

FROM PERESTROIKA TO COLD CIVIL WAR: REFLECTIONS ON THE SOVIET DISINTEGRATION CRISIS*

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1. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

The Civil War was already underway in the Soviet Union when Boris Yeltsin, in his speech at the Democratic Russia Conference on 9 March 1991, called upon Russian opposition to set up a powerful democratic party, declared "war" on the central leadership, and accused President Gorbachev of lying. This has been primarily a *Cold Civil War*, fought mainly through speeches, articles, editorials, TV broadcasts, and street demonstrations – although in some places from Lithuania to Georgia it has at times also escalated into real war with human casualties.

The Cold Civil War is a part of the Soviet crisis of disintegration, a crisis which seems to be the most significant event in international political history since the emergence of the bipolar world after World War II.

The Soviet disintegration crisis is a process of transition. Most probably it will mean a transformation of the current Soviet Union into a cluster of independent and semi-independent states – some of which may be in the future united with federative and confederative ties; the others, on the basis of interstate alliances. The years 1985–91 mark only a beginning of this process. It will inevitably continue in the general historical sense, but it may also have reversals and setbacks, with periods of pro-Kremlin counter-revolutions and restorations. The whole process may take decades.

The Soviet disintegration crisis is a manifestation of the painful agony of the command-economy based mode of production, a mode of production remarkable for its reliance on extensive growth and the destruction of the environment. It is also a nationalities crisis – a period of struggle for national self-determination in various forms, from cultural autonomy to the separate state.

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Finally, as indicated above, the Soviet disintegration crisis marks an end of the bipolar world. The Soviet Union is historically finished as a military superpower, although it may take considerable time until this historical fact can be translated into the language of concrete figures for Soviet defence industry production and armed forces deployment plans.¹ Whether the new world order will be one of unipolar US domination in the near future or an immediate transition to multipolarity is of course another question – I will not speculate about this topic here.

2. A REVOLUTION FROM ABOVE

March seems to be a crucial month in recent Soviet history: Gorbachev was elected General-Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party in March 1985; the first semi-free All-Union parliamentary elections in the USSR were held in March 1989; Lithuania declared its independence in March 1990. So it was not so surprising that the Soviet referendum on the preservation of the unity of the USSR took place in March 1991, and that political analysts are disposed to believe that something will happen again in March 1992.

The first phase of the Soviet disintegration crisis may be called a *revolution from above*. Its story is well known. It was a perestroika in the classic sense, highlighted by the "acceleration" of scientific and technological progress through command-economy methods; by the introduction of glasnost or limited freedom of expression;² by "new thinking" in foreign policy. The revolution from above started in March 1985; its manifesto was Gorbachev's book *Perestroika*.³ In 1987, after his initial economic reform had proved a failure, Gorbachev added an element of democratisation to the package of his measures.

The period 1985–89 saw a phase of unleashing the revolutionary processes, of relaxation of the CPSU's total grip over society. The first signs of the emerging disintegration and nationalities troubles displayed themselves during that period; "the character of the problem posed by the multi-ethnic makeup of the Soviet state was transformed."⁴ Violent protests broke out in Alma-Ata in December 1986 against Gorbachev's decision to replace the republican party chief; Crimean Tatars and other deported nationalities began to claim back their rights for some territorial autonomy; a bloody conflict in and around Nagorno-Karabakh erupted in Transcaucasus; and the Estonian Supreme Soviet made a first move in the "war of the laws", declaring republican sovereignty and its right to veto All-Union laws.

3. THE LEGALIZATION OF THE PARLIAMENTARY OPPOSITION

The next phase started with the elections to the USSR Congress of People's Deputies in March 1989 and may be identified as a period of the *legalization of the parliamentary opposition*. The main outcome of these elections was the fact that now at least 10% of the members of the USSR parliament regularly identified themselves as a legal democratic opposition to the ruling Communist elite. Among the Baltic deputies to the USSR parliament, the representatives of the democratic opposition forces were even dominant. During that period Gorbachev's policy took on new features – instead of initiating changes, he was reacting to the events unleashed by him. And Gorbachev's reaction was by and large a strategic retreat from orthodox Communist and imperial positions, under the pressure from below. The collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe in the Fall of 1989 was the most vivid example of this withdrawal. A similar pattern can be traced when the Kremlin watched helplessly as Lithuania (May 1989), Latvia (July 1989), Azerbaijan (September 1989), Georgia (November 1989 and March 1990) declared their sovereignty and their right to veto All-Union laws. On certain occasions the Kremlin tried to crack down and halt the disintegration processes by force, as in Tbilisi in April 1989 and in Baku in January 1990. But in the long run these bloody and tragic efforts to regain control proved counter-productive – they increased the political cost of maintaining the empire, eroded Gorbachev's political image within the USSR, and (at least in the Georgian case) only strengthened the anti-Soviet movements.

