

ETHNICITY AND INDEPENDENCE: THE CASE OF ESTONIA IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE*

Andrus PARK

In this article¹ I argue that Estonia's ethnic developments in 1991–93² were characterised by the following features:

- after the independence declaration, there was (at least on the surface) a decline in the intensity of ethnic tensions; many public signs of ethnic conflict were displayed less vividly in 1991–93 than in 1988–91;
- there was an asymmetry of post-imperial changes in different social sub-systems from an ethnic point of view: the official political elite and state apparatus were visibly Estonianised, and migration trends changed rapidly; while education, mass media, economic activity, etc. witnessed only modest adjustments in that period;
- the Russian movement in Estonia grappled with a serious adaptation crisis in 1991–93;
- Estonia's citizenship policy followed a quite strict restorationist strategy until the September 1992 elections, after which a trend toward liberalisation occurred;
- there were two main directions of international pressures in regard to Estonia's citizenship and minorities policy in 1991–93: the governments of the Western countries and the main interstate organisation were mostly friendly, while Russia was sharply critical. The Western media and human rights organisations also often expressed disapproval of Estonia's policies;
- compared with many other post-communist states (Moldova, former Yugoslavia, the Transcaucasian states, even former Czecho-Slovakia) the minorities and citizenship policy in Estonia in 1991–93 appeared to be quite successful: the visible signs of ethnic tensions diminished; violence or active separatism on ethnic grounds was avoided; Estonia's integration into European and other international organisations was generally successful.

* Originally published in *Europe-Asia Studies*, 1994, 46, 1, 69–87.

Many tangible factors seemed to push Estonia in 1991–93 towards ethnic violence. Among those factors were: an ethnically mixed population; the high social cost of economic transition; the sudden drop in the status of certain ethnically identifiable social groups like the Russian-speaking Soviet bureaucracy, the Soviet Army and KGB veterans; the proximity of Russia, which made it very easy to encourage and supply all types of pro-Russian separatist groups.

It is difficult to explain exactly why Estonia's development in 1991–93 was generally peaceful. Most of the factors that apparently contributed to the peaceful political development in 1991–93 are not obvious or tangible; for example, the tradition of pragmatic, peaceful and somewhat impassive individualism in Estonia, which is suspicious about grand visions and great sacrifices. From my point of view (based first of all on countless discussions with the local people) the main factor may have been deeply embedded belief—shared both by Estonians and non-Estonians—that Estonia would achieve relative economic prosperity much more quickly without Russia. Alas, such balance of beliefs is quite fragile, since the real transition to capitalism in Estonia and in the neighbouring countries is barely beginning. The non-tangible factors mentioned above may be helpful in explaining the past, but they may not be fruitful for predicting the future.

ANALYSING THE CASE OF ESTONIA: LURE AND LIMITATIONS

The break-up of the USSR and the Soviet bloc in general produced an interesting set of transitions, where the features of post-communist, post-imperial and post-colonial alterations appear simultaneously, and in some instances (the Baltic states) are mixed with the elements of post-occupation shifts. The growing importance of ethnic conflicts is certainly one of the 'megatrends' in the post-communist world, although this tendency takes different contours in different specific settings.

The change in the status of the representatives of the dominant nationality of the former empire in post-imperial independent states is a fascinating topic for comparative studies. Turks in the Balkan states and on Cyprus, French in North Africa and Germans in Czechoslovakia before World War II provide some comparative cases, but the differences between those instances and the post-Soviet scene appear greater than the resemblances. The 25 million Russians in the former Soviet republics were in a difficult position in 1991–93: the USSR not only disappeared more quickly than most other empires, it was thoroughly discredited together with the totalitarian communist regime. The universal condemnation of the communist system also largely delegitimised (at least in the eyes of some nationalist movements) the communist-era migration trends and their demographic consequences.

Many authors have emphasised that Estonia (and the other two Baltic states) were the most Westernised³ among the former Soviet republics, often used as a peculiar 'testing ground' where the Soviet leadership

experimented with new economic policies. The per capita living space in Estonia in 1986 was 34.9% larger, the life expectancy 1.7% longer and the infant mortality 37.0% lower than the average in the USSR. The Estonian SSR ranked first among the Soviet republics in the number of private cars per 1 000 population and of books published per capita. In 1980 the Estonian language was fourth (after Russian, Ukrainian, and Georgian) in absolute numbers of published titles of books and brochures in the USSR⁴. The capital, Tallinn, and the rest of the northern part of Estonia had for years enjoyed access to Finnish TV, which effectively deprived the Soviet media of their monopoly in that area⁵. Since Estonia was occupied by the USSR in 1940, the period of communist rule was shorter than in Russia, and the idea of restoration of the pre-communist independence was based not only on collective historical memory, but also on the living recollections of many individuals.

The Soviet bloc was a centralised empire⁶, composed of various territorial 'circles' around the metropolis (Russian heartland). There are several ways to identify those 'circles', but one scheme could include Russia's autonomous republics, 'old union republics' (like the Ukraine), 'new republics' (i.e. the acquisitions during World War II), client states in Eastern Europe (the Warsaw Pact countries), overseas communist client states (like Cuba and Vietnam), and client states of communist orientation (like Ethiopia). It is logical to make a distinction between the broad categories of the 'inner empire' (the USSR itself), and the 'outer empire' (client states in Europe and all over the world).

I think that the process of transition to democracy and capitalism is proceeding somewhat differently in different territorial 'circles' of the former empire—especially from the point of view of ethnic relations. The former heartland—Russia—is not likely to go through any drastic changes in its ethnic make-up, even if Chechenia, Tatarstan, and some other republics are successful in their bid for independence. At the other end of the spectrum, the former client states in Eastern Europe and elsewhere were practically not Russianised under communism; their main ethnic controversies are 'horizontal', i.e. between the former client states themselves. Although a lot of 'horizontal' conflict formations exist also in the former 'inner empire', 'vertical' tension (i.e. conflict which involves the Russian diaspora) prevails in the former USSR, especially in the Baltic area.

Estonia is an interesting case for understanding ethnic strains in one of the areas of the former 'inner empire' where the communist regime was imposed in 1940–44 from outside, mostly by Russians (i.e. by representatives of another ethnic group), and where the ethnic composition of the population was quite radically changed under Soviet rule through deportations of the indigenous people and other similar forms of arranged migration.

As Table 1 shows, there were 61.5% of Estonians in the Republic's population in 1989, the second largest ethnic group were Russians (30.3%), followed by Ukrainians (3.1%), Belarusians (1.7%) and Finns (1.1%).

