

WORLD WAR I AS A CRISIS OF MODERNIZATION IN FINLAND

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World War I was a turning point in the formation of the Finnish society. In 1914—1919 Finland went through a serious economic, political and social crisis including the civil war in 1918. It was the war and the collapse of the Russian Empire that launched the crisis, but in effect it was a crisis of the old social order. As a matter of fact the Finnish society was being rapidly modernized during 1914—1919. This took place in a very special way: it was not a result of winning independence, but — from a broader perspective — the history of the nation state (including the history of nationalism) was the major agent in the process of modernization, or, in other words, modernization *in this case* required the functioning of the nation state. In 1919 Finland was in a situation when rapid modernization became feasible, or even compulsory, for the reforms carried out in 1919—1921 were a political compromise the aim of which was to achieve a stability of the society after the Civil War. We may summarize it as follows — after WWI Finland was a far more modern society than before it. The following list of changes can illustrate the result of this process: The emergence of a modern (liberal) state where state power reflected the will of the citizens; The new Republic was not the result of a national plan, but a social compromise, a form of class-based democracy founded upon recognizing “social interests”; Public means of coercion to secure social order (not suppressing people) was established in 1918—1919; Modern (formal) bureaucracy was created, “servants of the people” nominated by the people to be responsible to the people; Local administration was renovated, now based to local citizenship; Modern state economy was established, including combined state budget system controlled by the parliament, fiscal regulation, protectionism as a tool of social policy, and state companies in the key sectors of the economy; Universal taxation became the nucleus of the state budget, progressive income tax and the idea of redistribution of wealth through the state were introduced. In this case modernization was not liberation from a strong state, instead the state was the main instrument in promoting it by interfering into the markets and in securing social stability. Modernization in Finland was, and has been ever since, a national state project based on political consensus. The years of the crisis in 1914—1918 were a hard lesson in learning the need of compromise. Although it may sound strange now, it was nationalism and socialism as civic religions that were the decisive ideologies in making the modern state of Finland. As a result of the experienced crisis there was not too much trust left in the doctrines of the freedom of man or of markets.

It is a commonplace notion in historiography to see wars as exceptional periods when the normal social development gets interrupted. As a result of this attitude, social changes taking place during the war are explained by the war itself, and usually these changes are, of course,

negative. An opposite standpoint is to see a war from the perspective of social history. Then it is easier to see that wars can produce essential social changes. This is the idea behind the title of this article.¹

World War I was in Finland a social crisis, a historical turning point when the existing social order broke down and something new — better or worse — occurred instead. This was in no way exceptional; in fact most great social changes — at least revolutions — have taken place through wars. This is because in normal conditions social institutions and structures are rather steady and competent in resisting changes. That is why there is needed an exceptionally strong disorder to fell the system, but when the latter begins to quake, the results might be much more dramatic than anyone could have imagined (think of the development that proceeded from the strikes in Gdansk up to the collapse of the USSR!).

Another point concerning the role of wars in history is that it is tempting to think that it was only the war that led history in an unfortunate direction. This is the easy explanation of the bolshevik coup and of the emergence of the socialist camp after WWII. However, if social history is taken more seriously, it is the inner organization of the society that should be the focus of the study. From this angle of approach WWI looks different: we may think that in exceptional times social structures become visible, and this affords an opportunity to study the foundations of society which normally are hidden (masked by ideological precepts). As a good example we may take here the Russian Empire whose social weaknesses were revealed by the crisis of WWI.

Now, is it correct to call WWI a crisis of modernization? I believe it is, because it was then that in most European countries, including Finland, the ancien regime was replaced by a modern social order. In 1920 Finland was a far more modern society than it was in 1914. Several features typical to ancien regime faded away in the social disintegration aroused by the War. In 1914—1920 the Finnish society went through an important reorganization.²

The most important social institution of the modern society (besides family) is the **liberal state**, i.e. such a society in which the state power is (formally and actually) based on and reflects the political will of the **citizens**. (The functioning of democracy, however, may vary from poor to perfect.)

