ASPECTS OF ANCIENT GREEK MORAL VOCABULARY: ILLIBERALITY AND SERVILITY IN MORAL PHILOSOPHY AND POPULAR MORALITY

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Abstract. This paper deals with some aspects of ancient Greek moral vocabulary, based on the texts of certain authors from the 5th and 4th century B.C. It describes and analyses the use of the term *aneleutheros* and its derivates in ancient Greek moral philosophy and popular morality. It is concluded that the concept of *aneleutheria* probably did not play a very significant role in popular morality, but was important for the philosophers, especially Plato. Major part of the philosophic approach to *aneleutheria* seems to treat it as a limited-range "cover" term that embraces many kinds of negative qualities and dispositions, although there are often allusions to its specific connections with money-matters. This specific use of the term can be most explicitly seen in Aristotle's ethical works and in the *Characters* of Theophrastos.

1. Introduction

This paper deals with some aspects of ancient Greek moral vocabulary against the background of the concept of liberality in ancient Greek society.

The distinction between popular morality and moral philosophy expressed in the title of the paper is to be understood the way that Sir Kenneth J. Dover has put it in his fundamental book *Greek popular morality in the time of Plato and Aristotle* (Dover 1974, abbreviated *GPM*): 'morality' of a culture denotes the principles, criteria and values which underlie its responses to various moral experiences; 'moral philosophy' or 'ethics' denotes rational, systematic thinking about the relationship between morality and reason (Dover 1974: 1). In addition, Dover asserts, there are other types of rational thinking about morality, which can be assigned to linguistics, psychology and sociology. The existence of the distinction between popular morality and moral philosophy or ethics should, in fact, be self-evident, and has been considered as such by recent writers (e.g. Taylor 1990:233).

Thus, two approaches are possible in this kind of study: a theoretical and a practical one. Theoretical discussion on ethical subjects from the antiquity is well preserved in the works of philosophers, whereas from the practical side, everyday use of moral language and the so-called popular morality, very little is known (see below, section 2, on ancient sources available). At the same time, the question of how things were functioning in practice is very intriguing, especially when Aristotle, the most important ancient theoretician on moral philosophy, puts practice in the first place (see, e.g., *EN* 1103b26).

2. Sources

In the preface of *GPM*, Dover has expressed his surprise on the fact that although there are many books about the history of moral concepts in early Greek poetry and in Attic tragedy, as well as treatises that follow the history of these concepts in the historians and philosophers, "none has treated works composed for the persuasion or amusement of large audiences as the primary evidence for the moral assumptions made by the average Athenian citizen during the years when Plato was writing the *Republic* or Aristotle the *Nicomachean Ethics*" (Dover 1974: XI). Although carefully avoiding the use of philosophical works in his treatment of popular morality, Dover agrees that the opinions and statements of the two great theorists whose works have survived, viz. Plato and Aristotle, form an inevitable background of the study of ancient Greek morality and values. Thus, they even appear in the title of Dover's book, although primarily as an indication of the temporal scope of the work.

The reason for this limitation in time is the fact that we are much better informed about the period 428–322 (from the birth of Plato until the death of Aristotle) than about any previous or subsequent period of Greek history. In these roughly one hundred years we find the whole Attic oratory, historians such as Thukydides and Xenophon, most of the surviving plays of Euripides, some of Sophokles, all comedies of Aristophanes, and nearly all the quotations from Old and Middle Comedy. The circulation of Herodotos' work almost coincided with the birth of Plato, and Menander's career began immediately after the death of Aristotle (see Dover 1974:4).

The second limitation is in space. Since the literature of the period is practically all written by Athenians or by participants in Athenian culture, it is reasonable to concentrate on moral phenomena of Athens (see Dover 1974:2, Pearson 1966:2).

Finally, the third limitation is in gender. It goes without saying that all of the moral philosophy of the period is written by men. Even if we would leave aside the philosophers, all other material that would tell us anything about popular morality is also written by men. Thus, we are dealing with the Athenian society in the 5th and 4th century B.C., as seen and depicted by men. In studying the above-mentioned authors and works we shall learn something about what men believed women to think and portrayed them as thinking, but not necessarily anything about what women actually thought (Dover 1974:2).

In respect of sources, Dover has claimed that in the study of popular morality, the main genre that gives us plausible information is practical rhetoric, i.e. the Attic oratory. He warns against imagining that either Plato's work or Aristotle's represented an intellectual systematisation of the principles which were manifested in the moral choices and judgments of the ordinary unphilosophical Greek (1974:1–2), stating that studies of ancient Greece have suffered already from assuming Greek morality to be 'epitomised in Plato and Aristotle' (1974:2, note 1; see also Pearson 1966:210–212). While this is certainly true, one should not, at least not without good grounds, accept the other extreme either, namely the view that Plato and Aristotle should be left aside when talking about popular morality.

