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TRANSITIONAL SOCIETY AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN ESTONIA 1987—1991

This article deals with the emergence of new social movements in Estonia, and proposes a certain political model for the process of transformation of Estonian society. It presents a brief overview of the social movements of the period 1987—1991. The social movements are analysed in institutional terms, that is in terms of their organization, their formal membership, their declared goals and programmes, and their respective effectiveness in shaping policies. Employing modern theories of civil society and movements, an analytical survey and periodization of the emergence of civic structures in Estonia in the years 1987—1991 is presented. It is argued that a successful social ideology must simultaneously legitimize a transformation of social order, i. e. power structure, and provide a meaningful frame for the articulation of important problems, also perceived needs and aspirations of its adherents. Nationalism as a holistic ideology is contrasted to a segmentary imperial one. Three basic competing ideological frames, i. e. hegemonic political projects, are revised from the standpoint of emerging civic society. A concept of "movement society" is discussed, and its very high impact in restoring Estonian statehood is investigated.

The Baltic case — patterns of social movements

There is a rich tradition of investigating social movements in modern European societies. The Baltic popular movement and other national movements stood at the forefront of the recent changes in these countries. Press and the scholars have done much to assess and interpret all this, but there have been very few serious attempts to study the pioneering role of social movements in the transition period of the Baltic States. It seems to be quite a complicated task to grasp the social and mental essence of these very powerful processes. Many very popular and productive research schemes, like Tarrow's conception of "political opportunity structures," which have been successfully elaborated, as, for example, in reconstructing the history of the movements in Finland, are obviously Euro- and West-centric, for they treat these movements against the background of post-modern realities.¹ The macro-sociological analysis into social mass movements is in this case dominated by the problems defined in the theory of the "self-creative society."²

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¹ Tarrow, S. *Struggle, Politics and Reform: Collective Action, Social Movements and Cycles of Protest*. Center for International Studies. Cornell University, Ithaca, New York, 1989, 32.

² Hegedus, S. *Social movements and social change in self-creative society: New civil initiatives in the International Arena*. — In: *Globalization, Knowledge and Society; Reading from International Sociology*. Sage Publications, London, 1990, 320.

The recent unprecedented upsurge of social movements in Eastern Europe has produced tremendous changes. But the Baltic case with its turbulent explosion of mass movements following a long period of evolution dominated by the movements, was unique even in the context of the East-European revolutionary changes, and can hardly be squeezed into the conceptions developed mainly by German and Hungarian social scientists as a further elaboration of "action-identity" research paradigm. The East-European scholars trace the reformist movements that transform politically already very much emancipated societies (Hungary, Poland), making them progress into not only formally, but into actually independent national states.

To conceptualize the post-socialist experience in the transition of the Baltics, we must treat social mass movements in the Estonian society not only as "transitional," "post-socialist" or "post-totalitarian," for it must be taken into account that this "post-imperial" nation has had quite a long European tradition of civil society, interrupted by Stalinist invasion. Usually the essence of the movements has been characterized as "nationalism." The demand for independence has been really the strongest argument the Baltic movements have had. The other side of this demand was that the struggle for influence differed very much from competition for power in Western systems, and even from that in Eastern Europe. Moreover, the local authorities could no more than the movements themselves decide the outcome of their contest. This decision could only be made by Moscow.

Actually the "nationalist demand" of Estonian mass movements for independence was a call for social emancipation and political revolution. These demands became a canopy under which a broadly-based, democratic, and generally moderate (nonviolent) opposition developed. "National crisis," used in a very broad sense as a key word describing conditions of mass mobilization, has in the Baltic case little to do with "nationalism" or national crisis in the traditional sense. It refers to the situation which threatened basic, historically developed collective values and identities, and cannot be captured by "traditional" democratic measures or old political frames. The label "national crisis" reflects the problems which defy standard solutions and undermine the very legitimacy of the existing socio-political order. In their demand for national rights, the Baltic movements extended a challenge to the empire that dealt a heavy stroke to the heart of Stalinist political ideas and economic principles upon which the Soviet Union was built.

Scholars writing on Baltic history of the five recent years usually do not bother to distinguish social movements in the Baltic States from the corresponding social groupings in the other areas of the previous Soviet Empire. But the movements that emerged in Estonia differ in many respects from the new civic structures in Russia. Again, scholars writing on the Baltic States do not distinguish between social movements and other social groupings, and have not made a clear-cut difference between dissent groups, parties, movements, or associations.³ Following their unique role as well as co-operation of different civic structures and social networks (associations, clubs, societies, movements, pressure groups, etc.) in the recent Estonian history and the emergence of civil society, it is important to examine their formation separately, as moments of the developmental dialectic of a political system.

Charles Tilly's conceptualization of models of collective actions may furnish an illuminating starting point for the analyses also in the Estonian

³ *Walter, H., Clemens, Jr.* Baltic Independence and Russian Empire. St.-Martins Press, New York, 1991; *Самородный О.* Становление многопартийности в Эстонии в 1988—1990 годы. — Proc. Estonian Acad. Sci. Social Sciences, 1991, 40, 3, 212—228.

case. In his attempt to distinguish social movements from other forms of organized political actions, Tilly maintains that a social movement "actually consists of a series of demands and challenges to power-holders in the name of a social category that lacks an established political position." The proper analogy to a social movement, he argues, is "neither a party nor a union" but "a political campaign."⁴

This kind of definition of mass movements by contrast with mass parties and other formal organizations as bodies characterized by relatively high level of ideological and programmatic unity, must be central in analysing movement practices in Estonia. But this unity can be discovered on a higher level and in a different form than the ideological, doctrinal or programmatic unity of parties and interest groups. Here, "orientation" can be used as a concept encapsulating this specific common denominator. Orientations are "collective representations" — beliefs, outlooks, creeds, sentiments, and intellectual dispositions — which have, as their principal reference, a specific socio-political order. They are more general than attitudes; they refer to readiness to adopt certain attitudes.⁵

In the Baltic case, mobilizing 'orientations' reflect a deeper and a more crucial social conflict than that faced by modern European societies. The uniqueness of the particular movement phenomenon in Estonia can be understood only in the context of nation's historical past and its geographical location. There is a solid temporal frame or the mobilization process demonstrating the continuity of the social past and present. The "unresolvedness" of the most basic civil rights — the lack of national rights — as well as the industrial societal issues triggered an abundance of social movements springing from cultural, civil, and environmental concerns. Modern conflicts that occur in "post-industrial" societies embrace only one segment of the social structure. In each case, only partial interests are at stake, which modify the balance of power between the social groups engaged in a conflict. Most of the movements in Estonia appeared from the perspective of national emancipation, social de-alienation, and cultural-political praxis as articulations of social potential, a way to generate a civil society and restore the Estonian state. This explains why the emerging movements focused less on the defence of particularized interests than on destroying the "totalitarian system of power," advancing "general humanistic values," and fostering the national rebirth of Estonia. These were the issues connected with national hegemonic projects.

But along with the national emancipatory activities of the Estonians there also emerged some movements supporting old communist or state-socialist hegemonic projects. The origin of these movements can be explained only in the context of new value orientations launched by the Estonian movements.