Table 1

Main Ethnic Groups in Estonia

	1959		1989	
	Number	%	Number	%
Total	1 196 791	100.0	1 565 662	100.0
Estonians	892 653	74.6	963 269	61.5
Russians	240 227	20.1	474 815	30.3
Ukrainians	15 769	1.3	48 273	3.1
Belarusians	10 930	0.9	27 711	1.7
Finns	16 699	1.4	16 622	1.1
Jews	5 436	0.5	4 613	0.3
Latvians	2 888	0.2	3 135	0.2
Germans	670	0.1	3 466	0.2
Tatars	1535	0.1	4 058	0.3
Poles	2 256	0.2	3 008	0.2
Lithuanians	1 616	0.1	2 568	0.2
Others	6 112	0.5	14 124	0.9

Source: Marje Joeste *et al.*, eds, *Eesti A & O* (Tallinn, Eesti Entsüklopeediakirjastus, 1993), p. 96.

In pre-Soviet times the population of Estonia was ethnically highly homogenous: in 1881 the share of Estonians in the population on the territory of today's Estonia was 89.8%, and in 1939 the corresponding number for the Republic of Estonia was 88.2%⁷. The Soviet years produced also a certain degree of interaction between various ethnic communities: for example, out of 11 774 marriages registered in Estonia in 1990, 996 (8.5%) were between Estonians and non-Estonians (Russians, Ukrainians, etc.). The majority of those 996 interethnic marriages (642) were between Estonians and Russians⁸.

Let me make also one terminological remark at this point. I sometimes use the term 'Russian-speaking population'. Although this term is awkward, it nevertheless reflects the fact that not only ethnic Russians but also segments of some other ethnic groups in Estonia (Ukrainians, Belarusians, Tatars, etc.) often use Russian as their everyday language of communication.

PHILOSOPHY OF RESTORATIONISM AND CITIZENSHIP POLICY

After August 1991 there were two main phases in Estonia's citizenship policy: the phase of tightening (which lasted until the September 1992 parliamentary elections), and the phase of liberalisation (which started when the new government in October 1992 announced its intention to relax some of the citizenship regulations). Whether the period of

relaxation ended in June 1993 is too early to say at the time of writing—at least the proposed new legislation on foreigners in June 1993 triggered a lot of criticism from the parliamentary opposition and from the leaders of the Russian community. For example, one of the Russian activists, Khanon Barabaner, declared that Estonia was becoming a 'police state', some of the representatives of the ruling right-wing coalition were making 'fascist' speeches and those mechanisms that previously had helped to prevent conflicts between the two communities were 'crumbling'⁹.

Estonia's independence was gained in 1991 on the restorationist model, i.e., from the point of view of the mainstream Estonian political forces 1991 saw not the creation of a new state but the restoration of the pre-1940 Republic of Estonia. Estonia's citizenship policy also followed this restorationist line and produced quick and deep changes in the ethnic composition of the electorate.

The 1938 citizenship law was reintroduced in Estonia on 26 February 1992 (an earlier decision in principle to reinstate the law had been taken by the Supreme Council in November 1991). According to this legislation, all those who were citizens of the Republic of Estonia on 16 June 1940, as well as their descendants, were granted citizenship; the others were considered to be foreign nationals or stateless persons. According to same estimates, about 90 000–100 000 non-Estonians in Estonia qualify as citizens, which means that the majority of non-Estonians may get Estonian citizenship through naturalisation. The naturalisation requirements are quite liberal: anyone who has resided in Estonia for two years (starting from 30 March 1990) may apply for citizenship. The citizenship law went into effect in February 1992, so non-citizens who had already resided in Estonia two years before that were able to begin applying for naturalisation almost immediately. Applicants must take an oath of loyalty to the Republic of Estonia and its constitutional order, and demonstrate some knowledge of Estonian.

The language requirements were specified in a separate law, adopted by the Riigikogu (State Assembly or parliament) on 10 February 1993. Those requirements specified that an applicant's spoken Estonian must be clear enough to understand but he or she may take time to find a suitable word, repeat and reword the phrase, and make mistakes in grammar and syntax. The parliament gave the government the right to establish a separate set of requirements for applicants born before 1 January 1930, for invalids of the first category, and for those second category invalids whose state of health makes it impossible for them to pass the examination under normal rules. Those who received primary, secondary or university education in Estonian were considered exempt from the language examination.¹⁰

Generally speaking, the current Estonian citizenship law does not discriminate against anybody on formal ethnic grounds, and is more liberal than similar legislation of most other countries.¹¹ But the immediate real political effect of the citizenship law can be interpreted of course in ethnic terms: most ethnic Russian residents of Estonia were not eligible to vote in the September 1992 elections: 689 319 citizens of the Republic of Estonia

were registered as voters and 467 629, or 67.8% of them, participated in the elections.¹²

The period after the September 1992 elections was marked by relaxation of citizenship regulations. Although the victorious right-centre coalition led by the Prime Minister, Mart Laar, came to power advocating a rigid course on citizenship issues, it started to liberalise its stance soon after assuming office. On 18 February 1993 the Estonian parliament simplified the rules for those who had applied for citizenship before the Congress of Estonia elections in March 1990. Under the streamlined version of the law, these early applicants are exempt from the Estonian language test and do not have to pass the one-year waiting period required from other applicants. The liberalisation clause was introduced by two right-wing members of the ruling coalition. Around 34 000 non-citizens applied to the Congress for citizenship in 1990;¹³ this number should not be confused with the much smaller number of people who applied for citizenship after Estonia passed the citizenship law. The liberalisation of the government's approach to citizenship issues led to a counter-reaction from the radical Estonian nationalists: the Estonian Decolonisation Fund was set up on 9 February 1993, vowing to fight against granting residence permits to all Russian speakers and declaring that its aim was to increase the share of Estonians in the population from the current 63.5% to 80% through encouraging 'peaceful remigration'.¹⁴

The number of applicants for Estonian citizenship in 1992 was surprisingly low: only 7 571 persons applied for citizenship, and it was granted to 5 417, of whom 3 989 were ethnic Estonians. Citizenship was granted for special services to 465 persons.¹⁵ The possibility to grant citizenship for 'special services' (bypassing all the formalities of naturalisation) was used quite skilfully by the Estonian government to influence the leaders of the Russian community: for example, the Mayor of the Russian-populated Narva disclosed in October 1992 that all the city's leadership had received Estonian citizenship in this way.¹⁶ The fact that many non-Estonian celebrities (scientists, cultural figures, business managers, etc.) accepted preferential treatment from the Estonian authorities on citizenship matters led to accusations of moral treachery by other members of the Russian-speaking community:

We all fell together under the wheels of history. But apparently everybody unfortunately will attempt to escape individually. But let us not do this at the expense of others or common sense ... nobody can persuade anybody that people who gave the best years of their lives to the republic (i.e. Estonia), generations of whom have been born here, should still (have to) earn elementary civil rights.¹⁷

At the same time, the Consul of Russia revealed that 25 146 persons had asked for Russian citizenship in 1992.¹⁸ The number of citizens of Russia in Estonia was growing quite steadily: at the time of the Russian referendum on 25 April 1993 there were already 33 000 of them.¹⁹ Still, the majority of Russians seemed to have taken a 'wait and see' attitude in 1992, which can be well illustrated with the example of the mainly