Before the war Finland was a Grand Duchy of Russia, which means that **it was not a state** in its own right except in the fantasies of Finnish nationalists, for it actually was part of the Russian Empire. Yet it was true, and it has been a tradition in Finnish historiography to emphasize the fact that Finland enjoyed the so-called inner autonomy.³ In many ways Finnish institutions were separate from the Russian system; there was separate domestic legislation, including the parliament, local administration, Finnish citizenship and passport, national bank and currency, even customs border against Russia, etc. The Finnish civic society was based on Swedish tradition and was rather well developed in comparison with the other parts of the Empire. That included the high level

¹ This article is based on my forthcoming book «Kun yhteiskunta hajosi» — (As Order Collapsed), 1994, in which an extensive bibliography can be found. My understanding of several ideas is based on works by other Finnish scholars, of which I would like to mention Risto Alapuro, Matti Peltonen and Hannu Soikkanen. A broader analysis will be found also in **Haapala, P.** Social History in Modern Finland (forthcoming 1995).

² **Haapala, P.** Suomalainen yhteiskunta. — In: Itsenäistymisen vuodet. III. Helsinki, 1992, 128—131.

³ About this debate see: **Jussila, O.** Maakunnasta valtioksi. Porvoo, 1987.

of political organization that was admired by V. I. Lenin, who believed that "the socialist reorganization of Finland would be an easy job". National repression against Finns was mild and the plans of Russification were never realized.⁴ However, national autonomy did not mean the existence of a national state. The whole social organization was legally dependent on Russia, or more precisely, on the Emperor, as the Grand Duchy of Finland. This became easily noticeable during the War, when Finnish administration came under a strict Russian military and political control, when the Senate was occupied by the Russians and the state of war with all its emergency orders was declared in August 1914. Besides this legal dependence, Finns had to realize the political facts, namely that they could not escape the actual balance of political powers in Russia. So, Finns adapted themselves to the situation: the Finnish ruling class utilized the autocratic order to ensure its own privileges, whereas the lower classes often rested their hopes with the Emperor for carrying out social reforms. In 1917 the Finnish bourgeoisie formed an alliance with the Provisional Government against socialists who collaborated with Bolsheviks, and some tried for co-operation with Kornilov and other "White Russians". During the Finnish Civil War the Whites joined Imperial Germany and the Reds were ready to join the oncoming socialist Russia.⁵

This is to stress that the winning of independence was not as simple as nationalist historiography likes to remember it. The creation of liberal state in 1919 was not a conclusion of a long-term national plan, but it originated from current social pressures and political difficulties. When WWI and the Civil War broke down the old social order, the privileged classes were too weak to maintain their absolute power. After a six months' white dictatorship and the collapse of Germany, a political compromise was achieved: Finland became a liberal republic and the parliament became the nucleus of political power, which was not the case in 1906—1917. The political and legal structure that was then created has lasted almost unchanged until today. In comparison to many other western nations the Finnish social order was — and still is — state-dominated, but it is still democratic by nature.

The new political system was formally liberal but socially class-based, i.e. the major parties clearly represented different social classes. It was understood by everybody that politics was a compromise between "class interests". This may sound outdated now, but in those days this marxist slogan portrayed the idea of a new kind of state; the autocratic state on the other hand did not recognize social differences but tried to solve the contradictions by violence. The history of Nordic countries shows that class-based democracy as a form of modern state has perhaps been more successful than individual-based democracy.

Ideologies have always an important role to play in building up political systems. At the turn of the century the most powerful ideologies in Finland were nationalism (divided into elitist and popular forms) and socialism (which in its popular form may be very far from theoretical orthodoxy). These ideologies had certainly several conservative and collective features, yet in their social function they both reflected the first precondition of a modern state, which is citizenship. These ideologies were supported by the lower classes as they represented their cultural and social emancipation, i.e. their **identity as citizens**. It was

⁴ About comparisons to Baltic states see: **Alapuro, R.** *State and Revolution in Finland*. London, 1988, 221 ff.

⁵ **Polvinen, T.** *Venäjäin vallankumous ja Suomi 1917—1920*. I—II. Porvoo, 1867, 1971; **Ketola, E.** *Kansalliseen kansanvaltaan. Suomen itsenäisyys, sosiaalidemokratit ja Venäjäin vallankumous 1917*. Helsinki, 1987.

the incorporation of these people into the bourgeois society that prevented the founding of dictatorship of any kind, or other elitist power structures for that matter, like monarchy. Here nationalism and socialism (in its popular interpretation) worked in the same direction.⁶

Every state may not need a strong army to protect her territory, but it certainly needs armed forces, or other means of coercion, to protect the social order. This is not nice to say, but it is one of the lessons taught by history of WWI. The crisis in 1917—1918 in many ways resulted from the lack of enforcement power after the collapse of the Russian military rule. Thus it is not a surprise that the first and most expensive reform in Finland after the War was the founding of armed forces. Military service became compulsory for all men, which also put limits to the possibilities to use the army as a tool in politics.

