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THROUGH US DIPLOMATIC EYES (1940—1944): THE SOVIETIZATION OF ESTONIA

(June 1940—December 1941)**

The sources

According to official and unofficial US diplomatic documents, a fairly accurate stream of information about events in Estonia during the crucial years of Soviet occupation, annexation, and sovietization flowed to the State Department, enough to lay the groundwork for US Baltic policy, national policies, and diplomatic attitudes whose basic outlines still operate today, half a century later.

Before assessing the quality of the information and the abilities of the State Department to interpret it, it might be well to look briefly at the sources on which the US foreign policy establishment relied to provide it with data about what was transpiring in the distant Baltic region to small countries whose fate was only remotely connected with US national interests, let alone security concerns.

Though the US had no embassy in Estonia, it had a permanent chargé d'affaires, Walter A. Leonard, in Tallinn, who sent regular, incisive reports directly to Washington. Until the formal annexation of Estonia in July 1940, this office provided the bulk of primary information to the State Department's European Division's Eastern Europe Section (EDEES). Among the dispatches from Tallinn were telegrams, regular situation reports and updates, press clippings and other items from local publications. There is no evidence that the US diplomatic representative had any knowledge of the Estonian language, though he must have had a reliable translator working in the office of the chargé d'affaires who identified newspaper articles of importance. The office also had its informal network of individual informants, most of them journalists and a few prominent intellectuals and politicians cultivated at social occasions. Besides, as the crisis deepened, the chargé d'affaires' office served as a magnet, attracting those anti-Soviet Estonians forced increasingly to voice their opposition by seeking to export information via the diplomatic corps' personnel considered sympathetic to the cause of an independent Estonia.

A second source of primary information came from Riga, Latvia, where the US ambassador for both countries was stationed; most of this, however, was either about the two Baltic states in general or material specifically about Estonia originating from the consulate in Tallinn.

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** This article is based entirely on documentation found in Records of the Department of State relating to Internal Affairs of Estonia, decimal file 860:1170 (rolls 21 and 22).

The third major source of information, especially for the months of sovietization following the June 17, 1940, invasion, came from the US embassy in Moscow. As the Soviets isolated Estonia and sealed it off hermetically, Moscow became an important locus from which to obtain whatever could be gleaned about events transpiring in Estonia.

A fourth major source of information, especially for the period in question (June 1940—December 1941) were the US diplomatic legations in Helsinki and Stockholm. The former used Estonian refugees as its primary source of information. The latter, with the help of Swedish authorities interested in the Swedish minority in Estonia, helped the US obtain general data about that country.

These four sources provided the bulk of the contemporary information for the period in question, for the process of sovietization between June 21, 1940 (the day of Soviet invasion) and the first week of December 1941 (the Soviet retreat from the German invasion started on June 22). Whereas relatively sufficient information was forthcoming in the first weeks or months after the Soviet invasion of Estonia on June 21, 1940, it became more and more spotty as increasingly entrenched Soviet authorities stanching the free flow of information to foreign diplomats. By the time the Germans attacked, a year later, the US obtained news of the broad outlines of the character of Soviet rule in the newly acquired Soviet Socialist Republic.

Much of what was missing was supplemented during the war years. Most information about the Soviet period of Estonia, in particular the later months from June to December 1941, came from three independent US diplomatic stations: (in order of importance) Stockholm, London, and Moscow.

Stockholm has already been mentioned for 1940—41. During the war, it continued to obtain information of the Soviet period largely from Estonians escaping German rule. Occasionally, London was able to supply some news of those years (1939—45), thanks to reports handed over by the Polish government in exile's Political Intelligence Department, and from Estonian exiles. As for Moscow, the US diplomatic staff there was able from time to time to reap some news about the Baltic region in general and Estonia in particular from sundry sources, many of them anonymous.

