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THE ROLE OF TERRITORIAL, CLASS AND RELIGIOUS CLEAVAGES IN NORWEGIAN POLITICS

I have two purposes with this paper. One is to present a general model for the analysis of political systems and political behavior, as it has been developed by the Norwegian political scientist Stein Rokkan together with leading American colleagues. The other is to explain the development of some main features of the Norwegian political system in the light of this model.

Mainly owing to Rokkan's work, Norway has become one of the standard cases or examples in international literature on political systems. The model is in its details extremely complex, and has been used for comparative analysis of party systems and political behavior in most West-European, and also some East-European countries. However, space does not allow me to include other countries besides Norway.

After a brief general presentation of the model, I will use it to analyze the development of the Norwegian party system. Finally, I am going to discuss changes in political behavior in the postwar period, as it is expressed in changed support for the different political parties.

The model

The questions which Rokkan asked and tried to answer had all to do with the social and political processes connected with the industrial revolution and the development of national states in Europe. The angle he chose and the way he posed the questions varied considerably in his numerous articles, but two of the main issues were these:

1. How to explain the development of different party systems in different countries? The term "different" refers both to the number of parties, the extent to which each party represents one or more class or other interests, and the degree of stability of the particular system.

2. How to explain changes in political behavior among the citizens? "Political behavior" usually refers to electoral behavior.

In Rokkan's analysis the term "cleavages" occupies a central position. To explain the characteristics of each political system it is necessary to "draw" a map of the social, economic and cultural conflicts dominating the societies in the crucial phases of party formation. Last century's development of mass cultures (schools, newspapers), new political institutions based on extended suffrage and the industrial revolution certainly had long-term integrative effects. However, these developments created new conflicts, interacting with old ones. Some of the conflicts are of such importance that they influence the pattern of parties and create stable oppositions in certain parts of the territory. Such conflict lines are called cleavages.

Cleavages are territorial, ethnic and cultural differences of a more or

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less permanent character.¹ They refer to differences of a structural character, which do not change suddenly. There might also be sub-cleavages, for instance within a class or a territory, which may play a more or less permanent role. This will be illustrated later through the Norwegian example.

Further, cleavages may *overlap*, or they may be *crosscutting*. For instance, most of the workers might come from one ethnic group, the bourgeoisie from another, this is overlapping. In case of crosscutting, workers, bourgeoisie and intelligentsia are fairly evenly distributed among all ethnic groups. The more crosscutting, the more complex is the analysis of the development of party systems; on the other hand, the political systems will then often be more stable.

So far, the model has mainly been used to analyze competitive systems, i.e. those with more than one party. In principle, however, it should be possible to apply it on one-party systems as well, although the analysis would then have a more tentative character.

It should be underlined that what Rokkan offers is a *model*, not a causal theory. It cannot be classified either as a materialist or an idealist model. There are no mechanical deductions in his thinking, but a constant interaction of economic, social and political forces. For the *user* of the model, it is possible to stress for instance changes in the modes of production more than Rokkan does, and still keep within the overall framework. His aim was explicitly to stimulate other scientists to develop new and testable hypothesis.

The basic idea is this: parties always represent interests, but there is not necessarily one party for each interest group or each class in the society. One class can support different parties, and one party usually unites and represents more than one interest. How the interests are distributed, and which parties are formed to serve the purpose of *aggregation* and *defense of these interests* are decided by the cleavage pattern and by the timing of two crucial revolutions — the national and the industrial.²

The national revolution involves three main processes:

First, the territorial consolidation of state power. It includes acquiring state monopoly of violence, a state-controlled system of taxation and administrative standardization within the territory.

Secondly, the national revolution usually involves standardization of culture, mainly achieved through a unified educational system. In this phase, conflicts may arise between the expanding centerforces on the one side, and ethnic, regional and other "alternative" cultural power centers on the other.

Thirdly, the extension of suffrage to an exceedingly wider share of the population. On the one hand, this creates possibilities for political mass-participation, and social classes earlier denied access to political power now mobilize. On the other hand, the participation of new groups creates new tensions, and is usually followed by fundamental changes in the political system.

The industrial revolution involves development of a new type of working class, as well as introduction of the market economy in the countryside. Again, new types of conflicts are produced, as well as new alliances. The party system of a given country is a result of the interaction of all the factors mentioned.

And now, let us proceed to our case — Norway.

¹ Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives. S. M. Lipset, S. Rokkan (eds.). New York: The Free Press, 1967, 9—33.