Russian-populated town of Narva: in September 1992 there were more than 7 000 citizens of Estonia in that city, almost 1 300 citizens of Russia and about 80 000 people without citizenship.²⁰ Russian citizens in Estonia were politically very conservative: only 28% of them supported El'tsin and 27% approved his reform policies at the Russian referendum on 25 April 1993.²¹

At the same time, sociologists suggest that in spring 1992 there was considerable interest among Russians in obtaining Estonian citizenship: in April 1992 38% of Russians said that they were interested in getting Estonian citizenship, while only 20% were explicitly not interested. The same study claims also that about 40% of Russians in Estonia were in fact born in Estonia (corresponding numbers for Ukrainians and Belarusians are somewhat lower).²² One deterring factor in submitting applications may of course be the language test: according to the April 1992 survey, only 9.2% of Russians in Estonia can read, speak and write fluently in Estonian, while 32.0% do not understand Estonian at all.²³ Another survey, carried out in January 1992 in the Russian-populated city of Sillamäe (previously one of the closed cities of the Soviet military-industrial complex) showed that only 1.6% of respondents were 'definitely' determined to emigrate from Estonia, whereas—on the other hand—only 4.5% were equally determined to 'integrate into Estonian culture'.²⁴ This leads to the conclusion that a majority of Russians and other Slavs in Estonia want to stay, many of them are interested in getting Estonian citizenship, but most of them want also to preserve their non-Estonian national identity, and are not so eager to learn the Estonian language.

ESTONIANISATION OF THE POLITICAL SYSTEM

According to Soviet statistics, the general share of ethnic Estonians in the bureaucracy of state and other 'management organs' of the ESSR in 1987 was 72%; in science personnel—67%; in culture and the arts—84%; in education—71%; in health care, sports and social security—67%; in trade and the service sector—62%; in the building sector—61%; in transport and communications—47%; in agriculture—84%; in industry—47%.²⁵ There are no comparative data enabling us to follow the exact evolution according to the same classification scheme in 1991–93, but an educated guess is that the most radical ethnic changes were taking place in the political establishment.

In the 1970s and early 1980s the Communist Party usually allocated about 70–80% of the seats in the Supreme Soviet of the ESSR to ethnic Estonians. For example, there were 73.3% of Estonians among the Supreme Soviet deputies 'elected' in March 1980. More importantly, although the share of Estonians in the Communist Party of Estonia was about 50%, they were usually given 70–80% of the seats on the Central Committee.²⁶ These figures should of course be taken in the proper context: the decision-making positions in the party were always taken by Russians or completely Russianised Estonians, often born and raised in Russia.

The share of ethnic Estonians in the local parliament remained generally stable as a result of the relatively free 1990 Supreme Soviet elections, based on the Soviet-era electorate. There were 105 members of the Estonian Supreme Soviet after the March 1990 elections (four of whom were representing the Soviet Army), and 75.2% of them were Estonians.

Not surprisingly, a major change occurred in September 1992, when the Riigikogu (State Assembly) of the restored Republic of Estonia was elected by the citizens of Estonia. Although the handbook of this newly elected Estonian parliament does not contain exact generalised data on its ethnic composition, a brief glance at the list of deputies shows that they were practically all ethnic Estonians.²⁷

As mentioned above, the locus of power in Estonia at least until 1988 was the leadership of the Communist Party, dominated in 1978–88 by the Siberian-born hardline First Secretary Karl Vaino, who was sent to Estonia in 1947 and by the end of his tenure in 1978 could still not speak Estonian fluently. Out of the five positions in the secretariat of the Central Committee of the CPE two or three (i.e., 40–60%) were usually taken by ethnic Russians in the 1970s and early 1980s. Ethnic non-Estonians were also strongly represented in the political Bureau of the party.²⁸ Since the party lost most of its power after 1988, the 1989–93 leadership dynamics can be better observed on the basis of the cabinet of ministers. Although the ethnic self-identification of government ministers is usually not disclosed in the handbooks, an educated guess is that the cabinet of Edgar Savisaar in summer 1990 included about 9% of ethnic Russians as ministers, while the cabinet of Mart Laar in autumn 1992 was 100% Estonian.²⁹

The share of Estonians at the beginning of 1993 was still very moderate in some of the power structures that under Soviet rule were traditionally staffed predominantly with non-Estonians. For example, Igor Amann, the Director of Estonia's Police Department, revealed on 27 January 1993 that 58.6% of the police force were Estonians.³⁰ By 1 May 1993 the share of ethnic Estonians in the police force had risen to 60.8%.³¹

The new Estonian constitution that was adopted following the referendum on 28 June 1992 contains (in addition to general human rights clauses about outlawing ethnic, racial and other discrimination) a number of provisions that are aimed at protecting the rights of the ethnic minorities. For example:

- the right to cultural autonomy for ethnic minorities is guaranteed (article 50);
- in the regions where more than half of the permanent population is composed of ethnic minorities, everybody has the right to receive answers from the authorities in the language of that minority (article 51);
- the language of an ethnic minority may be used as a language in official dealings in the areas where the majority of the population does not use Estonian (article 52);

- the right to vote in local (municipal, county, etc.) elections is granted to permanent residents, i.e. non-citizens are also eligible to participate (article 156).³²

Although much depends on how these general provisions are specified in concrete laws, the articles listed above work in favour of the Russian-speaking population, allowing them in fact to control local government in Russian-populated areas.

REVERSAL OF MIGRATION TRENDS

Under Soviet rule Estonia was characterised by a great inflow of Russians and other non-Estonians from the Soviet republics, who came to take advantage of Estonia's relatively higher living standard, and also because Russian immigration to Estonia was encouraged as a part of Soviet policy. The 1988 sovereignty declaration and Estonia's drive toward greater autonomy within the USSR started to slow down the immigration from other Soviet republics, and the transition to independence reversed it completely: 1990 was the first year when more people left Estonia than arrived. The yearly net out-migration increased eight times in 1990–92, as Table 2 shows.

Table 2

Estonia: International Migration

Year	Total migration increase	Year	Total migration increase
1960	1 491	1981	6 585
1965	7 726	1982	5 680
1970	11 369	1983	4 613
1971	9 909	1984	4 748
1972	7 275	1985	6 510
1973	7 207	1986	6 112
1974	3 575	1987	4 283
1975	3 794	1988	965
1976	4 457	1989	171
1977	6 858	1990	-4 021
1978	5 762	1991	-8 060
1979	4 899	1992	-33 267
1980	6 422		

Source: *Estonia. A Statistical Profile* (Tallinn, Statistical Office of Estonia, 1992), p. 39; *Estonian Statistics*, 4, 1992, p. 9.

Note: International migration includes also migration between Estonia and other parts of the former Soviet Union.