To understand the essence of each hegemonic project, three questions of a general character concerning some basic dimensions of the social movements should be raised:

1. What was the role of the structures of civil society in the birth of the social movements?
2. What kind of relations existed between the movements and the existing political structures?
3. What type of socio-economic relations and ownership system had the movements accepted as the basis for a nation-wide social contract?

⁴ Tilly, C. Models and realities of popular collective actions. — *Social Research*, 1985, 52, 4, 735—736.

⁵ Pakulski, J. *Social Movements: Politics of Moral Protest*. Longman House, Melbourne, 1991, 60.

From "normalized" society to "movement society" — historical background

Turbulent emergence of civil structures in Estonia formed a period of very complex interaction between the state and the movements. In those years Estonian political society did not resemble a civil society with structures peculiar to it, such as established political parties, unions, and other interest associations. It was more, as termed by Steven Fish, a "movement society" — that is a myriad of interacting political campaigns.⁶ However, the self-constituting, if not fully self-governing element in the extra-state social initiative "from below," was represented very unequally in different movements.

The movements, having a background in the Estonian or Russian communities, respectively, mobilized themselves in totally different ways. But it is an over-simplification to qualify the movements as just nation-based ones. The dimensions of interpretation behind the political space where people place themselves must be shifted from the purely national dimensions — interpreted predominantly in terms of ideology — into the dimensions of civil society, life style, and culture.

The nation-based difference also divided the whole field of movements in all basic socio-cultural dimensions. Political campaigns, forms of social leadership, the mode of ruling civil organizations, etc. reflected a crucial fact, namely that the Estonian community commanded a much larger amount of cultural, social, and organizational capital than did the Russian community. Siisiäinen defines it as "the social, cultural, and even economic resources produced by an organization and accruing both to its members and representatives as to the organizations themselves."⁷ It must be stressed that, along with the conflict of interests, different political and organizational cultures were also in conflict, or — and it was essential — the difference in organizational culture produced or rather helped to enforce the national encampment situation in the deepening crisis. Democratically minded non-Estonian groups — the democratic Russian intelligentsia — had no organizational resources to mobilize their supporters. In Russia, the most difficult problem for democrats was the conflict with the authorities. In Estonia, they had a population not accustomed to civic initiative, or — which was more important — there was no civic infrastructure, no developed decentralized organizational frame in the Russian-speaking community to rely upon. This explains why some Russian group initiatives, like "Referendum", or cultural movements and clubs did not gather enough power or why they just lost momentum. The point is that very large groups of Russian population were actually not represented in social movements, so the whole picture of movements in the Russian community is seriously disbalanced.

This basic fact must first of all be explained historically. It is even not fair to speak about two "communities" in Estonia in the sociological sense. Despite the fifty years of acculturation, the Estonian community was not a fragment of a Russified Soviet society but a relatively independent integral unit. Yet, the "civil garrison" of immigrants turned, after the dissolution of the Soviet Empire, really into something like a fragment of formless dismemberment. It was particularly evident from the perspective of civil culture and civil society. For the Estonian nation the consequences of the Soviet occupation had been catastrophic. A great part or even the majority of the intellectual leaders either left the country in 1944,

⁶ Fish, S. The emergence of independent associations and the transformation of Russian political society. — *Journal of Communist Studies*, September 1991, 7, 3, 299—334.

⁷ Siisiäinen, M. Four studies on voluntary associations. — Publications of the Department of Sociology. University of Jyväskylä, 1991, 44, 53.

or had been killed or deported. But in many aspects the development of Estonian society had only been interrupted. During the first half of the century modern civil society was already under way in Estonia. While the organizational infrastructures of civil society were completely sovietized or destroyed, the Estonians had saved their organizational capital, their basic socio-cultural frames, and people with democratic habitus, who influenced the political culture and mentality of the nation.

The socio-cultural background of Russian "civil garrison" was completely different. With Stalin's rise to supremacy towards the end of the 1920s, the destruction of any type of non-state societal activity became indeed a crucial revolutionary imperative of the Soviet state. Space for social initiative from below was abolished, and all the organizations positioned between the atomized individual and the state were destroyed. In the 1932 Law on Associations and the 1936 Constitution, the principles of intermediation and free association vanished. One of the most striking aspects of Soviet rule between Stalin's death and the rise of Gorbachev to power in 1985, was the persistence of purely static theory and practice in connection with associations. The end of Stalinist terror was in no way accompanied by a reduction in etatization or by opening space for independent associational life. Though there was no mass terror, yet an automatic, reflexive, institutionalized negatively bureaucratic response to any organized expression of independence on the part of societal groups was there all right. The 1977 Soviet Constitution asserted, to an even greater extent than its Stalinist predecessor, the fact that all organized activity had to conform to the substantive goals of the state. In practice, the Brezhnev leadership defined permissible organized activity solely as that which was taking place within the confines of state institutions.⁸

The "Baltic explosion" and its efficiency can be understood in the context of the existing elements of a civil society, the multi-dimensional readiness of the nations to realize publicly their resources of civil culture after the long period of their "underground" functioning in private spheres, mental structures, cultural milieu, etc. Readiness to act corresponded to the associations culture as well as to all the shared basic values. Potentially the whole nation, with the very few exceptions of those who had totally sold themselves out to the powers that be, was a dissident nation, and as such it was looking for any opportunity to manifest publicly its authentic outlook and orientations. The social movements that emerged in Estonia so visibly and so spectacularly in those years had been ready to emerge at any time. Those movements embodied attitudes which the whole nation shared, though it had not dared express them.⁹ Likewise, it must be pointed out that the turbulent emergence of mass movements in Estonia can be adequately conceptualized only in the larger context of the "Baltic Rebirth."

The emergence of the movements — an analytical overview

Politization of the masses of people became a fact in Estonia in 1987. Judging by the changes in the emerging civil society, transformation of the social movements and the increasing role of civil activities in the political life, the period of 1986—1991 can be divided into four phases.

⁸ *Bauman, Z.* On the maturation of Socialism. — *Telos*, Spring 1981, 47, 50.

⁹ *Shtromas, A.* How political are the social movements in the Baltic republics? — *Nationalities Papers (Special Issue)*. *Huttenbach, H. R. and Sedaitis, J.* (eds.). A Symposium on Social Movements in the USSR. Fall 1990, XVII, 2, 16.

These phases are rough and approximate, and are employed for the purpose of the investigation of central tendencies that underlie an extraordinarily complex phenomenon.

Phase I: Second half of 1986 to late-1987. From repression to qualified tolerance

For Estonia, it was the beginning, already delayed, of a starting phase of the onset of partial liberalization in official thinking and policy concerning independent associations. *Glasnost* legitimized a wide range of demands for greater self-expression. The phrase "socialist pluralism" had entered the official Soviet discourse during this time. *Glasnost* started to be felt in changing habitus; new initiatives and attitudes emerged in all the aspects of public life, giving birth to a new political culture. The concept of "pluralism" was open to a multiplicity of interpretations, but in practice it amounted to *de facto* tolerance of the formation of some small citizens' opinion-groups or even organizations outside the Party control. The phenomenon that operating associations create preconditions for the occurrence of mass movements, common in the parliamentary democracies, was a rarity in transitional Estonia, and it played a marginal role in the mobilization of movements. After a long period of incubation, the "revolutionary" self-creativity dominated over the evolutionary processes in the emergence of movements.