4. DISINTEGRATION IN THE PERIPHERY

In March 1990 the *disintegration in the periphery* of the Soviet empire started. It was pre-determined by the fact that the 1990 elections to republican parliaments in the Baltic states and some other Soviet republics were largely free and resulted in the victory of non-Communist and pro-independent political forces.⁵ The disintegration developments were most vibrant in the Baltic area. On 11 March 1990 the newly-elected Lithuanian parliament adopted the act 'On Restoration of Independent Lithuanian State' declaring this tiny Baltic nation independent of the USSR. Although the Lithuanian move led to the imposition of economic blockade by Moscow, the Lithuanian position was never seriously challenged by Gorbachev. The Kremlin was again relatively passive when Estonia (in March and May 1990) and Latvia (in May 1990) adopted a series of measures declaring the transition periods to complete independence. In May 1990 the Baltic states formally restored their pre-WWII political alliance and started to pursue intensive foreign policy, seeking support for their independence drive from the Western countries.

⁵ Originally published in *Bulletin of Peace Proposals*, 1991, 22, 3, 237-244.

5. THE KREMLIN VS. MOSCOW: THE TRANSITION TO DUAL POWER

In May 1990 Gorbachev's arch-rival Boris Yeltsin (who was to leave the Communist Party later in July) was elected Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Republic, and on 11 June the RSFSR parliament adopted a declaration 'On State Sovereignty of Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic'. In essence this meant that the largest of the Soviet republics (containing half of the USSR's population and producing more than 90% of its oil) had now done – at least formally – the same thing which tiny Estonia had done in November 1988. This meant the *transition to dual power* in the USSR, the start of a period of deep conflict of territorial and functional power structures in the Soviet Union. On the one hand there was now the Kremlin city-state, with army, banks, and diplomatic representations abroad, but no territory. On the other hand there were republics, with territory but no strong functional power mechanisms. This conflict between the Kremlin and Moscow, between the Center and the Republics, is certainly one of the most interesting features of the patterns of the Soviet imperial breakdown.

The RSFSR sovereignty declaration triggered an avalanche of similar declarations by the other union republics. To declare the sovereignty and the supremacy of republican laws over the All-Union ones was no longer heresy, it had become a norm of political behavior in the USSR. Uzbekistan and Moldova adopted sovereignty declarations in June, Belorussia and the Ukraine in July, Turkmenia and Tajikistan in August, Kazakhstan in October, and Kirgizia in December. A more radical and independence-oriented declaration was adopted by Armenia in August. The election of a member of the Karabakh Committee, Levon Ter-Petrosyan, as the Chairman of the Armenian Supreme Soviet in August 1990 demonstrated that the Communist Party had lost control over the Armenian Parliament and that Armenia would increasingly come to follow a secessionist path. In June 1990 one of the leaders of Moldova's Popular Front announced that the Front's ultimate goal must be 'the reunification of Romanian territories East of the Prut in an independent state – the Romanian Republic of Moldova'. In August 1990 Moldova's President Mircea Snegur suspended his Communist Party membership. All this demonstrated clearly that secessionist forces were getting stronger in Moldova, too.

Gorbachev reacted to the growing disintegration crisis in summer 1990 with a proposal to work out and sign a new Union Treaty of the USSR, replacing the 1922 Treaty and expanding the rights of the republics. But, at least for the Baltic states and for Armenia, Moldova, and Georgia, the idea of a New Union Treaty was already 'too little, too late'.