The reversal of the migration trends was largely responsible for the fact that the share of ethnic Estonians in the republic's population started to grow again: in 1992 an estimated 63.0% of the republic's population were Estonians, whereas the corresponding figure for 1989 was 61.5%.

SLOW CHANGE IN EDUCATION AND PUBLISHING

While political life on the level of parliament and government was visibly Estonianised, the changes in education occurred at a much slower pace. For example, the share of students who study in Russian in all types of higher educational institutions in Estonia dropped from 20.2% in the academic year 1990/91 to 18.8% in 1992/93, i.e. the change was only marginal (see Table 3).

The percentage of students who studied in Russian in general elementary and secondary schools in Estonia (i.e. general education from the first to the thirteenth grade) also dropped slightly during the transition to independence. At the beginning of the academic year 1990/91, 36.7% of students were given instruction in Russian in general elementary and secondary schools; in 1991/92 the figure was still 36.7%, while on 29 December 1992 the percentage of students studying in Russian was 34.7%.³³

Table 3

The Role of the Russian Language in Higher Education in Estonia, 1990-93

	1990/91		1991/92		1992/93	
	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%
Number of students in higher schools	25 899	100.0	25 643	100.0	24 464	100.0
of which study in Russian	5 223	20.2	5 007	19.5	4 609	18.8
of which in universities	25 899	100.0	24 718	100.0	22 875	100.0
of which study in Russian	5 223	20.2	4 690	19.0	4 214	18.4
Of which in applied higher schools ^a	—	—	925	100.0	1 589	100.0
of which study in Russian	—	—	317	34.3	395	24.9

^a There were no applied higher schools in Estonia in the academic year 1990/91.

Source: Statistical Office of Estonia.

I have no data about the publication trends in 1992 and 1993, but the 1990–91 trends suggest that at least at those initial stages of transition to independence there was no dramatic Estonianisation of publication patterns.

As Table 4 illustrates, in certain cases (copies of books printed) there was even quite a significant drop in Estonian-language publishing, which was apparently attributable to market demand (more publishing in English and other "Western" languages, export of Russian-language printed materials to Russia, etc.). The 1985–91 trends on TV and radio also showed no signs of dramatic Estonianisation: while the production of Russian-language broadcasts by Estonian TV dropped somewhat, there was a significant increase in Russian-language broadcasting by Estonian radio, from 1.7 hours daily in 1985 to 5.4 hours in 1991.³⁴ The situation with TV changed in spring 1993 when Ostankino became the only programme relayed from Russia by Estonian TV (previously Estonian TV had also re-broadcast Rossiya and St Petersburg programmes).³⁵

Table 4

The Share of Estonian-language Publications Among Items Published in Estonia, 1980–91

	% of the number of titles and copies			
	1980	1985	1990	1991
<i>Books and booklets</i>				
Titles	61.5	63.4	66.3	67.0
Copies	73.1	70.1	59.3	47.2
<i>Magazines and other periodicals</i>				
Titles	68.6	67.3	77.0	75.5
Annual circulation	77.2	78.0	77.9	81.6
<i>Newspapers</i>				
Titles	72.0	71.4	66.7	69.0
Average circulation per issue	84.5	84.7	72.5	...

Source: Calculated by the author on the basis of data from *Estonia. A Statistical Profile* (Tallinn, Statistical Office of Estonia, 1992), p. 101.

ETHNICITY AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC TRANSITION: MIXED SIGNALS

More time and special research are needed to pass any judgement about the ethnic shifts that were taking place in the social and economic spheres in 1991–93. The conventional sociological viewpoint is that under Soviet rule immigrants from Russia and other Soviet republics had advantages in

getting housing, while local Estonians had to wait for decades. For example, at the beginning of the 1970s, 81% of non-Estonians but only 55% of Estonians among the urban population lived in the more prestigious state-subsidised low-rent flats with central heating, bathroom and other similar amenities.³⁶ Probably this situation is slowly changing (since departing Russians often sell their flats to Estonians) but more data are needed to offer any definitive generalisation in this respect. A sociological survey in September 1991 suggested that Russians in Estonia generally earned more than ethnic Estonians (52% of Estonians and 65% of Russians belonged to the income category of 300 rubles or more per month per family member),³⁷ but again it is too early to say anything about the 1991–93 changes in this respect.

As in all the post-communist countries, the transition to a market economy in Estonia is associated with growing unemployment, impoverishment of the majority of the population and growing social pressures. In this respect, Estonia at the end of 1992 was just at the beginning of the process: its official unemployment rate was then 1.9% of the workforce. The corresponding figure for Latvia was 2.1% and for Lithuania 1.0%.³⁸ Since unemployment rates in 1992 were much higher in the Central and East European countries that had advanced further on the path of pro-capitalist reform, it is not difficult to predict that the corresponding numbers will grow also in Estonia. For example, the percentage of unemployed in autumn 1992 in Poland was 13.5%; in Hungary–13–14%; in the Czech Republic–2.5%; in Slovakia–10.4% and in Bulgaria 13.3%.³⁹ The likely growth of unemployment will have certain ethnic dimensions in Estonia, since it will hit disproportionately the Russian populated north-east of the country (which was rapidly industrialised by the Soviet authorities in the 1940s–60s, and produced mostly for the Russian market) as well as the primarily Russian-staffed former Soviet defence and heavy industry sector elsewhere in Estonia. The organisations of unemployed that were created in December 1992 in Narva and in January 1993 in Tallinn were mostly composed of ethnic Russians.⁴⁰ One sign of the importance of ethnicity in economic life was the creation of the Estonian-Russian Chamber of Entrepreneurs on 26 November 1992,⁴¹ which unites primarily Russian businessmen in Estonia and which stated in December 1992:

We are extremely concerned about the fact that the mutual recognition of the independence of Estonia and Russia was followed by an abrupt severance of the financial, commercial, scientific-technical and production-cooperation contacts which had been established between the subjects of economic management of the two countries over the decades. The artificial barriers created by the efforts of the new-wave politicians have already led to a drop in production, an increase in the number of unemployed, and the far-reaching process of many companies and enterprises going bankrupt.⁴²

Estonia's approach to privatisation in 1991–93 was quite friendly to all residents: as a leading Russian-language newspaper explained in March 1993, the laws on the voucher privatisation of flats offer 'equal opportunities' both for citizens and non-citizens.⁴³ On April 1993

amendments to the land reform act were adopted which allow foreigners to buy land in Estonia.⁴⁴ In February 1993 there were 51 028 registered enterprises, institutions and organisations in Estonia and only 16.8% of them were classified as state property (other forms included: municipal property—1.4%; private property—50.0%; cooperative property—17.4%; property of public organisations—5.9%; property of rented enterprises—0.4%; property of foundations—0.4%; joint property with foreign participation—5.3%; property of foreign countries—2.4%).⁴⁵ Although the privatisation of medium and small enterprises has been massive (as well as the creation of new firms), there were no notable public scandals or complaints about discrimination on ethnic grounds in this matter in 1991–93, if we leave aside some dealings with the property of the former Soviet army.

