

Active participants in the discussions were: E. Lippmaa (Tallinn), V. Gorodnyuk (Minsk), H. Vainu (Tallinn), J. Bojars (Riga), J. Prikulis (Riga), E. Udam (Tallinn), L. Hannikainen (Helsinki), L. Pavlova (Minsk), and V. Vare (Tallinn).

Suggestions for the resolution were made by D. A. Loeber (Kiel), V. Smolin (Tallinn), E. Duraczynski (Warsaw), J. Bojars (Riga), V. Vadapalas (Vilnius), K. Pihlakas (Tallinn), N. Drak (Lvov), and V. Gorodnyuk (Minsk).

Here we have an optional selection of presentations.

Läbirääkimistel võtsid sõna E. Lippmaa (Tallinn), V. Gorodnjuk (Minsk), H. Vainu (Tallinn), J. Bojars (Riia), J. Prikulis (Riia), E. Udam (Tallinn), L. Hannikainen (Helsingi), L. Pavlova (Minsk) ja V. Vare (Tallinn).

Ettepanekuid resolutsiooni projekti kohta tegid D. A. Loeber (Kiel), V. Smolin (Tallinn), E. Duraczynski (Varssavi), J. Bojars (Riia), V. Vadapalas (Vilnius), K. Pihlakas (Tallinn), N. Drak (Lvov) ja V. Gorodnjuk (Minsk).

Sõnavõttud on avaldatud valikuliselt.

В прениях приняли участие Э. Липпмаа (Таллинн), В. Городнюк (Минск), Х. Вайну (Таллинн), Ю. Боярс (Рига), Ю. Прикулис (Рига), Э. Удам (Таллинн), Л. Ханникайнен (Хельсинки), Л. Павлова (Минск) и В. Варе (Таллинн).

С предложениями по проекту резолюции выступили Д. А. Лозбер (Киль), В. Смолин (Таллинн), Э. Дурачиньский (Варшава), Ю. Боярс (Рига), В. Вадапалас (Вильнюс), К. Пихлакас (Таллинн), Н. Драк (Львов) и В. Городнюк (Минск).

Выступления публикуются выборочно.

<https://doi.org/10.3176/hum.soc.sci.1990.2.08>

Proc. Estonian Acad. Sci. Social Sciences, 1990, 39, N 2, 148—150

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Dear Chairman, dear colleagues!

You see, after such a film we of course feel as if it was another life. After all, fifty years are a long period of time. And when we see some fragments of that life, it is of course impossible to stay calm. There was this episode of Molotov's arrival in Berlin and his talks with Hitler. It was then that I personally became linked with the whole process, working during the whole period of the war with the Ministry of External Affairs, called then People's Commissariat of External Affairs. As to my participation in the affairs of the pre-war period, so it started with this trip of

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Molotov to Berlin. There were some other moments about which I shall tell briefly as they were directly connected with the events that were analyzed today during the first part of our conference.

I was not present when the Treaty on Non-Aggression and that of Boundaries and Friendship were signed. But it was already during the talks of Molotov and Hitler that I first heard about the existence of a Supplementary Protocol. Molotov demanded that German troops be withdrawn from Finland as Finland belonged, according to the Supplementary Protocol, to the Soviet Union's sphere of interests. And afterwards during other talks — Molotov had three rounds of talks with Hitler, and then he talked to Ribbentrop — the Pact and the Protocol have been recalled several times when problems of consultations or interference into the situation by Germany were discussed. This concerned especially the presence of German troops in Rumania and Bulgaria, and the concentration of German troops on the Soviet-German border. I think it is no news to you that Hitler was eager to urge Molotov to discuss the problem of the fate of the British Empire following its defeat. He seemed to want to involve the Soviet Union somehow in the division of the British Empire. But Molotov kept evading the issue.

Hitler said that he did not know why German forces had been concentrating on our border, he said he did not know what the matter was there. However, during the second round of the talks he said that they were having a rest there while in Finland they were in transit to Norway in order to attack England from Scandinavia. In Rumania they were as a military mission at Antonescu's request to help improve Rumanian armed forces.

