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### A TRIANGULAR DRAMA

#### Domestic, Continental and British Features in the Relationship between State, Municipalities and Voluntary Associations. Balto-Scandinavia in the Nineteenth Century

#### Universality vs. peculiarities

New perspectives are invaluable for one's possibilities to create new knowledge. After some decades' study of the history of one's own country, one has often inadvertently collected a whole set of so-called self-evident things in one's mental luggage; this and that is the "normal way" history has taken, it "should be" so and so. To take just two examples characteristic of Swedish conditions, it is "self-evident" that local self-government in one form or another has existed as long back in history as we can trace it, and that voluntary associations, "popular movements", grew so strong during the end of the last century that they have taken over both state and society; in order to live in accordance with expectations, Prime Minister Olof Palme talked of the ideal political life in terms of meetings in temperance lodges. In how many countries could that be a selling argument?

Another "self-evident" thing, both to many a Scandinavian eye as well as to foreigners, is that Scandinavia is one "whole", a family of countries very closely related to each other. And so it is — today. Countries have simply become much more alike, and I would argue that democratization of states and societies after World War I, which followed upon an economic integration of countries of a kind earlier unknown, meant a lot, actually, it was decisive for this unifying process. A general development wiped away what had been particular for centuries.

#### Why a comparative approach?

After these introductory examples some words ought to be said about the comparative method I have used in different studies of the Balto-Scandinavian area.<sup>1</sup> Quite often comparative research has rested upon

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<sup>1</sup> A detailed documentation of this article would not be proportionate to its length. It should be seen as a condensation of results obtained in studies I have already undertaken. Some of these are (summaries in foreign languages in brackets): *Adertonhundratalets associationer* (Nineteenth-Century Associations. Research and Problems concerning an Explosive Vacuum or Principles and Forms of Organization between Two Social Formations circa 1800—1870). Uppsala, 1985; *Idé och verklighet i 1800-talets Norden. En och samma nykterhetstanke i olika stater och samhällen.* — In: *Andræ, C. G. et al. (eds.). Arkivet, historien, rörelsen.* Sven Lundkvist 60 år. Stockholm, 1987; *The Age of Associations. Principles and Forms of Organization between Corporations and Mass Organizations. A Comparative Nordic Survey from a Swedish*



projects that have involved several scholars, each representing his or her country. Of course such an approach is naturally justified when a lot of basic research is required, but it does not guarantee that the questions under consideration are subjected to the same theoretical concepts and to identical methodological instruments. Instead, I have tried to treat the whole Balto-Scandinavian region from the very outset as my area of study. This means that the comparative element has been present in the research process from the very beginning.

According to my own opinion, there were good prospects of employing this model in the case of this article, like in other studies I have undertaken, since it deals with a subject which is quite well covered by studies at the national level. One immediate advantage which this method conferred was that a treacherous phenomenology was avoided. A mechanical summary of facts observed in individual countries easily leads to similar phenomena alone being compared, and it neglects the fact that similar functions may have been at hand regardless of their external guise. Once this step has been taken, the second follows almost automatically: conditions and trends, which easily seem self-evident when considered from a purely national perspective, become instead national peculiarities in a general, though varied process, when viewed from a comparative perspective, which involves posing the same question in relation to socio-economic-political systems that are to some extent dissimilar. It follows from this that areas subjected to comparative research, like the Balto-Scandinavian countries, must be both sufficiently similar to allow comparisons to be made meaningfully, and sufficiently different to enable the historian through "secondary analysis" or "analysis anew" at this higher level to extract qualitatively new knowledge from earlier research and already familiar facts.

Thus, the success or failure of the comparative approach often depends on the possibility of being able to use the findings of research at the national level. However, the task inherent in this approach — in contrast to simple addition, which merely leads to a quantitative growth in known fact — is, as Marc Bloch argued when he wrote about comparison as a method in *Revue de Synthèse Historique* in 1928, "oriented towards knowledge and not towards practical results" (here quoted from *Land and Work in Mediaeval Europe*, 1967), that is to say more or less unconnected facts produced by examining more or less varying sets of problems. (From the historiographical point of view, it is interesting to note that 19th-century observers in our countries, who lived in states and societies which were considerably more different than they are today, often displayed a more advanced comparative approach than later scholars.)