So the question is, whether Plato and Aristotle are reliable sources of evidence for the moral views current in their time. It has been claimed that their writings may be expected to provide, in addition to their authors' theoretical views, *some* evidence of current moral attitudes. In Plato's dialogues, for example, some characters do not express Plato's own beliefs, but rather views, which Plato presumably believed to be current at the time. Aristotle, on the other hand, counts some current moral beliefs as those which the ethical theory has to systematise and harmonise.[1] In his words, "we must examine the principle (sc. the definition of good for man, or happiness) in the light not only of a logical argument, its conclusion and premises, but also of what is commonly said about it", and, after mentioning a few typical concepts of happiness, "some of these views are popular and traditional (literally, held by many people and from ancient times), others held by a few distinguished men; and it is not reasonable that either class should be wholly wrong, but more likely that they should be right in one respect at least, or even in most."[2]

The question as to what extent a scholar setting out to diagnose and analyse the sentiments, emotions and behavioural patterns that were predominant in a "dead" society is entitled to draw unselectively on a wide range of dissimilar sources has been emphasised recently by G. Herman (2000:11). He, too, values the forensic speeches most highly, suggesting that they should be privileged above other sorts of evidence.[3]

In this paper, I have not confined myself to practical rhetoric, as the various sides of the concept of liberality and illiberality can more effectively be seen in comparison of different genres. In drawing conclusions, however, the two sides – i.e. popular (actual) morality and philosophers' ideas about morality – should be kept apart. The paper has its origins in the work on Theophrastos' *Characters*, a

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[1] *EN* 1095a28–30, *EE* 1216b26–35, 1235b13–18; see Taylor 1990:233, and cf. Dover 1974:7 for opposite opinions.

[2] *EN* 1098b9–11, 27–29.

[3] Herman 2000:13, with an addition that this is true at least in so far as the problem he is analysing, viz. revenge in Athenian society, is concerned. Compared to Aristotle, the passages from the Attic orators, he says, by virtue of the context in which they were pronounced and of their lack of reflexivity cannot but be read as direct, straightforward expressions of Athenian social mores.

piece of writing which has not been conclusively defined in genre yet.[4] While it contains various interesting social types that have deserved and deserve scholarly attention, choosing *aneleutheria* has special reasons that will be explained below.

3. Freedom and slavery

Status as one of the determinants of moral capacity has been observed, in the context of Ancient Greece, from three aspects: 1) wealth and poverty, 2) town and country, 3) freedom and slavery (Dover 1974:109–116). Freedom (*eleutheria*)[5] is one of the most important social values for the Greeks of classical Athens, and terms connected with it, both on the positive and on the negative scale, are extremely important in Greek social and ethical context.[6] M. H. Hansen has distinguished three different meanings of *eleutheria*, depending on context: freedom as opposed to slavery (social), freedom in the sense of the autonomy of the polis (political), and freedom of the individual in public and private spheres (constitutional).[7]

It has been stated that the slave was not expected – as the citizen was – to display the virtues of loyalty, good faith and self-sacrifice. It was usually taken for granted that a slave could not be trusted, which does not mean that there were no exceptions (see Dover 1974:114; cf. Lysias 13.18). We may even find the sentiment that a slave of good character is a better man than a free citizen of bad character.[8] In contrast with the slave, the free man was expected not to be dominated by fear, but to take the path of toil and sacrifice wherever there was a choice between pleasure or safety on the one hand and honour or service to the community on the other (Dover 1974:115). According to Demosthenes, the most important difference between a slave and a free man in Athens was that for any wrongdoing the slave had to answer with his body, while the free man could, in

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[4] See, e.g., Steinmetz 1959 and Ussher 1993:3 ff. I need to mention this starting point at the beginning, as Theophrastos does not wholly fit in the temporal scope described above. He is, however, a pupil of Aristotle, and can be discussed in Aristotelian tradition, and his work *Characters* is usually dated to the year 319 B.C., i.e. only three years after the death of Aristotle.

[5] Greek words and phrases have been transliterated throughout the paper.

[6] For thorough treatises on the Greek *eleutheria*, see Raaflaub 1981, 1984, and especially 1985. Raaflaub follows its historical development from the archaic times on, covering various spheres of its use (e.g., inner liberty, liberty of a state, liberty outside the state, etc.).

[7] Hansen 1991:75–76, paraphrased after Kallet-Marx 1994. Various sides of linguistic and semantic questions that should be taken into account in a terminological study have been thoroughly discussed by K. Raaflaub (1985:13 ff.). Thus, in examining the notion of 'liberty', we should not confine ourselves to one specific word (viz. *eleutheria*), but rather examine a broader semantic field that includes terms more or less connected with 'liberty'. In addition, one also has to take into account various contrastive and complimentary notions (Raaflaub 1985:16). I am aware that the approach used in this paper may, in some case, be too much focused on some specific words. This does not, however, affect my principal conclusions.