Glasnost started to be felt in Estonia comparatively late. The local Communist Party leaders appeared to be conservative even in the light of not-too-progressive *perestroika*. This, in its turn, meant for local governors a weakening of the backing from Moscow and facing the already socially active and relatively much better organized public alone. The political awakening of the broad masses of people started in Estonia in spring 1987 with the so-called "Phosphorite Crisis." It was clear to the majority of people and politicians that the struggle against plans to expand phosphorite mines in northeast Estonia had only formally to do with environmental issues.

Very symptomatic to this stage of the upsurge of civil activities, resulting from the lack of independent civil structures, was the struggle over the control of the legal quasi-civil structures. In the system that called itself "Soviet" the discussion began how to restore the rule of the true "soviets" or "councils," and what the constitution really meant. In many cases the activists made use of official institutions like May Day demonstrations and the Young Communist League. As there was no access to the press or TV, the organizers of the public rallies had to rely on Western media.

The first signs of massive legal opposition within semi-independent civil structures were the gatherings of Cultural Heritage Protection Clubs not far from Tallinn, proposing frameworks for future co-operation. On December 12, 1987, the Estonian Heritage Society was founded in Tallinn. The establishment of a students' organization, *E.Ü.S. Sodalitium*, on December 16, 1987, became the first step in the restoration of the network of pre-occupation academic organizations. Already the next year gave birth to a dozen of restored academic organizations.¹⁰ The post-Stalin generation of humanitarians and authors founded, on December 26, 1987, an alternative cultural association *Wellesto*. The foundation of an association of persons who have suffered from illegal repressions — *Memento* Society — was determined to investigate the crimes of Stalinism. It exemplified first efforts of repressed Estonians to act as a pressure group.

¹⁰ Pruuli, T. Iseseisev üliõpilasriik. — In: Eesti eest. Tallinn, 1989, 16.

We know about the emergence of some oppositional groups, like the Estonian National Front and Democratic Movement, protesting against phosphorite-excavating plans in northern Estonia. The period also witnessed the beginning of street demonstrations organized by several groups like Free and Independent Youth Column No 1, whose goals and tactics placed them beyond the bounds of official tolerance. This group formed itself in October 1987; they picketed, restored the memorials to heroes of the Estonian War of Independence in Võru (southern Estonia), and flew the Estonian national flag.¹¹ In August 1987, MRP-AEG movement (the Estonian Group for the Publication of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact) was initiated by a handful of dissidents. At that time the absolute majority of Estonians kept a safe distance from the group, yet its public actions served as a powerful catalyst for anti-regime activities.

The idea of IME programme (acronym for Self-Managing Estonia) was first heralded when Siim Kallas, Mikk Titma, Tiit Made, and Edgar Savisaar published in a Tartu daily newspaper a short statement about it on September 26, 1987. "Four Men's Proposal" gave birth to a very influential, economically oriented movement with a clear political significance. Despite the very negative attitude of the Party and government officials to the idea, a research group was organized to articulate the programme (IME Council). Public discussions, TV panels, series of articles, and so on and so forth, were organized to get the government's support to the idea. According to the comment by Tiit Made, these discussions helped bring the problems of economy closer to the general public and make them more understandable, involving people into politics after about half a century of empty political agitation.¹² In March 1988, 80 per cent of the whole population of Estonia supported the idea.

Thus, this period can be described as a phase of activation of predominantly non-political movements and increased politization of non-political associations. The first steps were made to overcome the discontinuity of civil and political traditions. However, the marginal nationalist and anti-state activities were still successfully suppressed or outmanoeuvred by the authorities. National cultural elite was still loyal to *perestroika* politics of the Communist Party. Restructuring (*perestroika*) policy had solidified the determination of a group of Party members and non-Party intellectuals to find a common language.

The decisive change took place in social habitus, in the mental orientation of the people. At that stage some success had already prepared ground for further protest actions, as it bolstered the confidence of the protesters and showed those who had remained quiescent that a considerable number of people were no longer afraid to speak up. The attitude "They'll-never-permit-us-to-do-that" changed into "We'll-do-it-anyway." History had begun to move.¹³

Phase II: Spring 1988 to late 1988. The Singing Revolution

This was a period of the emergence of very powerful mass movements, of discussions about the role of civil society in the power structure, and the beginning of a real re-division of power. The round-table discussions of the Creative Unions' Cultural Council on the radio and talk-shows "Let's think" on Estonian TV proved effective as vehicles for organizational integration; they not only contributed a lot to the radicalization of the demands of the intelligentsia, but they helped mobilize the whole nation. In April 1988, the Estonian Greens institutionalized their movement.

¹¹ Raun, M. Poliitilised väikeühendused. — In: Eesti eest. Tallinn, 1989, 25.

¹² Made, T. Mu isamaa. Helsinki, 1988, 43.

¹³ Taagepera, R. Estonia's road to independence. — Problems of Communism, November–December 1989, 21.

Actually it rooted itself in the "phosphorite campaign," which had already at least a year-long history.

The emergence of the Popular Front of Estonia in April and that of the Interfront in June 1988 opened a principally new phase in the transformation of power structures in Estonia. The public dimension of societal conflict began to change the political culture; the de-scholastization of the political discourse started. The first elements of the true sharing of power took shape and really autonomous civil structures came into being. It should be pointed out that the creation of the Popular Front came to the authorities as a surprise. It is not correct to pronounce that the Communist Parties in the Baltics lost the movements they themselves had helped create.¹⁴ The Popular Front became a synonym of pro-Estonia opposition.

There are a few similarities between the second phase of events in Estonia and the "Prague Spring." In contrast to Lithuania with her national composition of the Communist Party, the pro-imperial mentality prevalent among the Russified leadership of the Communist Party of Estonia prevented here any close co-operation between some *perestroika*-minded Party leaders and the intellectuals. Nevertheless, many distinguished intellectuals and Communist Party members joined the Popular Front movement. They had little control, but they encouraged the building of consensus.

The position of the local Estonian organization of the Soviet Communist Party was controversial, indeed. And so was the role of that part of Estonian intelligentsia which turned to be captives of the system. Actually the Soviet Communist Party was not a political party but a highly sophisticated imperial power-structure. As such it played an important stabilizing role in the increasing conflicts along the national line, but it had not much space for manoeuvring. The democratic wing of the local Party organization, dominated by Estonians, supported the cause of independence and retained a degree of trustworthiness. Then, gradually they lost initiative.

From the standpoint of the principles of Soviet power, it is a pure speculation to maintain that Gorbachev preferred the Popular Fronts in the Baltic States to the local Party organizations as forces that would build *perestroika*.¹⁵ The Baltic communist organizations had failed to inaugurate society *in nuce* on the one hand and Moscow on the other were unavoidably heading toward a collision with the local Communist Parties uneasily existing between them. Quite soon after initiation, the Popular Front became totally independent; furthermore, it actually dictated its will to the Party and made it move towards an agenda the Party had never chosen. The dialogue with the Popular Front was one of the shifts in Party politics in the interests of the stability of the political system. As a result, an alternative national political elite emerged, and it achieved the status of real "agency" in the political structure. Institutionalizing nationally-orientated political elite as an alternative to the so-called "policy of germination of the managerial apparatus" or the "policy of the promotion of national staff" was the second essential step towards a civil society.

