existence of communist institutions and practices. For example, in the case of Estonia the Supreme Council elections of 18 March 1990 took place against the background of the continuing presence of the KGB, a communist-party controlled Soviet army, a centralized system of command economy, a not entirely free press, limited freedom of international travel and communications, etc. The same factors also overshadowed the elections to the Estonian Congress of 24 February 1990 (a peculiar alternative parliament, elected by the citizens of the pre-Second World War Estonia and their descendants, i.e. excluding the Soviet-era colonists).³⁵

Many classical anti-monarchist revolutions sooner or later reached the point of executing the ousted rulers, like Charles I of England or Louis XVI of France. Killing a king was a ritual, marking the culmination of the *symbolic destruction of the old regime*. Perhaps a similar ritual in anti-communist revolutions is fulfilled by the destruction or humiliation of the communist parties, which formed the heart and the essence of the old political order.

The pro-Estonian wing of the republican Communist Party was already seriously weakened by the beginning of 1990, but the pro-USSR wing (dominated largely by ethnic Russians) maintained considerable power, especially in the Russian-populated areas and large industrial centres. The real symbolic destruction of the Communist Party as a specific institution of the communist political system took place only in the wake of the abortive August 1991 coup in Moscow, when the CPSU and a number of other communist organizations were outlawed in Estonia.

DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION AND ELECTIONS

The next two stages do not appear to present much conceptual trouble and can here be mentioned quite briefly as 'first democratic constitution' and 'first democratic elections'.

The *first democratic constitution* is here understood as a new fundamental law of a previously communist state, a law that corresponds to internationally accepted democratic norms, like Estonia's Constitution, adopted by referendum on 28 June 1992. The *first democratic elections* can be interpreted as elections, taking place under the post-communist democratic legislation, and matching the criteria of 'free and periodic elections'.³⁶ Estonia held post-communist parliamentary elections on 20 September 1992. Those elections resulted in the sweeping victory of the right-wing and anti-communist forces.³⁷ The democratic nature of Estonia's development was further confirmed, when Estonia was in May 1993 accepted to the membership of the Council of Europe.³⁸ However, questions about how deep, adequate and stable is Estonian democracy were still often asked in 1992–93.³⁹

It is only legitimate to speculate that the next possible landmark after the initial completion of democratic transition could be some major *reverse shift*, i.e. an electoral victory of the opposition forces, often led by former Soviet-era middle-level economic managers and technocrats. Those opposition forces usually advocate lowering the social cost of economic transition, in the name of defending the interests of pensioners, farmers, intellectuals, and other social groups who suffer most in the upheaval. Real or alleged corruption among the new right-wing political elite also helps to decrease the popularity of yesterday's anti-communist freedom-fighters. This reverse shift in fact reflects a further consolidation of democracy, because all the main political forces have by now (sincerely or not is another matter) accepted the democratic rules of the game.

In Estonia something like a reverse shift may have happened during the October 1993 municipal elections when the ruling right-wing coalition suffered a crushing defeat by the centrist opposition parties, especially in the capital Tallinn.⁴⁰

The main 'turning-points' of the 1985–93 transition in Estonia are shown in Table 1. Limited space does not allow me to speculate in detail about the wider meaning of the above scheme. It is obvious that the

Turning-points of post-communist democratic transition, Estonia, 1985-93

start of the revolution from above	1985
start of the revolt of intellectuals	1986
first important 'calendar riots'	1987
emergence of the opposition mass movement	1988
transition to pluralist quasi-parliament	1990
symbolic destruction of the old	1991
first democratic constitution	1992
first democratic elections	1992
first reverse shift	1993

turning-points of political transition from communism share certain similarities with the turning-points in other revolutionary transitions. Many revolutions are unleashed by reform from above; a new political regime is consolidated either through democratic elections or through newly established dictatorship, etc. Almost all revolutions suffer certain reversals and setbacks. Charles Tilly has thoughtfully asserted that a revolution has two components: a revolutionary situation and a revolutionary outcome.⁴¹ The process of the post-communist transition is far from being over: it may take years before we see a 'revolutionary outcome' and be able to locate the post-1985 transition in Estonia on the general 'map' of revolutions and democratic transitions.