[8] Cf. Eur. *Ion* 854–856, Men. fr. 722; see also Dover 1974:115.

most cases, satisfy the law by paying the necessary amount of money, and corporal punishment was the last penalty to be inflicted on him.[9]

In addition, the very contrast between democracy and other forms of constitution, in which the distribution of power was restricted, could easily be expressed in terms of freedom and slavery (see Dover 1974:116). Cf., e.g., Herodotos 5.78, who offers the opinion that when the Athenians were ruled by tyrants, they fared poorly in war, because their hearts were not in the doing of their masters' bidding, but when Athens became a democracy, they fought with greater success because each man felt that he was fighting for himself. Aristotle identified the sovereignty of the majority and freedom as the two things which were considered to be the defining features of democracy, and noted that people asserted that freedom was the aim (*telos*) of every democracy.[10]

The state of not being free can be expressed by a special word like the English 'slavery' or Greek *douleia*, or by means of negative prefix. Thus, we have the word *aneleutheria*, derived from the adjective *aneleutheros*, which in turn is an opposite to *eleutheros* 'free'.[11] The specific words *doulos* and *douleia* are mostly used for slaves and slavery in the strict sense of those words. The form with negative prefix has a broader circle of meanings.

Starting from the positive side, the key word is the adjective *eleutherios*, from which we have a derivative abstract noun *eleutheriotēs*. Both the adjective and the abstract noun have two major meanings: 1) speaking or acting like a freeman, fit for a freeman, liberal *resp*. liberality (broad sense); 2) freely giving, bountiful *resp*. freeness in giving, generosity (in relation to money, narrow sense). Negative counterparts reflect the same distinction: *aneleutheria* means a) illiberality of mind, servility; b) illiberality in money matters, stinginess. These meanings are widely known and reported by any major Greek dictionary (see, e.g., *LSJ* s.v., cf. also Raaflaub 1981:299). It is interesting to see how those parallel meanings are reflected in Greek texts: sometimes both appear in one genre, author or group of authors, in other cases we can see strict usage of the words in only one of the meanings mentioned above. Thus, I will discuss the background of these concepts and follow their use mostly in philosophical, but also in historical and rhetorical, as well as dramatic[12] context. I will also touch upon the relation between these two concepts, for I believe that they have much in common.

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[9]   Dem. 22.55, 24.167; see also Sinclair 1988:28.

[10] *Pol*. 1317a40–b16; cf. also Ober 1989:295, Sinclair 1988:21. The most important freedom that was often emphasised was *isēgoria*: the right of the citizen to address the sovereign assembly of the people. This inevitably led to a more generalised freedom of speech (*parrhēsia*). On those two terms and their application see Ober 1989:296 and especially Raaflaub 1980 and 1985:277–283, 325–326; cf. also Finley 1983:139–140.

[11] Formally, because actually the adjective *eleutherios* forms a more exact opposite (cf. Latin *liber* and *liberalis*), but *eleutheros* is also used in this sense (see also Plato, *Laws* 914c, 669c).

[12] Dramatic is, in this case, restricted to comic, as the words *aneleutheros/aneleutheria* are almost never used in Greek tragedies (with the exception of Soph. fr. 314.149). We can, however, see many references to the opposition of *eleutheros* and *doulos*, e.g. Eur. *Andr*. 433–434, *Hec*. 234; Soph. *Trach*. 63, etc.

4. Theophrastos

As mentioned above, Theophrastos' *Characters* have formed a starting point of this study. It is characteristic to the structure of the *Characters* that at the beginning of every chapter we find a definition of the abstract noun, which is followed by a description of the character trait in various situations, which, in turn, begins with the agent noun. The authenticity of the definitions has been called into question on numerous occasions by various scholars, but there are also arguments for it.[13] The definitions in the *Characters* differ from the definitions of Aristotle (see below, section 5.2) in that they almost entirely lack allusions to triple system, where character traits are defined as negative extremes at both sides of a positive mean.

The part of description consists of common, everyday situations and the reactions of different character types in them. The aim of Theophrastos is not the creation of ethical theory; his description is concerned with prototypes of behaviour and follows the occurrence of those types in the real world.

The definition of *aneleutheria* in the *Characters* (*Char.* 22) is as follows: *aneleutheria* is the lack of any ambition connected with expenses.[14] The following description of the type shows that actually he does not wholly lack ambition — he just tries to satisfy it with the lowest possible cost. Cf. also *EN* 1122b19, b35, where Aristotle mentions some expenses that are connected with magnificence (*megaloprepeia*): a) things connected with the worship of gods (sections 2 and 4 in the *Characters*); b) social obligations (sections 2, 3, 5, 6); c) personal expenses (sections 6–13). The definition also has similarities with Aristotle's definition in *EE* 1221a33, and the Pseudo-Aristotelian definition in *De virtutibus et vitiis* (1251b13 f.). The characterisation by Theophrastos has much in common with his own description of *mikrologia* 'pettyness' (*Char.* 10) and *aischrokerdeia* 'base covetousness' (*Char.* 30; see especially Ussher 1993:103 ff., 184 ff. and 254 ff.).

