

UKRAINE'S RESISTANCE AGAINST RUSSIA: A STRATEGIC CULTURE PERSPECTIVE

Dogachan Dagi

Baskent University

Abstract. The concept of strategic culture is often used to explain Russia's decision to invade Ukraine, but its relevance to Ukraine's resistance is largely overlooked. Neglecting the role the Ukrainian strategic culture has played in defying Russia underrates Ukraine's agency and disregards the sources of its resilience. This article explores Ukrainian strategic culture as a key to understanding its response to Russia's advances since 2014. It argues that three interwoven characteristics of Ukrainian strategic culture, namely, its narrative of insecurity, commitment to sovereignty, and alignment with Western institutions, have shaped and sustained the Ukrainian resistance against Russia. Based on these defining features of Ukrainian strategic culture, this article asserts that Ukraine's policy options are constrained not only by its physical capabilities but also by the ideational milieu created by its strategic culture.

Keywords: Ukraine, strategic culture, Russia-Ukraine war, Ukrainian foreign and security policy

DOI: <https://doi.org/10.3176/tr.2025.2.02>

Received 28 February 2025, accepted 21 March 2025, printed and available online 10 June 2025

1. Introduction

When Russia invaded on February 24, 2022, only a few expected that Ukraine would survive more than a week. With its larger and better-equipped military, Russia appeared capable of marching into Kyiv and overthrowing the government in a matter of days. Yet, Ukraine put up a determined resistance to halt Russia's advances

along its borders to the surprise of the world, including the Russians themselves. While strong leadership, public resilience, effective military tactics, and substantial Western assistance have been critical in explaining how Ukraine has managed to withstand the Russian invasion, this article argues that its emergent strategic culture stands as one of the most significant factors.

The concept of strategic culture is often used to explain Russia's decision to invade Ukraine but its relevance to Ukraine's resistance is overlooked. Neglecting the role Ukrainian strategic culture has played in defying Russia underrates Ukraine's agency and disregards the sources of its resilience. This article aims to explore Ukrainian strategic culture as a key to understanding its resistance to Russia's claims over Ukraine since 2014 and to explain how the ideational milieu created by its strategic culture shapes policy options for Ukraine.

Three interwoven characteristics of Ukrainian strategic culture stand out as key factors in explaining Ukrainian resistance. First, Ukrainian strategic culture is constructed on a narrative of perpetual insecurity and victimhood, which is rooted in historical references to the Cossack Hetmanate, the Holodomor, and the Second World War. References to these historical occurrences have defined the primacy of security and identified the source of threats for Ukraine as an independent entity, which points out Russia as the usual culprit (Brusylovska and Sinovets 2017). Second, Ukrainian strategic culture is based on the indispensability of sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity which constitutes the foundation of Ukrainian statehood, perceived to be threatened or outright dismissed both historically and presently by Russia. Third, its strategic culture envisions Ukraine as a distinct nation and a fundamentally European state, which is continuously denied by Russia (Koval et al. 2017). This choice settles the question of where Ukraine belongs internationally while portraying Russia as an obstacle. These set objectives and identified threats in Ukrainian strategic culture have framed Russia as the principal impediment to preserving the Ukrainian nation and protecting its statehood instigating its resistance and constraining its policy options.

This article, in this context, argues that these three characteristics of Ukrainian strategic culture, which are narrative of insecurity, commitment to sovereignty, and alignment with Western institutions, have shaped and sustained Ukraine's resistance against Russia. They have also rendered compromises with Russia, particularly on issues of territorial integrity, national sovereignty, and Western orientation, rather difficult, while legitimizing and strengthening Ukrainian defiance.

2. Ukrainian strategic culture

Unlike its Russian counterpart, which has been extensively studied since Snyder (1977), Ukrainian strategic culture is one of the 'least studied cases' (Brusylovska and Sinovets 2017: 11). The scholarly focus on Russian strategic culture is commendable, however, the lack of attention to Ukrainian strategic culture is a significant oversight. Likewise, Russian strategic culture and its role in prompting the 2022 invasion have

been thoroughly scrutinized, but Ukrainian strategic culture and its role in resisting Russia have received far less attention (Herd 2022, Götz and Staun 2022, Kari and Pynnöniemi 2023, Skak 2024). The neglect of Ukrainian strategic culture persisted even after the 2022 invasion, which underestimates Ukraine's will as an independent security actor and relegates it to a passive role, "just an object in the big geopolitical players' game" (Akaliyski and Reeskens 2023: 523) in a conflict that takes place on its own territory. However, understanding Ukraine's resilience vis-à-vis the Russian encroachments requires analyzing the characteristics of its strategic culture which circumscribes, influences, and justifies Ukraine's approach to Russia's offensive.

Strategic culture is shaped by history, geography, and identity that surround and weave together a political community. It is an 'ideational milieu' that guides decision-makers, restrains policy options, and provides a compass for foreign and security policy (Johnston 1995: 46, Meyer 2005). Through the lens of strategic culture, threats are defined, enemies are identified, and objectives are set. In a way, strategic culture frames strategic choices and determines appropriate behaviors concerning matters of security and defense. As such, it constitutes a context that "surrounds, and gives meaning to, strategic behavior" (Gray 1999: 51). In this way, strategic culture does not determine state behavior, but it circumscribes it by providing decision-makers with a commonly shared idea of what is acceptable and what is not. In other words, it creates a milieu within which choices are made (Gray 2007, Lantis and Howlett 2019). That is, while Ukrainian strategic culture does not necessarily dictate a policy of seeking alliances with NATO to safeguard its independence or require a policy of countering Russian influence, it does nevertheless inform policies in that direction as it constructs this discursive framework in which independence is valued, and Russia is defined as the adversary. This means that the prevailing strategic culture of Ukraine limits the possibility of certain decisions (i.e. compromise with Russia) while rendering others almost compelling (i.e. integration with Western military and political institutions).