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Viewpoint. — Scandinavian Journal of History, 1988, 13, 4, 321—343; Rättsuppfattningar och sockenrätt (Rechtsauffassungen und Gemeindeggerichte. Zaren gegen Barone und Barone gegen Bauern im estlandschwedischen Lokalverwaltungskampf um 1850). — Scandia, 1988, 54, 1, 29—52. Agrargesellschaftlicher Wandel und Landgemeindewesen. Die Entstehung kapitalistischer Organisationsprinzipien und -formen in Balto-Skandinavien bis zum ersten Weltkrieg. Eine vergleichende Analyse. — In: *Loit, A.* (ed.). The Baltic Countries 1900—1914, Stockholm, 1990; Die Verbürgerlichung des Landgemeindewesens. Ein Umriß am Beispiel der balto-skandinavischen Länder im Übergang vom Feudalismus zum Kapitalismus. — In: *Jacobelt, W., Mooser, J., Stråth, B.* (eds.). Idylle oder Aufbruch? Das Dorf im bürgerlichen 19. Jahrhundert. Ein europäischer Vergleich. Berlin, 1990; En historisk utmaning. När 1800-talsnationen avlöste 1600-talsstaten (A Historical Challenge. When the 19th-Century Nation Replaced the 17th-Century State). — *Historisk Tidskrift*, 1990, 3, 342—356. Verschiedene Bauern vor demselben Gericht. Schweden und Esten im Verhältnis zum Wiekschen Manngericht 1665—1885. Ausgangspunkte für eine Diskussion des "Schwedischen" (forthcoming in the series *Studia Baltica Stockholmiensia*).



Let us return to the fact stated in the very beginning, viz. the situation after World War I. If we accept that our countries had become quite similar at the time of the Versailles Treaty, things were totally different when the Vienna Congress was opened some 100 years earlier, to reorganize Europe after the Napoleonic Wars. (If one wants to, it is possible to argue that the 19th century started in the 1810s and ended in 1918.) It is a well-known fact that the map of the Continent was redrawn at the beginning of the previous century. Empires and kingdoms were dismembered, the growth of the population was immense (according to a Swedish bishop, Esaias Tegnér, who was asked to disentangle the eternal question of poor relief, it was due to the effects of "the peace, the vaccine and the potatoes"), and *l'ancien régime* was not able to handle this new situation — nowhere, be it in newly erected so-called open societies or in the prevailing, purest autocracies. What to do? It was not too easy to answer that question in the contemporaneous world. Emancipation, in a wide sense, had come and with it the problem how to establish different types of "night-watchman states."

The only "self-evident thing," to use this expression in a proper way, was that the whole situation opened up for a triangular drama, or more precisely, for two such performances. But before going into that, it is necessary to give a rough outline of the Scandinavian situation at the beginning of the 19th century. In 1809 the old Swedish realm was dismembered, when Finland was ceded to czarist Russia as an autonomous Grand Duchy, governed by its old, domestic Swedish laws (according to the Grand Duke himself, Alexander I, Finland was "raised to the rank of a nation"). At the same time "Little Bernadotte Sweden" in the west, under a new dynasty, returned to constitutional conditions, which had been ineffective since the so-called Gustavian autocracy was established in 1789. To put it in an easy way, two new states had been born, and the new rulers, i. e. the quite liberal Alexander I and the in-many-ways-relatively-conservative Charles XIV, had to govern these countries in accordance with laws made long before they got their chance to create a new social order. Five years later, the Scandinavian scenery was to become even more complicated when the Danish Monarchy collapsed and Norway was born again as a liberal, sovereign state in a very loose personal union with Sweden, i. e. the old hereditary foe — the Kingdom of Denmark proper continuing as an autocracy, at least formally.

To sum up, two old states had become divided into four, in two of which, Sweden and Finland, society had governed itself for centuries in municipalities belonging to the "public sphere", to the *öffentlichrechtliche* sphere, to use a German term, since the English language lacks an adequate term, and in two of which, Denmark and Norway, society had been governed from above according to autocratic principles from the middle of the 17th century, when i. a. local self-government had been choked. (What happened in Iceland, the Faroe islands and the duchies Schleswig-Holstein must be omitted in this context, although they have their own interesting peculiarities.) To complete the picture, it must be added that the Baltic provinces, i. e. Estonia, Courland and Livonia, belonged to Russia, although society was still completely dominated by the feudal Baltic-German nobility, which situation I would like to characterize in terms of "leased-out state power," *verpachtete Staatsmacht*. The Swedish-speaking minority on the west coast of Estonia and on the Livonian island of Runõ (Ruhnu) was the exception in an agrarian ocean of serfdom, in "the most purely noble-dominated lands in the world," as



it was formulated by a contemporaneous critic. Only here we meet the "privileged peasantry," i. e. free people who could not be sold and who could appeal to special rights given to them hundreds of years earlier by the Swedish regents — privileges that were also recognized by the later Czars.

Let us sketch the *first* triangular drama. What to do as a state, as central government, when one could not keep control over local things and conditions exclusively from above any longer? It is of crucial importance to consider the cards responsible people had to play with. They were not too many, only three in fact, and they fit very well into a triangle: the state at the top, and at the bottom we have, on the one side, local communities, i. e. municipalities belonging to the public, to the state, by laws, and on the other voluntary associations placed in a "private, societal free sphere," in a *privat-* or *assoziationsrechtliche* sphere, under Benthamite "rule of law," as it has been termed. Of course, seen from the audience, this was an exciting situation. When *repräsentative Öffentlichkeit*, personal government, had to give way to its *bürgerliche* successors with more competing wills in wider social strata, anything could happen, and so it did. Let us have a look at the actors weak and strong — and sometimes indifferent!