The information

The process of sovietization was carefully followed by US diplomatic observers in and near Estonia. Great attention was given to the Soviet-inspired political manipulations in Estonia prior to the annexation and to the actual mass invasion of Estonia by Soviet troops. The intimate link between the influence of the occupying forces and the evolution of political events in Estonia was not lost to the State Department's Division of Eastern Europe to whom all the communiqués were dispatched.

What might be identified as the beginning of sovietization is the moment when General Laidoner, the Estonian commander-in-chief agreed to allowing more Soviet troops to enter Estonia on June 17, 1940. Though sovietization, arguably, could be pushed back to the signing of the Nazi-Soviet Pact on August 23, 1939 — an international agreement that virtually isolated Estonia from the rest of the world, leaving it prey henceforth to unrestrained Soviet pressure — real sovietization — the fundamental restructuring of Estonia's government and society according to a Moscow blueprint — did not take place until Estonia was fully occupied. Once the country was swamped by foreign troops it was open to total manipulation, a process that allowed it to be reorganized

along the Soviet model. Sovietization meant the purging of the old native order of an independent Estonia and replacing it with a new foreign-imposed structure designed for an Estonia totally subordinated to the will of the Kremlin. This process would have been impossible without a Soviet military presence, without the naked fact of occupation and the raw power it could exert on Estonia's political and social leaders. In fact, it emasculated them. As Leonard reported on June 17, 1940, "the [new] Estonian government will not be formed until after conferences and approval of [the] Soviet authorities." The day before, the government had resigned, and President Konstantin Päts had been asked to form a new government. However, before he could begin, the country had been overwhelmed by the invasion of 90,000 additional Soviet troops, 115,000 in all. The subsequent "occupation" (as it was constantly described by US reports from Tallinn) coincided with the arrival of Stalin's overseer, Zhdanov, of what was to be the involuntary incorporation of Estonia into the USSR, an "Anschluss," as Leonard pointedly referred to it.

The invasion had been preceded by several important events. As early as March 1940, a John Wiley reported from Tallinn that Soviet pressure had caused the Estonian Minister of Foreign Affairs to resign. Threats of blockading railroad transportation forced his hand. Other Estonian ministers and politicians were equally targeted for resignation and disgrace, ultimately leading to the collapse of the entire cabinet by June 16. On May 5, Leonard reported on the formation of a state propaganda office (Informatsiooni Keskus) on April 26 which provided an instrument for coordinating state-approved information via the press. The law for the new office appeared in the official Gazette (*Riigi Teataja*) and made it possible to promulgate Soviet desired news and allowed for an orchestrated attack on the government, discrediting it for failure to live up to the September 28, 1939 Pact of Mutual Assistance between the USSR and Estonia, thereby further accelerating the crisis that led to the call for a new government. In fact, it was echoing a campaign originating in Moscow in *Pravda*, since mid-May. The extent of the Soviet military occupation and its strategic impact on curbing independent political life in Estonia was noted in a report in July by Major G. E. Huthsteiner, the military attaché. Leonard had already evaluated this information as early as June 27, including the infusion of 400 additional military aircraft.

According to US reports, the process of the sovietization of the Estonian government worked as follows:

On June 21, four days after the Soviet invasion, leaders of 17 trade unions, inspired by communist activists, called for mass demonstrations against the government. Their banners dubbed the former government as one "of war provocators". Instead they called for a government in sympathy with the USSR. On June 22, Vares announced a new cabinet. According to Leonard, who forwarded biographical sketches on each member, all the cabinet ministers had a "working-class" background, of whom two were communists (this *before* the party was declared legal), and the others were characterized as "left socialists". On June 23 the new government called for elections which would provide "assurances for . . . the working classes". On June 27, the Estonian Communist Party was legalized and announced its first all-republic meeting in Tallinn for July 1, to be organized by K. Säre, from the Bureau of Information of the Central Committee.