The alliance of the oppositional intelligentsia and the masses of the people as embodied in the Popular Front of Estonia was strong enough to effectively paralyse the Party apparatus' ability to control power. The

¹⁴ *Shtromas, A.* How political are the social movements in the Baltic republics? 20.

¹⁵ *Trapans, J. A.* The source of Latvia's popular movement. — In: *Trapans, J. A.* (ed.). *Toward Independence. The Baltic Popular Movements.* Westview Press, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Oxford, 1990, 35.

Board of the Popular Front of Estonia started to operate as a quasi-parliament, and the people themselves began to claim leadership in *perestroika*.

Accepting the Popular Front as a legal part of the political structure in January 1989, the local administrative structures ceased to be an absolute "Master State" and changed into a "Service State" for independent perpetrators of the emerging civil society. By restricting the State, the political revolution got a start. The increasing conflict between the alien socio-political system, the central authorities in Moscow and the will of the Estonian nation was, on the local level, transformed into a "democratic" confrontation between the Popular Front and the Interfront — to a great extent a creation and an agent of the KGB. From the standpoint of the future developments the reform tactics introduced by the Popular Front played a really decisive role. It produced conflicts among the ruling elite and pro-Soviet *nomenklatura*, and managed to make some inroads among non-Estonians.

Estonian Song Festivals used to mobilize the emerging mass movements (later the "Hot Summer" of 1988 was remembered as the "Singing Revolution"); they were quite understandable and very effective in the context of the Estonian protest culture as well as in the history of forming the national identity. The Song Festival tradition, which had survived Stalinism and Soviet rule almost intact, was perceived by many Estonians as a legal and true form of protest. Estonian singing tradition had accumulated much organizational, emotional, and moral capital. Obvious links with the Song Festival tradition gave the Popular Front's mass actions extraordinary mobilizing power and turned them into carriers of a very clear political message.

Founded in November 1988, confronting umbrella associations — the Estonian League of Work Collectives and the United Council of Workers' Collectives — demonstrated the increasing role of civil structures in political conflicts and in the fragmentation of old structures. Giving the people greater access to state power, they unfortunately encamped the full-scale polarization of the Estonian and Russian communities along their respective national lines. The United Council of Workers' Collectives was in no way an independent voluntary association. It was formed mainly by directors of large militarized plants subordinate to all-Union ministries in Moscow. The working collectives constituted an essential part of Soviet social system, a particular social organism. Adopted in the initial period of *perestroika*, the Law on the Working Collective showed that there was an imperative tendency to keep the whole society homogeneous. Before, there used to be strict ideological discipline in every sphere of life, then came mandatory democracy. A one-dimensional society was seeking a way to remain a one-dimensional society.¹⁶

Political mobilization of industrial collectives, manipulated by *nomenklatura*, was initiated by the leaders of Interfront and reflected their acute need to compensate for the lack of civil society frameworks. The only other structure the directors could rely on was the Republican Section of Veterans of War, Armed Forces, and Soldiers-Internationalists. In November 1989, the Republican Council of Strike Committees and the Committee for the Defence of Soviet Power and Civil Rights in Estonia were formed after the adoption of the Declaration on Estonia's Sovereignty. Representing a hegemonic mode of ruling without a real legitimacy, the United Council manifested a dictatorship of leaders enjoying total control

¹⁶ Järve, P. Democracy or Authoritarianism: Is there a Choice for the Baltics. Unpublished report prepared for the conference "The Baltic States in Transition: Prospects for the Late 1990s" Pärnu, January 16—19, 1992.

over the workers. The United Council of Workers' Collectives was in complementary relations with the Intermovement (see below). Complementary relations prevailed also between much more democratically structured Estonian League of Work Collectives and the Popular Front.

The leaders of the Popular Front, taking the initiative in campaigns and ideological leadership, realized that public social hegemony could be effective only through mature institutions of a civil society, including voluntary associations. Its attempts to transform this umbrella organization's role into a hegemonic control over the creation of new associations were obviously hegemonical.

Estonian Green Movement was in fact a radical wing of the Popular Front. Estonian Nationalities Forum and Consultative Council of Movements were very much furnished by the Popular Front. The organization of self-defence groups of the Popular Front was actually also a form of political mobilization. Later these groups developed into the Home Guard and the Boader Guard leadership and first battalions.

Yet, an attempt of the Popular Front leadership to create the Front of Estonian Youth did not succeed. The youth associations with their own ideological and symbolic world did not fit in with the prevailing hegemonic political culture of the generation of the sixties, who played a leading role in the "Singing Revolution."¹⁷ The first session of the Youth's Independent Forum gathered on June 4, 1988. They found it impossible to identify themselves with emerging civil structures, and, despite certain specific interests, were not able to establish political organizations or movements simultaneously opposing both the officialdom and the Popular Front, as was intended.

Phase III: The end of *perestroika*-inspired changes

The nationally-minded movements had to identify themselves with Gorbachev's version of a "civil society" and therefore the Communist Party of Estonia came under strong public pressure. Most of the movements had for different reasons already dropped the word "*perestroika*" from their discourse (this concerned both the Estonian and the Russian community). The initiative in formulating alternatives to the existing system shifted completely from the Party to the mass movements. In the beginning, they focused on a struggle to dominate the Party. Already in February 1989, the United Council of Workers' Collectives demanded a Communist Party meeting within ten days. It was an unprecedented step — a social movement issued instructions to the Party, prescribing also the agenda and the norm for representation.

At the end of Phase III, the Soviet power structures — first of all the Communist Party — lost their ruling and elite consolidating role. This also meant the recapitulation of the Party from the structures of state power. The dominating status of the Communist Party was excluded from the Soviet Estonia's Constitution of February 23, 1990. After losing the state-party position, and propelling itself to the position of an ordinary element of political grouping, the Estonian Communist Party was, like most of the civil structures, badly split along national lines and depressed by mass defection.

The Popular Front and other democratic movements got a major boost from the campaign and the winning of elections to the Congress of the People's Deputies of the USSR on March 26, 1989, and the elections to the Estonian Supreme Soviet on March 18, 1990. But the central dynamics of the drama unfolding in Estonia during this period is to be found in the

¹⁷ Raun, M. Noored ja vanad noored. — Looming, 1992, 8, 1112.

movement society furnishing an optimal basis for developing open competition, solidarity norms, internal obligatory capacities, collective identities, hegemony projects, etc. The future of Estonian society from then on largely depended on the capacities of the movements and their interaction with other civil structures.

The new source of societal dynamics lay in an impressive change of the associational structure, i.e. in institutionalizing civil society and radicalizing national consciousness. In May 1989, the Baltic Assembly, a co-ordinating body of the Popular Fronts of the Baltic States, was founded.