It goes without saying that rulers of despotic or autocratic states were relatively little, or not at all, interested in initiatives coming from the subjects (although these had started to think of themselves as citizens). And as always happens in new situations, new words had to be added to the old vocabulary to give exact expressions to new phenomena. So the critics of societal self-organization invented the term "non-state institutions," *Unstaatlichkeiten*, to describe organs founded out of control of the only permitted, central authorities. Louis XIV had taught the world that *l'état, c'est moi*, and what was beside that, was inconceivable; it just could not exist, or at least it should not exist.

And they tried to live in accordance with their principles. In the Baltic provinces, where serfdom was abolished in the second decade of the 19th century, i. e. when the growing capitalist mode of production asked for an alternative and more effective order, the Czar ratified laws regulating municipalities under manorial control, in which every thinkable social function was listed — with the addition that no self-organization among the peasantry was permitted. (The only voluntary associations to be found at this early stage were the ones founded in bigger cities by the leading Baltic-Germans, and even those were looked upon with some suspicion. In the official city directory of Reval in 1843 a series of such associations were listed under the headline "Societies and Corporations Founded Independently of Civil Authorities," i. e. "outside the state.") The non-German "people of the countryside," the *maarahvas*, were not even allowed to sign documents saying that they were to refrain from drinking vodka, since every such agreement was looked upon as a conspiracy against the given order, although temperance as such was welcomed, especially among people in responsible positions in the newly-erected municipal organs.

Ideas of temperance organized in "societies" were preached in front of the throne in St. Petersburg by the American Presbyterian Priest Robert Baird in the 1830s, and he must have found the whole situation quite odd when he saw the outcome of his efforts. It is quite obvious that the initiatives and attitudes of the Petersburg type were very much related to what was commonplace in the whole region east of the River Elbe; we know of the attempts the Germans made to reorganize rural local government at the very beginning of the century, which failed (the only thing that came out of it was new principles for towns and cities). And so, we



have touched upon the *second* "drama" — where did the main ideas of a new social order come from?

As already indicated, the Czars could not behave in the same radical way on the northern coast of the Gulf of Finland, since Alexander I, in 1809, had sworn to keep to the old domestic, i. e. Swedish, judicial framework. So it was impossible for him to change public local self-government as it had developed more or less organically since old times (and which also meant that freeholding peasants and people of rank under the chairmanship of the state-church clergymen, who were elected by the peasants, could do a lot of things within the law in their parishes). But at the same time it must be pointed out that the Czar had not given such promises to *society* as he had had to give to *state* institutions. And we can see the effects of it very clearly. Like in the Baltic provinces, the whole structure of society became very "communalist" or "municipal" — with the important difference that in Finland local government was in the hands of the peasantry, while, for 50 years longer, it remained under manorial control in the Baltics.

In short, the role of the state was strong, and society had to live with it. At the same time new social movements were emerging. In Finland the main stream was "Fennomania," the attempts to form, and give identity to, a new, Finnish nation. This was a necessary step, since people had realized that they "were not Swedes any more" and that they "did not want to become Russians," and so they had to "become Finns." One of the leading ones in this movement was J. W. Snellman, and in our context we should pay special attention to his handling the municipalities in awakening the slumbering, old subjects from Swedish times. Like an early Paasikivi or Kekkonen, he had to balance between Russian realities and Swedish inheritance, i. e. between the possible and the impossible thing, and in doing so he realized that the public municipalities, the uniting link between state and society, were institutions worth trying; in fact they were the only possible solution to the problem. And in reading his "State Doctrine" from 1842, *Läran om staten*, one finds Hegelianism practised in a way which is very seldom found in Scandinavia. In many ways it can be read as a manual for what was to come in Finland: citizens awakening within the state in a German manner, within domestic, Swedish state institutions, without trying too much of "non-state" ones. That is, too, why the Finnish state church was allowed to develop in such a way that different religious ideas could dwell within the same walls (from the point of view of the more and more secularized state, it was more convenient — and less dangerous — to have dissidents inside controlled state institutions than outside them). Autocratic states borrowed ideas from autocratic states, which is as self-evident as necessary to point out.