² *Rokkan*, S. Territories, centres, and peripheries: toward a geoethnic-geoeconomic-political model of differentiation within Western Europe. — In: Centre and Periphery: Spatial Variation in Politics. J. Goffman (ed.). London: Sage Publications, 1980, 34.

The development of the Norwegian political system

Norway was territorially united under one monarch in the beginning of this millennium, and has stayed so with minor changes until this day. From 1319 we were a Danish colony, but kept a certain autonomy with regard to administrative regulations. In connection with the Peace of Kiel in 1814, Norway was granted internal independence, but had to accept a personal union with Sweden and the dominance of Stockholm in all external affairs.

In May 1814 Norway got its first Constitution, which granted suffrage to all men who owned or leased a certain amount of land, as well as owners of burgher rights or real estate in the cities, and the King's officials, *embetsmennene*. About 2/5 of all men aged 25 and over gained political citizenship in that year.

The country was administrated by a corps of senior civil servants with academic education from Denmark, *embetsmenn*. They were guided by the Swedish Government and by our own ministers, who partly resided in Sweden, partly in Norway. *Embetsmenn* were as a rule not removable (lifelong appointments), and the group also included clergy and officers.

Norwegian population of that time consisted mainly of small independent peasants, but with considerable groups of tenants, farm hands and fishermen. The country had a weak national bourgeoisie and quite insignificant numbers of large estate owners and industrial workers. Up till 1900 the political system was characterized by cleavages developed or made visible through the mobilization of peasants into the political system. Center-periphery and cultural conflicts were the most important. From 1900 rapid industrialization ensures that class issues are introduced, as well as the struggle among the parties to win working class votes.

The first parties: the Left and the Right

The first two parties — *Venstre* (the Left) and *Høyre* (the Right) — were formed in 1884. The formation of *Venstre* followed a gradual development of various peripheral oppositions, and *Høyre* represented an attempt to stem these forces. The *timing* of the formal consolidation as parties was decided by the need for effective pressure groups in the *Storting* (National Assembly) in connection with a conflict concerning the relationship between legislators and the Cabinet ministers.

The struggle focused on two issues: first, a proposal to break down the barriers of communication between legislators and the Cabinet ministers; second, it centered on the King's right to veto constitutional amendments.

The Constitution had issued a clear-cut division of power between the King and the Cabinet on the one side, and the *Storting* on the other. The ministers were to retain complete independence from the legislators, who had nothing to say in questions concerning appointment of ministers and other high officials of the State. With regard to ordinary laws, the King could refuse to sanction decisions of the *Storting* twice. If three successively elected assemblies adopted the same decision it would become valid law even without the King's consent. The conflict centered around the question whether the King had an absolute or just a postponing veto in matters concerning the Constitution.

Until 1872, the *Storting* had kept rejecting any proposal that the ministers should have access to their meetings, out of fear of the persuasive powers of the articulate officials in the King's Council. In 1872, the situation changed. A new alliance of rural representatives and urban

liberals felt strong enough to demand the presence of the ministers, in order to increase their influence on the executive power. One of the purposes was to make it possible for the *Storting* to confront the ministers with questions about their administrative dispositions. The King refused to sign a constitutional amendment providing for the new arrangement, until in 1880 the *Storting* insisted that the Government should declare it a law, in spite of a third veto from the King. The struggle that followed became a question of national defense as well as popular sovereignty versus old, monarchic rule.

About one third of all men were enfranchised by that time. The radicals, the Left, successfully mobilized in the fiercely partisan elections in 1882, which witnessed a voter turnout of 70% (compared to 45% in 1879). The aim of this mobilization was to gain the necessary majority in the *Storting* to have the ministers who had refused to sanction the constitutional amendment in 1880 prosecuted in a special Court of the Realm.³ This court, consisting of one of the two chambers of the *Storting* and the Supreme Court, was the most important potential power instrument against the Government. The members of the Government were sentenced and dismissed from office. In addition, they had to pay fines. From then on the Government had to accept its dependence of and responsibility toward the National Assembly, rather than toward the King. After the conservative defeat, the King gave in and appointed a Government from the Left, which enjoyed support from a majority of the *Storting*.

The mobilization of peasants and farmers into national politics did not take place as one big wave. It was rather a couple of different oppositions. In 1884 the Left offered these groups a common platform, and they managed to form an alliance of peripheral forces against the Government loyal to Sweden. Only for a few years did *Venstre* manage to unite all the various oppositions, and several splits occurred from 1887 to 1973.