Thus, Theophrastos understands the word in the narrow sense as 'stinginess' or 'meanness over money'. The description is given in increasing gradation – in the final situations the expenses that are needed become smaller and smaller.

It should be mentioned that the real-life images of Theophrastos follow their own logic and differ essentially from philosophical treatment. The *opus* of Theophrastos is unique in that it sketches the most typical outlines of character types. The habits of behaviour are mainly described in their external manifesta-tions as behavioural regularities, and the discussion of the motifs that lie behind

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[13] For their authenticity see Steinmetz 1962: 16, against Stein 1992. In any case they spring from an ancient source, for we have papyrus evidence for them from the texts of Philodemos.

[14] *Hē de aneleutheria estin apousia tis philotimias dapanēn echousēs*; the translation follows Schweighäuser's conjecture. Although I use the translation 'ambition' for *philotimia*, it should be noted that in the Greek world the word is mainly used in a positive sense (something like 'honourable feeling').

them is almost absent.[15] The description of each individual in the *Characters* presumably has the sole purpose of creating the character trait he is supposed to possess. In this they differ from Aristotle's descriptions, which aim primarily to illustrate a philosophical, or specifically ethical, principle. For Aristotle's treatment, both the abstract name of the trait and the agent noun are suitable, and he uses those two possibilities without distinction. The aim of Aristotle is to reach an ethical conclusion, and occasional descriptions of traits help him reach that aim, but are not an aim in their own.[16]

Now, if we search for occurrences of those words, which Theophrastos uses to denote specific character types, in other Greek authors of the same or preceding period, it appears that most of those words denote well-known social types and, in addition, are very often found in connection with each other or with other words and expressions denoting negative social behaviour in the Greek literature of the 5th and 4th century B.C. Thus, 25 out of 30 Theophrastean character types are somehow connected with each other in other authors.[17] It can be speculated that some kind of hierarchy of the Greek moral and social values may be revealed through the most widely used characteristics in Theophrastos and the earlier and contemporary tradition, and that Theophrastos deliberately chose character types that were better known to his audience and important in the society.

The most eminent character type on this negative scale is *aneleutheria* 'illiberality' resp. *aneleutheros* 'illiberal' (*Char*. 22 in Theophrastos). It has to do with questions of mental, economical, and social independence: submissiveness and dependency on the one hand and self-reliance on the other. Freedom has an economical side, which is connected with the use of money and the question of how and how much one spends it. This is what we can explicitly see in the work of Theophrastos, exemplified by the description of a negative counterpart.

5. Philosophical prose

5.1. Plato

Unlike Aristotle (see below, section 5.2), Plato does not give a systematic overview of negative character traits; he just mentions them here and there. Two of the most important places are *Rep*. 590a–b and *Laws* 649d. In *Rep*. 590a–b, Plato attempts to show that the bad reputation of certain activities and traits is not

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[15] This has been stressed many times, especially by William W. Fortenbaugh, who also introduced the phrase *behavioural regularities* (in his German articles also *Verhaltensregelmäßigkeiten*), see e.g. Fortenbaugh 1975.

[16] At the same time, Aristotle stresses that he is not really after the definition of virtue as such, but rather aims at *becoming good*, for this is, according to him, the only way to benefit from this kind of study (see *EN* 1103b26), i.e., his goal is practical and concerned with moral improvement.

[17] Excluding *Char*. 6, 8, 16, 21, 29. It should be noted that five out of 30 abstract nouns are found for the first time in Theophrastos (*Char*. 8, 16, 17, 27, 29), and both *mikrophilotimia* and *mikrophilotimos* in *Char*. 21 are found only in Theophrastos.

simply arbitrary but is the result of their connection with certain conditions of soul which Plato has already argued to be undesirable (White 1979:236). Here, both illiberality and flattery (*kolakeia*)[18] are connected with money (*chrēmata*).

The adjective *aneleutheros* and the agent noun derived from it are used abundantly in the dialogues of Plato, also in connection with various words and phrases expressing value judgments. In general, it is associated with a) desire of profit (through money or power), and b) servility. In both cases we can see connections with flattery (*Rep*. 590b, *Symp*. 183a–b). Servility is often used by Plato as a synonym for unworthy and illiberal behaviour – cf., e.g., *Laws* 880a, where he speaks of a 40-year-old man, who at this age is bold enough to fight with someone, either in attacking or in defending. Plato states that this kind of man is boorish (*agroikos*), illiberal (*aneleutheros*) and slavish (*andrapodōdēs*).[19] Friendship, which plays an important role in Plato's theory, is not possible in a state where rulers and the ruled ones live like master and slave (hence liberty and friendship go closely together), nor on the other hand if the good and the worthless are treated alike, for "equality between unequals is inequality" (*Laws* 757a). Either extreme leads at discord (cf. Guthrie 1978:340).