Understood as such, it is not possible to deny the existence of a distinct Ukrainian strategic culture even though Ukraine, as a modern state, is a relatively new political entity. Similar to Russian strategic culture, where there have been competing visions about threat perception, security priorities, strategic objectives, and self-identification between those conventionally referred to as Slavophiles and Westernizers (Tolz 2001, Herd 2022), Ukrainian strategic culture is also not monolithic. Though centuries of dependence in the form of Russian, Polish, or Austrian rule make navigating the evolution and divergences within a broader umbrella of Ukrainian strategic culture problematic, three strands of contending strategic cultures have been impactful since Ukraine gained its independence in 1991. The first strand endorsed an attitude of strategic neutrality between the West and Russia, arguing that a non-alignment policy that considers the global balance of power, as well as regional realities, would be in favor of Ukraine (Minesashvili 2020). The second strand was represented by Russophiles who strived for reintegration with Russia and the continuation of the *status quo* as a nation that is part of the 'Russian world' (Penkela et al. 2020). The first strand has lost traction since the annexation of Crimea and pro-Russian armed

separatism in eastern Ukraine since 2014 (Klymenko 2020), while the second did not only lose public support in the aftermath of the Maidan Revolution, it has also been discredited and criminalized since Russia's full-scale invasion in 2022 (Kyiv Post 2014). Therefore, largely shaped by its relationship with Russia a nationalist Europhile strategic culture has dominated the Ukrainian public sphere since 2014, constituting a foundation for its resistance to Russia.

2.1. Vulnerability and victimhood

A central characteristic of the prevailing Ukrainian strategic culture is the conviction that Ukraine not only has a particularly attractive geopolitical location in Eurasia, which increases the likelihood of becoming a victim of the neighbors' ambitions, but also that its vast terrain of steppes without any natural boundaries except the Black Sea in the south, renders Ukrainian cities indefensible (Brusylovska and Sinovets 2017). This perception of insecurity toward stronger external forces eager to occupy the territories of Ukraine is further reinforced by the nationalist construction of history that portrays the Ukrainian people as continuous victims who had to endure centuries of foreign rule starting with the Mongol invasion of the Kievan Rus in the 13th century, continuing with Polish, Lithuanian, Ottoman and Austria-Hungarian occupation of today's Ukrainian territories from the 14th to the 19th century. None of them, however, had generated the trauma caused by Russian rule that started from the mid-17th century until the dissolution of the Soviet Union at the end of the 20th century. In Ukrainian strategic culture, Russia portrayed as an unredeemable menace, has victimized Ukraine throughout history. The villain, according to Ukrainian President Zelensky, resumed its 'evil' with its 2022 invasion under President Putin who is 'a sick old man from the Red Square' (2024, August 24), a 'thug,' and a 'monster' (2024, Feb. 17). This role historically and presently attributed to Russia in the victimization of Ukraine not only revitalizes the traumas of the past but also justifies its struggle for independence and resists the attempt of occupation.

The Ukrainian leadership has, thus, reproduced a historical narrative in which the Russian statecraft emerges as the sole victimizer of Ukraine while other misdeeds of different actors (i.e., the Polish, the Austrians, etc.) that can also be interpreted as oppression are conveniently omitted. The victimization of the Ukrainian people by Russia is narrated to start from the Pereyaslav Agreements of 1654 when the Cossack Hetmanate sought protection from the Tsar of Muscovy against perceived threats emanating from the Polish – Lithuanian Commonwealth only then to be absorbed by Russia who saw the agreement as a prerequisite for military occupation. Then, Ukraine is believed to have suffered a long and deliberate process of Russification during which Ukrainian identity was demoted to a subordinate 'little Russians' status. This involved the mass migration of Russians into Eastern Ukraine, the suppression of the Ukrainian language in education and publication, and efforts to erode distinct Ukrainian identity (Pavlova et al. 2023).

The most important sources of trauma vis-à-vis Russia since independence and before the full-scale invasion of 2022, however, remain to be the man-made famine

(Holodomor) of 1932–1933 and the Stalinist political repressions (the Great Purge) of the late 1930s. The nationalist Europhile strategic culture of Ukraine, ever since independence, promulgated a reading of history where the Holodomor and the Great Purge were presented as deliberative Russian policies, a genocide, to eliminate the Ukrainian people (Koval et al. 2017, Klymenko 2020, Penkela et al. 2020). This narrative connects the past to the ongoing war in Ukraine in which Russia is depicted by Zelensky (2023, Nov. 25) as “the heir to the worst crimes and murders of that era,” a force that tried to “exterminate us, to subjugate us, to torture us.” They failed in the past so that they will fail again now, the narrative suggests.

In essence, the conviction reinforced through such historical accounts that Ukraine has suffered in the past but, more specifically, Russia has perpetually victimized Ukraine with its policies designed to hinder Ukraine from emerging as an independent and separate sovereign nation free from Russian influence. Such narrations of victimhood against an imminent Russian threat from past to present have built the will to resist, justify, and necessitate a political choice of defiance at all costs while rendering a reconciliation with Russia practically unfeasible.

2.2. Sovereignty and independence

As a nation with a history of being subject to centuries of foreign rule from the Habsburgs to the Soviet Union that gained its independence at the end of the 20th century, it is no coincidence that notions such as sovereignty, independence, non-interference, and territorial integrity are essential elements of Ukrainian strategic culture. Indeed, there are no other narratives that are not only present in virtually all speeches of the Ukrainian political elites (especially after the Maidan Revolution of 2014) but are also the central theme in virtually all official strategy papers published by the Ukrainian state. The then President of Ukraine, Poroshenko (2015), referring to Russia’s annexation of Crimea and its support for armed separatists in Eastern Ukraine, regularly condemned “the aggression against sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Ukraine.” President Zelensky’s (2022, Feb. 24) first speech in the aftermath of Russia’s invasion in 2022 also pledged to safeguard Ukraine’s freedom, independence, and sovereignty: “No one will be able to convince or force us, Ukrainians, to give up our freedom, our independence, our sovereignty.” This attitude towards sovereignty and independence has strongly been entrenched in the official documents. The 2015 Military Doctrine declares Ukraine’s redline as “principles of equality, non-interference in internal affairs, mutual respect for independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity” (Rada 2015). Similarly, the 2020 National Security Strategy identifies the top priority for ensuring national security to be “upholding independence and state sovereignty” (Rada 2020).