First, the party included a liberal cultural opposition in the main valleys and the inner fjords in the southern half of Norway. Opposition to the use of Danish written standards in schools and local administration and skepticism toward increases in state expenditures were the core issues among these people. Schools based on a liberal Christian belief and a new written language based on the Norwegian dialects, *landsmål*, were organized. These *folkehøyskoler* produced hundreds of leaders for the peasant movement, and later became centers for nationalist agitation against the union with Sweden. The conservative Government formed new alternative rural schools for youths in 1875, with the explicit aim of creating an alternative to the politically radical public high schools. But the attempt failed: even these schools became radical bastions.⁴

The peasant associations, *bondevennforeningene*, formed also an important part of the same opposition. They demanded increased public saving and stable, low interests on mortgage loans. More generally, they fought for the reduction of the power of the central state officials, *embetsmennene*, and increasing that of the local elected councils (established in 1837). *Bondevennene* were dissolved in 1875, but their activities were continued by radical discussion clubs, *samtalelag*, and leftist clubs, *venstrelag*. During the general elections in the 1870s and 1882 they mobilized peasants to support peasant candidates, not the *embetsmenn*, as had been widespread earlier. Also, sport clubs of riflemen, *skytterlag*, were formed. Their members were trained in shooting, and the clubs were used as a threat during the constitutional fightings in 1884, when the Left feared a state coup from the King and his conservative supporters.

Another rural opposition had its stronghold in the southern and western

³ Rokkan, S. Territories, centres, and peripheries, 375—403.

⁴ Seip, J. A. Utsikt over Norges historie II: 1850—1884. Oslo: Gyldendal, 1981, 192.

coastal areas. The *pietist* movement consisted of Christian fundamentalists, who were critical of the secularist influence from the cities. They disagreed with the above-mentioned liberal opposition's emphasis on language (respect for the Word implied that the Bible should remain in Danish!). But they were strongly opposed to the near monopoly enjoyed by the Evangelic Lutheran state church clergy in conducting religious sermons. The pietists demanded the right of local laymen to perform ordinary sermons. Besides, they shared the liberal rural opposition's skepticism toward high state expenditures and the powers of the King's officials.

The reason why the above-mentioned oppositions sought to increase their influence in the *Storting* and on the ministers, was mainly a wish to use these institutions to increase and secure the powers of *local* institutions. Several old demands supporting *peasant communalism* were made law after 1884.⁵ Having gained the majority in the national assembly in 1882, the Left used their powers to secure the right of the locally elected councils to appoint the police sergeants, *lensmenn* (1884). This was earlier done by the King's officials.⁶ In 1887 the majority of the *Storting* voted in favour of local *juries*. The power of government-appointed judges was reduced for the benefit of lay jurisdiction. In 1889 the local school councils gained increased powers to elect school teachers. The power of the clergymen in the councils was reduced.⁷

The rural oppositions also had some support from urban liberals, mainly intellectuals, who, inspired by nationalism and originally French ideas about popular sovereignty, supported the struggle against the conservatives. Many of them belonged to "academic proletariat" — usually first generation academics who had problems with getting jobs in the central administration. Among them were also historians, linguists and writers, who all became important participants in the nationalist mobilization against the Union.

The government officials, the bourgeois elements and some large land owners formed the Right party, *Høyre*. This was a reaction to what they saw as a threat to the constitution and the independence of the government. But they had no chances to mobilize the number of voters that supported the Left, and lost the power necessary to postpone the decision on the government's responsibility to the parliament. Rokkan has pointed to an important difference in the conservative response to the mass mobilization of peasants in Norway and Britain. In Britain, the urban bourgeoisie and the landed aristocracy managed to unite their forces against this mobilization, within the conservative party. In Norway there was not such strong landed aristocracy, and consequently the urban-rural front was more clear-cut in this early period.⁸

What happened to the two "old" parties after the constitutional struggles in the 1870s and 1880s? The peripheral alliance did not last. The first split came in 1880, when the rural fundamentalists in the Southwest formed a temporary alliance with the most conservative faction of the city liberals, the *Moderates*. This alliance did not last either, and some of the Moderates later joined their old party again. But the Southwest has until now remained a distinct periphery with its own political preferences.