6. POLARIZATION OF POLITICAL FORCES

When Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze unexpectedly announced his resignation on 20 December 1990, he warned: 'A dictatorship is on the offensive. I tell you this with full responsibility. No one knows what this dictatorship will be like, what kind of dictator will come to power and what kind of order will be established.' The replacement of liberals around Gorbachev with Communist Party conservatives like Boris Pugo and Gennadii Yanayev, the rejection of the plan of the market-oriented economic reforms (Shatalin plan) by Gorbachev in October, the re-introduction of censorship for Central Television, the acts granting to President Gorbachev almost dictatorial powers through parliamentary decisions in September and December – all these are usually taken as irrefutable signs of an offensive by the Communist Party conservatives. But I would say that the period which started tentatively in September–October 1990 was rather one of the *polarization of political forces*. This was a polarization in the most primary sense: the conservative forces consolidated their positions in the Kremlin and around President Gorbachev, while the liberal and democratic forces became entrenched in the republics.

The polarization period was marked by the rise of 'horizontal' interrepublican diplomacy. One of the most remarkable developments in this direction was the signing of the Russian–Ukrainian ten-year bilateral agreement in November 1990, covering also political issues. Another feature of the polarization period was a clear representation crisis in Soviet foreign policy. That became particularly vivid in November 1990 in Paris during the CSCE meeting, when Gorbachev protested against the presence of Baltic representatives as guests. Although the French government satisfied the Soviet demands and abolished the guest status of the Baltic representatives, this was nevertheless a clear sign that domestic troubles were now following Gorbachev abroad, and that the Kremlin could no longer remain independent from the separatist republics in its foreign policy.

In November 1990 the secessionist front of the Soviet republics was further extended: after the victory of the non-Communist parties at elections to the Georgian Supreme Soviet, a veteran dissident Zviad Gamsakhurdia was elected as Chairman of the Georgian parliament. Gamsakhurdia has stated that he envisages a five-year transition period to complete independence for the Georgian state.

The polarization phase was connected with the significant aggravation of 'Matryosha-type conflicts'. Now, *Matryosha* is a Russian doll, a very popular souvenir. It is possible to open every large *Matryosha* doll. Inside the large doll there is a smaller one, inside the smaller one there is an even smaller doll, and so on. By 'Matryosha-type conflicts' I mean here conflicts with minorities and smaller autonomous state units inside the secessionist republics. Although the problems of the minorities (Russian minorities in Estonia and Latvia; Russian and Polish minorities in Lithuania; Russian and Gagauz minorities in Moldova; Ossetian and

Abkhazian minorities in Georgia; etc.) had been in focus before, the Fall of 1990 marked a certain aggravation of the problem. In August 1990 the Gagauz minority in Moldova proclaimed the formation of the Gagauz Soviet Socialist Republic, and in September the Slavic minority stated that they had formed a Dniestr Soviet Socialist Republic on the left bank of the Dniestr. These 'republics' were strongly supportive of the unity of the USSR. A more violent scenario of the same kind was played out in Georgia. In September 1990 the South Ossetian Autonomous *Oblast* inside Georgia proclaimed itself a separate republic. The attempts of the Georgian authorities to crack down on this separatist movement were to escalate into real war later in 1990.

7. COLD CIVIL WAR

The next period started in January 1991 when the Kremlin attempted to regain control over Lithuania and other Baltic states by military force. The bloody crackdown in Vilnius and in Riga marked a beginning of the *Cold Civil War*. As I said above, the Cold Civil War is characterized by a certain degree of the use of force. It is significant that the pattern of the Kremlin's use of force itself is changing, taking on interventionist, 'internationalist' features. In 1989 in Tbilisi and in 1990 in Baku it was possible for the Soviet leadership to use 'Tiananmen Square tactics' to crack down on opposition movements, relying to a certain extent on existing local government structures. The 1989 and 1990 crackdowns were by and large 'domestic crackdowns', with the Soviet authorities behaving as if they were in their 'own country'. By contrast, the 1991 January crackdown in Riga and in Vilnius more resembled the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia with all the characteristic features, including the setting up of the puppet centers of power (the National Salvation Committees). The January 1991 events symbolized the introduction of the neo-Brezhnevist doctrine by the Gorbachev government, proclaiming the limited sovereignty of independence-minded republics.