Pledges to defend these quintessential values, however, are proclaimed with a constant reference to an ‘other,’ which turns out to be Russia, perceived as the main source of threat. That is, the prevailing Ukrainian strategic culture places a peculiar emphasis on preserving sovereignty against Russian interference, gaining independence from Russian spheres of influence, and maintaining/regaining

territorial integrity in the face of Russian encroachments. In this context, narrations of history by the Ukrainian leadership highlight how Russia is perceived as an obstacle to the Ukrainian pursuit of independence and sovereignty. In this context, the Cossack era is reproduced and the Cossack Hetmanate is seen as a precursor to the modern Ukrainian nation-state, portraying Ukrainian Cossack leaders as defenders of statehood while depicting Russians as colonial oppressors (Klymenko 2020). Poroshenko (2019) hailed Mazepa, an important Cossack figure who fought against Russians in the 18th century, as a “symbol of Ukraine’s resistance against Russia,” claiming that Mazepa should be remembered with the likes of Washington, Bolivar, and Gandhi as “fighters against imperial forces.” While the Ukrainian leadership condemns the Soviet Union for committing crimes against humanity, war crimes, and genocide, they praise figures such as Bandera for their dedication to the national cause and their fight for an independent Ukrainian state (Rada 2010). For President Zelensky, too, he is “one of the people who defended Ukraine’s freedom” (Kyiv Post 2021).

The narrative of the prevailing nationalist Europhile strategic culture that Russia is the leading villain that not only victimized Ukraine historically but continues to be the main source of threat to Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity is further affirmed in the official documents published by the Ukrainian state (Pavlova et al. 2023). The 2015 Military Doctrine concludes that the main political challenge facing Ukraine is “attempts by the Russian Federation to destabilize the socio-political and economic situation in Ukraine, as well as provoking separatist sentiments in areas of compact residence of national minorities on the territory of Ukraine” while the most serious military threats to Ukraine are “territorial claims of the Russian Federation to Ukraine and encroachments on its sovereignty and territorial integrity” (Rada 2015). In a similar vein, the 2021 Military Doctrine of Ukraine after proclaiming that the “protection of sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine is the most important function of the state, the cause of the entire Ukrainian people” argues that the “aggressive foreign and military policy of the Russian Federation threatens the national security of Ukraine and (...) can lead to further escalation of armed aggression against Ukraine and provoke an international armed conflict in Europe” (Rada 2021).

To maintain its sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity in the face of an imminent Russian threat, the Ukrainian leadership has historically sought a strategic partner to safeguard its statehood. The strategy of building sovereignty through alliances became more evident in the aftermath of the Maidan Revolution and Russia’s subsequent annexation of Crimea in 2014. Thus, it is no surprise that the 2015 Military Doctrine that mentions NATO forty-five times declares Ukraine’s main military objective to be securing NATO membership (Rada 2015). Ukraine’s search for alliances to enhance its sovereignty was further manifested in 2019 as Ukraine’s constitution was changed to “ensure the implementation of the strategic course of the State to acquire full membership of Ukraine in the EU and NATO” (HCJ 2023). Although Ukrainian strategic culture appears to embody two contradictory tendencies, prioritizing the inviolability of sovereignty while seeking alliances with

stronger foreign powers, Ukrainian strategic documents interpret this not as a model of dependence but as a sovereign choice to safeguard its statehood (Rada 2015, Koval et al. 2017).

Overall, the notions of independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity play a key part in shaping Ukraine's threat perception, security priorities, and strategic objectives. In President Zelensky's words (2024, August 24): "Only Ukraine and Ukrainians will determine how to live, what path to take, and what choice to make. Because this is how independence works." Russian attacks on this choice thus prompt a swift response highlighting that Russia is the primary source of threat to Ukraine's sovereignty and suggesting that Ukraine should distance itself from Russian influence. Such a strategic culture that views Russia persistently targeting Ukraine's statehood and denying its independence defines resistance as the most appropriate response.

2.3. Ukraine as a distinct entity with a European destiny

Another key feature of Ukrainian strategic culture that cements its resistance against Russian aggression is the aspiration to assert itself as a separate entity with a unique history and a future trajectory separate from Russia. Ukrainian leadership has consistently claimed that centuries of Russian occupation and hostility aimed at absorbing and even eradicating the Ukrainian people. They, therefore, reject the Russian narrative of '*triyedniy Russkiy narod*' [triune Russian people], which stipulates that Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarussians originated from the Kyivan Rus during the 10th century and together they constitute a single Russian nation (Klymenko 2020, Kolsto 2023). For Ukrainians, such a reading of history does not only reveal a certain hierarchy as they are referred to as '*malorusov*' [little Russians] while Russians are the '*velikorusov*' [great Russians], but it also effectively denies identity and sovereignty to Belarus and Ukraine and legitimizes Russia's claim for a sphere of influence.

Seeing themselves as a distinct nation, Ukrainian leadership challenges such a reading of history and insists that the Kievan Rus was principally Ukrainian, and that Ukraine has an older and separate history from that of Russians and Belarussians. This narrative offers an alternative to Russian historiography, exemplified by Putin's (Kremlin 2021) famous 2021 article entitled "On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians" which denies the very existence of Ukrainian ethnicity and grounds Ukraine's right to sovereign development separate from Russia (Wolczuk 2000, Kuzio 2001, Klymenko 2020).

Ukraine's endurance as a distinct nation and its strong will for self-determination despite centuries of Russian aggression and policies of assimilation is often complemented by a narrative that highlights its European identity which Russia actively suppressed. It is often asserted that Ukrainians have always been a European nation with a firm European identity, struggling against Russia, which is essentially an alien, non-European power, described by Zelensky (2024, June 7) as the 'opposite of Europe.' Thus, Ukrainian history from the Kievan Rus onwards is narrated as a part of European history with evident parallels with other European nations. For

instance, contrary to the Russian historiography, the prevailing Ukrainian narrative is that the choice of the Kievan Rus to convert to Christian Orthodoxy is yet another proof that Ukraine is inherently European. This is why Poroshenko (2018) claimed that by “introducing Christianity more than 1000 years ago, Prince Vladimir the Great had not only made a religious, but also a political – a European – choice.”