In *Laws* 919e, Plato asserts that although in a polis one should in most cases observe attentively that the citizens do not become infected with impudence (*anaischyntia*) and illiberality (*aneleutheria*), it is not easy to determine by laws, what exactly is appropriate to freemen and what is not. Liberality is often described in terms of what it is not, e.g. by saying what a liberal man must not do, and not what he has to do to be liberal. Theft (*klopē*), in any case, is considered unworthy and illiberal, see *Laws* 941b (where we also read the word *anaischyntos* 'impudent' again).[20] By theft Plato (in the ideal state of Magnesia) also means appropriation of things one has found.

Aneleutheria is also connected with meanness or petty behaviour (*Rep*. 486a: *smikrologia*, *Rep*. 469d: *smikra dianoia*). Even some kind of music can be *aneleutheros* (*Laws* 802c–d).

In *Rep*. 486b, Plato talks about distinction between philosophical and unphilosophical disposition: a man with a cowardly (*deilos*) and illiberal (*aneleutheros*) nature is not able to have a share in true philosophy. In the following section, he adds the adjectives *philochrēmatos* 'money-loving' and *alazōn* 'boasting'. Although the adjective *aneleutheros* is here used in the broader sense, we can notice an allusion to financial interests, denoted by the word *philochrēmatos*.

In two cases, *aneleutheria* in the works of Plato is connected with *hyperēphania* 'arrogance', which is treated as an opposite of it. We are reminded

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[18] Flattery is another important negative characteristic in ancient Greek (and not only) society. For an old, but still the most thorough treatment of it see Ribbeck 1884. Some new interpretations can be found in Nesselrath 1985:88–121.

[19] See also *Rep*. 577d, where Plato uses *aneleutheria* together with the word explicitly denoting slavery (*douleia*).

[20] See also *Laws* 857a: a thief will be detained in prison until he has paid twice the value of the theft unless excused by his prosecutor.

of Aristotle's triple system in *Crit*. 112c, where Plato describes the former size of and living conditions in Athens and its acropolis, here specifically the soldiers' quarter: in building houses (incl. temples) no gold or silver was used, but a middle way between arrogance and illiberality was followed. Thus, Plato actually talks about a positive mean here, but does not specify it. In *Rep*. 391b–c we are dealing with criticism of Homer: what Plato does not like is that the poet ascribes to heroes and gods qualities that they could not possibly have possessed. For example, we cannot believe, according to Plato, that Achilles, who was of divine descent, possessed two antagonistic qualities – illiberal love of money[21] and arrogance towards gods and men. Here, too, the connection of *aneleutheria* with money matters is explicitly stressed. Cf. also *Rep*. 560d, where *aneleutheria* in narrow sense as 'stinginess' is opposed to *kosmia dapanē* 'modest spending'.

In *Theaet*. 184 c, the word *aneleutheros* is used in opposition with adjective *agennēs* 'ignoble': here, Plato makes his case in saying that the easy use of words and phrases and the avoidance of strict precision is in general a sign of good breading (*ouk agennes*), whereas the opposite is *aneleutheron*.[22]

In *Gorg*. 465b, Sokrates describes self-adornment (*kommōtikē*)[23] as *kakourgos* 'rascally', *apatēlos* 'deceitful', *agennēs* 'ignoble' and *aneleutheros*. In *Gorg*. 518a, he continues on the theme: in comparison with gymnastics and medicine, other arts are slavish (*douloprepēs*), menial (*diakonikos*) and illiberal.

In *Rep*. 400b, *aneleutheria* is used together with *hybris* 'wantonness, insolence' and *mania* 'madness' (following *allē kakia* 'other evils') in the context of rhythm and metrical feet (fr. 8 of Damon the musical theorist). A bit later, in *Rep*. 401b, we are told that in the ideal city there should be a watch over craftsmen to forbid them to represent the evil disposition (*kakoēthes*), the licentious (*akolaston*), the illiberal (*aneleutheron*) and the graceless (*aschēmon*), either in the likeness of living creatures or in buildings or in any other product of their art. In *Rep*. 422a, Plato asserts that both wealth and poverty should be kept from slipping into the polis without the knowledge of the guards, for one of them brings along luxury (*tryphē*), idleness (*argia*) and innovation (*neōterismos*), and the other illiberality and the evil of bad workmanship (*kakoergia*).

In *Laws* 644a, Plato states that an upbringing which aims at money-making or physical strength, or even some mental accomplishment devoid of reason and justice, would be vulgar (*banausos*) and illiberal, and utterly unworthy of the name 'education' (*paideia*).

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[21] Literally *aneleutheria meta philochrēmatias*; cf. *Rep*. 485e–486a, where honesty, the love of truth and the rejection of *philochrēmatia* and *aneleutheria* are hallmarks of the philosopher. The last two are considered characteristic to Egyptians and Phoenicians in *Laws* 747b.

[22] This manifestation of Plato's dislike of technical precision in the use of words has been emphasised when dealing with his own philosophical key terms, which can also be "multivocal" (Guthrie 1978:97).