The Cold Civil War has been characterized by growing indecisiveness and retreat on the part of the Kremlin. The February and March 1990 referendums in the Baltic republics destroyed the myth that the majority of the people of these republics were against secession from the USSR. The 17 March 1991 All-Union referendum demonstrated vividly that Gorbachev's government was unable to organize the vote in the Baltic states, Moldova, Georgia, and Armenia: the central power had lost effective control over many spheres of life in those republics. Although support for the Union in Russia itself was considerable, the referendum in Russia was primarily a defeat for the Kremlin, because Yeltsin got (against Gorbachev's will) backing for the establishment of the Russian presidency.

In sum, then, we may say that the loss of the six small secessionist republics by the Soviet government was in a sense formalized through their successful boycott of the referendum. Although the referendum gave

overall endorsement to Gorbachev's idea of preserving the Soviet Union, it did not solve any of the basic dilemmas facing the All-Union political leadership in Spring 1991.

8. APOCALYPTIC TRENDS

It is impossible to predict the future of the Soviet Union in any precise manner. Walter Laqueur has rightly observed: 'Before 1985 nothing seemed possible except perpetuation of the status quo; today there is an almost endless variety of possibilities.'⁶ But we may at least outline some basic trends and conditions relevant for the Soviet future.

First, democratization inevitably leads to the disintegration of the USSR. Only a command-economy-based totalitarian regime can keep the Soviet empire together. I would argue also that even a market-economy-based right-wing dictatorship (on the model of Franco's Spain or South Korea at certain stages of its development) would not be capable of preserving the unity of the USSR. There are many reasons indicating that this statement is true or at least very close to being true: the Soviet Union has more than 130 nationalities, most of them living on their historical homelands; all the comparable empires in history have disintegrated; there are a great number of territorial disputes between the Soviet republics and different nationalities; the Soviet republics differ greatly in the level of their socio-economic development, culture, resource allocation (the Soviet Union in fact resembles a federation of such totally different areas as North and South America and China); and so on. But the best proof of the fragility of the USSR is the history of the past six years itself. As soon as the Brezhnevist totalitarian regime was relaxed after 1985, the Soviet empire started to fall apart.

Secondly, there is no hope for quick economic recovery in the Soviet Union. On the contrary, it is quite reasonable to believe that the economic decline will continue with increasing speed throughout 1991 and probably beyond. According to official Soviet statistics, in 1989 Soviet GNP still rose 3% (compared with the 1988 level).⁷ By contrast in 1990, for the first time in many years, Soviet GNP fell 2% according to the official Soviet assessment and inflation was more than 19%.⁸ In the USA, the CIA estimated that Soviet GNP fell in 1990 by 5% and that inflation at the beginning of 1991 was more than 40%.⁹ Some Soviet specialists have predicted at least a 15% drop in GNP for 1991.¹⁰ There have even been some warnings about the possibility of a 40–50% slump in overall Soviet production.¹¹

One does not need to be an economist to understand that even the best possible market-oriented economic reform in the USSR will be socially extremely painful and will not yield quick positive results. But the best possible reform is of course out of the question – at least for the time being there are no signs that the USSR government has a coherent strategy for shifting to a market economy. Gorbachev's plan for the transition to a

market economy (accepted in October 1990) was worded in deliberately vague and watered-down language.¹² Ed Hewett was right, writing at the end of 1990, that 'the next few months will be much like the last few: enormous confusion and contention while economic decline and political disintegration intensify'.¹³ At least the actual economic policy of the Soviet government during the first months of 1991 suggests that it is attempting to rely heavily on the old-style command-economy methods.

Thirdly, if we assume that the Soviet economy is in fact collapsing, then it is also not difficult to predict that economic anarchy will sooner or later lead to some form of political crackdown. Of course, the nature of this possible future dictatorship cannot be easily predicted. It may well take the form of an attempt to restore the old-fashioned Brezhnevist Communist order. But in this case history will just repeat itself, and in 5–10 years' time a new perestroika will commence – only from a worse initial position. Or the future dictatorship might be an authoritarian one, oriented toward a transition to a market economy. In the latter case, there is at least hope that, after several years of hardship, a more efficient mode of production can emerge from the ruins of the command economy. But, as indicated above, I do not think that an authoritarian regime based on a market economy is able to maintain the unity of the USSR.