Besides strong state and political democracy, modern bureaucracy was also built up after the war. By modern bureaucracy here is meant a bureaucracy that is free from political bigotry that officials serve the objective state while following legal procedures. Reliability of administration is certainly one of the key issues in the legitimacy of the society. This is another thing that did not work in Finland during the crisis. Finland had a long tradition in formal bureaucracy, but dependence of Russians at the top and paternalism and social distance at the local level, had disrupted the image of civil servants.

Still one more thing that was closely connected to the social and political crisis during the war: that was the question of local administration. Most people had no vote in municipal elections and this was the major dispute between labour movement and bourgeois parties before 1918. After the Civil War, communal reform was introduced and local democracy was established. This became an essential part of the national political life. In many cities social democrats came to dominate local administration, and landowners lost their monopoly of power in the countryside, too. This effectively integrated workers into the community, and stabilized the whole society. Local self-government had a long (if not always strong) tradition in Finland, and local administration was responsible for technical and social infrastructure (including schools and health care). Such activity was made possible by a rather high local income tax.

Before the war Finland had a state budget of her own, but it was organized in funds and controlled by the Emperor, not by the parliament. It was only after achieving independence that Finland got a modern budget system. The point here, however, is not the system as such, but the fact that the old system reflected premodern financial state finances. It is only in the modern state that the government has tools for **national economic policy**. In post-war Finland the role of the state in banking sector declined, but it increased in other fields of economy, in financing the infrastructure, and above all in monetary policy and in the regulation of foreign trade. What was perhaps surprising here, was the fact that independence (and the making of a liberal state) did not produce any liberation of markets. Just the opposite, the first years brought about a strictly regulated economy, a kind of command economy in which the state controlled production, consumption, as well as trade. Protectionist policy continued throughout the 1920s, and Finland represented a more closed economy than it used to be under the Russian domination. This is how the national economy

⁶ Kansa liikkeessä. Helsinki, 1987; Haapala, P. Työväenluokan synty. — In: Talous, valta ja valtio. Tampere, 1992,


was balanced after the years of crisis. A typical economic novelty were state-owned companies in the key sectors of the economy (in energy, raw materials, forestry, and agriculture). All this did not make Finland any socialist state: it only illustrates (the often forgotten fact) that modern society is not a *laissez faire* society by definition.

The growing sphere of public government required new revenues. This led to higher taxation and in this respect WWI was also a turning point in Finland. The first steps towards modern taxation were taken during the War, which meant a turn from accidental taxation of luxury goods and from non-productive poll-tax to progressive taxation of income and property, and to wide and systematic taxation of consumption. At first new taxes were needed to finance the War, but in 1918—1920 the whole taxation system was renovated. Finland got a modern taxation system, by which I mean the formalization of taxation, i.e. a system that is legally equal for all taxpayers and that is democratically controlled and predictable. The tax rate was low as compared to today's taxes, but in principle it was a major social change: the state was empowered to tax all revenues (including the cases of aristocracy, state officials, and the clergy) and the state redistributed resources from the rich to the poor to secure the social rights of all its citizens.⁷

Everything said above is to demonstrate the fact that liberation from the Russian social system did not in itself mean liberation from the state. On the contrary, Finland is an example of a society in which **modernization was realized through the state** and with its support. Another important notion is that the changes which I have interpreted as modernization, were mostly introduced after the declaration of independence, but not because of it — it was internal social relations that were decisive. It would be tempting to think that Russian domination had prevented the earlier modernization of Finland, but that is not true. In fact Russian rule had encouraged economic modernization by opening new markets, and as to social issues, the Finns had not achieved any consortium in these matters, i.e. there was no national programme of modernization of any kind that could have been hampered by the Russians. Altogether the idea of national state before WWI was a rather conservative concept, a kind of national-idealistic version of the *ancien regime*. Liberalism in Finland was a marginal political and social force.