[23] In his treatment it is flattery disguised as gymnastic, because it deceives men by forms and colours, polish and dress, so as to make them, in the effort of assuming an extraneous beauty, neglect the native sort that comes through gymnastic.

In *Laws* 728e, we see Plato prefer the mean position between opposite extremes in case of honour, for one extreme makes souls puffed up (*chaunos*) and over-bold (*thrasys*), the other makes them base (*tapeinos*) and illiberal (*aneleutheros*). The connection with *tapeinos* 'mean, base' is seen again in *Laws* 774c and 791d. In *Laws* 843c–d, *aneleutheria* appears with *anaideia* 'shameless-ness' (in the context of neighbourly relations); in *Laws* 914c, *aneleutheros* is connected with *akoinōnētos nomōn* 'having no share of, i.e. disregarding, laws'.

Thus, *aneleutheria* in Plato's works is connected with both servility (i.e., behaviour that is inappropriate to freemen) and, in narrow sense, stinginess. Nevertheless, the broad sense prevails, although sometimes there are allusions to the financial side, as well. As has been mentioned already, Plato finds it quite difficult to determine by laws, what exactly would be appropriate to freemen.

5.2. Aristotle

Aristotle divides human ethical qualities into three groups: positive mean (*mesotēs*), which is the ideal form, and two negative extremes, falling short (*elleipsis*) and excess (*hyperbolē*).[24] The positive mean is the way of behaviour which is accepted in society and considered desirable, the extremes are, eventually, damnable. The aim of Aristotle is to demonstrate the negative qualities of the extremes, thus reaching the conclusion that the middle way is the best. Extremes are opposite to the mean, but also to each other, and the mean is opposite to the extremes. At that, the reciprocal opposition of the extremes is greater than opposition to the mean; some extremes may even have some similarities with the mean. It should also be remembered that the mean is sometimes more opposite to one extreme, sometimes to other (see *EN* 1108b13 ff.).

In connection with *aneleutheria*, let us first deal with a triad that in Aristotle's treatment falls under liberality: *aneleutheria – eleutheriotēs – asōtia*. The third term (*asōtia*, 'prodigality, wastefulness') is not very important for Aristotle (as mentioned already, the parts of the triple system do not have to be equal). He writes that prodigality is not really vicious and only appears when a person has nobody to guide him; with the help of guidance, the prodigious man can achieve the positive mean. *Aneleutheria*, on the other hand, is incorrigible, and it is caused by two things: a) old age (*gēras*), and b) any kind of inability (*pasa adynamia*, *EN* 1121b13–14). As an extreme illustration of *aneleutheria*, Aristotle mentions usurers (*tokistai*), who lend small sums at high interest: this is because they "take more than they ought and from the wrong sources" (by which Aristotle presumably means poor citizens, *EN* 1122a1–3). At the opposite end of the scale, the 'generous man' gets his wealth from proper sources (e.g. his own private means, *EN* 1120b1), and gives it in the right amounts at the right time to the right people (*EN* 1120a24–26). Again, we may presume that Aristotle has in mind "the deserving poor" (Millett 1991:43).

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[24] See, e.g., *EN* 1107a33–1108b7, *EE* 1220b38 ff. The general view that moderation is good, and excess to be avoided, had been anticipated by popular morality and by poets as well as by Plato.

Aristotle also mentions subgroups of *aneleutheria*, which are in turn divided in two: one group is characterised by the too small a wish to give something away (*elleipsis tēs doseōs*), the other one by the too great a wish to acquire something (*hyperbolē tēs lēpseōs*, see *EN* 1121b16 ff., cf. also *EE* 1232a6 ff. and *Rhet*. 1366b15). In *MM* 1.24.1 we also find a general note that there are many kinds of *aneleutheria*,[25] with the reason that the vice has often many forms, whereas the virtue does not. A medical parallel is offered to illustrate this claim: illness has many forms, while health has only one. Thus, in all passages mentioned above, the term *aneleutheria* is used in the narrow sense.

A short treatise with traditional Latin name *De virtutibus et vitiis*, which we find in Aristotle's corpus (but which is probably written somewhat later), should also be taken into consideration, for it has sections 1250b25–35 devoted to the term *eleutheriotēs*. Liberality is, first of all, characterised as a quality of being generous in money matters (although not in every situation, but only in case of praiseworthy activities), spending a lot on necessary things and offering help in the case of important expenses. It is probable that the author here combines the treatment of liberality with that of friendliness.

The term *aneleutheria* is dealt with longer in the same treatise, sections 1251b4–17, where it is again divided into three subgroups: a) *kimbeia* 'stinginess', b) *mikrologia* 'pettiness', c) *pheidōlia* 'sparing'. It seems that the author tries to combine both meanings of the word here, because he ends the treatment of *aneleutheria* with the assertion that such life as is characteristic to an *aneleutheros* is commonly lived by servants, and is slavish and dirty.