In March 1989, the Internationalist Movement (Intermovement) was formally constituted. Its leaders claimed that the existence of the nationalist Popular Front forced them to take countermeasures and to organize themselves. But most decisive seems to be the fact that the Communist Party of Estonia was no longer the instrument of the Russian community, and there was an urgent need for some other power structure (the resignation of the native Estonian leaders was one of the first demands of the Intermovement Congress). The Intermovers started to voice their demands ever more loudly. In May 1989, a mass demonstration was organized. In June 1989, the leaders of the Intermovement called a large meeting in Tallinn. In August 1989, many Russian-manned factories stopped work to protest against new Estonian laws setting residence requirements for participation in local elections. Actually many of these stoppages were not strikes initiated by the workers but lock-outs organized by directors of Moscow-controlled factories to disturb and destruct the evolutionary emergence of civil structures. These activities were characterized as "the conspiracy of directors." Blackmail gave its result — the residency requirements were abandoned. In March 1990, two days after the Estonian Congress asserted its legitimacy, a large rally organized by the Intermovement took place. The military provided meetings with technical equipment and, on the territory of one of the Soviet Army units in Estonia, a radio station "Nadezhda" was installed for Intermovers.

In the end, it became obvious that both the officials and the movements were facing a new challenge. In February 1989, the movement of Estonian Citizens' Committees was established. Compared to the explosive start of the Popular Front, the dynamics of the new large-scale integrative civil institution was completely different. Backed by other emerging or actively operating legal and semi-legal civil structures — the Estonian National Independence Party, the Estonian Heritage Society, and the Estonian Christian League — Citizens' Committees had a long public mobilization phase. The Committees organized themselves as the associations of the citizens of the pre-war Republic of Estonia.

The movement developed gradually: about 100,000 citizens of the Republic of Estonia or their descendants were registered by July 1989, and about 600,000 by February 1990. It was a unique action aimed at restoring the Republic of Estonia through the grass-roots mobilization of her citizens still under Soviet occupation. Setting up the machinery for elections is a hard work even in a law-governed society. Estonians demonstrated an extraordinary organizational potential. It was the largest mass movement in the recent Estonian history, and it publicly declared the Soviet regime in Estonia illegal.

The Popular Front leadership distanced itself in the very beginning from the movement of Citizens' Committees by its openly uncompromising and confronting tactics toward the latter. There was already the experience of the events in Tbilisi (in April 1989), and contrary to some of the leaders of the movement of the Citizens' Committees the Popular Front did not regard the provoked intervention of the Empire as something

positive from the viewpoint of the main goal — the creation of a democratic Republic of Estonia based on an organic civil society and a law-governed state. However, in the broadest context of the radicalization of the social movements, the Popular Front itself had created that new “public space” for radical national activity for the movement of the Citizens’ Committees. This new movement, in its turn, radicalized the Popular Front and pushed it to declare independence as its final goal publicly in its electoral platform in October 1989. This initiated co-operation between the Popular Front and the Citizens’ Committees.

The new programme of the Popular Front published in October 1988, stole much of the thunder of the Citizens’ Committees. But the questions of tactics had already very much transformed into a conflict of the hegemonic elite and its position in the emerging Estonian State. The new radical movement was a chance for marginal groups to move into the centre of the political arena. Opportunities to create a new alternative political elite opened for some groups of intelligentsia marginalized up to then and deprived of an access to power and to media, such as clergymen, some groups of World War II veterans, previous dissidents, etc.

From the perspective of organizational resources, the new movement tried to monopolize the national historic experience, and it took a total control over “historicity.” The Popular Front was accused of having “exploited” even the tradition of Song Festivals. Actually the representatives of restorative fundamentalism worked out a sophisticated hegemonic strategy to decompose the existing structure of domination which was already extensively “occupied” by the Popular Front. In opposition to the Popular Front’s idea of creating civil structures as pressure groups for transforming the state institutions, the national fundamentalists elaborated etatist ideology. They argued that it should not be the civil society but the state that would constitute the basic structure for re-building the Estonian society. If the Popular Front’s hegemonic project can be labelled as socio-central with the state conceptualized primarily as an instrument or a representative of the social contract, then the national hegemonic project of the Citizens’ Committees may be termed as state-centred and ethnocentric.

In the spring of 1990, the Estonian Congress, the representative quasi-parliamentarian body of the citizens of the Republic of Estonia, was elected. The Congress initiated and supported mainly restorative state-centred or state-orientated activities. The Estonian Committee — the permanently working body of the Congress — advocated the restoration of the Defence League, which was to serve as its “safeguard.” The militant leaders of the movement, mobilizing all possible fragments of anti-communist tradition in the Estonian history, had a very close contact with the German Army Veterans Associations. The Estonian Committee supported and got moral and financial support from the Lutheran “national church.” Some attempts were made to revive women’s paramilitary organization, and strong support was given to the undergoing rebirth of Scouts’ movement. Rallies, mass gatherings, picketing, and other public mass actions, mobilizing support, for example, to the Popular Front did not play any important role in forming the image of the Estonian Congress.

The goal of rapid revolutionary change, coupled with the strategy to focus attention on the transformation of the state rather than on the development of the society, essentially restricted the movement’s capacity for integrating societal interests. A specific feature of this kind of pre-war “civil society” restoration strategy was fundamentalistic “state of mind,” the mode of social and political imagination, which could be defined as Utopian. To a large extent it is an ideological frame inherited from the previous political culture. Under the Utopian mode of social perception

political decision-making procedures are not in harmony with the actual social situation. The ideal image of what is to be achieved acquires supremacy over the real social situation and is imposed as an imperative according to which reality has to be transformed at any price in spite of obstacles and "enemies," "here and now," so as to correspond to the Utopian (or anti-Utopian) "golden age" recalled from the past or "brave new state."¹⁸

The spring of 1990 was the peak of the national independence-movement cycle that had already flourished for two years.¹⁹ Mass mobilization and activity had reached its utmost. The structure of the Popular Front and the Citizens' Committees conflict should be regarded as a dichotomy that functioned simultaneously in two overlapping dimensions. Stimulated by the enduring national identity crises, the conflict and competition between the two elite groups has been supplemented by a conflict over the principles of the national hegemonic project itself. The conflicting interests revealed in the course of this type of double conflict, regardless of status, ideological, generational, etc. position and party-affiliation of its participants, continuously mobilized Estonians against the central occupying power.

Phase IV: Spring 1990—summer 1991. Stagnation of the "movement society" and its transition to the pluralist democracy

The spectrum of the political groupings in Estonia was rather stable from the spring of 1990 to August 1991. The crucial challenge that the independence-minded movements in Estonia faced remained the same — how to transform the vindicative aspirations and contentious attitudes of the Estonian nation into a workable potential for a systemic change in the relations with the Soviet Union. The opposite goal of the imperial-minded grouping took a more firm form.

By the spring of 1990, very obvious changes had taken place both in the inner dynamics of the movements and in their relations with state power. The mass mobilization of people for national hegemonic projects voicing predominantly Estonian national demands, had reached its stagnating phase. The emergence of new mass movements had almost stopped. Only one of these — Genf '49 movement — gathered power.