On July 5, a report speaks of Soviet coastal and island defenses, effectively cutting off Estonian contact with nations across the Baltic Sea. The same day, visiting Soviet officials announced that the Estonian

army would be "reorganized" even as they called for new parliamentary elections and a new president for the country. The following day elections were announced for July 14—15, giving no time for preparations. A few days later, the government stated that elections would take place "with the collaboration of the communist party". In effect this meant (report July 12) that all independent candidates (80 in all) would be screened; by July 12, sixty independent candidates had been rejected. The remaining twenty were described by Leonard as either "unknowns", "provincial personages", and/or "suspected... communist stooges". Prior to elections, wide-scale arrests of Russian and Polish refugees from the USSR and from occupied Poland took place. At the same time, the government announced Soviet plans to try publicly former government members, further poisoning the atmosphere. By election time, most unwanted independent candidates had withdrawn "voluntarily". Election results supplied in a report of July 17 indicated all government candidates (i. e. Soviet-picked candidates) had been elected in all 80 voting districts. Most had had no opposition. Of 81.5% of eligible voters, 93% had voted for government-backed candidates. There were immediate rumors from unidentified sources that Estonia would soon be annexed to the Leningrad district.

Instead, the new government lost no time organizing demonstrations calling for immediate union with the Soviet Union as a separate republic. The crowds, however, showed little enthusiasm, singing the International listlessly, but spontaneously breaking out in song with the Estonian national anthem (even though it had not been listed in the formal program), whereupon Soviet soldiers quickly dispersed the crowd.

Meanwhile in Moscow, *Pravda* (July 18) reported mendaciously that Estonians were enthusiastically calling for "the reorganization of the bourgeois Estonian Republic into an Estonian SSR and its annexation by the USSR". The next day, Vyshinsky flew into Tallinn and consulted with Zhdanov on the fate of Estonia after annexation. On that occasion, about July 18—19, began a one-month moratorium on the banks, while Soviets started to requisition buildings — offices, houses, and apartments — for their use. After the arrest of General Laidoner (who proved to be too patriotic) the newly elected government announced its four-point agenda: sovietization, annexation, nationalization of land, and the state take-over of industries and banks throughout Estonia. On the evening of July 21 the Estonian Parliament unanimously endorsed the proposition that Estonia become a Soviet Socialist Republic and the next day, President Päts resigned in favor of Prime Minister Vares.

On July 23, Johannes Kaiv, the Estonian consul in the United States, noted that Estonia had in fact become an "occupied country" and advised Secretary Cordell Hull not to recognize the annexation of the country. At the same time Leonard reported on July 24 that the Estonian Parliament had passed legislation for nationalization before it resigned only to remain in session for an interim period until the writing of a new constitution for a Soviet Estonia. Leonard made a point of stressing the unconstitutionality of the election. One of its last acts was to publish the declaration to enter the USSR which appeared on July 22, 1940, in No. 70 of *Riigi Teataja*.

By then, the process of the imposition of Soviet will had already begun. President Päts having been forced to resign sought political asylum in the US, appealing to President Roosevelt for the safety of his family. On July 25, the State Department authorized issuing him with a diplomatic visa, but not right away, and then only to him and not to the members of his family in early September, by which time it was too late for him to leave the country. One obstacle was the closing of

the Estonian Foreign Office by August 1 and of other government agencies, forcing all decisions and plans to be administered by Moscow or Soviet authorities in Estonia. On August 5, all Estonian officials abroad were ordered back; those who refused were threatened with severe punishment. (Most did *not* return.)

On August 6, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR passed a law accepting the Estonian Parliament's request to enter the Union as a Soviet Socialist Republic, and, on August 7, the Soviet flag was hoisted in Tallinn; on August 24, the Estonian SSR was formally placed under the Soviet Constitution. In place of the recently elected Parliament, Estonia received a 14-member Soviet of People's Commissars. By then, the US Embassy in Moscow had advised nonrecognition of the annexation, advice taken by the State Department on September 24 as a formal position of US foreign policy. The decision was reconfirmed in April 1941.

