CULTURE WARS IN ESTONIA AT THE BEGINNING OF THE 20TH CENTURY

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This article focuses on the emergence of a striking cultural clash in Estonia in the early 20th century as the traditional agrarian society came increasingly under the impact of modernization. The factors that contributed to this phenomenon included socioeconomic change, the expanding educational system and student body, growing international contacts, and the paradoxical effects of tsarist attempts at cultural Russification, which in the end backfired and actually encouraged Estonian aspirations. The article surveys the competing cultural models offered by traditional nationalists, radical social democrats, and the Young-Estonia movement, especially the latter's role in fostering the public debate on cultural issues. It concludes with a brief assessment of Young-Estonia's impact and reception.

It is well established that the early years of the 20th century constituted a period of profound change in Estonia. Industrialization and urbanization were transforming the economic and social landscape, and although unsuccessful in fulfilling its ultimate goals, the Revolution of 1905 publicly raised previously unheard of political issues and goals that could not be eliminated by the post-revolutionary reaction. These aspects of Estonia's modernization have been relatively well investigated. However, we have a considerably less clear picture of the cultural transformation that was taking place. On the eve of the 1905 Revolution nothing less than a powerful confrontation of strikingly different cultural views was emerging in Estonia, and this cultural clash, enhanced and abetted by the revolutionary experience, became a permanent feature of Estonian life, as it is of every modern society. In place of a mainly rural-oriented culture based on Baltic German models, explicitly urban alternatives appeared in the form of the Young-Estonia movement and radical social democracy.

This article will reevaluate several issues associated with the “culture wars” of this period and attempt to shed some light on them. It will argue that the cultural
sphere should not be viewed as some sort of superstructure, but one that deserves independent analysis and investigation in its own right.

One of the most significant questions related to the cultural clash of the early 20th century is its origins. Where did this strikingly new phenomenon come from? Certainly, part of the explanation must be seen in the above-mentioned social and economic modernization. Two key elements of this process should be singled out in this connection: the growing concentration of Estonians in the cities and the increasing wealth of a considerable part of the Estonian population in both town and country. From no more than half of the total urban population in the years 1867–1874, the Estonian share rose to two thirds by 1897. Although Baltic Germans continued to play a role in urban life that was far out of proportion to their declining numbers, the growing Estonian presence was palpable and psychologically important. At the same time the rise of an Estonian bourgeoisie in the cities and the growing ranks of Estonian landholders in the countryside meant that more and more Estonians were in a position to pay serious attention to cultural concerns.

A second causal factor that is often — and rightly — mentioned in the existing literature is the striking expansion in the number of Estonian secondary school and university students in this period. The memoir literature from this era clearly suggests that young Estonians no longer felt isolated in the gymnasium and high schools, and they thus felt more sure of their identity than had previous generations. The Estonianization of the secondary school student body continued throughout the first decade and a half of the 20th century, and by 1916, Estonians comprised over half of the total in both Estland and northern Livland or about 7000 students. At the university level the growth was also explosive, from about 200 in 1900 to some 700 in 1910 and further to roughly 1000 by 1915, although more than half of these students were enrolled at institutions outside of Estonia itself. This quantitative growth was complemented by a qualitative one, as the expanding numbers of Estonian secondary school and university students increasingly felt the need to broaden their cultural horizons. Using Mannheim’s concept of generations, it can be argued that a highly distinctive “new generation style” appeared in Estonia in the first years of the 20th century, developed and carried in the main by young Estonians born in the 1880s. The emergence of such a style is not automatic or routine, but “depends entirely on the trigger action of

the social and cultural process." Interestingly, the characteristic format in which this new generation found its initial voice was among secret circles of secondary school students all over Estonia, and among the most notable results of this ferment was the formation of the Young-Estonia movement itself in 1904.7

Another contributing factor to the emerging cultural clash in Estonia was the major leap forward in communication beyond the traditional boundaries of the world of the Baltic Provinces by the beginning of the 20th century. To be sure, Estonia had already become less and less isolated since the 1860s, but the process picked up increasing speed as the end of the 19th century neared. The growing access to information on international affairs is perhaps best illustrated by the qualitative and quantitative expansion of Estonian-language journalism in the 1890s and the initial years of the 20th century. News reports on the world external to the Baltic region became increasingly sophisticated, and the number of journalistic titles and their circulation figures mushroomed. For example, in the first decade of the 20th century, the total number of newspapers, supplements, and magazines in Estonia nearly tripled from 27 to 78.8 The pace of translation of world literature into Estonian also increased rapidly at the end of the 19th century and especially in the early 20th century, including – in the latter period – growing numbers of works from French, Finnish, and Scandinavian literature.9 During this same period more and more Estonian university students began to attend institutions of higher learning outside the Baltic region, especially in St. Petersburg, and although many did not return to Estonia, those who did brought a broader perspective to the growing intelligentsia.10 By 1900, educated Estonians were much more conscious than in previous decades of developments in the Russian empire as a whole, and this growing awareness enhanced the impact of the pre-1905 ferment that was present in much of the European areas of the tsarist empire.