In spite of all the pain of transition, Estonia in 1991–93 was considered one of the few success stories of the post-Soviet economy: its new currency, the kroon, was stable, the inflation rate was falling, the foreign trade balance was positive and foreign trade was quickly reoriented from the former USSR to the West. Estonia's Prime Minister, Mart Laar, declared in June 1993 that the Estonian economy had started to improve again.⁴⁶ PlanEcon seemed to have been quite right in November 1992 in saying of Estonia and the other Baltic states that their 'decline in aggregate output during 1992–94 will be steeper than elsewhere in the former USSR, but the subsequent recovery will be stronger and more dynamic'.⁴⁷

ADAPTATION CRISIS OF THE RUSSIAN MOVEMENT

The 1991–93 phase can be best described as an adaptation crisis for the Russian movement. The Russian-speaking political forces in Estonia were trying during that period to grapple with the loss of their status as peculiar representatives of the distant but powerful 'centre' of the USSR. There were two distinctive sub-periods in the development of the political activities of Russian speakers: the period of disintegration and disorientation (August 1991–December 1992), and the period of moderate and controversial consolidation, which started to take shape after the Russian speakers managed to create their Assembly in January 1993.

Ethnic controversy in Estonia intensified several times before Estonia's independence was officially recognised by Moscow: there were demonstrations or other public actions by pro-USSR Russian speakers in July 1988, February 1989, March 1989, August 1989, September 1989, May 1990, January 1991, etc.,⁴⁸ while the period from September 1991 to 1993 was less full of public signs of ethnic conflict. The post-independence decrease in the ethnic conflict levels in Estonia in 1991–1993 does not mean either that a new upsurge of ethnic conflict is out of the question, or that non-Estonian ethnic groups in Estonia are satisfied with all the changes.

Most powerful political organisations of Russian speakers in Estonia before 1991 (the United Council of Workers' Collectives, the International Movement, etc.) had a pro-communist orientation and were easily destroyed in the wake of the failed coup in August 1991. For example, the CPSU was outlawed in Estonia on 23 August 1991.⁴⁹ On 22–23 August the government dismissed some (non-Estonian) directors of large all-union enterprises for supporting the coup, and established Estonian control over the industrial giants that were the power base of the pro-USSR movement in 1988–91.⁵⁰ On 25 August the International Movement, the United Council of Workers' Collectives and the 'workers' detachments' were banned, and an investigation into the activity of the coup collaborators was ordered.⁵¹ The local councils in the Russian-populated towns of Narva, Kohtla-Järve and Sillamäe (who on 25 August 1991 finally decided to recognise the laws of the Republic of Estonia and replace the red Soviet flags on their buildings with the Estonian tricolor) were also dissolved and new elections were held on 20 October 1991. The effect of those elections was quite modest: the same old pro-USSR leaders were re-elected in Narva and Sillamäe, while moderate changes occurred in the leadership of Kohtla-Järve.⁵²

New post-communist political organisations of Russian speakers started to arise almost immediately after the coup, but they were fragmented and did not obtain much influence. The Russian Democratic Movement (founded on 30 August 1991) was typical in this respect.

As I indicated above, one of the most important milestones was the creation of a quasi-parliament for Russian speakers. A meeting on 30 January 1993 in Tallinn of different public, cultural and national movements and organisations, representing 'principally the Russian-speaking part of the population', created a Representative Assembly; 37 members of the Assembly were elected, and 13 were nominated later. The nine-member leadership was headed by Nikolai Yugantsev, 44, a businessman, and included two former Supreme Council deputies (V. Lebedev and P. Grigorev), Co-Chairmen of the Russian Democratic Movement (V. Lvovsky, A. Semenov and Kh. Barabaner), the Narva Trade Union Centre leader (V. Poniatovsky), Sillamäe Town Council Chairman (V. Maksimenko), and one of the leaders of the war veterans (N. Toporov).⁵³

The members of the meeting entrusted the Assembly with representing and defending their rights in the following spheres:

LEGAL—to ensure participation in all structures of state power, municipal organs, international organisations, etc., thus contributing to the integration and stabilisation of society;

SOCIO-ECONOMIC—to achieve equal conditions in owning property, in employment and pay, in health care and social security;

HUMANITARIAN—to ensure access to education, including higher education, on the optional basis of either the Estonian or the Russian school; and to support and develop national, cultural and confessional associations.⁵⁴

The Assembly claimed also that the elections to the State Assembly on 20 September 1992 had passed

without the participation of more than one-third of the permanent residents, who have been deprived of the citizenship of Estonia and whose political, economic and social rights are consequently being violated

and that

Estonia is ignoring some universally recognised principles and norms of international law, which may lead to conflicts between peoples and the rise of tension in Estonia's relations with other states.⁵⁵

The reaction from Estonia's government was quite calm: it promised to treat the Assembly 'as an ordinary public organisation that acts within the Estonian constitution'.⁵⁶ Since the Russian movement in Estonia is fragmented (this was demonstrated, for example, again on 16 January 1993, when 12 more hardline Russian organisations left the Assembly's organising committee⁵⁷), that quasi-parliament may disappear soon. But even if that particular organisation disappears, the model of 'alternative parliament' is likely to emerge again in some other form, perhaps connected with some Russian-dominated municipal assembly.

The hardline activists among the Russian speakers in 1993 were planning to convene their own *sobor* and demanding radical concessions from Estonia's government; namely, making Russian the second state language, introducing dual (Estonian-Russian) citizenship for minorities, ensuring proportional representation of all ethnic groups on all levels of state power and reorienting Estonia from the West 'toward Russia'.⁵⁸

The political organisations of Russian speakers in Estonia in 1991–93 included also various Russian-dominated city councils (most notably in Narva), trade unions in the Russian-populated areas,⁵⁹ and newspapers and Russian-language mass media in general. For example, on 20 June 1992 the trade unions of the mainly Russian-populated towns of Narva and Sillamäe adopted a statement demanding the right to include their representatives in the Estonian delegation at the Russian-Estonian talks about the withdrawal of Russian troops and other bilateral issues. The chairman of the Narva City Council, Vladimir Chuikin, in a newspaper interview in summer 1992 predicted Estonia's entry into the CIS and argued against the withdrawal of ex-Soviet troops.⁶⁰ On 10 July 1992 the first Russian volunteer from Estonia to fight in the Moldovan civil war was buried in Narva. Local journalists reported that several factories in Narva had given holidays to men to fight in Trans-Dniestr.⁶¹ Throughout 1992 the local authorities in Narva threatened to organise a referendum about the 'status' of that city, i.e. even implying that Narva might declare itself a free city. On 17 September 1992 a working group was set up to formulate the question for a referendum.⁶² On 1 June 1993 the Union of Russian Citizens in Narva appealed to the government of the Russian Federation not to withdraw its troops from Estonia, since they were on a 'peace-keeping mission'.⁶³