We have already met Robert Baird visiting Czar Nicholas I. The American also went to Copenhagen to convince the Danish court that the country's popular beer ought to be enjoyed with moderation. The King and the Queen were very little impressed; they had nothing against the idea of temperance, but state authorities could not support non-state affairs; if Baird wanted to change the drinking behaviour of the King's subjects, he was welcome, that was all. Once more we are in an autocracy, but in a tattered one. Nothing was officially changed after the ominous events in 1814, not immediately. But it would not last long before new signals were heard. Already in 1803 some of the "best men" among the peasantry were given limited access to the poor-relief organs in the parishes, in order to give legitimacy to the whole system, since the common man had to contribute to the financing of it. And after the July Revolution in 1830 "estate assemblies" (*ständerforsamlinger*, *Stände-*



versammlungen) were claimed by the Holstein Duchy, which belonged to the German League, where such institutions had been announced, and the King could do nothing but introduce them as consulting institutions, four of them actually, in order not to furnish the annoyed, demanding and self-conscious masses with a national parliament. It could be added that the King's chief advisors in this intricate case were elected carefully; they were no less than Czar Nicholas I and Prince Metternich themselves!

One of the first questions to be raised in these new "parliamentary" organs was that of local self-government, which was also introduced around 1840 in a rather controlled form, and the debate about the new municipalities was highly influenced by the discussions taking place in German states. As the Baird example has shown, voluntary associations were hardly promoted by the authorities, at least not such ones that could mean an ideological threat. Economic enterprises in the form of organizations in society were, on the contrary, welcome to contribute to the development of the country, where the state itself had actively taken part in defeudalizing the agrarian sector and tried to foster a class of freeholding, capitalist peasants, an "agrarian petty bourgeois class", an *agrarsmåborgerskab*.

There are other German features to be found in 19th-century Denmark, first and foremost at the religious level. Unlike the Swedish state-church clergy, which were, as I have already said, elected by the peasantry, their Danish counterparts were, like all other local officials, appointed by the King or the central authorities. Of course that situation was not very satisfying for an emerging class of freeholders, but what to do under more or less despotic conditions? Regular free churches, "non-state churches", such as the English ones from the 18th century, could not be established, so other means had to be tried. Like in Finland, it was, from the point of view of the state, easier to let one hundred flowers bloom inside the state church. But in addition it should be stressed that Danish religious life was (or: had to become) very German-Lutheran in character, and the idea of the "universal priesthood" became the solution of the times. Associations for religious and other non-material purposes were regarded as the worst things in a protestant country of this kind; founding associations was comparable to such horrible things as "taking vows, popery, or jesuitry." People should take part in the religious revival as *individuals*, not as members of non-state institutions. And it worked — and it should be added that, even after the abolition of despotism in 1849, the Danes continued the way chosen; instead of free churches the way e.g. Great Britain and Sweden know them, they continued the reformation of the state church making it a so-called broad popular church (*den rummelige folkekirke*). And without going into details it can be said that Danish liberalism, for historical reasons, also became Hegelian in its state-orientation.

Liberal Norway, after 1814, represents a most interesting country in this comparative context. The non-estate parliament, if one may describe the individual-based *storting* so, had hardly come together when it demanded local self-government, which was not introduced by law until 1837 when a law was signed by the King in Stockholm, which was more or less a copy of the many German drafts discussed in the Danish duchies Schleswig-Holstein; elected municipal organs consisting of a handful of people. And, of course, it was all an odd situation; the peasantry was represented at the state level 25 years before they got a say in their own local communities. It is an interesting thing that the Norwegians did not get inspiration from Sweden, although the two countries were united in a union, but at the same time it is quite self-evident; the Norwegians had to tidy up in an autocracy that had broken down, and if they should have



a chance to build new constructions upon the rest of their own legal inheritance, they had to borrow principles and forms from countries with the same type of experience. In fact, Sweden and Norway in many respects represented a union that never became a union.

Swedish municipal life has already been touched upon in connection with Finland; up to the final democratization of municipal life in 1918 all who were in the position of a vote, i. e. those who payed taxes, could come together to the so-called parish meetings; to the "amorphous and exciting parish meetings," as the clergymen who had to preside in them sometimes complained, since hundreds of people could gather. These institutions are, the most striking example we have of domestic features in 19th-century Scandinavia.

This domestic tradition is immediately seen in a comparative discussion of how European rural self-government was made "bourgeois" in the 19th century, i. e. how municipalities in the countryside underwent a *Verbürgerlichung*. This was the case in most countries where newly erected municipal institutions for the agrarian sector quite often borrowed ideas and features from what had developed in towns and cities in spite of centralizing, governmental policies. In Sweden and Finland we find an opposite process: urban municipal life had suffered much harder from state intervention than had the peasants' communities, and when reforms were introduced in the second half of the 19th century it was much more of a question how to transform old state-supervised magistrates into decision-making institutions of the old rural type. To play with words, we got a *Verbäuerlichung*, and not a *Verbürgerlichung*, of towns and cities.

If we look at the state—municipality side in the triangle described above, it can be easily seen that Sweden and Norway became very different. However, a look at the other relationships reveals most remarkable similarities. Let it be that the King, Charles XIV, was a conservative person — and so he has been characterized in all Norwegian and Swedish analyses — but widening the horizons, one must remember that he, in his peninsula, was sitting on two constitutional thrones. Actually he was surrounded by mere despoties; if one forgets Britain. And it became the destiny of the former Continental marshal in Napoleon's war machinery to witness a British import in societal life that Scandinavia neither before nor later has experienced.