In 1933 the Left lost most of their religiously active members, who formed the *Christian People's Party*. The constant attempt to compete with

⁵ Nordby, T. En motivforskners antediluvianske verden. — Historisk Tidsskrift, 1986, N 1, 99.

⁶ Bergsgård, A. Norsk historie 1814—1880. Oslo: Det norske Samlaget, 1964, 137.

⁷ Nærbøvik, J. Norsk historie 1870—1905. Oslo: Det norske Samlaget, 1986, 180.

⁸ Rokkan, S. Norway: numerical democracy and corporate pluralism. — In: Political Oppositions in Western Democracies. R. A. Dahl (ed.). New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966, 79.

the Labour Party gave the Left Party a profile which was alien to the strong believers. In 1926 the pietists also lost a struggle (a national referendum) to retain the ban on the sale of alcohol. Several liberal clergymen were appointed against their will. And the Left was dominated by people who did nothing to stem a tide of cultural radicalism alien to Christianity in the theaters and the press of the capital.⁹ The religious cleavage is still alive, and the Christian People's Party's profile has up till now been to demand more religious teaching in schools, in state radio and television and to struggle against free abortion.

The religious cleavage was not the only problem facing the old Left Party. In 1920 the medium and larger farmers broke out and formed their own *Agrarian Party*. The above-mentioned struggle to gain workers' votes was one of the reasons. The farmers were not interested in radical and expensive social programmes and workers' insurance schemes. According to them, the State should rather use the money to support Norwegian grain production and new farms. They also wanted protectionist custom tariffs on imported grain.¹⁰ At the same time they were still culturally alienated from the city conservatives in the Right Party. Hence, the decision to form their own party.

What remained of the Left, the old *Venstre*, has ever since kept its rural profile. Ecological concerns and fighting for extended use of the written language based on dialects have been the most important issues. Largely, they have supported state interventionism in all matters increasing social welfare and schemes to retain threatened settlements in the peripheries.

The Right Party or the conservatives became after 1884 more and more a clearly interest party, fighting for the broadening community of commercial and industrial interests. However, since the end of the 1970s there has been a marked tendency to appeal to the youth by using the now almost world-wide popular slogan of "individual creativity". Before this, the party never managed to get near the Labour Party in support from the voters.

Before continuing with the development of the Labour Party, just a few words about the crucial referendum in 1905, which ended the Union with Sweden. All the parties supported a break up of the Union at that time. Only 184 Norwegians voted against. What happened was that both the outright nationalist movement with its basis in rural cultural protest and the newly urbanized intelligentsia allied with the national bourgeoisie. The members of the bourgeoisie were generally not nationalists, but nonetheless possessed a distinct national identity.

Among the conservatives the attitude toward the Union changed over a period of only four months. The background was Swedish insistence that the common foreign minister by law should be a Swede, and that the Norwegian consulate service should be subordinated to him. This was too much for the rapidly growing group of Norwegian bourgeoisie, who were aware of the importance of an independent foreign service. One might say that in 1905 the national feeling developed into outright *nationalism*, which on this particular question led to a unity with the socially and politically distant nationalist movement. However, it did not result in any permanent political alliances.

The Labour Party in Norwegian politics

Although *Arbeiderpartiet* was formally constituted in 1887, it played only a minor role until after 1900. The role of class cleavages in Norway

⁹ *Furre, B. Norsk historie 1905—1940*. Oslo: Det norske Samlaget, 1972, 234.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 166.

increased considerably from the end of the 1890s onward. Two factors are important explanations: the rapid growth of the working class and the extension of suffrage to all men above 25 in 1898. The registered electorate more than doubled from 1897 to 1900.¹¹

The immediate effect was an increased polarization along class lines in the cities and industrial centres. But the Labour Party and the trade unions soon established local organizations in the north of Norway and in some coastal peripheries in the west. Intensive mechanization of agriculture, particularly from 1890 onward, increased the small peasants' vulnerability to market fluctuations. Large loans imply a need for stable incomes. In periods of crisis, support for the Labour Party tended to increase among small rural producers. The number of rural wage workers (including those in forestry) also increased considerably, partly due to high birth rates. Many of them were radicalized through the battle to have their trade union recognized.¹²

Consequently, the Labour Party became the first party to cut across the earlier territorial cleavage lines. It established alliances between rural and urban, peripheral and central forces and stimulated a series of moves toward the development of "nationalized" politics. Class conflicts in the traditional fishing and combined fishing and agricultural areas in the North became as important for the growth of the Labour Party as the new cleavages within the industrial centres.¹³ Many of these areas were heavily suppressed by local "island-kings" who owned not only the fishing boats and port facilities, but also the shops and the islands where bird eggs could be picked. The first five Socialists to be elected to the Parliament all came from the North. This was in 1903.