From then, direct information from Tallinn became spotty and fragmentary. On October 8, there was a report on the Presidium's provisions for the procedure to institute nationalization, beginning with shipping. On October 25, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR ordered that all Estonian institutions be subordinated to Moscow, a ruling after the fact, made legal by the introduction of the new Fundamental Law of the Estonian SSR.

Since that day, the bulk of the information about the last months of Soviet rule in Estonia prior to the outbreak of war in June 1941 and the German invasion in December came from diplomatic reports outside the USSR, most of them gathered during the war. It is important to note that by the war's end, the State Department had a relatively detailed awareness of what had transpired before the German invasion and the set of criminal abuses heaped on Estonia by the Soviets.

One of the earliest reports came from Helsinki and was filed by Robert McClintock, secretary of the legation, on February 10, 1941. Most of his information came from Estonians fleeing across the border. He reported that prior to the outset of the 1940—1941 winter, a steady stream of fishing boats arrived in Finland with Estonian refugees. Later, many walked across the ice. According to these refugees, the Soviets had introduced collectivization and introduced forced labor for former politicians and government employees. These were formed into labor gangs and used to work in the forests and to construct Russian military bases and installations in Paldiski and Tallinn. They further reported that the new cadre of civil administrators consisted primarily of Russian imports with a small but visible number of high-ranking Estonian Jews in public administrative posts.

Their reports mentioned uniformly the all-pervasive presence of the GPU. Soviet soldiers were to be seen everywhere, and permits were required to travel to Latvia or to other parts in the USSR. Prior to June 22, 1941, about 90,000 Estonians had applied to leave as Germans under the terms of repatriation. Only 6,000 qualified, the implication being the remaining 24,000 were really Estonians masquerading as German as a way of leaving Soviet Estonia. Furthermore, the Estonian refugees in Finland spoke of the serious drop in industrial productivity ever since nationalization. Shops had closed on account of insufficient stocks, and as food shortages increased, so did prices. As Estonians were fired as foremen and skilled machinists, unskilled or incompetent Russians who replaced them mishandled and broke valuable machinery. Management by workers' committees proved disastrous. On another note, the authorities closed the University of Tartu in response to a mass student boycott.

In another report dated June 12, 1941, McClintock (drawing on data provided by the British Secret Service in Finland), reported from Stock-

holm that Estonia was being prepared for war with Germany. His report mentioned mass mobilization of Estonians, a policy that was quantified and evaluated in subsequent reports compiled in December 1941 on the basis of information culled from Estonian deserters from the Soviet army and other Estonian eyewitnesses who had taken refuge in Scandinavian countries.

On June 24, 1941, Johannes Kaiv (now in New York), writes that President Konstantin Päts had been arrested and deported along with members of the former Estonian government and parliament.

Two weeks earlier, McClintock included a report about Estonia by British Security Services in Finland. It made six major points:

1. Estonia had been designated as a cattle-farming zone and was to stop producing grain.
2. The evacuation of Germans had caused a severe shortage of doctors and engineers.
3. In the process of collectivization, hedges and paths demarcating private paths had been deliberately ploughed under.
4. The Soviets were planning programs of replacing Estonians with Russian settlers.
5. In industry, the Soviets were introducing the principles of Stakhanovism.
6. The NKVD were arresting people on a steady basis, most of whom disappeared.

Following the outbreak of war, a report from Helsinki dated December 11, 1941, passed along information from volunteer Estonian soldiers in the Finnish army. According to these reports, the Soviets had instituted mass arrests on June 13, 1941, known to the Estonian soldiers as "Black Friday". Among those arrested were "financiers" and Russian emigrants. They and others were forced to sign statements to the effect they were leaving Estonia voluntarily. Thereupon they were shipped by freight cars, the men separated from the women and children, to unknown destinations. Many, it seemed, died en route. Women and children were heard from, but not the men. An early estimate of the numbers of people affected by the Soviets between June 30 and November 23 (when the Soviets retreated from Estonia) was about 58,000. This number included those arrested, deported, mobilized, and those who disappeared permanently.