Like in the process of emancipation we experience today, it was obvious to the analysts 175 years ago that the state did not want "any more on its plate," as it was stated by the Uppsala historian and politician Erik Gustaf Geijer, a Swedish Bentham, one could almost say. If the voluntary associations would not come like "auxiliary troops", everything would collapse, he continued, and the only thing the old state had to do was to "disentangle the bankruptcy" of the feudal corporations.

And the auxiliary troops did appear in the Scandinavian double monarchy, the societal "free sphere" was completely overflowed by "societies" in every imaginable sector. The Norwegian historian Sverre Steen has argued that the state was *dissociating* itself from a series of functions it had earlier been responsible for, and, in such a situation, what choice had society but *associating* itself? It has quite a lot to say that the Royal Governor of Stockholm had to apologize for not having been able to make accurate statistics about all voluntary associations that kept the capital going in 1833; *das gesellige Jahrhundert*, the century of societies, had come, to use an expression formulated by the Swiss historian Ulrich Im Hof — and in the same year the Danish minister of the interior, i. e. the police chief, talked in secret with the Crown Prince about the idea of association as a possible solution of problems old and new. One Scandinavia — two different worlds, or at least two completely different



types of states. And two different types of societies; if we got very "communalist" or "municipal" ones in the autocracies, we have to use the term "associative" to describe Sweden and Norway.

It is a well-known fact that Scandinavia in many ways is related to Germany and German institutions — at the *state* level. The whole "system," and together with it the legal, official language is very easy to "translate" into German, if one may say so, and that might be the reason why, for a long time, highly state-oriented research has also been oriented towards the Continent, and looked for impulses coming from there. And in doing so the British import has been neglected. But if one studies what happened to *society*, it is evident that this picture has to be redrawn. The relatively liberal governments in Norway and Sweden supported from the very beginning every so-called society that was launched to solve problems in a proper way. (At least liberalism was *offensive* in the sense that new organizational forms were tried, although they could be filled with conservative norms.) And it was speeded up; one could draw a very long list of non-state institutions that were all direct translations from their English counterparts, or better: mothers. (Sometimes they look quite unfamiliar to Swedes and Norwegians, since they were so rapidly introduced that English terms were not avoided at all; some emissaries were sent to Scotland to learn how to build up savings banks, others went to England to study the monitorial schools etc., etc.)

We have already seen how Robert Baird was received at the courts in St. Petersburg and Copenhagen. When he came to Stockholm and to Charles XIV, he was given the most well-known medal for cultural achievements for his initiatives, *Illis quorum meruere labores* ("For those whose work will survive"), and soon more than 150,000 Swedes and Norwegians belonged to the Temperance Societies that were founded immediately. And it must be remembered that separate ones were established for each country, as always. It is an interesting, and in research almost totally forgotten, thing that the British import contributed to the growth of the Scandinavian nation states, to Swedish and Norwegian national consciousness. When introduced, the adjective "British" was simply cut out and replaced by "Norwegian" and "Swedish"; every society with self-respect named itself in that way, and there was a dividing line as sharp as a razor around the years 1809 and 1814 (before that the Swedish Academy, founded in 1786, was quite alone as a "Swedish" institution). Old states and their subjects had to give way to new nations inhabited by citizens, feudalism that had been organized in so many *particular* ways was defeated by *uniformly* organized capitalism. And nations were fostered in Bible, Temperance, Educational, Missionary Societies and so on and so forth, in reasoning and discussing *bürgerliche Öffentlichkeiten* to borrow the expression the contemporaneous world used, and which Jürgen Habermas has taken up in his analyses.

Thus, the national component *was* important, a new, non-particular identity had to be erected. And, of course, this is very well, perhaps even best, illustrated in the development of the Estonian language, in which the old, already mentioned *maarahvas*, i. e. the "people of the countryside," could not be used to describe a new self-conscious "nation"; a new word *rahvus* had to be "invented." The example given illustrates that nationalists sometimes had to fight "backwards", against obsolete domestic features. This became very significant also for Sweden in the previous century, when liberals in a "diachronic" way attacked worn out institutions from the "Age of Greatness," i. e. from the 17th-century military state. We have already seen that the "synchronic" battle became much more important in e. g. Finland, like Norway, since it was not always too easy to have more or less demanding, new neighbours around the corner. (It



could be added that the Swedish version of early 19th-century national consciousness became less visible to the naked eye, at least in retrospect than its western and eastern counterparts.) There were, in other words only *Sonderwege*, many different paths leading towards the same goal. However, only when separate nations and their traditions had been "invented," was it possible to think of unifying entities at higher levels, of "Scandinavianism," which also emerged, like the idea of a mental bridge over the Gulf of Finland, a *Soome sild*.