Later, *Arbeiderpartiet* went further to the left than any of the other Scandinavian labour parties. The majority supported the Third International in a vote on this question in 1918, and the minority left the party. The (temporary) victory of the revolutionary line in Norway has been explained by a Norwegian historian as a result of two distinct factors: the extremely rapid industrialization after 1905, which created a new working class without traditions, and, hence, open to revolutionary ideas. Secondly, the struggles for parliamentarism and universal suffrage were carried out earlier in Norway than in Denmark and Sweden, before the development of a working class movement. In our neighbouring countries these struggles resulted in alliances between the labour movements and the liberal bourgeoisie. This had a moderating influence on the workers' movements.¹⁴

However, the revolutionary period was short-lived. In 1923 a vote on whether the party should support the Moscow Theses resulted in a new split. This time the left lost, and formed the Communist Party. Following this move, the Labour Party broke with Comintern. The Communist party has since been an insignificant factor in Norwegian politics, apart from the first election after World War II, where they gained 11% of the votes.

In 1927 the Labour Party formed its first government, but depended on support from the Left Party. This support was withdrawn when the Labour Party presented a radical socialist programme. But Labour again came into power in the election in 1930. However, an analysis carried out by the party showed that huge membership potentials existed in the rural areas. In these areas there was a marked imbalance between the member-voter ratio, whereas in the city almost every voter was a member.¹⁵ The

¹¹ Rokkan, S. Norway, 89.

¹² Furre, B. Norsk historie, 201.

¹³ Rokkan, S. Norway, 81.

¹⁴ Furre, B. Norsk historie, 120, quotation of E. Bull.

¹⁵ Rokkan, S. Norway, 83.

party had to decide whether it should become a broad people's party, or a working class activist party, more like the CPSU.

The first alternative was chosen. The party had already considerable support in the rural North. The economic crisis of the 1920s brought new rural supporters from other parts of Norway, among them Central Norway and the East.

In the general elections in 1933 the Labour Party mobilized on a broad program to solve the economic crisis, paying much attention to the situation in the rural areas. This resulted in almost absolute majority of the parliamentary seats. But they still needed guaranteed support from some other party to be able to form a stable government. The Agrarian Party promised to back the Government, if Labour promised to support the larger farmers as well as the small.

Again an important change in Norwegian politics — a stable Labour Party Government — came into being through an alliance in defense of the rural interests. The Agrarians represented a higher socioeconomic strata than the rural Labor leaders, but this class cleavage proved less important in the acute situation of economic crisis than the traditional conflict between primary economy and the commercial and industrial interests in the cities. Apart from the war years, the Labour Party was uninterruptingly in power from 1933 to 1963. I will return to the postwar period later.

To sum up: after 1927, when the Labour Party first came to power, the main characteristic of Norwegian party struggle was no longer the fighting between the Left and the Right, but between the Labour Party on the one side, and all the offshoots of the parties that were established before the granting of universal suffrage on the other side.¹⁶ The class cleavage and the territorial cleavage interacted in such a way that, paradoxically, the Labour Party became the party with the broadest social basis. An important mobilizational factor among the peasants was an extremely harsh economic crisis in the rural areas in the 1920s. Many of the peasants were forced to sell their land and became proletarianized against their will. The party who set itself the task of securing the interest of the workers also became the main party for this group. This had important consequences for the political program in the years after the war.

The postwar years

In the first election after the war, in 1945, the Labour Party gained 41% of the votes, and the Communist Party almost 12%. There was an absolute socialist majority, and this situation continued until 1965. But the situation was difficult: a survey carried out in 1957 showed that Labour gained more than 20% of its votes from farmers, smallholders, fishermen and forest workers.¹⁷ To the right of the Labour Party were both the old Left, the Agrarian Party and the Christian People's Party, all competing for support from these same groups. On the other side were the Communists. But after the Communist coup in Czechoslovakia in 1948, they were reduced to a party with 2% or less of the votes. So the threat was really only from the right.

An additional factor making rural votes important was the electoral law. It establishes that the number of voters needed to get one representative in the *Storting* differs from region to region. In the North only half the number needed in the areas surrounding Oslo is required. It is considered that people living in the central regions have better access to other channels of influence.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 88.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 93.