- ¹ I would like to acknowledge the generous support of the United States Institute of Peace for a research project which made the writing of this article possible. The opinions, findings and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this publication are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Institute of Peace.
- ² Toivo U. Raun, *Estonia and the Estonians*, 2nd edition, Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press, 1991; Rein Taagepera, *Estonia: Return to Independence*, Boulder, Westview Press, 1993.
- ³ Andrus Park, "From Perestroika to Cold Civil War: Reflections on the Soviet Disintegration Crisis", *Bulletin of Peace Proposals*, Vol. 22, No. 3, 1991, pp. 257-64; Andrus Park, "CSCE, Minority Issues, and the Soviet Disintegration Crisis", in Marilyn Wyatt (ed.), *CSCE and the New Blueprint for Europe*, Washington, DC, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service, 1991, pp. 59-65; Andrus Park, "Beyond Perestroika", *Theory and Society*, Vol. 20, 1991, pp. 689-96; Andrus Park, "The Post-Soviet System of States", *Bulletin of Peace Proposals*, Vol. 23, No. 1, 1992, pp. 11-16.
- ⁴ Timur Kuran, "Now Out or Never: The Element of Surprise in the East European Revolutions of 1989", *World Politics*, Vol. 44, October 1991, p. 37.
- ⁵ Alexander Motyl, "Building Bridges and Changing Landmarks: Theory and Concepts in the Study of Soviet Nationalities", in: Alexander Motyl (ed.), *Thinking Theoretically About Soviet Nationalities*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1992, p. 268.
- ⁶ Other authors have also used the word "post-communist" in this sense. See: Russell Bova, "Political Dynamics of the Post-Communist Transition", *World Politics*, Vol. 44, October 1991, pp. 113-38.
- ⁷ Theda Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1983, p. 287.
- ⁸ David Kowalevski, "Periphery Revolutions in World-System Perspective, 1821-1985", *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 24, 1991, p. 83.

- ⁹ Stephen M. Walt, "Revolution and War", *World Politics*, Vol. 44, April 1992, p. 323.
- ¹⁰ Charles Tilly, "Singular Models of Revolution: Impossible but Fruitful", *Center for Studies of Social Change. New School of Social Research. The Working Paper Series*, No. 138, 12 June 1992, p. 17.
- ¹¹ Priit Järve has offered a more complicated scheme of possible developments, using the following symbols: CT (communist totalitarianism), CA (communist authoritarianism), PCA (post-communist authoritarianism), and PCP (post-communist pluralism). See: Priit Järve, "The Baltics of the Early 1990s. Between Democracy and Authoritarianism", *Politiikka*, Vol. 4, No. 4, 1992, pp. 308–15. My use of symbols is closer to that which can be found in: Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*, Norman, University of Oklahoma Press, 1991, pp. 43–45.
- ¹² Cf. also: Christopher J. Panicko, "Turkmenistan Unaffected by Winds of Democratic Change", *RFE/RL Research Report*, Vol. 2, No. 4, 22 January 1993, pp. 6–10.
- ¹³ Cf. Bess Brown, "Central Asia: The First Year of Unexpected Statehood", *RFE/RL Research Report*, Vol. 2, No. 1, 1 January 1993, p. 30.
- ¹⁴ See also: Andrus Park, "Ideological Dimension of the Post-Communist Domestic Conflicts", *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, Vol. 26, No. 3, September 1993, pp. 269–70.
- ¹⁵ My conceptualization is greatly influenced by Zbigniew Brzezinski's "three-layer" model of the Soviet empire. See: Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Game Plan: A Geostategic Framework for the Conduct of the U.S.-Soviet Contest*, New York, The Atlantic Monthly Press, 1986, p. 16.
- ¹⁶ I tried to analyse the Kremlin-versus-Moscow-controversy in: Andrus Park, "From Perestroika to Cold Civil War", *Bulletin of Peace Proposals*, Vol. 22, No. 3, September 1991, pp. 257–64.
- ¹⁷ I think that most Sovietological theories about the original intentions of Gorbachev and other reformers are not verifiable. See Andrus Park, "Gorbachev and the Role of Personality in History", *Studies in Comparative Communism*, Vol. 25, No. 1, March 1992, pp. 50–51.
- ¹⁸ Apparently Gorbachev's behaviour in those years corresponded to what George Breslauer had denoted as "prescription No. 2" for transitional leadership: "Mobilize new forces into politics that will ally with reformist forces in the establishment". See George Breslauer, "Evaluating Gorbachev as Leader", in A. Hewett and Victor H. Winston (eds), *Milestones in Glasnost and Perestroika: Politics and People*, Washington, DC, The Brookings Institution, 1991, p. 411.
- ¹⁹ William J. H. Hough, "The Annexation of the Baltic States and Its Effect on the Development of Law Prohibiting Forcible Seizure of Territory", *New York Law School Journal of International and Comparative Law*, Vol. 6, No. 2, Winter 1985, pp. 480–81.
- ²⁰ Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?", *Foreign Affairs*, Summer 1993, p. 30.
- ²¹ Ernest Gellner, "Nationalism in the Vacuum", in Alexander Motyl (ed.), *Thinking Theoretically About Soviet Nationalities*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1992, p. 246.
- ²² Cf. Silvia Õispuu (ed.), *Eesti ajalugu ärkamisajast kuni tänapäevani* (History of Estonia From the Era of Awakening to the Present), Tallinn, Koolibri, 1992, p. 269.
- ²³ There are now several written accounts of political opposition in Estonia under Soviet rule. See for example: Mare Kukk, "Poliitiline opositsioon Eestis nõukogude perioodil" (Political Opposition in Estonia in the Soviet Period), *Proceedings of the Estonian Academy of Sciences. Social Sciences*, vol. 40, No. 3, 1991, pp. 229–48; Viktor Niitsoo, "Eesti rahvuslik vastupanuliikumine aastail 1968–1975" (Estonian National Resistance Movement, 1968–1975), *Akadeemia*, Vol. 5, No. 9, 1993, pp. 1819–33.
- ²⁴ Boris Yeltsin, *Against the Grain*, New York, Summit Books, 1990, p. 139.
- ²⁵ Toivo U. Raun, *Estonia and the Estonians*, second edition, Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press, 1991, p. 238; Jaan Kelder and Indrek Mustmets (eds), *Keda me valisime?* (Whom did we Elect?), Tartu, Tartumaa, 1993, p. 231.
- ²⁶ Mall Jõgi (ed.), *Eesti NSV loominguliste liitude juhatuste ühispleenum 1.–2. aprillil 1988* (The Joint Plenum of the Boards of the Creative Unions of the Estonian SSR, April 1–2, 1988), Tallinn, Eesti Raamat, 1988, pp. 5–231.
- ²⁷ Toivo U. Raun, *Estonia and the Estonians*, Second edition, Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press, 1991, p. 223; Rein Taagepera, *Estonia: Return to Independence*, Boulder, Westview Press, 1993, p. 125. About similar developments in Latvia and Lithuania see: Graham Smith (ed.), *The Nationalities Question in the Soviet Union*, London, Longman, 1990, pp. 62–63 and 79–80.
- ²⁸ Rein Taagepera, *Estonia: Return to Independence*, Boulder, Westview Press, 1993, pp. 120–24. The role of Green issues at the early stages of anti-totalitarian movements has been noted by many authors. See for example: Nick Manning, "T. H. Marshall, Jürgen Habermas, Citizenship and Transition in Eastern Europe", *World Development*, Vol. 21, No. 8, 1993, pp. 1322–23.