The reign of Charles XIV, which ended in 1844, was characterized by the state-promoted societies I have tried to describe above, i. e. associations that were not in conflict with the established order, though they did not belong to the state and were open to male and female members of "all estates and classes" of society, which was important to stress in a new non-stagnant era. The *first* step in the history of society organizing itself according to individualist principles had been taken. The new liberal King Oscar — his Celtic name was not changed! — was to witness the *second* one, which came when the conflicts grew in both towns and cities and in the countryside, events that were due to the continuing economic and social differentiation, and, of course, the new organizational phenomena were not unaffected by the February Revolution. "Workmen's associations" and educational circles popped up in towns and cities, and in the rural districts it became quite common that "masters' associations" were founded to make landless people, whose number increased, save money for their own poor relief. The protective functions embedded in the reciprocal, patriarchal feudal system, which Marx looked upon with admiration when he saw its alternatives, were given up. Now things had changed in Denmark, too, where freeholding peasants had become the backbone of society, which, in the end, was the main reason why absolutism was abolished in 1849. It goes without saying that the abolition of serfdom in Russia in 1861, the end of the "state night," i. e. the revival of parliamentary life in Finland in 1863, and the municipal reforms in the Baltic provinces a few years later, like the upheaval of the *corvée* in this area, belong to the same liberalization of Europe. Concerning radical, organizational innovations, it was once more a question of British import; the ideas of Marx and his fellows found their way to Scandinavia from London.

But this radicalization did not last very long. If liberalism had once been offensive when new organizations were introduced, it had now become *defensive*, if one studies its *ideological programme*. Now we meet, in the Finnish case, the starting shot for governmental registration of voluntary associations, which is still effective, and, in the Swedish case, the so-called liberals of the fifties, men who in a continuing restructuring of class-relations in society tried to defend what they had attained and achieved some decades earlier, i. a. access to state power. Workmen's associations were taken over by the industrialists, the ideal of consensus was preached for a couple of decades — until, let us say, the Paris Commune, when once more popular, even socialist, tendencies made themselves visible in mass organizations from below of a sort never seen before. The *third* step was there. History had gone from corporations, via intermediate associations, to mass organizations. And, as a consequence of a diminishing world, now it became natural for many nationalists to fear "Internationals," communist ones or, as we shall see below in the case of Russia, temperance-oriented voluntary associations, or others. (In the case of Sweden, we should remember that the liberal national consciousness, which was so characteristic of the early 19th century, in the 1890s was replaced by a conservative, quite mythological nationalism, visualized in *Skansen*, not least as a consequence of the leftist Norwegian attitude to the union; see below.)



And once more organizational life had to change names. Bible societies had to give way to regular free churches (in Sweden they were once again a British import), temperance societies to temperance lodges from the Anglo-Saxon world, workmen's associations were split up into trade unions and socialist workers' communes, which on the other hand were more Continental in character (Scandinavian labour movement is very little, if at all, inspired by Fabian ideology), and employers founded their own interest organizations. The idea of consensus was abandoned, the negotiating compromise took its place, and one must remember that many of these mass organizations were politically active, especially in Sweden, where they, without legal restrictions of the Finnish type, functioned more or less as political parties.

To bring concreteness to the comparative perspective, one can describe 19th-century Sweden as a Middle Kingdom, sharing old state-municipal traditions with Finland and new voluntary associations in society with Norway (see the scheme at the end of the paper). And it is easily understood why the expression Popular Movements' Sweden came into being; an expression so full of positive connotations that it is practically inconceivable for scientific purposes. Extremely active mass organizations could start an everlasting dialogue with local officials in relatively open municipalities — a dialogue that, as we have seen, Prime Minister Palme had to take part in. So he had to do, since for a century these "movements" have since long ago, in more or less petrified form, often had a decisive say in public life at all levels. (Norway could be used as a contrast to Swedish developments. Here it became necessary, not least because of the dissonance in the union negotiations, or even quarrels, to unite all radical, national elements in a national political party, *Venstre*, "The Left.")

Of course, one can construct more Middle Kingdoms from the figure; Norway sharing municipal traditions with Denmark and organizational freedom with Sweden, although interest groups in Norway never became so politically active; Finland having the same municipal inheritance as Sweden and a non-associative profile reminding of the situation in the rest of the Russian empire. If we think of the role of popular mass organizations, Finland and the Baltic provinces were the exceptions for a long time, where the so-called Russification put an effective stop to almost all civic activities of this formally organized type (it was not even allowed to introduce the International Order of Good Templars in Russia, since that would mean an international ingredient, i. e. an uncontrollable threat, in the Czar's holy autocracy). The bringing up of nations had to take place in more informal, quite state-supervised activities — if people did not gather to the first "singing revolutions," the nation-building purpose of which no government could attack. In these parts of the empire it was not until after the 1905 revolution that a western system of voluntary associations started to grow rapidly. The same social functions had been there all the time, but in completely different forms.