Genf '49 was launched as a typical single-issue action to articulate popular pressure to protect young Estonians from being conscripted into the occupying Army. On April 11, 1990, the E.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet passed a law that ruled forced conscription into the Soviet Army illegal and forbade Estonian officials to help conscription officers. The last was the "first real step towards making a break with Soviet structures since declaring the beginning of a transitional period towards independence."²⁰

The other mass movements were concerned with the deepening participation crisis. Alienation of the movements from the grass-root level became obvious. The Citizens' Committees, the launching apparatus of the movement, almost ceased to exist some months after the elections of the Estonian Congress. These processes reflected an increasing tendency towards an anti-democratic trajectory in dominating mass movements. Under the conditions of deep crisis that promoted rapid and large-scale

¹⁸ *Bankovskaya, S. P.* On the "birth-marks" of Socialism in Latvia. — In: *Nikula, J., Melin, H.* (eds.). *Fragmentary Visions on Social Change — Poland, Latvia and Finland.* Department of Sociology and Social Psychology, University of Tampere. Working Papers B: 34, 1992, 55—59.

¹⁹ *Rosimannus, R.* State-power and public confidence in Estonia 1985—1991. — *EMOR-REPORTS*, 1991, 1, 1, 15—24.

²⁰ *Estonian Independent*, 1990, April 18; 1991, Jan. 24.

mobilization, also some centralistic and disciplinarian sentiments deepened and made the movements more vulnerable to organizational takeovers by groups who saw in them tools for their particular party or group interests. The Popular Front actually became "a prolonged hand" of the Estonian Popular Centre Party, and the Estonian Committee was strongly dominated by the Estonian National Independence Party.

State power, having a controversial status of transitional administration, experienced a deepening legitimization crisis. It was put under a strong pressure both by the fundamentalist movements and by Moscow authorities. Under the conditions of grave power crisis some mass movements turned more and more to the role of the sustainers of the existing state power. To achieve this goal they worked out quite complicated long-term tactics.

The Estonian Congress, where the national radicals were over-represented and the leading position was in the hands of the Estonian National Independence Party, declared itself the highest legislative power (but not the executive power) in Estonia, and started to issue by-laws. This was the case of a dual power of rival movements. One of the tactics of the Estonian Committee was to ask the self-governmental institutions for its recognition as the highest organ of power. Numerous executive commissions were created to fulfil the role of the ministries or take them over, but they had no power resources to act as a real legislature.

When they lost much of popular support and political initiative, the leadership of the Estonian Committee became involved in provoking conflicts and creating a tense atmosphere. The tactic of the Defence League (which subordinated itself to the Estonian Congress) was to organize provocative actions on the eastern border with the objective to destabilize the political situation.

Open criticism of the Supreme Soviet by the Estonian Committee was harsh. But it was very characteristic of the Estonian Congress that beyond the "paper war" and the massive pressure exercised on the public opinion, the Estonian Committee did not make any attempt to mobilize masses for realizing its goals.

The most effective times of the Popular Front as a nation-wide mass movement were obviously over. But the movement got a new, an ambiguous role. The leader of the Popular Front got already in September 1989 a job in one of the subdivisions of the Soviet Estonian government. In March 1990, the Popular Front won the elections to the Supreme Soviet, and formed the cabinet. The congress of the Popular Front held in May 1990, issued a new programme, and set up a "chamber of deputies" as a new subdivision within its leadership. Now its role was to support the reforms of the government. As a new elite, acting in very complicated conditions, the leadership of the Popular Front tried to combine the mobilizing of local public for the secessionist movement on the one hand and certain loyalty to central authorities in Moscow on the other in the interests of Estonians.

The social-movements cycle was obviously on the decline. It was impossible for the Popular Front to be at the same time "in power" and "in opposition." The tendency of the movement toward bureaucratization and hierarchism deepened. The Popular Front movement as a massive protest movement was already very much "spent." But in many essential dimensions of the "mass movement society" the Popular Front had yet the extraordinary role to fulfil by organizing mass actions and rallies. The most spectacular among these actions was the "Baltic Chain." The ability of the Popular Front to mobilize masses was very urgently needed when the Intermovement and its allies organized a dramatic show in front of the Estonian government building, and a crowd numbering some thousand

people tried to break into the building and occupy it. The crowd was dispersed by the Popular Front massive counter-demonstration. It was the only case in the period under investigation when large crowds confronted each other in the streets.

A highly symptomatic reflection of the decline of the left-wing massive popular movements was the founding of the *Vaba Eesti* Party (Free Estonia) in January 1990. It was not only a very specific pre-election coalition movement but also a well-designed hegemonic structure. Free Estonia's main opponent was the Popular Front, and it launched a vigorous drive to conclude election agreements with other political movements and groups with the aim to come out as a leading structure. The number of its adherents, however, was quite steady — about 12–13 per cent of the population — during the whole period.²¹

In this phase the activists of the Intermovement and the United Council got much boost from anti-democratic tendencies in Russia. The “revolutionary will” of the people was again a powerful argument. On May 26, 1990, pro-Moscow deputies of the Estonian Supreme Soviet and local governments gathered in Kohtla-Järve (northeast Estonia) to create a third level of legislative bodies. They claimed not to be establishing an alternative power structure but only “an organ to guarantee the normal life for the citizens of the USSR” residing in Estonia. They formed a bicameral Interregional Soviet of Deputies and Workers and the National Economic Council chaired by Vladimir Yarovoi, director of a major defence plant in Tallinn, who boasted of a strong support from some Politburo members in Moscow. An alarming sign of deepening alliance between the Intermovers and the Soviet Army was that the Communist Party headquarters in Kohtla-Järve, where the gathering of the “internationalists” took place, was demonstratively guarded not by a voluntary paramilitary formation, the so-called Workers’ Self-Defense Groups, but by Soviet paratroopers.

In July 1990, a plan was launched to create an antidote to IME. *Integral* — a superstructure endeavouring to involve into the local economic complex all the plants and enterprises in the Baltic area that were commanded by Moscow ministries was founded. Its initiators declared semi-officially that their aim was to keep Estonia within the Soviet Union, but actually they were preparing a military crackdown in the Baltics. Also, differently from IME, *Integral* was elaborated in a great secrecy from the public.

The decline of the protest cycle, coupled with political and ideological demarcation lines in the hegemonic projects, served as a natural trigger for the emergence of parties. The discontinuity of civil and political traditions appeared at this point to be a serious disadvantage for the Baltic States in creating their multi-party systems. The movements had played a tremendous role in advancing democratic capacities of the people in composing their programmes, in perpetrating election democracy, in having political debate, etc. But the full-fledged multi-party political system was not yet ready to come into being.

Most of the emerging parties were rooted in the movements, such as the Green Party, the Estonian Social Democratic Party, the Estonian Rural Centre Party, the Estonian Liberal Democratic Party, the Estonian Labour Party, and the Estonian Popular Centre Party. The Intermovement generated the Russian Democratic Party. Many parties, especially right-wing ones, stemmed from different religious, student or semi-dissident associations. The most influential among these was the first new political

²¹ *Lobjakas, A.* Emerging multiparty system and public opinion in Estonia 1989–1991. — EMOR-REPORTS, 1991, 1, 1, 4–11.

party — the Estonian National Independence Party, founded already in August 1988.

By mid-1990, the political spectrum in Estonia had almost been completed. Many of the declared parties were actually parties in waiting, having small membership and few supporters. However, according to the polls about 40 per cent of the population had already in March 1991 “pluralist” consciousness. They were able to follow and discuss politics in terms of the developing multi-party system and were most receptive to the activities of new political parties. They were showing the first signs of ideological differentiation.²² Asymmetry of Estonian and Russian communities surfaced in this area, too. The necessary germs for the super-structure of political parties were first apparent in the Estonian community.