In this situation, should *Arbeiderpartiet* continue to keep the profile of a broad People's party — or should it develop a clearer class profile? Would it for instance pay to give in to the trade union demands for low prices on primary products? The party chose the broad avenue, or with a popular term from political science — to be a “catch all”-party. The problems with the pricing of farm and fishery products were solved by heavy government subsidizing. The protest this move provoked from the Right, Høyre, was less important for the party.

In spite of the Labour Party appeals to the primary sector, the Agrarian Party survived as a defender of the larger farmers. The Christian People's Party and the old Left kept to a large extent their respective strongholds in the South and West of the country. These areas were also bulwarks for the large and important religious fundamentalist movements and for the defense of the written language based on dialects.

Up to the 1970s the three parties in the middle kept a total of about 30% of the votes, the Labour Party between 40 and 50% and the Right Party between 15 and 20%. There was a broad national agreement about the need for economic growth and development of the welfare state, and with regard to internal politics these were years without serious political conflicts. However, in 1961, a small splinter group left the Labour Party on an issue regarding foreign policy, namely the membership in NATO. They formed the Socialist People's Party. Two former Labour Party representatives in the National Assembly constituted the parliamentary group of the new party. Norway had already for 11 years been a member of NATO, so one might say they needed an unusually long time to make up their minds.

As to occupational groups, the Labour Party still receives its clearest support from industrial workers. However, the share of the workers who vote Labour has decreased from 69% in 1957 to 59% in 1981. But it is interesting to note that the support for the party among workers in the South and the West of the country is almost 30% lower than the average for the whole country. This shows that the cultural and religious cleavages are still alive.¹⁸

Apart from workers, public employees, including teachers and state bureaucrats traditionally have a large and quite stable share of Labour-voters. The number of workers and of the above-mentioned groups of small farmers and fishermen has sharply decreased in the last 20–30 years, whereas the number of public employees has increased. This explains partly why the Labour Party's share of the voters has reduced during the last 20 years, from 48% to about 30% in the last polls.

A major event in Norwegian politics strongly contributed to the development of the voter behavior; namely the loss of support for the Labour Party among those remaining in the rural settlements. In 1972 most Norwegians participated in a national referendum about Norwegian membership in the European Common Market. The two largest parties, the Labour Party and the Right, supported membership. Apart from a faction of the old and insignificant Left, the remaining were against. An overwhelming national mobilization of farmers, fishermen, students, urban intellectuals and some workers resulted in a small majority (53%) against membership. The people employed in the primary sector saw membership as a threat to their existence. They were afraid of cheap imports and Common Market decisions that would remove the subsidies on their products. Large groups were afraid that Norwegian culture, including our language, would suffer. Folklore was widely used in protest rallies against the proposed membership. For the first and till now the last time folk costumes were

¹⁸ Valen, H. De politiske partiene. — In: Storting og regjering 1945—1985: institusjon-rekruttering. T. Nordby (ed.). Oslo: Kunnskapsforlaget, 1985.

seen in May Day parades. The territorial-cultural protest overlapped with the more economically based protest against the urban-based conservatives and the Labour Party industrialists. Finally, large groups among the religious fundamentalists seriously believed the Common Market represented the Animal (the Devil) in the Apocalypse. The "no-group" was indeed an unholy alliance of various forces.

The referendum caused a split in the Labour Party, and the Socialist Left Party was formed. It included half of the old Communist Party, as well as the party that was formed as a NATO-protest in 1961 (the Socialist People's Party). However, a considerable share of the voters supporting this party in the first general elections after the referendum have since returned to the Labour Party.

The old Left split in two on the EEC-question, and has now no mandates in the *Storting*. The Agrarian Party and the Christian People's Party remained virtually unaffected by this conflict. However, the parties in the middle have lost half of their voters since 1969. The loss is mainly a result of the reduction in employment in primary sectors, as well as the general urbanization and secularization processes. The Christian People's Party temporarily gained voters from the Labour and the Agrarian parties in 1977. One of the main questions during that year's general elections was the right of women to decide independently whether they should take abortion or not. But this gain was shortlived, partly because the religious dimension is quite unimportant among young voters.

There is a general tendency that the parties in the middle lose to the conservatives, to the right. In 1985 the Right gained 30.4% in the general elections. However, since then it has lost almost 10% to a party further to the right, the Progressive Party (see below).