This ‘European choice’ narrative has been further reinforced since independence with references to Belarussian (Eurasian) and Polish (European) cases. While the former is viewed as dishonorably accepting the patronage of Russia, the latter is described as “an aspiration to integration in the economic, political-military structures of Western Europe” (Kuzio 2001: 359) where Ukraine’s full potential could be realized. Hence, Ukraine has adopted the ‘returning to Europe’ discourse of the former-Soviet Central and Eastern European countries that sought to be a part of Western political and military institutions after the fall of the Iron Curtain, framing it as a ‘final farewell to the Russian empire’ and a ‘return to European home’.

Through this ‘European choice,’ grounded in historical narratives, a significant characteristic of Ukrainian strategic culture has taken shape, generating common beliefs, prescribing behavioral norms, and defining friends and foes. As such, it justifies the Ukrainian leadership’s contemporary pro-Western political agenda that seeks to integrate with Western political and military institutions while isolating Ukraine completely from centuries of Russian influence. Meanwhile, it is constantly underlined that Ukraine has had to endure hardship, including invasion, because of its choice for Europe, as Russia reacted aggressively to thwart Ukraine’s European aspirations and retain its control.

By portraying Russia throughout history as a symbol of oppression, colonialism, and authoritarianism and constructing an abstract ‘Europe’ that represents modernization, human rights, and the rule of law, Ukraine has positioned itself as a part of Europe, whose European orientation had been disrupted by Russian domination. Forced out of Europe, Ukraine sought to return to there both during the short period of independence from 1917 to 1921 and after its final independence in 1991. Admiration of European values is coupled with a strong will to adopt European values to a degree that the date of Christmas had been altered from the traditionally Orthodox 7th of January to the 25th of December as Poroshenko (2017, Dec. 24) proclaimed “Ukrainians should celebrate Christmas with the majority of Christians in the world and particularly those in Europe,” a decision followed later by the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (CNE News 2023). Poroshenko (2023) regarded it as “a symbolic return” of Ukrainians “to the European family of nations.”

Especially since 2014, Ukraine has been presented as establishing itself as a European state that shares European values and aspirations (Poroshenko 2015), and from the outset of the Russian invasion in 2022, the Ukrainian leadership has framed its resistance not only as a struggle for an independent Ukraine but also for the defense of European values against a common enemy. As put by President Zelensky (2024, June 7):

This Russian regime does not recognize borders. Even Europe is not enough for it... This battle for Ukraine is as existentially important for Europe as the battles won by previous generations of Europeans. This battle is a crossroads. The moment when we can all write history together now – the way we need it, or we can become victims of history as our enemy wants. I emphasize: a common enemy.

The Ukrainian leadership refers to ‘our Europe’ (Zelensky 2024, June 7) that must be protected against Russian aggression, not just Ukraine itself, which is part of it. To solidify the contrast between Russia and Ukraine, the former is, thus, depicted as a fundamentally non-European actor that aims to rob Ukraine of its distinctly European identity and threatens Europe itself. What is derived from this is that Ukraine is an ‘independent European state’ (Zelensky 2024, August 24) whereas Russia stands for an ‘anti-Europe’ (Zelensky 2024, June 7).

Constructed through such narratives, the prevailing Ukrainian strategic culture constructs a milieu in which the Ukrainian people can be distinguished as a historically separate nation entitled to exist freely and independently with its unique identity and culture as part of Europe. A sense of belonging to Europe constitutes an essential component of Ukrainian strategic culture, which not only creates a context where the political leadership feels compelled to resist Russian expansionism it also lays the groundwork for them to regard the West as its natural ally.

3. Ukrainian strategic culture in action

The nationalist Europhile Ukrainian strategic culture is marked by a sense of insecurity, a perception of perpetual victimhood, a strong commitment to sovereignty, a quest for forming alliances with formidable powers, and a distinct European identity. These fundamental characteristics of Ukrainian strategic culture, which define its threat perception, security priorities, strategic objectives, and self-identification, have been shaped by the constant framing of Russia as a threat.

The narratives advanced by the Ukrainian political elites suggest that Ukraine has historically been a victim of Russian aggression, and that Russia has persistently refused to acknowledge the existence of a distinct Ukrainian people, never ceasing to pose the most imminent external threat to Ukraine’s independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty (Klymenko 2020). In this context, the Ukrainian self is constructed not only as entirely separate from Russia but also as a fundamentally European nation destined to form alliances with Western powers against a common non-European adversary (Koval et al. 2017). Such portrayals of Russia as inherently ‘hostile other’ and Ukraine as perpetually ‘victimized self,’ inform Ukraine’s strategic behavior which compels the Ukrainian leadership to devise strategies aimed at alleviating the perceived threat from Russia. In other words, as demonstrated in this section, in its pursuit of relative security in the face of a major threat to Ukrainian statehood, sovereignty, and independence Ukraine is left with little room for maneuver but to resist perceived Russian irridentism and aggression by all means possible.

The prevailing Ukrainian strategic culture has played a crucial role in distancing Ukrainian identity from any association with Russia, ranging from cultural issues to security matters. The desire to reinforce Ukrainian sovereignty and assert the supremacy of Ukrainian culture within the borders of Ukraine led to the simultaneous promotion of the use of the Ukrainian language, while the privileges previously granted to the Russian language were revoked (Marukhovska-Kartunova et al. 2024) in response to Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014 under the pretext of protecting "Russian citizens and Russian speakers in Ukraine" (Kremlin 2014). The use of the Russian language within the territories of Ukraine was perceived as a vulnerability that Russia could exploit; thus, a policy of Ukrainization was expected to neutralize this pressure (Kulyk 2016, Abimbola et al. 2024). Even though the marginalization of the Russian language in Ukraine further antagonized Russia, the fixation of Ukrainian strategic culture on completely distancing itself from Russian influence, along with the perceived magnitude of the threat from Russia, hindered Ukraine's policymakers from showing deference to Russia's concerns. Hence, the Ukrainian strategic culture led to the framing of the Russian language as a major national security threat and encouraged a policy response.