“The movements society” era was not yet history in the summer of 1991. The dominating tendency of this phase of the emergence of civil structures — the creation of substituting structures for a weak state power could have been politically realized in the interest of one or the other community, using mainly the energy of mass movements. This made it highly probable that the conflicting social interests would degenerate into violent clashes.

At the same time the conflict area between the emerging sovereign Republic of Estonia and the Soviet Union started broadening as soon as Estonian authorities began to put their political declarations and legislative acts into practice.

The deepening conflict proved that despite some theories about “losing the main goal” (which was striving towards independence) in the mass consciousness, caused by a prolonged process on the road to independence and by the existence of institutions resembling those of an independent state, there was a very urgent need for public pressure to decide many single-issue conflicts. The abortive crackdown in January 1991 in Lithuania demonstrated what a valuable experience the mass movements had accumulated. The main resource for bringing forth further changes was still the social energy of civil society. The overall mood in Estonia in the spring of 1991 could be described as wary but determined.²³ No quick solution appeared to be in sight, but too much had already changed for Moscow to turn the clock back to the pre-1985 era.

Conclusions

“Movement society” is a very specific era of transition from totalitarian society with repressed civil structures into modern democratic society. Prevailing discontinuity in the changes is a dominating feature peculiar to transformations on all the levels of social life, also in case of institutional reforms, in public mentality, in promoting new leading elite groupings, etc. Myriads of emerging movements make it possible to promote rapid political changes in the society that has not yet sufficient institutional resources for this in its civil structures. Waves of movement emerge from flexible umbrella structures to cover all the most important fields of political and social conflict.

Turbulent emergence of massive social-political movements was a natural stage in rapid self-organizing and identity gaining for the people of a politically and socially alienated society, it was a central mechanism in the course of creating semi-political civil structures and forming its

²² Kivirähk, J. From the Singing Revolution to the referendum of independence. — EMOR-REPORTS, 1991, 1, 1, 12—14.

²³ Raun, T. U. Estonia and the Estonians. Hoover Institution Press, Stanford University, Stanford, 1992, 239.

political superstructure — a multi-party system. The “movement society” is a label for an extremely intensive period of the outburst of social energy, the re-institutionalization of society, and redistribution of the access to power.

Unexpected intensive processes of democratization unbalanced and destabilized the Estonian society to a very critical extent. Estonian- and Russian-speaking communities and social groupings alienated from each other had not only conflicting interests, but also different historical resources and experiences for social and political mobilization.

The great efficiency of movements and their complementary relation to the state explain the extraordinary dynamics of the transitional period in Estonia and in all the Baltic States. It was quite different from the dynamics of societal processes in Russia. There was no gap between intelligentsia and masses, typical of Russia and some East-European countries. Social activism, particularly in the initial phase, could rely on the tight web of personal links and cultural associations much less bureaucratized than in other parts of the Soviet Empire. The democratic movements possessed enough leverage over the local administrative apparatus and state institutions to hold and defend democratic values sought by societal movements. Moral and cultural resources of the Estonian society gave a chance to transform fragmented and demoralized state power into a stabilizing instrumental power. Already in the first phases of the transformation of power structures some progress was made towards the law-governed state.

The “movement society” of the transitional period had some specific features in Estonia:

1) All major mass movements were dominated by middle-aged people. The leaders of the movements were more often than not representatives of the “generation of the sixties,” those who had experienced the “thaw.” In the sharp contrast to the “revolutions from below,” radical students’ and youth movements in Estonia were conspicuous for their organizational weakness and fragmental programmes. The relative quiescence of the young generation robbed the movements of potential sources of energy and dynamism.

2) An important feature of the societal self-organization was the predominance of large-scale integrative movements. These were based on the decisive role of national hegemonic projects in launching the movements. Different “fronts” or “committees” served not only as a framework for the integration of interests but also for the cumulative representation of diverse interests by several discrete organizations getting the same support from the “umbrella structure.”

3) The segmentation of Estonian population along ethnic lines got some new essential dimensions. The ethnic polarization reflects fundamental social and socio-cultural fragmentation of society. The majority of the Russians did not organize themselves at all, and the groups representing democratically orientated immigrants did not succeed in building up any representative mass movement. The largest movements in the Russian community were essentially motivated by the fragmentation of the Soviet Empire and the erosion of the communist regime. The leaders of the non-Estonian movements were local Communist Party leaders, army officers, and managers of the military plants, who were afraid of losing their privileged positions, and who made use of the fragments of the occupation regime and their military status to organize themselves politically.

4) The evolution of the mass movements took place under extraordinary conditions of a transitory, not traditional regime. The tendency toward

bureaucratization of the movements and transforming them into parties was combined with the persistence of only partially institutionalized structures operating along with the normalized political institutions as pressure groups.

In the general frame of the "movement society" three principally different hegemonic projects were in conflict. The main conflict was between the different roles they gave to the state and civil society in their projects of creating a stable and democratic community in Estonia.

The hegemonic project promoted by the leaders of the Russian community was in fact a retrograde plan to restore the previous state of affairs as well as the previous power structures. Very weak self-organizing resources of the Russian community in Estonia and the specific self-conscious quality of the people actually performing the role of a civil garrison in an occupied country gave them along with disciplinary measures also ideological arguments for blocking the emergence of real independent civil structures. Under the populist neobolshevik slogans like "Power to the work collectives," "Army and the working class keep together," "Get the newspapers under the work collective's control" an attempt was made to renovate old structures in a quasi-democratic form of "direct democracy": restoration of the Stalinist state was under way.

The fundamentalist hegemonic project of the Estonian Committee gave, besides promoting some civil structures, priority to the restoration of the Estonian state and state-subordinated institutions. This project actually denied most of the political and social structures that emerged during the occupation. Depriving immigrants of some basic rights for political activity, and also the right to land ownership, some other property rights, and the rights for activities in the field of big business, the leaders of the Estonian Congress restricted the emergence of civil structures in the Russian community. But a real stability of an openly ethnocratic society must have a powerful police state as its precondition.

The national hegemonic project of the leaders of the Popular Front of Estonia gave priority to the promotion of a civil society. A powerful civil culture was seen as a central precondition *sine qua non* for democracy and a balanced evolution of the society towards independent Estonian state. These aims were the focus of the Popular Front's government programme.

The trajectory ("life cycle") of the "movement society" in Estonia and in the other Baltic States was actually close to the "standard alternatives." Differences in the heritage of local political culture in the Baltic States made only some corrections in these trajectories. But, judging from the recent history of Estonia, we cannot accept the prevailing West-European conception that the movements can "hardly be seen as a major factor of social change, but they often paved a way for a new socio-political order."²⁴ For the attempts of the social movements to restore central social values and for the anti-systemic direction of their actions a revolutionary orientation was of much greater importance. The comparatively rapid institutionalization and centralization of the "hegemonic movements," which promoted new values and fostered the national rebirth of Estonia, can be explained by reference to the political and social context of the Baltics. The emancipatory task to destroy the occupation structures generated the "transitional" status for the actual state, and fuelled the self-creative dimensions of the "movement society."