Fourthly, it seems clear that it is already impossible for the Kremlin to restore the unity of the USSR without extensive use of force, involving considerable bloodshed. The possession of firearms by civilians¹⁴ (especially in Armenia and Georgia); the existence of various locally controlled paramilitary, police, and security formations in Transcaucasus, Moldova, and the Baltic states; the resoluteness of the pro-independence forces in many republics; the already obtained experience of armed fighting (first of all in Transcaucasus) – all this indicates that the attempt to regain control over all the Soviet territories may well become a military problem. Some analysts are even convinced that the Soviet government lacks sufficient force to crack down.¹⁵

But even if the actual armed fighting in the case of a large-scale crackdown should be limited to Transcaucasus, it is difficult to conceive how the Kremlin could silence the rebellious parliaments or mass movements in the Baltic states, Georgia, Armenia, Moldova without making arrests or expelling a number of the new wave politicians from the USSR. It would also be very difficult for Gorbachev (or any other Soviet ruler) to control the democratic opposition movements in other Soviet republics without resorting to repression. But at the same time it is clear that any large-scale wave of repression will inevitably destroy the public image of the leader who unleashes them. That applies also to Gorbachev's image abroad.

As stated above, it is impossible to predict the exact shape of the events to come. What we may say is that the future is likely to unfold in the light of the above described tendencies, and perhaps many other contradictory ones. The best scenario for the next 2–4 years, in my opinion, would be gradual transition of the USSR into a loose confederation consisting of the main Slavic republics, the Central Asian republics, and Azerbaijan. The

Baltic states, Georgia, Armenia, and Moldova could become at the same time de facto independent states.

Following that scenario, Gorbachev would during 1991 most probably continue his strategic retreat. He might even resign and hand over power to the Federation Council, or he might attempt to create a coalition government with the opposition forces. Such a scenario would offer at least some hope of meaningful economic reform in what remains of the USSR and also a hope that at least the Baltic states could create Western-type democratic societies. But the most desirable scenario is of course not necessarily the most likely one.

The basic problem for the All-Union political leadership and Soviet conservative political groups in general in the coming months will be: How willing are they to use force to restore Kremlin control over the USSR? It is easy to imagine a political form of a full-scale conservative takeover in the USSR: declaration of martial law; suspension of the activities of republican parliaments and other elected bodies, political movements, and parties; ban on strikes; bloody crackdown on resistance in the republics; tough censorship and attempts to isolate the USSR from the outside world; return to the traditional forms of centrally planned economy, with assurances that such 'temporary' return is needed to save the Soviet economy from collapse and that the transition to market economy will continue; promises to the West that the USSR will continue the 'new thinking' in the foreign policy, etc. It is also possible to predict that the social basis for such a tough new regime would be hardliners from the Communist Party apparatus and state bureaucracy; conservatives from the military, KGB, and Ministry of Internal Affairs; people from military units returning from Eastern Europe, humiliated, to bad housing; ethnic Russians escaping from the anti-Russian nationalism of the secessionist republics, etc.¹⁶ The question of course is whether these hardliners will have enough determination to carry out the above depicted actions. It seems to me that at least at present the hardliners lack the determination to attempt a full-scale crackdown and might instead try some truncated version of it.

9. THE SOVIET DISINTEGRATION: WHAT SHOULD THE WEST DO?

While it may be difficult to say what the Western countries should do at each concrete stage of the Soviet crisis, it is relatively easy to say what they should *not* do. They should not remain silent and passive if the Soviet government attempts to crush democratic opposition in Russia or secessionist governments in the republics. They should not retreat from their position of the non-recognition of the incorporation of the Baltic states into the Soviet Union. They should not personalize their policy towards Moscow, making it dependent on the personality of President Gorbachev or any other individual. They should understand that 'there is no way that the West can confer upon Gorbachev the political legitimacy that his own people have denied him'.¹⁷

The Western countries should not give any substantial economic aid to the command-economy oriented central government in Moscow until that government has changed its course fundamentally and launched a truly radical market-oriented economic reform in the Soviet Union.

We might also formulate at least some minimal positive suggestions. For example, it is clear that any Western investment in the sphere of independent printing, publishing, and broadcasting in the USSR (i.e. any help to the media, which are not controlled by the government) can only be positive. Everything that can be done to reduce the closed nature of Soviet society (through joint ventures in international telecommunications, opportunities for Soviet specialists to study abroad, various other forms of exchange of people and information) can only have positive results. It seems clear that Western governments should keep the dialogue and communications open with all the republics and major political forces in the USSR. Also, together with continuing the policy of the non-recognition of the 1940 incorporation of the Baltic states into the USSR, there are several other simple steps that the Western countries can take to help solve the Baltic issue: a gradual increase of Western diplomatic or semi-diplomatic presence in the Baltic states (starting with the establishment of the information bureaux and ending with full-scale diplomatic recognition of the democratically elected governments); official Western support for granting observer-status for the Baltic states in the CSCE and for the idea of an international conference to settle the Baltic problem.