The categories of those affected were the following: former military officers, members of the Civic Guard, state officials, high members of non-communist parties, police officials, factory owners, merchants, and union leaders. According to some, mass arrests began in the winter of 1940—41. A second wave began on the night of June 13, 1941, and lasted till August 28. Interspersed were incidents of mass murder: in Tartu about 300 political prisoners were shot; in Kuressaare, about 100. In all, 753 cases had been authenticated; of these 10% were children and 20% women. (The reports include lengthy lists of names of prominent people deported.) By the end of summer 1941, of 1,000 doctors, only 400 remained.

Herschel V. Johnson, the US representative in the Stockholm legation, forwarded materials on this subject on May 14, 1942. He includes a letter by Klaus Scheel, an Estonian banker who writes that in as early as 1941 all his acquaintances "of Estonian nationality... have disappeared without trace". He estimates that up to 6% of the Estonian population had been deported and fears most of them are already dead. A later dispatch to the State Department from Stockholm based on an article in *Dagens Nyheter* (March 24—30, 1944) has even higher figures on the Soviet period. It speaks of 61,000 Estonians "deported by force in 1941", of

which "35,000 were compulsorily mobilized and 5,500 were active soldiers". In all, 41,000 Estonians were forced into the Red Army. Those who did not desert were sent as slave labor to Siberia and northern Russia as "unreliable". 10% of the population was lost due to Soviet assault on the Estonian population during the period of sovietization according to the highest estimates received by the State Department before the end of World War II.

During the 1940—41 months from annexation to German invasion (according to Polish sources in London forwarded to Washington), the Soviets sought out "pro-Germans" — politicians, intellectuals, scientists and other professionals — those whose loyalty was under suspicion. They sought to ferret out members of fascist parties and editors of anti-Soviet newspapers, as well as students from groups like "Sakala".

According to a July 3, 1944 report authored in the United States, anyone suspected of having foreign links was targeted by the NKVD. During the last months, there were regular staged demonstrations, usually consisting of "new" Russians. Propaganda was introduced everywhere: "at meetings, in factories, at rallies, etc".

The churches in particular, and religious life in general, became specific targets of the Soviet authorities: heavy taxes were levied on the churches; church buildings were nationalized — some rented back at prohibitive prices, and others seized outright; the clergy and congregations were forced to work in factories and on the railroad.

A major source of information, though politically colored, was that emanating from Estonians in Stockholm, some of whom were preparing for the post-war period, looking towards the US for support in their reclaiming Estonia as an independent country. One was the *Rahvuskomitee* (National Committee of the Republic of Estonia); it issued a series of manifestos and declarations and communicated them to the US legation in Stockholm during 1944 before the Soviet invasion. Another source was *Päris Eesti* (The Real Estonia) which issued several bulletins in 1943 written by Heinrich Laretei, the former Estonian minister to Sweden, and his exile friends. As of August 1, 1944, several issues appeared of *Eesti Teataja* (Estonian Herald). All of these prepared their anti-Soviet case by disseminating information about the Soviet years (1939-41), especially about the period of sovietization following annexation in July/August 1940.

Thus by the war's end, the US State Department had a relatively accurate sense of what had taken place in the months Estonia was systematically "restructured" as a Soviet Socialist Republic and its people were forced violently into the mold of a Moscow-imposed society. Besides deportations, this had included replacing Estonians with Russians and Byelorussians and starting a demographic policy aimed at slavizing Estonia. The attrition of the Estonian population was further encouraged by forcing them into the ranks of the Soviet armed forces which swallowed up a sizeable portion of the young men of Estonia, many of whom fell during World War II or perished in Siberia along with other Estonian "political" deportees. In the countryside, collectivization and centralized planning had begun to impose a new rural character on the very segment of society where Estonian national identity had managed to survive centuries of foreign occupation. In the months of 1940—41 from annexation to German invasion, sovietization had included a mass attack on Estonia's cultural élite and their institutions. Those who survived found themselves in Stalinist organizations in which independent cultural expression was impossible.