### *E pluribus unum*

A summary could start with what was said at the beginning: If the Balto-Scandinavian countries were very different when the Vienna Congress was opened, they had become very similar at the time of the Versailles Treaty. And in a comparative perspective nothing seems self-evident; history has consisted of peculiarities or variations of a common theme. What had happened?

Details left aside, I think one can argue that our countries did not decide their own destinies, although many different practical institutions were tried from different ideological positions. With some simplification one can say that many radical ideas emanated from the way society had



become self-organized in the Anglo-Saxon world, and that more of state-oriented innovations came from the Continent. I think the main reason why our countries became so similar is that our part of Europe, willy-nilly, belonged to the western system. In spite of a very much varied socio-economic-political map at the beginning of the 19th century, capitalism developed along the same line everywhere, and so did state and societal institutions. Democracy demanded the same things everywhere, and when democratic organs had been established in all European countries in almost the same way, things, mentalities and ideologies followed suit and became more and more streamline. The expression *e pluribus unum* is valid not only for the United States but also for Europe and Scandinavia. Built upon more or less vigorous domestic traditions, the Scandinavian countries borrowed ideas from abroad and formed what has often been called the Scandinavian model.

But still there are so many differences left that you cannot, with precision, translate Astrid Lindgren's "Emil in the Soup Tureen" into any other language than Finnish, since he, when he had grown up, became chairman of a very special municipal organ that, because of an identic history, exists only in Sweden and Finland. If this splendid author had appointed him chairman of a free church, a temperance lodge or a trade union, i. e. organs that we borrowed at some time from abroad when domestic institutions did not suffice any longer, there would have been no problems. But placing her charming star in a municipal position with old traditions within a state that has always had to bargain with society, she made the task of her translators impossible! But her contribution to comparative research, to the possibilities to create qualitatively new knowledge, is indisputable.

#### Instead of a conclusion

#### SWEDEN AS A "MIDDLE KINGDOM" AFTER 1809/1814

NORWAY

SWEDEN

FINLAND

**In common with Finland:**

**Old constitutionalism, i. e.**

Strong municipalities (especially in the countryside) = *öffentlichrechtliche Öffentlichkeiten*

**In common with Norway:**

**New "night-watchman states," i. e.**

Strong "societies"/associations (esp. in towns and cities) = *privatrechtliche Öffentlichkeiten*

**Own characteristics:**

Strong organizations in very free municipalities = the role of "popular movements"/mass organizations at different political levels in state and society

very strong

quite weak

very strong

national identification

"threatening"

"inoffensive"

"threatening"

against neighbours



## KOLMNURKDRAAMA

Kodumaiseid, kontinentaalseid ja briti jooni riigi,  
kogukondlike omavalitsuste ja vabatahtlike ühingute suhetes.

Balto-Skandinaavia 19. sajandil

Soomlastele ja rootslastele tundub iseendastmõistetav, et kohalikud omavalitsused on olemas olnud läbi kogu ajaloos; taanlaste, eestlaste (ja teiste Balti riikide põliselanike), islandlaste ja norralaste jaoks pole see nii, sest sellised asutused tuli 19. sajandil alles rajada. Norralastele ja rootslastele on sama iseenesestmõistetav, et vabatahtlikud ühingu- «Unstaatlicheiten» (mitteriiklikud asutused) rajati vahetult pärast Napoleoni sõdu selleks, et lahendada kõikvõimalikke sotsiaalseid probleeme; taanlaste ja islandlaste meenuvad peaaegu kohe majandusliku ühistegevuse seltsid, soomlased meenutavad riigitruude fennomaanide hajusalt organiseeritud liikumist uue rahvuse harimiseks ning Baltimaade elanikud teavad väga hästi, et sellistest lihtrahva organisatsioonidest ei saanud nii varasel ajajärgul veel juttugi olla.

Lühidalt: võimukandjate jaoks, kes olid enamal või vähemal määral mõjustatud valgustusajastu ja emantsipatsiooni ideedest, oli probleemiks, kuidas tuleks korraldada riigivõimu ja ühiskonna vahelisi suhteid neil rahvastiku suurenemise, sotsiaal-majandusliku kihistumise ning kasvavate rahaliste väljaminekute aegadel; kas keskvõimul tuleks teha panus riigi haldusaparaadi osana tegutsevatele kogukondlikele omavalitsustele (näit. Eestis vallavalitsustele) või elanike uue kategooria — kodanike — poolt rajatud ühingutele. See dilemma oligi «kolmnurkdraama» toitepinnaks. Siinne käsitlus lähtub põhiseisukohast, et üleminek suure osas eripärasustel põhinevalt feodalismilt tunduvalt enam ühenäolisemale kapitalistlikule süsteemile pidi toimuma iga riigi valitsuse (või keskviimude) poolt kehtestatud reeglite järgi. Autor eeldab, et nii sarnasuste kui ka erinevuste piiritlemiseks selles üldises, kuid lokaalsete erijoontega protsessis on vajalik kasutada võrdlevat (komparatiivset) lähenemisviisi.