There has been an overall tendency during the last 10—15 years for the old cleavages, like class, territorial and religious, to become less important. Voters are less stable, and "questions of the day" play increasingly important roles. On a more structural level, the tendency can briefly be explained by three factors.

First, the numerical decrease of both rural dwellers and workers. A larger share of the population consists of wage earners in the service sector or in local and central administration. These groups have less characteristic party choices than the traditional ones, although they tend to choose either the Labour Party or the Right Party.

The second factor concerns changes in political behavior both within territories and within classes.

In the South and West of Norway, a polarization has taken place. The Right Party has gained markedly on behalf of the old cultural/religious protest parties. But the Labour Party has also gained some places. Within the working class, the most stable electorate is represented by old people — those who had experienced World War II and World War I, as well as the period of rapid growth of material welfare in the postwar years. The young workers, like young people in all social groups in present-day Norway, are extremely volatile. They change their party preferences rapidly, in a pattern that until 1977 was completely unknown in Norwegian politics.

Also, the young Norwegians seem to be more conservative than before. A majority of those who voted for the first time in 1981 and 1985 voted conservative. The new Progressive Party, *Fremskrittspartiet*, formed as a protest to high taxes and immigrants some years ago, has mainly drawn its supporters from the youths. In the local elections last September they mobilized on the parole to keep the Norwegian borders closed to foreigners until we have solved our own problems. The party more than doubled its share of the votes, to almost 7%. In the last poll (April 1988) it gained

18.6%, compared to 21.5% support for the Right. A survey published by our main newspaper, *Aftenposten* on May 7, 1988, shows that 30% of the supporters of *Fremskrittspartiet* admit that they view immigrants as a negative phenomenon in the Norwegian society.

Another interesting fact is that this party seems to gain support both from youths from very wealthy families and from typical low-income groups. It is a typical urban or semi-urban phenomenon.

The third factor explaining the changes is the occurrence of completely new issues on the political agenda from the 1970s onward. One is the question of bureaucracy versus private initiative and responsibility. The so-called ordinary people without special ties and contacts in the various state bureaucracies often feel it is hopeless to find their way through the wilderness and simply to be heard. People have started arguing that the many regulations created to secure equal treatment of all classes have in fact created a new form of inequality. Those who are used to write formal letters, manage to negotiate on telephone, or can use their high positions as arguments nonetheless get things done more quickly. The Labour Party has become the nasty wolf, since it has been in Government for most of the postwar period. The anti-bureaucratic mood clearly explains much of the increased support for the Right and Progressive parties.

Another new issue is *ecology*. In Norway the debate has centered on the regulation of rivers in order to build hydroelectric power plants. A few years ago this caused major clashes between the police and demonstrators in the North, a conflict that lasted for 2–3 years. The regulation would disturb the economic base for a number of Lapps or Samis, who live on reindeer. Besides, it would destroy beautiful landscapes. The ecologists lost, after a bitter struggle, which even involved the murder of one of the activists.

The consequences of this conflict dimension with regard to party support are less clear than for the anti-bureaucracy dimension. However, it seems to have retarded the reduction in the support for the small, but still live old Left. And it has contributed to a stable 7–8% support for the Socialist Left Party. Both the Labour Party and the Right are seen as rigid defenders of economic growth, with little understanding of ecological concerns. Several political scientists expect the importance of ecological questions to grow in the future, as it has happened in West Germany.

Appendix. Voter support for the parties in the 1985 general elections and in polls in April 1988, %.

	Election, 1985	Poll, 1988
Labour Party	40.8	30.6
Right	30.4	21.5
Progressive Party	3.7	18.6
Socialist Left Party	5.5	8.5
Christian People's Party	8.3	7.9
Agrarian Party	6.6	5.5
Left	3.1	4.7
China-Communists	0.6	0.9
Liberal (former: Left)	0.5	0.6
Communists (Moscow)	0.2	0.0
Others	0.4	1.2
Total	100.1	100.0

Source: *Aftenposten*, May 7, 1988.

Presented by J. Kahk

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TERRITORIAALSETE, RELIGIOOSSETE JA KLASSIVASTUOLUDE OSA NORRA POLIITIKAS

On tutvustatud tuntud Norra poliitikateadlase S. Rokkani ja tema Ameerika kolleegide väljaarendatud teoreetilist mudelit poliitiliste süsteemide ja poliitilise käitumise (= valijaeelistuse) analüüsiks. Sama mudeli põhjal on selgitatud Norra poliitilise süsteemi põhijoonte kujunemislugu.