Yet despite this knowledge about Estonia under Soviet rule and its proclaimed policy of non-recognition, the United States did little if

anything to dissuade the USSR from entering Estonia or prevent resovietization and all its consequences. It knew of Estonian resistance in Estonia and of Estonian exiles in Finland prepared to form an independent government prior to the arrival of the Red Army. Nevertheless, as early as October 1, 1943, the State Department issued a telegram that the US should *not* encourage the formation of a Provisional Estonian government "because of various political implications". These were the instructions to its legation in Helsinki. As a result, the Soviet Army rolled back into Estonia in 1944 without any formal objection on the part of its ally the United States, thus signalling an implied policy of non-interference which took precedence over the formal policy of non-recognition. It was one of many accommodations between the two powers as they tacitly divided Europe into two zones of influence replacing the signed Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and its secret protocols about Estonia of August 1939 with the unsigned Moscow-Washington Entente, with one of its unstated protocols that left Estonia outside the sphere of post-war US national interests.

The conscious US neutrality vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and the fate of Estonia have to be seen in context of the passionate "Manifesto" issued by the National Committee of the Republic of Estonia whose text had been formulated by Estonian patriots in Estonia, smuggled out to Helsinki, and forwarded to the State Department in July 1944. It reads, in part, as follows:

"The Estonian people have not let themselves be crushed by four years of foreign occupation, nor have they ever recognized nor ever will recognize any imposed puppet government, either Soviet or German . . .

The National Committee has its seat in Estonia and consists of delegates from all political and social organizations of the country . . . The Committee calls upon the people to coordinate their struggle for liberty . . . and to maintain close contact with democratic states which recognize the principles of freedom."

Indeed, for unspecified *raisons d'état*, the United States chose not to act on behalf of the principles of freedom as they applied to Estonia in 1944 as it emerged from German occupation only to be submerged by a second Soviet occupation, euphemistically and deceitfully called a "liberation".

When Estonians write their own history again, they must come to grips with these realities that are hidden in the many sources contained in the National Archives. It will be an adventure of national rediscovery and a confrontation with a painful chapter in the Estonian people's past about which they have been denied all information, for much too long, by many parties in the international community.

Presented by P. Vares

Received
Jan. 15, 1991

EESTI SOVETISEERIMINE USA DIPLOMAATILISE PILGU LÄBI (1940—1944)

On tutvustatud infokanaleid, mis pidid tagama adekvaatse teabe kohalejõudmise Eestist USA-sse. Samuti on antud ülevaade sellest, mida USA-s Eestis toimuvatest sündmustest teati ja mida selle alusel ette võeti.

Eesti-teemalise teabe põhivahendajad olid: 1) USA *chargé d'affaires* Eestis Walter A. Leonard, kes lähetas oma telegrammid, analüüsid ja muud teated USA Riigidepartemangu Euroopa Osakonna Ida-Euroopa Sektsioonile (*State Department's European Division's Eastern Europe Section* — EDEES). Märgitagu, et Leonard ei osanud eesti keelt ning pidi teabe kogumisel kasutama tõlke ja inglise keelt valdavaid informaatoreid; 2) Riias paiknev Eesti ja Läti ühine USA saadik, kes edastas Ühendriikidesse mõlemat riiki puudutavat ühismaterjali ja ka talle Tallinnast lähetatud infot; 3) USA Moskva saatkond, kes sai Eestit käsitleva materjali edastajaks eriti siis, kui USA esindused Balti riikides likvideeriti (juuni 1940—detsember 1941); 4) USA diplomaatilised esindajad Helsingis ja Stockholmis, kes toimetasid edasi põhiliselt eesti emigrantidelt saadud materjale, mis tihti tuginesid anonüümsetele allikatele. Eesti annekteerimisest kuni 1941. aasta detsembrini olid põhilisteks infovahendajaks tähtsuse järjekorras Stockholmis, Londonis ja Moskvas paiknevad USA diplomaatilised esindused.