Moreover, Ukrainian strategic culture not only reinforced the distinction between the Ukrainian identity and a threatening Russia, but also, by consistently narrating a distinctly European history of Ukraine, helped accelerate Ukraine's integration into Western political and military institutions. In other words, Ukraine's nationalist Europhile strategic culture, which emerged as the nation's dominant paradigm from 2014 onwards, led to the severing of political and cultural ties with its Russian antagonist and intensified efforts to fully integrate into the broader Western civilization (Kuzio 2016). The prevailing strategic culture which perceives Russia as an imminent threat to Ukrainian sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence has significantly narrowed the range of options to those explicitly designed to resist Russia and move away from its influence. Similarly, the persistent narratives that framed Ukraine as a fundamentally European power returning to its European home after centuries of forced Russification have shaped political action aimed at furthering European integration almost inevitable and risk-free. In this context, the construction of a 'reality' in which Russia is portrayed as denying the existence of a separate Ukrainian nation and aiming to dismantle Ukraine as a sovereign country has made rapprochement with Russia nearly impossible, while the creation of a 'reality' where a European nation resists the dominance of a non-European, Asian state has made an alliance with Western powers not merely an option to consider but a necessity.

The emphasis on perpetual vulnerability and victimhood in Ukrainian strategic culture is deeply rooted in its historical experience (Vushko 2018). That is, the Ukrainian sense of insecurity cannot be understood without considering the key role of Russia's perceived historical desire to colonize Ukraine in shaping decisions about the 'appropriate' means of self-preservation and threat neutralization. Such deep-rooted sense of vulnerability and victimhood dominating Ukraine's outlook toward Russia has inevitably fostered a consensus within the Ukrainian political elites to remain vigilant against Russia. In line with this, it can be argued that the

prevailing nationalist Europhile strategic culture was a decisive factor in shaping the strategic decision to ‘resist’ the perceived Russian threat. Thus, the perception of Russia as an existential threat that requires immediate action has elevated NATO membership to a top national security priority. The magnitude and urgency of the threat to Ukrainian independence from Russia have led the Ukrainian leadership to dismiss any policy option other than gaining access to the security umbrella provided by NATO. Moreover, the tendency of the Ukrainian strategic culture to seek alliances with stronger states to enhance its sovereignty, along with portraying its identity as a part of the broader Western world, has strengthened reliance on NATO as a straightforward yet effective solution to centuries of Russian influence and hostility. In other words, the interplay between the perception of victimhood, the pursuit of guaranteed security, and a Euro-Atlanticist posture, with the Russian threat as the main reference point, has made NATO integration at all costs the most viable policy option.

The Ukrainian leadership, especially after the annexation of Crimea and the resurgence of Russia-backed separatism in eastern Ukraine from 2014 onwards, apart from their strategic aim of joining NATO, has emphasized the need to reform the nation’s defense capabilities in line with NATO standards (NATOMFA 2016). In this regard, the 2021 Military Doctrine reads:

Accelerating defense reform based on Euro-Atlantic principles and standards, which, together with increasing public support for the country’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations, will ensure membership in the European Union and NATO in the future, as well as ensuring an adequate level of military security for Ukraine (MOU 2021).

This implies that the Ukrainian political establishment, due to the influence of the prevailing Europhile strategic culture, is genuinely convinced that the means for building a strong military that can handle Russian aggression, even if Ukraine does not enjoy the security umbrella provided by NATO, is through following NATO guidelines. Thus, it is not surprising that “since Volodymyr Zelenskyy took office, approximately one hundred new NATO standardization agreements have been implemented (Getmanchuk and Fakhurdinova 2021: 2)”.

Focusing on Ukraine’s history of being victimized by Russia and framing Russia as the irredeemable enemy with whom coexistence is inconceivable (Andryivna and Volodymyrivna 2021) have obstructed the Ukrainian leadership from considering the possibility that Russia could have legitimate concerns about Ukraine’s insistence on being part of NATO. Indeed, just as the *Ruski mir* [Russian world] doctrine bestows upon Russia the duty to safeguard and promote the Russian world - encompassing Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, and Russian-speaking communities across the post-Soviet space – thereby increasing Ukraine’s threat perception of Russia (Smith 2019), Ukraine’s push to join NATO perpetuates the centuries-old belief that Russia is besieged on all fronts by an ontologically hostile West. It could, therefore, be argued that Ukraine’s prevailing strategic culture influences policymakers to view Russia as an illegitimate actor deserving only to be treated as a rogue state, which, in turn,

undermines the possibility of a meaningful diplomatic process, including potential concessions on the status of the eastern regions of Ukraine and Ukraine's bid for NATO membership. While Russian irredentism cannot be overlooked, Ukraine's stance toward Russia and its strong emphasis on sovereignty at least partly explains the failure of the Minsk I and Minsk II Agreements, signed in 2015, which aimed to implement a ceasefire in the eastern regions of Ukraine. This explains why Poroshenko viewed the negotiation process not with the end goal of permanent cessation of hostilities but as an opportunity "to take the time to build the effective Ukrainian Armed Forces" (Ukrinform 2019). Indeed, the framing of Russia as an eternal enemy and a rogue state that aims to upend Ukraine's sovereignty reduced the already slim chance of achieving a negotiated solution to the conflict.

However, the impact of Ukraine's prevailing strategic culture in shaping its defiance is most evident in its response to Russia's full-scale invasion on February 24, 2022. In line with the most characteristic traits of Ukrainian strategic culture, President Zelenskyy, in the immediate aftermath of the invasion, declared that "no one will be able to convince or force us, Ukrainians, to give up our freedom, our independence, our sovereignty" (POU 2024). The immense value attributed to Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity not only strengthened its resilience on the battlefield, dashing Russia's hopes for a swift victory but also paved the way for the categorical rejection of a ceasefire deal that did not include the full restoration of Ukraine's territorial integrity – meaning Russia withdrawing from the occupied territories of Ukraine. This explains why Ukrainian officials were not particularly enthusiastic about a ceasefire in the aftermath of the invasion, despite participating in negotiations with Russia in Minsk, Antalya, and Istanbul. Notably, it is acclaimed that significant progress was made during the negotiations in Istanbul in May 2022. Apparently, Ukraine was ready to abandon its NATO ambitions in exchange for a "security guarantee by which other countries – including Ukrainian allies who would also sign the agreement – would come to its defense should it be attacked again" (Troianovski et al. 2024). However, a diplomatic resolution that could potentially jeopardize Ukraine's territorial integrity was not rejected by the Ukrainian leadership.