Kui Põhja-Euroopa poliitiline kaart aastail 1809—1814 ümber tehti, jätkus Soome areng põhiseadusliku, autonoomse suurvürstiriigina avalik-õiguslikus sfääris, s. o. seaduste ja riigivõimu poolt reguleeritud institutsioonide valdkonnas, kuid Aleksander I ei kohustunud andma garantiisid eraõiguslikule ühiskonnale, mis muutus üsnagi ühingutevaseks. See joon oli veelgi silmatorkavam Balti kubermangudes, kus «maarahval» oli seadustega tagatud õigusi kas napilt või polnud tal neid hoopiski. Sõjajärgne Norra oli Rootsiga ühendatud lõdva personaaluniooni kaudu ning absolutistliku riigivõimu organitest lahtisaamine võttis seal tunduvalt kauem aega kui seltsiliikumise rajamine; sarnaselt Rootsiga muutus sealne sotsiaalne struktuur vägagi seltsidelembeseks, s. t. sai areneda kodanlik, «assotsiatiivne» avalik elu (*bürgerliche Öffentlichkeiten*).<sup>1</sup>

Põhjamaid selle pilguga vaadates on ilmne, et institutsionaalsetel struktuuridel oli sotsiaalsete funktsioonide paikapaneus määrav osa. Vähemalt teoreetiliselt võib väita, et Soome (ja teatud määral ka Taani, Fääri saared ning Island) muutusid omavalitsuslikeks (kommunistlikeks) selle mõiste kontinentaalses, võiks öelda hegellikus tähenduses, ning ühtki teist piirkonda ei omavalitsustatud (kommuniseeritud) nii põhjalikult kui Balti kubermange pärast pärisorjuse ning talupoegade mõisakeskse organiseerimisviisi kaotamist 1810-ndatel aastatel. Norra-Rootsi kaksikmonarhias soosis keskviim nii seltside poolt ettevõetud avalike koolide rajamist kui ka ühiskondlikku hoolekannet kõige laiemas mõttes, mis oli sageli mõjustatud briti benthamlike eelkäijate eeskujust. «Lahustuv» («dissootsieeruv») riigivõim andis ruumi seltsidena organiseeruvale ühiskonnale. Need ülemaalistena asutatud seltsid aitasid kujundada rahvusliku eneseteadvuse eri vorme.

Ajal, mil astuti viimane samm iseorganiseeruva ühiskonna ajaloos, toimus eriti omannäoline «kolmnurkdraama» Rootsis, maal, kus avalikke, otsustusõiguslikke kihelkonna-, hiljem kogukonnakoosolekuid (*sockenstämmor*, hiljem *kommunalstämmor*) kutsuti kokku kuni kohalike omavalitsuste täieliku demokratiseerimiseni 1918. aastal, väiksemates kogukondades (kommunides) veel hiljemgi. Proletaarsete kihtide kasvades 19. sajandi teisel poolel hakkasid mitmesugused aktiivsed vabatahtlikud ühingu- «rahvaliikumised»

<sup>1</sup> Siinses kogumikus on kasutatud terminit *tšiviilühiskond*. — Toim.



(«folkrorelser») kohalikku poliitikasse sekkuma sel määral, et neid tuleb pidada lausa poliitilisteks parteideks (nad on väga mõjukad tänapäevalgi). Selles mõttes muutus Rootsi 19. sajandil «Keskseks Riigiks», mida Soomega ühendas üsna laialdase kohaliku omavalitsuse traditsioon ning Norraga uus, vabatahtlikel ühingutel rajanev struktuur.

Kui Põhjamaid ja Baltimaid iseloomustas Napoleoni sõdade lõpuajal kõige enam nende erisus, siis pärast Esimest maailmasõda muutusid üha silmatorkavamaks enam ühisjooned. Kapitalism arenes kõikjal samade seaduspärasuste kohaselt, ehkki mitmeid erinevaid radu pidi. Seeläbi kujunes ühiskond, mis oli tunduvalt homogeensem kui sajand varem, mil heterogeensus oli peaaegu üldine.

Торкел ЯНСОН

## ДРАМАТИЧЕСКИЙ ТРЕУГОЛЬНИК

На примере в основном Швеции—Финляндии—Норвегии и в меньшей мере Дании, Исландии и Эстонии дается сравнительно-исторический анализ возникновения самоуправления и связей последнего с появлением обществ в период разложения феодальных отношений и перехода к капиталистическим. Анализируется также, насколько сложившиеся во всей Балтоскандии модели развития общества впитали в себя отечественные (шведские), европейско-континентальные и британские идеи и традиции правления.