Nende allikate kaudu sai USA kõige põhjalikumad teated okupatsioonielsetest sündmustest ja NSV Liidu survest Eestile. Üksikasjalikku teavet omati ka 1940. aasta juunis ja juulis toimunud riigipöörde ja ebademokraatlike valimiste kohta. Selle põhjal jõuti järeldusele, et ilma Nõukogude armee sekkumiseta poleks see pööre võimalikuks osutunud.

23. juulil 1940 palus Eesti peakonsul USA-s Johannes Kaiv USA riigisekretärit Cordell Hullilt, et Ühendriigid asuksid anneksiooni mittetunnustamise teele. 25. juulil soovitas USA Riigidepartemang vormistada K. Pätsile septembri alguseks diplomaatiline viisa, kuid viisat ei antud tema perekonnale. Septembris osutus viisa üleandmine aga juba hilinenuks.

Anneksiooni mittetunnustamise poliitikat soovitas NSV Liidu suhtes rakendada ka USA saatkond Moskvast. USA võttiski 24. septembril 1940 vastu seisukoha Balti riikide annekteerimise mittetunnustamise kohta ning kinnitas seda uuesti ka 1941. aasta aprillis. President K. Pätsi ja teiste juhtivate riigitegelaste arreteerimisest ja depõrteerimisest saadi teada J. Kaivi vahendusel 24. juunil 1941. Üksikasjalikumad andmed 1941. aasta massiküüditamisest, sundmobilisatsioonist ja NKVD poolt sooritatud massimõrvadest enne Eestist evakueerumist edastas USA-sse 11. detsembril 1941 Helsingist USA saatkonna sekretär R. McClintock. Samalaadseid andmeid lähetati ka Stockholmi saatkonnast 14. mail 1942. Need teated olid pärit põgenikelt ning Eesti emigrantlikelt rühmitustelt ja organisatsioonidelt. Suur tähtsus tõese informatsiooni levikul oli Eesti endise Rootsi saadiku H. Laretei bülletäänidel «Päris Eesti» ja «Eesti Teataja», mis sisaldasid informatsiooni aastast 1939—1941 põhirõhuga ajavahemikul juuli—august 1940.

Teise maailmasõja lõpul oli USA-l suhteliselt hea ülevaade Eestis toimunud vägivallast. Kuid hoolimata sellest teadmised ja väljakuulutatud mittetunnustamispoliitikast ei teinud USA midagi, et takistada NSV Liidu tungimist Eestisse ja Eesti sovetiseerimist. USA astus vastu isegi Eesti emigrantide püüdele moodustada enne NSV Liidu vägede uut sissetungi Eesti ajutine valitsus. 1. oktoobril 1943 ei soovitatud USA Riigidepartemangu telegrammis ajutise valitsuse moodustamist, sest see võinuks kaasa tuua mitmesuguseid poliitilisi kõrvalmõjusid. Eesti taasvallutamine NSV Liidu poolt ei leidnud USA-poolset avalikku vastuseisu, mittetunnustamispoliitikale eelistati mittevaheselegamist liitlase siseasjadesse. USA riigihuvist lähtudes nimetati seda okupatsiooni eufemistlikult «vabastamiseks».

Eesti uue tõese ajaloo kirjutamisel on tingimata vaja tutvuda ka USA Riigiarhiivi peitunud materjalidega.

С ТОЧКИ ЗРЕНИЯ ДИПЛОМАТИИ США (1940—1944): СОВЕТИЗАЦИЯ ЭСТОНИИ (ИЮНЬ 1940 — ДЕКАБРЬ 1941)

Представлены информационные каналы, которые должны были обеспечивать поступление в США адекватных сведений об Эстонии. Предложен также обзор имевшейся в США информации о событиях в Эстонии и действий правительства США, предпринятых на ее основе.