S. Rokkani mudelit ei tohi mõista kui ranget põhjuslikku teooriat, vaid see on suhteliselt vaba mõistete süsteem, mille eesmärk on stimuleerida kontrollitavate hüpoteeside püstitamist. Keskne koht selles mudelis on mõistel *huvide vastuolud* (*cleavages*). Vastanduvad huvid võivad ilmneda territoriaalsete üksuste, etniliste gruppide, sotsiaalsete klasside, kultuuriliste püüdluste ja muu vahel. Poliitilised parteid esindavad küll sotsiaalseid huvisid, kuid ühe sotsiaalse grupi või klassi huvid võivad jaguneda mitme partei vahel. Erinevate riikide poliitiliste süsteemide omapära on tingitud nende süsteemide kujunemisega iseloomustavatest vastuoludest. Sellel protsessil on kaks aspekti: 1) rahvuslik konsolideerumine ja 2) tööstuslik revolutsioon.

Norra praegusaegse poliitilise süsteemi kujunemine algas riigi vabanemisega Taani võimu alt 1814. aastal. 19. sajandi jooksul iseloomustas seda protsessi vastuolu kesk- võimu ning perifeeria vahel; sajandi lõpul sai järjest tuntavamaks vastuolu kuningavõimu ja tugevnevate demokraatlike jõudude vahel. Viimaseid esindas parlament (*Storting*). Sel pinnal tekkisid esimesed poliitilised parteid *Venstre* ja *Høyre*. Käesoleva sajandi algul mõjutas Norra poliitilise süsteemi edasist kujunemist industrialiseerimise tõttu kiiresti kasvava töölisklassi lülitumine poliitikasse. 1897. aastal tekkis *Arbeiderpartiet*, järgmisel aastal laienes aga valimisõigus kogu täisealisele meessoost elanikkonnale. Selle otsene tagajärg oli poliitiline polariseerumine klassitunnuste alusel. Lisandus uus mõõde senisele vastuolude süsteemile.

Viimast 10—15 aastat iseloomustab senise vastuolude süsteemi (klassi-, territoriaalsete, religioossete vastuolude) tähtsuse vähenemine poliitikas. Valijate poliitiliste eelistuste püsivus on nõrgenenud, suurenenud on labiilsus. Järjest tähtsam osa poliitikas on ideoloogiliselt neutraalsetel probleemidel, millest tähtsaim on ökoloogia.

Гро ХОЛМ

РОЛЬ ТЕРРИТОРИАЛЬНЫХ, КЛАССОВЫХ И РЕЛИГИОЗНЫХ ПРОТИВОРЕЧИЙ В ПОЛИТИКЕ НОРВЕГИИ

Статья знакомит читателя с теоретической моделью известного норвежского ученого С. Роккана, которая применяется для анализа политических систем и политического (электорального) поведения. Эта модель используется для изложения истории становления современной политической системы Норвегии.

Модель Роккана представляет собой не строгую причинную теорию, а относительно свободную систему понятий, на основе которых исследователь выдвигает легко поддающиеся проверке гипотезы. Центральное место в модели Роккана принадлежит понятию «противоречивые интересы» (*cleavages*). Они могут возникать между территориальными единицами, этническими группами, социальными классами, культурными традициями и т. д. Спектр интересов даже одной социальной группы или одного социального класса может быть очень широким и «привязанным» к различным партиям. Особенности политической системы любого государства складываются под влиянием тех противоречий, которые были характерны для периода ее становления. У этого процесса есть два аспекта: 1) национальное сплочение и 2) индустриальная революция.

Процесс становления современной политической системы Норвегии начался с 1814 г., когда страна освободилась от датской опеки. В XIX в. он протекал в обстановке обострения противоречий между центром и периферией, в конце века — между королевской властью и набирающим силу парламентом (*Storting*). На почве политических разногласий возникли две партии — *Venstre* и *Høyre*. Дальнейшее политическое размежевание в начале нынешнего столетия произошло под влиянием быстро растущего рабочего класса. Возникла еще одна партия — *Лейбористская* (*Arbeiderpartiet*). С расширением избирательных прав политическая система поляризовалась по классовому признаку.

За последние 10—15 лет прежние противоречия потеряли остроту, электоральная мобильность избирателя возросла. В политике на первый план выдвинулись идеологически нейтральные проблемы, в частности важнейшая из них — экологическая.