Before and during the War Finland was a **regulated market economy**, that is, in many ways public demands affected the markets. Most important here were production and trade licenses, also customs policy. Through the restrictions of the latter a remarkable portion of the Finnish industry was connected to Russian markets. However, this relationship was economically favourable for the Finns, and it promoted industrialization. The critical culmination of this development were the War years, when all export markets were in Russia and when large investments were still made in manufacturing. The negative side of this was — when we consider later developments — that easy profits did not stimulate effectiveness and the closing of Russian markets led to an adaption crisis in many industries. Yet, wood and paper industry fortunately turned to western markets, with massive state support (devaluation and protectionism, i.e. lowering production costs). The War, or lack of materials, produced also several technological innovations — it favoured electrification, and, above all, it taught the Finns how important the self-sufficiency of energy and raw materials was.

⁷ Haapala, P. Suomalainen yhteiskunta.



Indices of the value of FIM in 1913—1922.

Conditions were different for agriculture. During the Russian rule Finnish agriculture did not enjoy any protection from foreign competition. Finland was open to cheap imported (Russian) grain. This had ruined Finnish grain production, favouring the shift to animal husbandry. In a way this had modernized agriculture and made Finland an outstanding exporter of butter and other animal products. Especially St. Petersburg was dependent on many Finnish products. But this kind of modernization in agriculture also produced social problems by increasing the number of landless rural population and sharpening the conflict between crofters (*torppari*) and landowners. After the War, agricultural policy took a totally opposite direction and was characterized by protective customs (elimination of competition), subsidies for growing production, and above all, the land reform by which 55,000 landless families were settled. This was a socially remarkable reform, even though it was made in a typically premodern way — by anchoring more people by landownership. All in all, farming and the agrarian sector of the society experienced a remarkable boom in the 1920s. Ironic as it may be, this was made possible through active state support and in the name of “modernization”.

WWI started a modern period in Finnish economy by teaching the first real lessons of market economy. It is rather common to think that the War just eliminated the normal market mechanism, which led to economic instability. It might be, but for the contemporaries the War time revealed that particular mechanism for the first time. Until those years Finnish economy had been very stable; “good and bad years” followed each other like good and bad harvests, but never before had people experienced any unpredictable economic changes. All stability

seemed to disappear, and also old morals, when speculators became the heroes of the "new times". This, of course, intensified economic, social and political conflicts.⁸

Figure illustrates what happened in economy and in what order. Before summer 1917, Finnish economy did not suffer too severely, because production stayed high due to munitions industries. The collapse came when exports to Russia ended, but still worse was in coming when the Civil War between Finns themselves began. It ruined the economy for years.

It was inflation that became the symbol of an unstable economy. The roots of inflation were in the way the War was financed, i.e. in issuing bank notes. This was started by the Russian government, and the Bank of Finland followed suit by giving loans and selling marks to the Russian government. The amount of paper money in the Finnish market was increased through relying on the value of the rouble. Some realized that this would destroy the currency, but Finnish bankers and industrialists were not worried as long as the government used the money to buy war equipment and other products from Finland. Thus weak currency supported Finnish manufacturing industry and secured full employment. It is true that there was no uncontrolled inflation before 1917. It was only then that the scarcity of critical products like foodstuffs and energy led to inflation. This, in turn, resulted from the unsuccessful rationing system, and it again reflected more political than economic realities.

After Finland was separated from Russia in December 1917, the monetary system was not balanced, because issuing notes was continued and production continued to fall. The result was a huge national debt. It was only then that FM lost its international value and became finally devalued by 800 per cent. The order of things tells us that in the beginning there was false monetary policy, then failure in price regulation, and finally devaluation. The lesson here is that politicians, and even bankers of that time, did not fully realize that demand, supply and prices indeed follow each other and that this connection can be interfered only either by economic measures or by extremely strong political power. So, it was hard to learn that currency was not a thing with an absolute value, but a vulnerable economic relationship.⁹

It was typical then (and also later) that people explained inflation by condemning each other for immoral behaviour. There was good evidence for this: speculators made fortunes never seen before; in summer 1918 when 13,000 people starved, new record was achieved on the stock exchange. Unfortunately this moral and political reaction to inflation only deepened the crisis. The existing social order lost its legitimacy greatly for economic reasons: if people cannot rely on economic rationality, what can they rely upon.