Along these lines, Zelensky's peace plan of October 2022 makes it clear that Ukraine's territorial integrity is not up for negotiation. It also stipulates that for the cessation of hostilities, "Russia must withdraw all its troops and armed formations from the territory of Ukraine" (Ukraine 2024). Moreover, while it is true that the annexation of Crimea and pro-Russian separatism in eastern Ukraine from 2014 onwards had already "given NATO a second wind, making transatlantic solidarity important again (Koval et al. 2017: 40)," the Euro-Atlanticist character of Ukrainian strategic culture became even more pronounced in the aftermath of Russia's full-scale invasion. This transformation is evident in the official documents published after 2014 (MOU 2021, NATOMFA 2024), which refer to Ukraine's bid for NATO membership as an ontological necessity; in speeches by the Ukrainian leaders (Poroshenko 2015, Zelensky 2023) asserting that Ukraine is not only fighting for itself but also for the West; and in the constant plea to Western powers (NYT 2022, Reuters 2024) for the continuation of their financial and military assistance in the 'common struggle' against the Russian threat.

Overall, the dominant nationalist Europhile strategic culture has driven the Ukrainian leadership to adopt appropriate policies aimed at resisting Russian influence by all means necessary, including the marginalization of the Russian language, the reinforcement of a distinct European identity, and the pursuit of closer ties with Western institutions. This perception of a constantly hostile Russia has impacted Ukraine's strategic options, making dialogue and concessions difficult while affirming NATO integration as a national security imperative. Furthermore, the ongoing conflict with Russia has deepened Ukraine's reliance on Western support, thus, further solidifying its Euro-Atlanticist stance.

4. Conclusion

This article argues that Ukraine's defiance vis-à-vis Russia has not been a momentary reaction to the aggression but an outcome of its deeply rooted strategic culture. A historical narrative of vulnerability, steadfast commitment to sovereignty, and alignment with Western institutions as a distinct European nation constitute three interwoven characteristics of Ukrainian strategic culture creating a particular 'ideational milieu' that has informed Ukraine's resistance since 2014. They have guided Ukraine's political discourse and policy decisions, shaping its determination not to yield to external threats from Russia. The presentation of Russia as a historical antagonist, coupled with the prioritization of independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity in the face of Russian aggression, has led Ukraine to adopt policies aimed at distancing itself from Russian influence while strengthening its ties with Western political and military institutions. This has manifested in the promotion of the Ukrainian language, the rejection of Russian cultural influence, and the pursuit of NATO and EU integration.

Ukraine's claim to be a distinct historical and cultural entity with a European destiny has established its alignment with Western institutions as a historical imperative and strategic necessity to counter Russian expansionism, while also affirming it as a sovereign choice worth fighting for. In such an ideational context, Ukrainian strategic culture has identified threats, defined allies and adversaries, set objectives, and prescribed resistance. That is to say that Ukraine's policy options have not only been constrained by its physical capabilities but also by the ideational milieu rooted in and shaped by its strategic culture. Facing the invasion, the Ukrainian strategic culture has set limits on policy options and defined appropriate actions resulting in an active struggle against a threat to its security, sovereignty, and identity. That is, Ukraine's strategic culture has provided the ideational foundation for its resistance against Russia.

Thus, in practice, these characteristics of the prevailing Ukrainian strategic culture have translated into policy outcomes as the framing of Russia as an existential threat has reinforced Ukraine's resolve to resist territorial concessions, as seen in its response to the annexation of Crimea and, later, the full-scale invasion. The quest for European integration has not only guided Ukraine's foreign policy but also helped

secure Western military and economic assistance, consolidating its pro-NATO and pro-EU orientation. In sum, Ukraine's strategic culture, through which Ukrainian policymakers view their surroundings, assess threats, and set objectives, will continue to guide its long-term security policies. The deeply entrenched perception of Russia as a permanent security threat along with Ukraine's commitment to sovereignty and European integration will continue to define Ukraine's relations with Russia.

Funding statement: No funding availed.

Conflict of interest statement: None.

Declaration: No AI and AI-assisted technologies are used for this paper.

Data availability statement. This study is qualitative hence no quantitative data is utilized. All the qualitative data that is utilized for this paper is properly cited, accessible and available.

Address:

Dogachan Dagi

Department of Political Science and International Relations

Baskent University

Bağlıca Kampüsü Fatih

Sultan Mahallesi Üniversite Caddesi No:42/1, postcode 06790,

Etimesgut/ANKARA

Turkey

E-mail: dogachandagi@baskent.edu.tr

Tel no: 90 542 172 80 10

References

- Abimbola, D. Waliyullahi, Akin Ademuyiwa, and Ezekiel O. Tanitolorun (2024) "Retrospect and prospect: the Russian language amidst and identity crisis in Ukraine". *Trames* 28, 1, 81–100. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.3176/tr.2024.1.06>
- Akaliyski, Plamen and Tim Reeskens (2023) "Ukrainian values: between the Slavic-Orthodox legacy and Europe's allure". *European Societies* 26, 2, 522–551. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/14616696.2023.2206901>
- Andryivna, Yuliya and Maria Volodymyrivna (2021) "Ukrainian historical narrative: features and specifics of transformation". *Naukove piznannâ. Metodologiâ ta tehnologiâ* [Scientific knowledge: methodology and technology] 48, 2, 19–26. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.24195/sk1561-1264/2021-2-3>
- Brusylovskaya, Olha and Polina Sinovets (2017) "Strategic culture of Ukraine as the research instrument of the Ukrainian foreign policy". In: I. Koval, O. Brusylovskaya and V. Dubovyk, eds. *Strategic culture and foreign policy of Ukraine*, 7–19. Odesa: Odesa Mechnikov National University Press.
- CNE News (2023) "Orthodox Church of Ukraine switches to Western Calendar", May, 26. Available on line at <https://cne.news/article/3119-orthodox-church-of-ukraine-switches-to-western-calendar>. Accessed on 18.12.2024.