Most probably, the Russian empire is now nearing the end of its at least 700-year-long cycle of growth and gradual expansion. It is also probable that after getting rid of the imperial burden the Russian state will have a good chance of transforming itself into one of the major economic powers of the future multipolar world. But the 'end of an empire' is a quick and fixed event only on a broad historical scale which measures reality in centuries and millennia. On the scale of years, the end of the Russian empire is a long process; on the scale of days and months, it is an exhausting and often tragic political struggle.

POSTSCRIPT

This article analyzes events up until March 1991. The first phase of the Cold Civil War ended in April 1991 with the agreement between Gorbachev and the leaders of the nine Soviet republics. Although tensions in the Baltic states, Transcaucasia and some other areas remained high after the April agreement, the intensity of conflicts within Russia itself was temporarily reduced. All the same, this truce in the Cold Civil War did not change the basic trends identified in this article. The active phase of the Cold Civil War will probably be resumed in a not too distant future, unless the Gorbachev government gradually hands over its power to the democratic forces.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

- 1 Even the most radical Great Russian nationalists seem to have recognized that the future Russia cannot be a military superpower. Cf. for example, Aleksandr Fomenko, 'My zhiviy – istoriya prodolzhayetsya' ('We are Alive – History Goes On'), *Nash sovremennik*, no. 8, 1990, p. 163.
- 2 Cf. A. Park, 'Global Security, Glasnost and the Retreat Dividend', *Government and Opposition*, vol. 26, 1991, pp. 75–84.
- 3 Mikhail S. Gorbachev, *Perestroika i novoye myshleniye dlya nashei strany i dlya vsego mira* (*Perestroika and the New Thinking for Our Country and for the World*) (Moscow: Politizdat, 1988), 272 pp.
- 4 Uri Ra'anan, 'The "Russian Problem": Conceptual and Operational Aspects', in Uri Ra'anan, ed., *The Soviet Empire: The Challenge of National and Democratic Movements* (Lexington, Toronto: Lexington Books, 1990), p. 64.
- 5 A rather good survey of the 1990 elections has been compiled by the staff of the US Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe: *Elections in the Baltic States and Soviet Republics* (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1990), 188 pp.
- 6 Walter Laqueur, 'The Moscow News, Tomorrow', *Encounter*, May 1990, p. 3.
- 7 SSSR v tsifrakh v 1989 godu (The USSR in Figures in 1989) (Moscow: Finansy i statistika, 1990), p. 9.
- 8 *Ekonomika i zhizn*, no. 5, January 1991, pp. 9–13. Quoted from: *FBIS-SOV-91-023*, 4 February 1991, p. 39.
- 9 *The Wall Street Journal*, 25 February 1991, p. A8.
- 10 *RFE/RL Daily Report*, no. 50, 12 March 1991, p. 5.
- 11 *Financial Times*, 27 March 1991, p. 1.
- 12 Cf. *Izvestiya*, 18 October 1990, pp. 1, 3.
- 13 Ed. A. Hewett, 'The New Soviet Plan', *Foreign Affairs*, Winter 1990/91, p. 166.
- 14 The Soviet Defense Ministry spokesman told TASS on 25 March 1991 that some 513,000 weapons had been handed over to Soviet military units in 1990–91. He claimed that about 70% of the total had been stolen from arms depots and servicemen (*RFE/RL Daily Report*, 27 March 1991, p. 5). One can only guess the number of weapons not returned to the military.
- 15 Dimitri Simes, 'Gorbachev's Time of Troubles', *Foreign Policy*, no. 82, Spring 1991, pp. 113–114.
- 16 See Peter Reddaway, 'The Quality of Gorbachev's Leadership', *Soviet Economy*, vol. 6, 1990, p. 138.
- 17 Martha Brill Olcott, 'The Soviet (Dis)-Union', *Foreign Policy*, Spring 1991, p. 136.