In the midst of the crisis — and later in their memoirs — Finnish politicians accused Russia for ruining Finnish economy. Perhaps they were honest, but the final collapse was prepared by themselves, by their illusions and political narrow-mindedness. Anyway, in the end they learned that modern (capitalist) economy needs regulation, i.e. firm legal institutions and a political machine to settle conflicts. This idea was then to become central in Finnish social thinking. During the ancien regime the idea of national economy as a tool of social policy had been unknown, except in a limited sense — for supporting savings banks or for helping the landless to obtain farm land.

⁸ Haapala, P. Suomalainen yhteiskunta, 90—99.

⁹ Korpisaari, P. Suomen markka 1914—1925. Helsinki, 1926.

In the Grand Duchy of Finland the unity and the identity of the nation was based on the **idea of nationality**, on a moral and ethnic union. Modern state, instead, secures national unity by harmonizing material interests. Social gaps are no more seen as "natural" outcomes of social life, but as a social threat. After the War, social integration was happily helped by the paradoxical fact that the economic crisis diminished differences in living standards: — rural people achieved the standards of urban workers, the working class those of the middle class, and the upper class lost just because they had more to lose. After the Civil War it was also politically inevitable that social contradictions were smoothed down.

To sum up, social reunification was achieved with the help of political democracy, homogeneous national culture, unified educational system, and also by other social reforms favouring the low income population. This implication of modern welfare state may seem to be an exaggeration, but it is not that if we compare the social history of Finland with that of other newly independent countries of Eastern and Central Europe. In the Finnish case it was perhaps decisive that lower classes were rather well-organized and able to enter the political arena. On the other hand, the major national minority in Finland — the Swedish — were well represented in the élite and were able to defend themselves against extreme nationalism.¹⁰

Modernization took place in the immaterial sphere of social life, too. It should be pointed out here as a crucial fact that, for many reasons, the War years were a turning point in adopting "modern" or more liberal norms, values and behaviour.¹¹ First of all the Finnish society had reached a level of wealth and urbanization that made it possible for many (including workers) to enjoy a bit more fancy life. On the other hand it was the restless atmosphere and the crisis of legitimacy that encouraged people to behave contrary to the traditional code. As a sign of changes we should see the claim by many contemporaries of general moral decay — how indecent habits, immodest clothing, dancing and cinemas, neglect of religion, sexual and political liberation, educated women, etc., disrupted the nation. Actually, I believe that the real problem behind the moralistic reaction was the fear of losing control over the lower classes. A good example of what was going on was the rapid spread of family planning, i.e. prevention, which was absolutely against official ethics. If we summarize all phenomena of this kind, we may come to the conclusion that together with ancien regime the patriarchal order lost much of its authority. The laws were passed allowing to leave one's church or spouse, and the Emperor had gone already. When symbols fade, reality changes, too. What remained from the Russian-period legislation until today was the criminal law.

In many ways the Finnish society in the 1920s continued to be what it was before the War, for example, most social institutions were just modifications of the organs of the Grand Duchy. This continuity was logically emphasized as the ideological foundation of the young state. However, the social context had changed radically. This is why it is more appropriate to view the mentioned social changes in the perspective of modernization than in reducing them to the history of national progress. But whatever explanation we prefer, WWI was an important turning point in the formation of a modern society in Finland. And what is still more relevant is the fact that this was not just a Finnish but a European phenomenon.

¹⁰ Alapuro, R. State and Revolution in Finland.

¹¹ There is no special study of this subject, but broad agreement based on contemporary public discussion.