Ethics and politics constitute for Aristotle one continuous study, which he calls the philosophy of human life (*EN* 1181b15). The subject of both is the good for man, the end to which all human activities are directed, and the happiness of each individual and that of a whole state are the same thing (*Pol*. 1324a5 ff.).

But does his treatment of *aneleutheria* in political works coincide with what we have seen in his ethical treatises? First of all, the triple system that is central to his ethical (and, one should add, biological) works – viz. that the mean is natural and the best, whereas excess in either direction is a disorder – is not used in the *Politics*; *to meson* appears only in a few normative generalisations (see Finley 1983: 10).

Pol. 1336a29–30 mentions conditions that should be observed in bringing up children: among other things, the games that children play must not be *aneleutheroi* – here 'not appropriate to freemen' – and also not too weary or disorderly. In *Pol*. 1336b3 ff. the author continues on the upbringing of children, and the word *aneleutheria* is again used in a broader sense: children up to seven years of age should by all means be kept at home, so that they could not acquire unworthy habits from what they hear and see. Here, *aneleutheria* is also connected with *aischrologia* 'foul language, obscenity' and *andrapodōdia* 'servility'. The same context is found some sections further: in *Pol*. 1337b4 ff. Aristotle states that

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[25] The author actually uses a rare parallel form *aneleutheriotēs*.

the youth should be taught useful skills, but not everything that is useful, but only what is necessary and appropriate to freemen. It should be monitored strictly that young people do not engage in something that would turn a man *banausos* 'vulgar'. Vulgar in Aristotle's definition is something that in practice acts contrary to principles of *aretē*, be it in connection with body, soul or mind. At the same time the goal of doing or learning something is important: if something is done in the name of itself, friends or *aretē*, i.e. without external force, this behaviour is not unworthy (*ouk aneleutheron*); but he who acts in the name of others, i.e. not on his own initiative, is often slavish.

Activities are illiberal mostly for two reasons: a) because they prevent men from living an honourable and liberal life, tying their mental and physical powers with a specific skill, thus making it impossible to achieve real happiness (*eudaimonia*), and b) because they have a serving function, they are done on someone else's demand, they aim at financial profit and make people materially and mentally dependent on others (Raaflaub 1981: 305).

Thus, the *Politics* uses the term *aneleutheros* and its cognates in the broader sense, differing from Aristotle's ethical works.

6. Historiography

Compared to Plato and Aristotle, other authors of the period use the word *aneleutheria* and its cognates relatively seldom. We may find some phrases and words expressing value judgment connected with it in Xenophon, e.g. *ou prepon andri kalōi kagathōi* 'not appropriate to good and noble man' (*Mem.* 1.2.29); *akratēs* 'incontinent, intemperate' (*Mem.* 4.5.4). In *Symp.* 8.23, it is stated that union with someone whose regard is for the body rather than for the soul, is *aneleutheros*. In Sokrates' defence, Xenophon lets him say that he will prefer death to begging meanly (*aneleutherōs*) for longer life and thus gaining a life far less worthy in exchange for death (*Apol.* 9). See also Xenophon, *Mem.* 3.10.5, where Sokrates formulates some antitheses, including *eleutherion/aneleutheron*:

> *"Moreover, nobility (*to megaloprepes*) and dignity (*to eleutherion*), self-abasement (*to tapeinon*) and servility (*to aneleutheron*), prudence (*to sōphronikon*) and understanding (*to phronimon*), insolence (*to hybristikon*) and vulgarity (*to* apeirokalon*), are reflected in the face and in the attitudes of the body whether still or in motion."*[26]

Finally, in the *Constitution of the Lacedaemonians*, Xenophon compares some Spartan habits to those of other *poleis*. He says that in other states the most powerful citizens do not even wish it to be thought that they fear the magistrates: they believe such fear to be a badge of slavery (*aneleutheria*). But at Sparta the most important men show the utmost deference to the magistrates: they pride themselves on their humility, on running instead of walking to answer any call, in

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[26] The translation is that of E. C. Marchant (in *Loeb Classical Library* series).

the belief that, if they lead, the rest will follow along the path of eager obedience (*Lac*. 8.2).

Thus, the broader meaning of the terms can be seen in the historiographical works.

7. Comedy

In comedy, we have some occurrences of *aneleutheros* in Aristophanes: in *Plut*. 591, *aneleutheros* is connected with *philokerdēs* 'loving gain' and denotes the behaviour of a rich man, thus having the narrow meaning. Aristophanes, fr. 685 Kock, opposes average Attic usage of language to usages typical of townmen or countrymen. The usage of the "city fops" is much too elegant and feminine, whereas the country language is *aneleutheros* and boorish (*agroikos*). Here we can see a popular representation of the opposition between extremes and the middle, which is so characteristic to Aristotle. The word *aneleutheros* is here used in the broad sense.