- Getmanchuk, Alyona and Marianna Fakhurdinova (2021) "Ukraine and NATO standards: progress under Zelenskyy's presidency". *New Europe Center, Discussion Paper*. Available online at https://neweurope.org.ua/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Ukraine-NATO_Zel_web_eng.pdf. Accessed on 24.12.2024.
- Götz, Elias and Jorge Staun (2022) "Why Russia attacked Ukraine: strategic culture and radicalized narratives". *Contemporary Security Policy* 43, 3, 482–497. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2022.2082633>
- Gray, Colin S. (1999) "Strategic culture as context: the first generation of theory strikes back." *Review of International Studies* 25, 1, 49–69. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210599000492>
- Gray, Colin S. (2007) "Out of the Wilderness: Prime Time for Strategic Culture". *Comparative Strategy* 26, 1, 1–20. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/01495930701271478>
- HCJ (2023) The Constitution of Ukraine. Available online at https://hcj.gov.ua/sites/default/files/field/file/the_constitution_of_ukraine.pdf. Accessed on 19.12.2024.
- Herd, Graeme P. (2022) *Understanding Russian strategic behavior: imperial strategic culture and Putin's operational code*. New York: Routledge.
- Johnston, Alastair I. (1995) "Thinking about strategic culture". *International Security* 19, 4, 32–64. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.2307/2539119>
- Kari, Marti J. and Katri Pynnöniemi (2023) "Theory of strategic culture: an analytical framework for Russian cyber threat perception". *Journal of Strategic Studies* 46, 1, 56–84. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2019.1663411>
- Kartchner, Kerry, Jennie Johnson, and Jeffrey Larsen, eds. (2009) *Strategic culture and weapons of mass destruction: culturally based insights into comparative national security policymaking*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Klymenko, Lina (2020) "The role of historical narratives in Ukraine's policy toward the EU and Russia". *International Politics* 57, 6, 973–989. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1057/s41311-020-00231-x>
- Kolsto, Pal (2023) "Ukrainians and Russians as 'one people': an ideologeme and its genesis". *Ethnopolitics* 1–20. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/17449057.2023.2247664>
- Koval, Ihor, Olha Brusylovska, and Volodymyr Dubovyk, eds. (2017) *Strategic culture and foreign policy of Ukraine*. Odesa: Odesa Mechnikov National University Press.
- Kremlin (2014) "Address by President of the Russian Federation". Available online at <https://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20603>. Accessed on 12.12.2024.
- Kremlin (2021) "Article by Vladimir Putin 'On the historical unity of Russians and Ukrainians'". Available online at <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/page/136>. Accessed on 05.01.2025.
- Kuzio, Taras (2001) "Identity and nation-building in Ukraine: defining the 'other'". *Ethnicities* 1, 3, 343–365. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1177/146879680100100304>
- Kyiv Post (2014) "Party of regions, Communist Party banned in Ivano-Frankivsk and Ternopil regions". Jan. 27. Available online at <https://www.kyivpost.com/post/8951>. Accessed on 03.01.2025.
- Kyiv Post (2021) "Lawmakers ask Zelensky to return 'Hero of Ukraine' title to Bandera". July 5. Available online at <https://www.kyivpost.com/post/6768>. Accessed on 14.12.2024.
- Lantis, Jeffrey and Darryl Howlett (2019) "Strategic culture". In J. Baylis, J. Wirtz and C. S. Gray, eds. *Strategy in the contemporary world*, 89–107. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Marukhovska-Kartunova, Olga, Oleg Rabenchuk, Liudmyla Ladonko, Halyna Bzunko, and Nataliia Petrunia-Pyliavska (2024) "Cultural management: analysis of strategies, policies, and practices

- in Ukraine and the EU Countries". *Multidisciplinary Science Journal*, 6. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.31893/multiscience.2024ss0226>
- Meyer, Christoph (2005) "Convergence towards a European strategic culture". *European Journal of International Relations* 11, 4, 523–549. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066105057899>
- Minesashvili, Salome (2020) *European identity discourses in the contested neighborhood of Europe and Russia: the case of Ukraine*. (Discussion Papers, 2/20.) Europa-Kolleg Hamburg, Institute for European Integration.
- MOU (2021) "White book 2021: the armed forces of Ukraine". Available online at https://www.mil.gov.ua/content/files/whitebook/WhiteBook_2021_Defens_policy_of_Ukraine.pdf. Accessed on 21.12.2024.
- NATOMFA (2016) "President of Ukraine Petro Poroshenko: our strategic goal is NATO membership". Available online at <https://nato.mfa.gov.ua/en/news/50578-prezident-ukrajini-petro-poroshenko-nashuju-strategichnoju-metuju-zalishajetysya-vstup-do-nato>. Accessed on 12.12.2024.
- NATOMFA (2024) "Ukraine adapted annual national programme assessment for 2024". Available online <https://nato.mfa.gov.ua/storage/app/sites/115/ukraine-adapted-annual-national-programme-2024.pdf>. Accessed on 20.12.2024.
- NYT (2022) "Full transcript of Zelensky's speech before Congress". Available at <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/12/21/us/politics/zelensky-speech-transcript.html>. Accessed on 03.01.2025.
- Pavlova, Olena, Iryna Kuchynska, Volodymyr Gorbalskiy, Oksana Volodina, and Bogdana B. Melnychenko (2023) "The war between Ukraine and Russia as a historical and civilizational aspect". *Trames* 27, 4, 327–349. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.3176/tr.2023.4.01>
- Penkela, Alina, Ilse Derluyn, and Ine Lietaert (2020) "The Ukrainian divide – the power of historical narratives, imagined communities, and collective memories". *Regions and Cohesion* 10, 3, 125–139. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.3167/reco.2020.100311>
- Poroshenko, Petro (2015) "Opening speech of the President of Ukraine Petro Poroshenko at 12th Yalta European Strategy annual meeting". Sept. 11. Available online at <https://yes-ukraine.org/en/news/vistup-prezidenta-ukrayini-petra-poroshenka-na-12-y-shchorichniy-zustrichiyaltinskoyi-yevropeyskoyi-strategiyi-video>. Accessed on 14.12.2024.
- Poroshenko, Petro (2017, Dec. 24) "Poroshenko congratulated believers on Christmas according to the Gregorian calendar". Available online at <https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/news/28936305.html>. Accessed on 18.12.2024.
- Poroshenko, Petro (2018) "Volodymyr's Christian choice was also a European choice – Poroshenko". July 28. Available online at <https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-society/2507222-hristianskij-vibir-volodimira-odnocasno-buv-viborom-evropejskim-poroshenko.html>. Accessed on 18.12.2024.
- Poroshenko, Petro (2019) "Ivan Mazepa became a true symbol of Ukrainian resistance to Russia – president in Baturyn". March 14. Available online at <https://chor.gov.ua/nasha-diyalnist/novini/item/7899-ivan-mazepa-stav-spravzhnim-symvolom-ukrainskohoprotyv-rosii-p>. Accessed on 14.12.2024.
- Poroshenko, Petro (2023) "Christmas on December 25 is the return of Ukraine to the European family of nations". Dec. 25. Available online at <https://eurosolidarity.org/2023/12/25/christmas-on-december-25-is-the-return-of-ukraine-to-the-european-family-of-nations-poroshenko-family-prayed-in-sofia-and-congratulated-ukrainians-on-the-holidays/>. Accessed on 18.12.2024.