The Russian-speaking political elite in Estonia appeared to be weak and without mass support among their own community: one of the most surprising facts was that both Estonians and non-Estonians continued to

prefer ethnic Estonian politicians in the opinion polls. For example, in February 1993 the 'top ten' politicians for non-Estonians included only two Russians (in fifth and ninth places), whereas President Lennart Meri and Prime Minister Mart Laar (who both came to power as a result of the September 1992 elections, declared non-democratic by the mainstream Russian organisations) occupied eighth and sixth places respectively. The first three in the popularity list for non-Estonians were the former Prime Minister, Edgar Savisaar, the former Supreme Council Chairman, Arnold Rüütel, and the former Communist Party Chairman, Vaino Väljas.⁶⁴ The unimpressive personal image of Russian politicians among the Russian-speaking community may be one of the factors explaining why Estonia was relatively successful in 1991–93 in containing ethnic unrest. According to another poll, 47% of Estonians and 32% of non-Estonians supported the government of Mart Laar in May 1993 (the corresponding figures for January 1993 were 39% and 31%).⁶⁵

THREE KINDS OF INTERNATIONAL PRESSURES

The effect of the international environment on post-communist ethnic tensions certainly deserves a separate study. The whole anti-communist revolution was very much induced from outside; it was motivated not by some romantic grand vision of the future (like many past revolutions) but by the quite prosaic and often unrealistic wish of the people to return quickly to the 'normal' mainstream of civilisation and to live like the citizens of the rich Western nations. The post-communist transition is a periphery revolution in the most proper sense of that word, and the role of outside factors is enormous. In what follows I will briefly describe only a minor fraction of the immense impact of their international surroundings on post-communist realities, leaving a more extensive analysis for the future.

The official Russian Federation position on the Baltic changed in 1991–93. Before the collapse of the USSR, El'tsin quite often sided with the Baltic states in his struggle against Gorbachev and the Soviet establishment; after the end of the empire, the Russian Federation not surprisingly inherited not only the USSR's seat in the United Nations, but also some of its interests. Russia's policy has several sides, but one interesting feature of it is certainly what was labelled by Henry Huttenbach as The Sudeten Syndrome—the emergence of a post-Soviet principle of expansionism in the name of defending 25 million Russians abroad.⁶⁶

Estonia's citizenship policy (the fact that most residents were not granted automatic citizenship in Estonia as they were in Lithuania) was a major irritant for Russian political circles in 1992–93. On 17 July 1992 the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation passed a resolution accusing Estonia of 'flagrant violations' of human rights and the Estonian-Russian Treaty (signed on 12 January 1991) and threatening Estonia with

economic sanctions. The Russian government raised the issue in various international forums too, and also linked the troop withdrawal from Estonia to the rights of the local Russians. Still, the power struggle and instability in Russia itself in 1991–93 dramatically reduced its capacity to put pressure on Estonia. Russia's attempts to garner official Western support for its condemnation of Estonia's human rights record in 1991–93 largely failed. Generally speaking, the 1991–93 phase in Russian-Estonian relations was still marked by a quite visible retreat of the former imperial heartland.

The Western governments and the major interstate organisations (like the CSCE, the Baltic Sea Council, Council of Europe, etc.) were either supportive or neutral as far as Estonia's citizenship and minorities policy was concerned.⁶⁷ The mainstream Western position was to demand quick Russian troop withdrawal from the Baltic, and strongly to oppose any linkage between the troop withdrawal and citizenship policy. For example, the US Senate voted on 1 July 1992 to tie American aid to Russian troop withdrawal from the Baltic. Unless the White House could certify in a year's time that Russia had made 'significant progress' in withdrawing its troops and ending military activities in the region, US aid would be restricted to humanitarian aid only, the bill said.⁶⁸ In September 1992 the Secretary of State, Lawrence Eagleburger, advised the Estonian Foreign Minister, Jaan Manitski, that the US Administration had no objections to Estonia's handling of citizenship and human rights issues.⁶⁹ In January 1993 David Atkinson, the Chairman of a Committee of the Council of Europe, declared that Estonia would be recommended for European Council membership. In a reference to Estonia's minority problems, Atkinson also mentioned the 1949 Geneva convention on the impermissibility of settlement of occupied territory by the occupying country.⁷⁰ Atkinson stressed that people applying for Estonian citizenship should realise that it was impossible to grant it automatically to all those who came to a country in the course of migration processes 'unparalleled in history'.⁷¹ Although there were also some mild criticisms of Estonia's minorities policy by other officials of the Council of Europe and CSCE,⁷² those criticisms did not shape the overall picture. An official CSCE report, which was made public in February 1993, emphasised that Estonia's laws 'correspond to international norms'. The 1993 annual human rights report by the US State Department was also favourable to Estonia.⁷³ The Estonian Foreign Minister announced in March 1993 that Estonia 'had won' the propaganda battle about the rights of the Russian minority on the level of Western governments.⁷⁴

While the official governmental reaction from the West in 1991–93 was friendly to Estonia, the reaction on the level of mass media, human rights organisations, etc., was mixed, with quite a significant segment disparaging the Estonian (Baltic) record of treatment of minorities. For example, Frank Fukuyama claimed in *The New York Times* in December 1992 that Estonia had passed and Latvia had proposed 'discriminatory citizenship laws'.⁷⁵

Perhaps the most important among those faultfinding assessments was the position taken by such human rights organisations as Helsinki Watch and Freedom House. The 1993 annual report of Helsinki Watch emphasised that

no one denies that the governments have the right to adopt citizenship laws, yet special considerations should be given to Russians and others who moved to the Baltic states at a time when the Soviet republics were all one country. Therefore, comparing the Baltic citizenship laws that apply to the established residents with European or American laws on new immigrants is misleading because it equates two groups that are dissimilar. The first category of people had no way of foreseeing a change in their political status, whereas the latter consciously make this change.⁷⁶

In addition, Helsinki Watch emphasised specifically that 'persons with established ties of residence to a former [Soviet] republic should be presumptively eligible for citizenship in the state the republic has become, whether or not other criteria (such as *jus soli* or *jus sanguini*) would be met'. This principle—according to Helsinki Watch—applies regardless of 'whether one views the Soviet presence in the former republic as an illegal occupation'.⁷⁷ The critical tone of Helsinki Watch was echoed by another US based organisation, Freedom House, which published its 1993 comparative study of world freedom in February 1993. Estonia was listed among the countries where the human rights situation had deteriorated: in 1992 it was listed as a 'free' country, while the 1993 survey classified it as 'partly free'. There were only three countries in the world (Estonia, Latvia and Venezuela) which fell from the free to the partly free category in 1993. The survey noted that Estonia 'adopted steps to restrict citizenship and exclude Russian-speaking inhabitants'.⁷⁸

Summing up, we may say that international pressures in 1991–93 worked in two directions: the position of Russia and certain public figures and human rights organisations in the West pushed Estonia toward liberalisation of the restorationist approach to citizenship matters, whereas the generally friendly and supportive approach by the Western governments helped Estonia to make those changes slowly and keep the basic principles of its policy intact. Compared with many other post-communist states (Moldova, former Yugoslavia, the Transcaucasian states, even former Czechoslovakia) the minorities and citizenship policy in Estonia in 1991–93 was relatively successful: the visible signs of ethnic tensions diminished; violence or active separatism on ethnic grounds was avoided; Estonia's integration into European and other international organisations was successful, in spite of its slightly tarnished human rights image. But this success was of course still quite fragile and preliminary, since the transition to capitalism in Estonia was barely beginning.