From fragmentarily preserved comic texts, fr. 8 of Pherekrates consists of a single line, *aneleutheron sōma* 'un-free body'. Although we have no context, it is difficult to interpret the use of *aneleutheros* here otherwise than as a synonym of 'servile'. The last known occurrence is in Alexis' fr. 263.1 Kock, where an unknown character expresses the view that an awkward and undignified gait is a mark of the *aneleutheros*.[27]

That *aneleutheria* was connected with flattery (*kolakeia*), has been shown above in connection with Plato. We can also see this in comedy, although without direct mention of the negative term itself. Thus, according to Eubulos, fr. 25 Kock, Dionysios the tyrant of Syracuse was hard on flatterers but well-disposed to those who made fun of him, "thinking that such a man alone was free, even if he was (*sc*. formally) a slave." (cf. Dover 1974:115–116).

Thus, the comic writers use the term *aneleutheros* in both narrow and broad sense, and no preference can be deduced from the material available to us.

8. Practical rhetoric

If we look for examples of *aneleutheros* and its cognates in orators, we only find four. Lysias notes that to go to court because of slander is characteristic to men who are *aneleutheroi* and too *philodikoi* 'litigious' (10.1.2). Aischines, too, uses the word in broader sense, this is illustrated by the attribute *agennēs* 'ignoble' (3.46; cf. above, Plato, *Theaet*. 184c). Demosthenes uses the word *aneleutheros* for Megarians in the narrow sense ('stingy'), which is also supported by a word of

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[27] Cf. also Dover 1974:115, in whose interpretation the point of this passage presumably is that a free man should suggest even by his physical movements that he is, as it were, in control of the situation.

similar meaning, *mikrologos* (59.1.36). The same meaning is also found in Hypereides' fragment 255. The orators do not usually associate this word with servility, which was common in, e.g., Plato. We can see, however, that some other words connected with money-loving, such as *philochrēmatein*, were considered derogatory and expressed servility (cf. Isokr. 10.17), and a man could be blamed as 'worsted by money' or 'enslaved ...', or praised as 'superior to money' (e.g. Dem. 58.29; see also Dover 1974:171–172). At the same time it should be stressed that the opposition between slaves and freemen or persons with slavish character and those acting as is proper to a freeborn man, was abundantly exploited by the orators. They attack political opponents for their slavish actions or behaviour.[28] Attacks upon the former "servile" occupations of an opponent or members of his family (incl. ancestors) are common in the political, although not so much in private speeches (see Ober 1989:277–279 for a more thorough discussion on this subject).

9. Conclusion

What was the role of *aneleutheria* in the context of ancient Greek popular morality and moral philosophy? The evidence from the orators and comedy, which, if anything, could give us reliable information on actual morality of the time, is inconclusive. Taking into account the relatively infrequent use of the term in popular language (as based on rhetoric and comedy), it should be concluded that the concept of *aneleutheria* probably did not play a very significant role in popular morality.

Looking at other kinds of literary evidence that have been presented above, it is clear that the broader concept prevails. Its use is especially abundant in the works of philosophers such as Aristotle (except in his ethical treatises) and, even more so, Plato, and it is seen in connection with numerous other (negative) notions from the field of moral vocabulary. Now it may seem strange that Aristotle, in his ethical works, is mostly talking about *aneleutheria* in the narrow sense of the word, i.e. as meanness over money. However, his aim here is to illustrate a specific ethical principle. This can be compared with Theophrastos who describes the lack of positive individual character traits with the help of explicit examples that are visible in everyday life and have practical output in social relations. He exemplifies moral qualities that he believed to be important in the society. Meanness over money is just one of these. I do not think, however, that this narrow concept should be separated from the broader background that prevails in the rest of our evidence.

Plato seems to be a special case. No other author from the period uses the term *aneleutheria* and its cognates as frequently as he does. Relying on him, we can see that *eleutheria* and its opposite *aneleutheria* bear a social value and form a basis

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[28] E.g. cowardice, which was considered a natural characteristic of a slave; see Dem. 19.210, 22.53, 24.124, Hyp. 2.10, Aisch. 1.42, with Ober 1989:271–272.

for the relations between the members of the polis. The negative aspect of this concept focuses on meanness in every sense, although there are often allusions to its specific connections with money-matters. *Eleutheria* combines respect of the person's self with the care for others. It is a basic concern for every well-functioning society. *Aneleutheria*, in the broad sense, is something that denotes suppression of the individual initiative and subjection to constraint. Its connection with servility and submissiveness makes it a remarkable ethical category on the negative scale. This is also reflected in Aristotle's *Politics*, and can be seen in Xenophon, especially in the defence speech of Sokrates.

Thus, the major part of the philosophic approach to *aneleutheria* seems to treat it as a limited-range "cover" term that embraces many kinds of negative qualities and dispositions, including *aneleutheria* in the narrow sense. For example, every type in the collection of Theophrastos has something *aneleutheron* in it, i.e. not appropriate to a free man (cf. Arist. *Pol*. 1342b18–20). I would say that here we can see signs of the social values characteristic to the members of the democratic society. Democratic values were opposed to slavery and tyranny, and this meaning is reflected in the broad concept of *eleutheria–aneleutheria*.

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