ESIMENE MAAILMASÕDA KUI MODERNISEERIMISE KRIIS SOOMES

Pertti HAAPALA

Esimene maailmasõda oli Soome ühiskonna kujunemise pöördepunkt. Aastail 1914—1919 elas Soome läbi tõsise majandusliku, poliitilise ja sotsiaalse kriisi, sealhulgas kodusõja 1918. aastal. Kriis puhkes seoses sõjaga ja Vene impeeriumi kokkuvarisemisega, oma olemuselt kujutas see aga vana ühiskonnakorra kriisi. Tegelikult toimus neil aastail Soome ühiskonna kiire moderniseerumine. See ei olnud kättevõidetud iseseisvuse tulemus, vaid — laiemast perspektiivist lähtudes — rahvusriigi ajalugu (sealhulgas natsionalismi ajalugu) esines toimiva jõuna moderniseerimisprotsessis ehk teiste sõnadega moderniseerimine nõudis rahvusriigi funktsioneerimist. 1919. aastaks oli Soomes välja kujunenud olukord, kus moderniseerimine ei muutunud mitte ainult võimalikuks, vaid lausa sundis ennast peale. 1919.—1920. aastal läbiviidud reformid kujutasid poliitilist kompromissi ühiskonna stabiilsuse saavutamiseks pärast kodusõda. Pärast Esimest maailmasõda oli Soome märkimisväärselt modernsem ühiskond kui enne sõda. Seda ühiskonda iseloomustasid järgmised tunnused: moodne (liberaalne) riik, kus riigivõim kajastas kodanike tahet; demokraatia põhines erinevate ühiskonnakihtide sotsiaalsete huvide arvestamisel; riiklik sunniaparaat tegutses sotsiaalse korra kaitsjana; valitses moodne (formaalne) bürokraatia; «rahvateenrid» nimetati rahva poolt ja nad olid vastutavad rahva ees; kohalike omavalitsusorganite valimise õigus laienes kõigile kodanikele; valitses moodsa riigi majandussüsteem. Viimane väljendus parlamendi poolt kontrollitava riigieelarve süsteemi olemasolus, protektsionismi kasutamises sotsiaalpoliitika tööriistana, riigiettevõtete domineerimises majanduse võtmesektorites, üldise maksusüsteemi kujunemises riigieelarve tuumaks, progressiivse tulumaksu sisseseadmises ja rikkuste ümberjagamises riigi poolt. Siiski ei tähendanud moderniseerimine vabanemist tugevast riigist, vastupidi, riik oli peamine instrument moderniseerimise edasiviimisel oma sekkumisega turumajandusse ja sotsiaalse stabiilsuse kindlustamisega. Moderniseerimine Soomes oli rahvusriigi projekt, mis baseerus poliitilisel kokkuleppel. Kahel ideoloogial — natsionalismil ja sotsialismil — oli otsustav osa Soome moodsa riigi kujunemisel. Kriisi õppetundide tõttu ei olnud palju usku inimese vabaduse ja turuvabaduse doktriinidesse.

ПЕРВАЯ МИРОВАЯ ВОЙНА КАК КРИЗИС МОДЕРНИЗАЦИИ В ФИНЛЯНДИИ

Пертти ХААПАЛА

Первая мировая война стала переломным пунктом в развитии финского общества. В 1914—1919 гг. Финляндия пережила серьезный экономический, политический и социальный кризис, в том числе и гражданскую войну 1918 г. Кризис разразился в связи с войной и развалом Российской империи, но по сути своей он означал кризис старого общественного устройства. В действительности же в 1914—1919 гг. произошла быстрая модернизация финского общества. Сама история развития национального государства (и история национализма) выступила в роли движущей реформаторской силы или, другими словами, сама модернизация востребовала функционирование нацио-

нального государства. К 1919 г. в Финляндии сложилась такая ситуация, когда модернизация стала не только возможной, но и неизбежной, поскольку реформы 1919—1921 гг. были политическим компромиссом в целях стабилизации общества после гражданской войны.

Итак, после первой мировой войны Финляндию характеризовали следующие признаки: современное (либеральное) государство, где власть была выразителем воли народа; демократия строилась с учетом интересов различных социальных слоев общества; государственный аппарат принуждения стоял на защите общественного порядка; государством правила по-новому мыслящая бюрократия; «слуги народа» назывались народом и были подотчетны ему; право избрания органов местного самоуправления распространялось на всех граждан; действовала модернизированная экономическая система. Последняя выражалась в парламентском контроле за государственным бюджетом, в использовании протекционизма как инструмента социальной политики, в превалировании государственных предприятий в ключевых секторах экономики, в становлении налоговой системы как основы формирования государственного бюджета и в перераспределении национального богатства государством. Эти новшества не означали отказа от сильного государства. Наоборот, государство стало гарантом проведения рыночной экономики и укрепления социальной стабильности. В основе модернизации Финляндии, как проекте построения национального государства, лежало политическое согласие. Две идеологии — национализм и социализм — играли главную роль в построении современного общества в Финляндии. Из-за кризиса не было веры в доктрину свободы личности и рыночной свободы.