In a more general sense the 1991–93 situation around Estonia was just one side-effect of the identity search by the former Soviet bloc in general, and by its former heartland—Russia—in particular. Zbigniew Brzezinski has rightly emphasised that 'whatever economic policy the post-communist Russian leadership pursues, the political and economic prospects for Russia in the near term are in any case fundamentally unfavourable'.⁷⁹

If a pro-Western regime prevails in Russia, the former Soviet bloc will largely remain an underdeveloped periphery of Western Europe, a periphery where countries are competing to get closer to the inner circle of the European Community. In this case, Estonia with its small and relatively flexible economy may have a better chance than most of the other former Soviet republics to join the club of advanced nations at some point in the future, which in turn may also considerably ease the ethnic tensions in Estonia. If, on the other hand, a nationalist, authoritarian, xenophobic and anti-Western government comes into power in Russia, Estonia may be one of the most likely directions of the possible new Russian expansion. A radical anti-Western turn in Russia will make Estonia either a frontline state in a Europe divided once again (which may even increase Western help in the short run), or a place of violent post-communist ethnic strife. Since Estonia is small, open, and so dependent on Western help, the possibility of a purely domestic authoritarian turn in Estonia can easily be excluded—a non-democratic regime in Estonia can be imposed only from outside.

I have mentioned already that one of the megatrends in the post-communist world is the continuing visibility of ethnic conflict and the drive for self-determination. In fact, this trend is at least two-three centuries old and—although theoretically it should wither away in the modern 'global village'—it shows signs of getting stronger every year. If—as Ernest Gellner has succinctly pointed out—nationalism is a product of industrialism and universal literal high culture,⁸⁰ then there are no automatic reasons why the world with computers, space shuttles and CNN is less susceptible to nationalist pressures than the world with typewriters, aeroplanes and telephones. Of course, if the Western industrial democracies succeed over the next 10–20 years in creating a truly workable international civil society, at least in the economically most advanced part of the globe (a goal which is still very far from being achieved), then this new supranational system may make obsolete some types of ethnic conflicts that are now going on in the periphery of the advanced capitalist world.

¹ I would like to acknowledge the generous support of the United States Institute of Peace for a research project, which made the writing of this article possible. The opinions, findings and conclusions or recommendations expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Institute of Peace.

² This article covers the events until June 1993. There was a certain growth of ethnic tensions in Estonia in June 1993. Whether summer 1993 marks the beginning of a new phase in ethnic relations in Estonia remains to be seen.

³ Cf. Walter C. Clemens, *Baltic Independence and Russian Empire* (New York, St Martin's Press, 1991), p. 2.

⁴ Cf. Toivo U. Raun, *Estonia and the Estonians* (Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press, 1991), p. 213.

⁵ Romuald J. Misiunas & Rein Taagepera, *The Baltic States: Years of Dependence, 1940–1980* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, CA, University of California Press, 1983), p. 209.

- ⁶ Alexander Motyl, "Building Bridges and Changing Landmarks: Theory and Concepts in the Study of Soviet Nationalities", in Alexander Motyl, ed., *Thinking Theoretically About Soviet Nationalities* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1992), pp. 264–266.
- ⁷ Marje Joeste et al., eds, *Eesti A & O* (Tallinn, Eesti Entsüklopeediakirjastus, 1993), p. 96; Marje Joeste et al., eds, *The Baltic States. A Reference Book* (Tallinn, Estonian Encyclopaedia Publishers, 1991), p. 15; Raun, *Estonia and the Estonians ...*, p. 247.
- ⁸ Source: Family Registration Office of the Republic of Estonia. Unfortunately the Office does not have ethnic statistics for the post-1990 period.
- ⁹ *Hommikuleht*, 16 June 1993, p. 3.
- ¹⁰ *Riigi Teataja*, 11, 9 March 1993, pp. 259–260.
- ¹¹ Cf. the text of the Estonian citizenship law in *Riigi Teataja*, 2, 1938, pp. 1339–1343. The citizenship law implementation decision is published in *Riigi Teataja*, 7, 5 March 1992, pp. 175–176.
- ¹² *The Monthly Survey of Baltic and Post-Soviet Politics*, October 1992, p. 15. (*The Monthly Survey* is an English-language periodical, published in Tallinn, Estonia.)
- ¹³ Jaan Laas, ed., *Eesti kroonika, 1990* (Tallinn, Esintell, 1991), p. 32.
- ¹⁴ *The Baltic Independent*, 12–18 February 1993, p. 3. (*The Baltic Independent* is an English-language weekly, published in Tallinn, Estonia.)
- ¹⁵ *The Monthly Survey of Baltic and Post-Soviet Politics*, February 1993, p. 15.
- ¹⁶ *The Monthly Survey of Baltic and Post-Soviet Politics*, November–December 1992, p. 29.
- ¹⁷ *Molodezh' Estonii*, 24 March 1993, p. 1.
- ¹⁸ *The Monthly Survey of Baltic and Post-Soviet Politics*, February 1993, p. 16.
- ¹⁹ *Rahva Hääl*, 26 April 1993, p. 1.
- ²⁰ *Päevaleht*, 22 September 1992, p. 2.
- ²¹ *RFE/RL Daily Report*, 80, 28 April 1993.
- ²² Aksel Kirch, Marika Kirch & Tarmo Tuisk, *The Non-Estonian Population Today and Tomorrow. A Sociological Overview* (Tallinn, Estonian Academy of Sciences, 1992), pp. 9, 24.
- ²³ *Ibid.*, p. 17.
- ²⁴ Alla Litvinova, "Russian-Speaking Population of North-East Estonia", *The Monthly Survey of Baltic and Post-Soviet Politics*, November–December 1992, p. 45.
- ²⁵ *Trud v SSSR* (Moscow, Finansy i statistika, 1988), p. 22.
- ²⁶ Raun, *Estonia and the Estonians ...*, pp. 190–195.
- ²⁷ Cf. the biographies of the deputies in Jaan Kelder & Indrek Mustmets, eds, *Keda me valisime* (Tartu, Tartumaa, 1993).
- ²⁸ Cf. Raun, *Estonia and the Estonians ...*, pp. 190–195; Romuald J. Misiunas & Rein Taagepera, "The Baltic States: Years of Dependence, 1980–86", *Journal of Baltic Studies*, 20, 1, Spring 1989, pp. 69–70.
- ²⁹ Cf. Ülo Karu, ed., *Kes on kes eesti poliitikas?* (Tallinn, Eesti Entsüklopeediakirjastus, 1992), p. 83; Kelder & Mustmets, *Keda me valisime? ...*, p. 250.
- ³⁰ *The Monthly Survey of Baltic and Post-Soviet Politics*, February 1993, p. 21.
- ³¹ Source: Police Department of the Republic of Estonia.
- ³² Cf. *Eesti Vabariigi Põhiseadus* (Tallinn, Olion, 1992), pp. 18–48. The local elections law, adopted on 19 May 1993, specifies that non-citizens can vote but are not allowed to stand as candidates in local elections. Cf. *Estoniya*, 20 May 1993, p. 1.
- ³³ The data for 1990–92 are taken from *Eesti õppeasutused* (Tallinn, Eesti Vabariigi Riiklik Statistikaamet, 1992), p. 10; the data about the situation on 29 December 1992 are from the Statistical Office of Estonia.
- ³⁴ *Estonia. A Statistical Profile* (Tallinn, Statistical Office of Estonia, 1992), p. 105.
- ³⁵ *Rahva Hääl*, 6 May 1993, p. 1.
- ³⁶ Leokadiya Drobizheva, *Dukhovnaya obshchnost' narodov SSSR* (Moscow, Nauka, 1981), p. 80.
- ³⁷ Kirch, Kirch & Tuisk, *The Non-Estonian Population Today and Tomorrow ...*, p. 5.
- ³⁸ *Eesti Statistika*, 1, 1993, p. 55.
- ³⁹ Ben Slay, "East European Economies", *RFE/RL Research Report*, 2, 1, 1 January 1993, p. 114.
- ⁴⁰ *The Monthly Survey of Baltic and Post-Soviet Politics*, February 1993, p. 14.
- ⁴¹ The Charter of the Chamber was registered by the government of Estonia on 5 February 1993. Cf. *Riigi Teataja*, 8, 17 February 1993, pp. 181–188.
- ⁴² "Address to: President of the Republic of Estonia Mr Lennart Meri, President of the Russian Federation Mr Boris Yeltsin, Prime Minister of the Republic of Estonia Mr Mart Laar, Acting Prime Minister of the Russian Federation Mr Yegor Gaidar", *The Monthly Survey of Baltic and Post-Soviet Politics*, January 1993, p. 28.
- ⁴³ *Estoniya*, 29 March 1993, p. 1.
- ⁴⁴ *Rahva Hääl*, 16 April 1993, p. 1.