The extraordinary role of the movements in the power vacuum gave them a syncretic nature from the very beginning. In modern society social

²⁴ Pakulski, J. Social Movements: Politics of Moral Protest. Longman House, Melbourne, 1991, p. XX.

movements have usually a rational administrative political system as their counterpart, and the movements are more or less "complementary" to it. Emerging social movements in Estonia had administrative-bureaucratic terrorist imperial structures as their "counterpart" demonstrating a persistent unwillingness or even inability to recognize movements as legitimate vehicles of national interests. The task of the movements was to carry on new moral and political values and, at the same time, to "institutionalize" these values. Both processes — radicalization and bureaucratization of the hegemonic projects and movements — were inspired by the "revolutionary situation," by the urgent need to create some legitimate counterpart as soon as possible.

Presented by P. Järve

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Rein RUUTSOO

ÜLEMINEKUÜHISKOND JA SOTSIAALSED MASSILIIKUMISED EESTIS 1987—1991

Ajavahemik 1987—1991 moodustab Eesti lähiajaloo suhteliselt tervikliku perioodi. See oli kodanikuühiskonna tekkimise algus Eestis. Riigivõimu organite ja nende kontrolli all tegutsevate institutsioonide kõrval arenes ja legaliseerus nimetatute vastu suunatud kodanikuaktiivsus. Kodanikuühiskonna tekkimises oli massiliikumistel keskne roll. Muudest poliitilise organiseerumise vormidest (rühmitustest, parteidest, assotsiatsioonidest jne.) eristab massiliikumisi kollektiivse aktiivsuse domineerivalt väärtusorientatsiooniline põhistatus, selle üksnes osaline või habras institutsionaliseeritus ja antistaatilisus. Liikumiste määrama rolli tõttu ajastu poliitilises ilmes ja ühiskonna arengus võib kogu perioodi nimetada liikumiste ajajärguks. Liikumiste ühiskonda iseloomustab sotsiaalse aktiivsuse plahvatuslik kasv, liikumiste müriaadiline kuhjumine, nende radikaalsuse süvenemine ning liikumiste omavahelise konkurentsi muutumine poliitilise arengu keskseks teguriks.

Liikumiste ühiskonna tekkes ja arengus eristub neli perioodi.

Esimene faas: 1986. aasta teine pool—1987. aasta lõpp. Võimu lausrepressioneeriva surve asendumine valikulise tolerantsiga.

Teine faas: kevad 1988—1988. aasta lõpp. Laulev revolutsioon, ühiskonna «lahti-nõidumise» algus.

Kolmas faas: veebruar 1989—märts 1990. Liikumiste ühiskond domineerib sootsiumi poliitilises arengus.

Neljas faas: kevad 1990—suvi 1991. Liikumiste stagnatsioon ja pluralistliku poliitilise demokraatia süvenemine.

Massiliikumiste ilme Eestis, nagu kogu Baltikumis, määras nende tekkimise ajalooline kontekst ja poliitiliste vastuolude iseloom. Erinevalt Lääne modernsetest ühiskondadest, kus «süsteemikriitilised» liikumised edenevad õigusriigilise administratiiv-poliitilise võimukorralduse kontekstis, seisid Eestis massiliikumiste vastas ja oli nende peamiseks rünnakuobjektiks bürookraatlik-terroristlik, stalinlikku tüüpi riigisotsialism, mis samaaegselt oli ka imperiaalset laadi võõrvõim Eestis. Riigivõimu repressiivsete ülesannete seesugase kombineerumise tõttu oli rahvuslikel vabadusliikumistel tegelikult ulatuslik sotsiaalne sisu. Rahvusliku iseseisvuse taotlemise vahetute ülesannete taga peitus hoopis olulisem rahva euroopaliku poliitilise ja kultuurilise emantsipeerimise eesmärk. Massiliikumiste üldnimlik väärtustuum varustas ka rahvusliku protesti kui inimväärsema elu poole pürgimise ühe, keskse, universaalse ja tegusa kollektivistliku vormi erakordse plahvatusliku jõuga.

Liikumiste periood oli ühiskonna poliitilise arengu loomulikuks ja vältimatuks vahe-etapiks olukorras, kus tegelikult oli puudunud tsiviilühiskond. Massiteadvus tajus, et aktsioonilisus on rahva sotsiaalse energia ja tahte võimule raskesti tõrjutavaks legitiimeerimise viisiks, mis samal ajal oli ka mitmesuguste kollektiivsete ja isiksustatud identiteetide forsseeritud taasloomise teeks.

«Balti tee» — rahvaste sisemise ja välise vabaduse suunas kulgeva rahumeelse evolutsiooni eripära oli liikumiste perioodi läbimine. Üleminekuajastule kogu Baltikumis ei olnud iseloomulik mitte partikulaarsete, üksikülesandeid seadvate liikumiste, vaid hegemooniliste taotlustega ja ühiskonna kui terviku huvide väljendamise nimel toimivate liikumiste konkurents. Kolm nendest: Eestimaa Rahvarinne, Kodanike Komiteede Liikumine ja Interliikumine arendasid välja ka sellekohased hegemoonilised projektid. Nende projektide põhierinevus avaldub rollis, mille nad rahvuse uuestisünnis jätsid vastavalt kodanikuühiskonnale või riiklusele.

Kodanike Komiteede projekt keskendus lähtuvalt Eesti Vabariigi taastamise esmaülesandest rahvusriiklike struktuuride loomisele. Rahvarinde hegemooniline projekt rajanes kodanikuühiskonnale kui baasstruktuurile, iseloovusele ja sotsiaalse kokkuleppe saavutamisele sotsiaalsete rühmade vahel. Interrinde projekti aluseks oli neobolševistlik rõhuasetus mitteparlamentaarsetele võimustruktuuridele keskusega Moskvas.

Rahvusliku vabadusliikumise hegemooniliste projektide loomusest tulenes võimu küsimuse keskseks seadmine. Liikumised ise muutusid uute eliidi rühmade võimuvõitluse vahendeiks. Vana administratsiooni lammutamise ja asendamise vajadus viis suhteliselt kiiresti Rahvarinde ja Kodanike Komiteede liikumuslikult isekorrasuva loomuse minetamisele ja forsseeritud institutsionaliseerumisele ning aparaadistumisele.

Рейн РУУТОО

ОБЩЕСТВО ПЕРЕХОДНОГО ПЕРИОДА И МАССОВЫЕ ДВИЖЕНИЯ В ЭСТОНИИ (1987—1991)

Период 1987—1991 гг. вошел в политическую историю Эстонии как целостный этап, коренным образом изменивший соотношение между государством и гражданским обществом. В процессе политической эволюции самоорганизация общества приняла форму массовых движений. Необходимость такого специфического периода была обусловлена слабостью гражданского общества, составляющие элементы которого приобрели решающее значение благодаря активности масс.

Как и в других странах Балтии, массовые движения в Эстонии имели более четкие гегемонистические признаки по сравнению с аналогичными движениями в других странах Восточной Европы. Это было вызвано тем, что субъектом этих движений была целая поработанная нация, которая стремилась к национальной эмансипации.