- 29 See: J. Nõmm and A. Ottenson (eds), *Rahvakongress* (People's Congress), Tallinn, Perioodika, 1988; Alexandras Shtromas, "How Political Are Social Movements in the Baltic Republics?" *Nationalities Papers*, Vol. 18, No. 2, Fall 1990, pp. 15–21. A detailed study of the emergence of various social movements in Estonia as well as their typology is presented in: Rein Ruutsoo, "Transitional Society and Social Movements in Estonia, 1987–1991", *Proceedings of the Estonian Academy of Sciences. Humanities and Social Sciences*, Vol. 42, No. 2, 1993, pp. 195–214.
- 30 *Revue Baltique*, Vol. 2, No. 1, February 1991, p. 132.
- 31 Marje Jõeeste and Ülo Kaevats (eds), *The Baltic States: A Reference Book*, Tallinn, Estonian Encyclopaedia Publishers, 1991, p. 22.
- 32 Gustav Naan (ed.), *Eesti Nõukogude Entsüklopeedia* (Estonian Soviet Encyclopaedia), Vol. 2, Tallinn, Valgus, 1987, p. 256.
- 33 Toivo U. Raun, *Estonia and the Estonians*, Second edition, Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press, 1991, p. 228.
- 34 Advig Kiris (ed.), *Restoration of the Independence of the Republic of Estonia. Selection of Legal Acts (1988–1991)*, Tallinn, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1991, pp. 4 and 6.
- 35 About the important roles played by the Supreme Council and the Estonian Congress in 1990–91, see Rein Taagepera, *Estonia: Return to Independence*, Boulder, Westview Press, 1993, pp. 170–232.
- 36 See the list of those conditions for example in: Morton Halperin, et al., *Self-Determination in the New World Order*, Washington, DC, Carnegie Endowment, 1992, pp. 88–9.
- 37 Riina Kionka, "Free-Market Coalition Assumes Power in Estonia", *RFE/RL Research Report*, Vol. 1, No. 46, 20 November 1992, pp. 6–11.
- 38 *The Baltic Independent*, 21–27 May 1993, p. 1.
- 39 Cf. criticisms of Estonia's human rights record in: *Helsinki Watch*, Vol. 4, No. 7, 15 April 1992, p. 6; *Freedom Review*, Vol. 24, No. 1, February 1993, p. 8. About the interpretations of the notion of democracy and its applicability to the Baltic cases see also: Dag Anckar and Kornelija Jurgaitene (eds), *Democracy in Theory and Practice*, Åbo, Åbo Academy, 1993, pp. 3–139.
- 40 *The Baltic Independent*, 22–28 October 1993, p. 1.
- 41 Charles Tilly, "Singular Models of Revolution: Impossible but Fruitful", *Center for Studies of Social Change. New School for Social Research. The Working Paper Series*, No. 138, 12 June 1992, pp. 17–20.