- 45 *Eesti Statistika*, 1, 1993, p. 51.
- 46 *Rahva Hää*, 18 June 1993, p. 2.
- 47 *PlanEcon. Review and Outlook. Analysis and Forecasts to 1996 of Economic Developments in the Former Soviet Republics*, November 1992, p. 27.
- 48 Joeste & et al., eds, *Eesti A & O ...*, pp. 125–131.
- 49 Jaan Laas, ed., *Eesti kroonika, 1992* (Tallinn, Esintell, 1992), p. 35.
- 50 Joeste, ed., *Eesti A & O ...*, p. 131.
- 51 *The Baltic Independent*, 17–23 January 1992, p. 5.
- 52 J. Laas, ed., *Eesti kroonika, 1992 ...*, p. 37.
- 53 *Rahva Hää*, 3 February 1993, p. 1.
- 54 *Estoniya*, 2 February 1993, p. 1.
- 55 *The Monthly Survey of Baltic and Post-Soviet Politics*, February 1993, pp. 27–28.
- 56 *The Baltic Independent*, 5–11 February 1993, p. 7.
- 57 *Estoniya*, 16 January 1993, p. 1.
- 58 *Päevaleht*, 29 March 1993, p. 2.
- 59 There were only 18.5% of Estonians among the population of the north-east of Estonia in 1993 (in Ida-Virumaa county and in the towns of Narva, Sillamäe and Kohtla-Järve). Cf. *Severnoe-poberezh'e*, 26 May 1993, p. 4.
- 60 *The Baltic Independent*, 26 June – 2 July 1992, p. 3.
- 61 *The Baltic Independent*, 24–30 July 1992, p. 3.
- 62 *FBIS-SOV-92-184*, 22 September 1992, p. 65.
- 63 *Severnoe poberezh'e*, 2 June 1993, p. 1.
- 64 *Rahva Hää*, 3 March 1993, p. 2.
- 65 *Hommikuleht*, 17 June 1993, p. 5.
- 66 Henry Huttenbach, "The Sudeten Syndrome: The Emergence of A Post-Soviet Principle for Russian Expansionism", *Association for the Study of Nationalities (Eurasia and Eastern Europe). Analysis of Current Events*, 4, 3, 1993, pp. 1–3.
- 67 On the general background of US policy toward the Baltic states see, for example, Robert A. Vitas, *The United States and Lithuania: The Stimson Doctrine of Nonrecognition* (New York, Praeger, 1990), pp. 8–131; "Russians in Estonia", in *Minority Rights: Problems, Parameters, and Patterns in the CSCE Context*, compiled by the Staff of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (Washington, DC [no publication year given]), pp. 85–98; Morton H. Halperin & David J. Scheffer with Patricia L. Small, *Self-Determination in the New World Order* (Washington, DC, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1992), pp. 11, 27–29, 83, 141.
- 68 *The Baltic Independent*, 10–16 July 1992, p. 3.
- 69 *Postimees*, 24 March 1993, p. 10.
- 70 *Rahva Hää*, 20 January 1992, p. 1.
- 71 *FBIS-SOV-93-013*, 22 January 1993, p. 89.
- 72 Cf. for example, a report on the criticisms by the High Commissioner of the CSCE for ethnic minorities: *Päevaleht*, 25 January 1993, p. 1.
- 73 *The Baltic Independent*, 12–18 February 1993, p. 10.
- 74 *Rahva Hää*, 5 March 1993, p. 1.
- 75 *The New York Times*, 19 December 1992.
- 76 *Human Rights Watch World Report 1993* (New York, Human Rights Watch, 1992), p. 218.
- 77 *Helsinki Watch*, 4, 7, 15 April 1992, p. 6.
- 78 *Freedom Review*, 24, 1, February 1993, p. 8.
- 79 Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Out of Control: Global Turmoil on the Eve of the Twenty-First Century* (New York, A Robert Stewart Book, 1993), p. 173.
- 80 Ernest Gellner, "Nationalism in the Vacuum", in Motyl, ed., *Thinking Theoretically About Soviet Nationalities ...*, pp. 244–245.