- POU (2022) "Address by the President of Ukraine". Available online at <https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/zvernennya-prezidenta-ukrayini-73137>. Accessed on 27.12.2024.
- Putin, Vladimir (2021) "Article by Vladimir Putin "On historical unity of Russians and Ukrainians". July 12. Available online at <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/66181>. Accessed on 27.12.2024.
- Rada (2010) "On conferring the title of Hero of Ukraine on S. Bandera". Jan. 20. Available online at <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/46/2010#Text>. Accessed on 18.12.2024.
- Rada (2015) "On the new edition of the Military Doctrine of Ukraine". Sept. 2. Available online at <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/555/2015#Text>. Accessed on 27.12.2024.
- Rada (2020) "On the national security strategy of Ukraine". Available online at <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/392/2020#n2>. Accessed on 27.12.2024.
- Rada (2021) "On the military security strategy of Ukraine". March 25. Available online at <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/121/2021#Text>. Accessed on 27.12.2024.
- Reuters (2024) "Zelenskiy counts on more Western defence aid for Ukraine in next two months". Available at <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/zelenskiy-counts-more-western-defence-aid-ukraine-next-two-months-2024-01-20/>. Accessed on 21.12.2024.
- Skak, Mette (2024) "Russian strategic culture: a critical survey of the literature." In K. Kartchner, B. D. Bowen, and J. L. Johnson, eds. *Routledge Handbook of Strategic Culture*, 164–178. New York: Routledge.
- Snyder, Jack (1977) *The Soviet strategic culture: implications for limited nuclear operations*. Santa Monica: Rand Corporation.
- Tolz, Vera (2001) *Russia: inventing the nation*. London: Arnold.
- Troianovski, Anton, Adam Entous, and Michael Schwirtz (2024) "Ukraine-Russia peace is as elusive as ever: but in 2022 they were talking". *The New York Times*, June 15. Available online at <https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2024/06/15/world/europe/ukraine-russia-ceasefire-deal.html>. Accessed on 27.12.2024.
- Ukraine (2024) "What is Zelenskyy's 10-point peace plan?" September 17. Available online at <https://war.ukraine.ua/faq/zelenskyys-10-point-peace-plan/>. Accessed on 27.12.2024.
- Ukrinform (2019) "Poroshenko says Minsk agreements partially fulfilled their goal". December 13. Available online at <https://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-politics/2837640-poroshenko-says-minsk-agreements-partially-fulfilled-their-goal.html>. Accessed on 27.12.2024.
- Ulyk, Volodymyr (2016) "National identity in Ukraine: impact of Euromaidan and the War". *Europe-Asia Studies* 68, 4, 588–608. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/09668136.2016.1174980>
- Vushko, Iryna (2018) "Historians at war: history, politics and memory in Ukraine". *Contemporary European History* 27, 1, 112–124. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0960777317000431>
- Wolczuk, Kataryna (2000) "History, Europe and the 'national idea': the 'official' narrative of national identity in Ukraine". *Nationalities Papers* 28, 4, 671–694. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/00905990020009674>
- Zelenskyy, Volodymyr (2022, Feb. 2022). "Address by the President of Ukraine." Available online at <https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/zvernennya-prezidenta-ukrayini-73137>. Accessed on 12.12.2024.
- Zelenskyy, Volodymyr (2023) "Volodymyr Zelenskyy's speech at the special plenary session of the European Parliament". Available at <https://www.astrid-online.it/static/upload/zele/zelenskyy-speech-ep-9-2-23.pdf>. Accessed on 04.01.2025.

- Zelenskyy, Volodymyr (2023, Nov.) “Address of the President of Ukraine on the occasion of the Day of Remembrance of the Victims of Holodomors.” Available online at <https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/zvernennya-prezidenta-ukrayini-z-nagodi-dnya-pamyati-zhertv-87249>. Accessed on 12.12.2024.
- Zelenskyy, Volodymyr (2024, August 24) “Address by Volodymyr Zelenskyy on the Independence Day of Ukraine”. Available online at <https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/zvernennya-volodimira-zelenskogo-z-nagodi-dnya-nezalezhnosti-92805>. Accessed on 14.12.2024.
- Zelenskyy, Volodymyr (2024, Feb. 17) “Speech by President Volodymyr Zelenskyy at the Munich Security Conference”. Available online at <https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/ne-pitajte-ukrayinu-koli-zakinchitsya-vijna-pitajte-v-sebe-c-89021>. Accessed on 18.12.2024.
- Zelenskyy, Volodymyr (2024, June 7) “President’s Address to the National Assembly of France”. Available online at <https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/cej-rosijskij-rezhim-ne-viznaye-mezh-jomu-nedostatno-navit-y-91365>. Accessed on 02.01.2025.