Основными поставщиками информации об Эстонии были:

1) временный поверенный в делах США в Эстонии Уолтер А. Леонард, направлявший свои телеграммы, аналитические сообщения и другие сведения в отделение Восточной Европы европейского отдела государственного департамента США (*State Department's European Division's Eastern Europe Section — EDEES*), отмечается, что Леонард не владел эстонским языком и, собирая информацию, использовал переводы и помощь информаторов, владеющих английским языком; 2) посланник США в Эстонии и Латвии Джон Уайли, который находился в Риге и передавал в США объединенные материалы, касающиеся обоих Балтийских государств, а также сведения, поступавшие к нему из Таллинна; 3) посольство США в Москве, куда информация об Эстонии наиболее интенсивно начала поступать после того, как представительства США в Балтийских государствах были ликвидированы (июнь 1940 — декабрь 1941); 4) дипломатические представители США в Хельсинки и Стокгольме, которые передавали в основном материалы анонимного характера, полученные от эстонских эмигрантов. Начиная со времени аннексии Эстонии до декабря 1941 г. основными передатчиками информации были дипломатические представительства США, находившиеся — в порядке их значимости — в Стокгольме, Лондоне и Москве.

Посредством этих источников США получили подробную информацию о событиях, предшествовавших оккупации, и о давлении, оказанном Советским Союзом на Эстонию. В июне и в июле 1940 г. удалось получить отдельные сообщения о происшедшем государственном перевороте и антидемократических выборах. На основании этих сведений был сделан вывод о том, что без вмешательства Советской Армии переворот не был бы осуществлен.

23 июля 1940 г. генеральный консул Эстонии в США Иоханнес Кайв обратился к государственному секретарю США Корделлу Халлу с просьбой о том, чтобы США не признавали аннексию его страны. 25 июля государственный департамент США уполномочил американское консульство в Эстонии оформить президенту республики К. Пятсу (но не его семье) к началу сентября дипломатическую визу. Однако в сентябре это было уже запоздалым шагом.

Посольство США в Москве уведомило правительство Советского Союза о политике непризнания аннексии со стороны своего правительства. 24 сентября 1940 г. США заявили о непризнании аннексии Балтийских государств и подтвердили свою позицию в апреле 1941 г. Об аресте и депортации президента К. Пятса и других ведущих государственных деятелей сообщил И. Кайв 24 июня 1941 г. Подробности о массовых депортациях 1941 г., насильственной мобилизации и массовых убийствах, совершавшихся НКВД накануне ухода советских войск из Эстонии, сообщил в США 11 декабря 1941 г. секретарь посольства в Хельсинки К. Мак-Клинтон. Аналогичные сведения поступили и 14 мая 1942 г. из посольства США в Стокгольме. Эта информация была получена от беженцев, а также от эмигрантских групп и организаций. Большую роль в распространении достоверных сведений сыграли издававшиеся бывшим посланником Эстонии в Швеции Х. Ларетеем бюллетени «Päris Eesti» («Истинная Эстония») и «Eesti Teataja» («Вестник Эстонии»), содержавшие информацию о событиях 1939—1941 гг. особо выделяя период с июля по август 1940 г.

К концу второй мировой войны США располагали относительно полным обзором фактов и свидетельств насилия, совершенного в Эстонии. Но несмотря на такую осведомленность и объявленную политику непризнания аннексии, США не сделали ничего, чтобы воспрепятствовать новому вторжению Советского Союза в Эстонию и помешать ее вторичной советизации. США даже выступили против попытки эстонских эмигрантов накануне вступления войск СССР образовать временное правительство Эстонии. В телеграмме от 1 октября 1943 г. государственный департамент США не поддержал идею создания временного правительства, считая, что это может повлечь за собой различные побочные воздействия политического характера. Вторичное завоевание Эстонии Советским Союзом не подтолкнуло США к открытому протесту, политика непризнания была принесена в жертву невмешательству во внутренние дела союзника. Исходя из интересов своего государства США эвфемистически назвали оккупацию «освобождением».

Рекомендовано, создавая новую действительную историю Эстонии, настоящей образом ознакомиться и с материалами, хранящимися в Государственном архиве США.