Now we know on the basis of numerous documents that the decision to attack the Soviet Union had already been made, and therefore the proposal to associate us with the Tripartite Pact seems to have been an attempt at confusing Stalin. Stalin, of course, wanted to avoid this war, and that is probably why he decided to agree to this proposal. We returned from Berlin in November, somewhere around November 15—16, and already on November 25 Molotov invited Schulenburg to his office, and, referring to Ribbentrop's proposal, he said that the Soviet Government had considered the proposal to join the Tripartite Pact and was ready to accept it under certain conditions. Schulenburg's telegram with a survey of this meeting followed.

The conditions we suggested were highly interesting. Firstly, we required that our interests in Finland were recognized, German troops were withdrawn from our border, then we required recognition of our interests in the Black Sea area, and in connection with that the conclusion of a mutual assistance pact with Bulgaria and the establishment of our bases on the coast of the Black Sea. Next we insisted on the establishment of Soviet military and naval bases in the straits of Dardanelles and Bosphorus. It was stipulated that if Turkey did not agree to it, joint Soviet-German-Italian diplomatic and military measures ought to be taken to make Turkey agree to that proposal. And one more proposal — the recognition of our interests in the Persian Gulf.

Our proposals had been confirmed by Stalin, it could not have been otherwise. Stalin was ready to collaborate with Germany even in case of the division of the British Empire.

In this connection I would like to add that when Molotov's last discussion with Hitler was over, Hitler saw Molotov to the exit and said that he regarded Stalin as an outstanding personality who would go into history, and that he regarded himself as a historic personality, and he suggested that they met. Of course, Molotov told about all that. And at the meeting of the Politbureau where he gave an account of the talks in Ber-

lin, he said that probably there would not be any war with Germany in the near future. However, at this meeting Molotov did not speak about the proposed meeting of Stalin and Hitler, probably he told Stalin about that in person. But Stalin had some idea as he hoped to involve Hitler in talks up to the very last day and so avoid the war. He gave him various signals. Here it was cited how much we had supplied grain, oil, strategic materials. Besides, we also acted as an intermediary when Germany bought various colonial goods — caoutchouc from South-East Asia and Indonesia. As a matter of fact, German statesmen said that the Soviet aid actually nullified the British blockade, for thanks to the Soviet Union Germany could meet all her requirements. We also allowed Germany to use ports beyond the Arctic Circle.

A lot of time and energy has been spent on clarifying whether these Protocols were authentic or not, which has actually diverted our attention from the main points. The important thing is — what happened afterwards, and what should be done in the future, and what are the consequences of the Protocols. Still, the most important question is what happened in the wake of the Protocols. Here it has been demanded that these protocols should be regarded as null and void. Let us consider the Protocol from August 23. It determines Lithuania's right to the region of Wilno which formerly belonged to Poland. Suppose it will be reversed, then somebody in Poland might question the grounds on which Vilnius was transferred to Lithuania. What documents justify it? Why not let Kaunas be the capital of Lithuania.

And another problem, that of the state borders. There exists a viewpoint that the Ukraine and Byelorussia had been divided before the division of Poland took place. It is necessary to speak about that, too. Of course, now we can judge every action that took place in the past, every historical document, etc., but we should consider what was moral or immoral at that time. When the Munich deal was made, Poland also got its share. I am not speaking because I approve of all that, I simply want to say that in my opinion we should not consider only the Pact and the Protocol immoral. I think that the whole pre-war policy was immoral.

What happened after the Pacts? In Western Byelorussia I observed the following events. At first when we came into this area we were greeted as friends. But then an unjust exchange rate of the rouble and zloty was established. As a result, all shops in Lvov and Pinsk were soon empty. The reason was that our army and our administration came with an enormous amount of roubles. That meant that small entrepreneurs and shop-keepers were ruined. This brought about dissatisfaction and demonstrations. General Serov from the KGB was sent there, and he interpreted normal protests against economic robbery as counter-revolution and anti-Sovietism. Arrests, deportations, shootings, etc. started. And later Germans were welcomed with flowers.

In my opinion the most important task that we should undertake is to decide what should be done further.

Thank you for your attention.

The text of the presentation has been abridged.