The least understood – and most misunderstood – causal element behind the "culture wars" of the early 20th century is the impact of the era of Russification in Estonia, beginning in the mid-1880s. Traditional Estonian historiography depicted this period in highly negative terms, and this view continues to be

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dominant in much of the writing about these years, as Ea Jansen recently reminded us.\(^1\) As I have argued elsewhere, it is an exaggeration to describe tsarist Russification policy as “systematic” or “consistent” in the Baltic Provinces or anywhere else in the Russian empire. The imperial Russian government lacked the means, especially in knowledge of the local situation and in manpower, to implement such a policy in any sweeping way, particularly in the cultural realm.\(^2\) Having said this, however, it must be noted that the Russification era did have a temporarily negative impact on certain aspects of Estonian cultural development, especially education. Nevertheless, paradoxical as it may seem at first glance, this same period also contributed substantially to Estonian cultural modernization and helped lay the basis for the Young-Estonia movement and the \textit{Kulturkampf} of the early 20th century.

First of all, ironically, the failed attempt at cultural Russification did not lead to denationalization of the Estonians, but rather to their emancipation from Baltic German cultural hegemony. The local German cultural model was still present in the Baltic region after the mid-1880s, but its prestige and attractiveness were in decline. On the other hand, the introduction of the Russian cultural option faced many challenges, e.g., finding and training the appropriate teaching staff and implementing the use of Russian as the language of instruction at all levels of education. One clear result was that the clumsy efforts at Russification often had the opposite effect, i.e., speeding up the process of a developing \textit{Estonian} national identity among the youth.\(^3\) Thus, it is no coincidence that on the heels of the Russification era, i.e., at the end of the 1890s and in the first years of the 20th century, Estonian increasingly became the everyday language of native intellectuals.\(^4\) In short, since there was no clear victor in the Russo–German cultural competition that now developed, a third, specifically Estonian alternative gained strength, especially among Estonian youth who were too young to have been disoriented by the initial attempts at Russification.

As a relative latecomer to the Baltic region in any serious way, Russian culture found it difficult to gain a foothold, and its attractiveness to Estonians was also limited for social reasons. Although the number of Russians in Estonia gradually increased in the last two decades of the 19th century and surpassed the number of Germans by 1897, the established elites continued to be dominated by the Baltic German nobility and urban magnates. With regard to land and property ownership in Estonia, the relative position of Russians generally declined during


\(^{13}\) Raud, M. \textit{Sulg ja raamat: Mälestusi ajaloo pööriaegadest}. Lund, 1962, p. 75.

the final decades of the tsarist regime, as Toomas Karjahärm has recently shown. Among the civilian Russian population, the most significant occupational presence was in public administration and the Orthodox Church, as befitted the tsarist government’s centralizing tendencies.\textsuperscript{15} Unfortunately, the 1897 census does not provide data correlating native language and nationality, but in view of the situation sketched above, it is unlikely that ethnic Estonians became culturally Russified in Estonia much beyond the low level that existed before the mid-1880s, e.g., 0.6 percent in Tallinn according to the census of 1881.\textsuperscript{16}

As noted above, there is no doubt that the use of a foreign language as the means of instruction for most subjects in Estonian schools constituted a giant step backwards in educational terms. Nevertheless, what actually transpired in the 1890s is far from clear, and we still need a thorough study of the subject. What we do know suggests that there was a gap between theory and practice. For example, the transition period to the use of Russian was often drawn out, and the state’s ability to enforce the new system foundered on a lack of manpower. It is also important to bear in mind that, despite Russification, Estonian continued to be a subject of instruction in the rural schools, which the great majority of Estonian pupils attended, and the tradition of home instruction seems to have been put to good use in this period.\textsuperscript{17} In the final analysis, whatever the temporary educational obstacles created by the Russification era were, census data from 1881, 1897, and 1922 indicate that the traditionally high Estonian literacy levels did not suffer any decline in this period.\textsuperscript{18}

In view of the seeming threat posed by cultural Russification to the developing Estonian nation, it is understandable that most studies have focused on the negative aspects of this phenomenon. Nevertheless, it is important to note that there were also positive consequences from Estonia’s engagement with Russian culture in this period. Estonian students at all levels were exposed in a serious way to leading Russian writers in the original for the first time. From the memoir literature it is clear that the ethnic Russian schoolteachers who came to Estonia often brought a breath of fresh air in terms of an independent mind and a critical attitude toward authority, and they could even be mildly supportive of Estonian cultural aspirations, as in the case of one of Friedebert Tuglas’s teachers in Tartu.\textsuperscript{19} At Tartu University Russification fostered the emergence of a much more


\textsuperscript{18} Raun, T. U. The Estonians, pp. 317–318.

diverse student body than had previously been the case, and the curious central government practice of "exiling" radical university students to Tartu helped to expose Estonians to a broader range of political and cultural views.  

When discussing the impact of Russification, it is also useful to maintain a distinction between its administrative and cultural aspects. Although administrative Russification meant the introduction of "Russian" models, i.e., municipal government as well as judicial and police institutions, it clearly weakened Baltic German domination of Estonian life. If anything, from an Estonian point of view, administrative Russification did not go far enough, especially in not introducing zemstvo institutions in place of the Baltic nobility’s provincial diets. As we have seen, the consequences of cultural Russification were more ambiguous, but the key point is that the years from the mid-1880s to the mid-1890s were not a time when Estonian history stood still or moved backwards, but one in which the ground was further prepared for the cultural pluralism of the early 20th century.

As the Young-Estonia movement burst onto the scene with its first album, ready in 1904, but not published until the revolutionary year of 1905, the clash of cultural models in Estonia became increasingly visible, and with the abolition of pre-censorship and the greater opportunities to publish in the post-1905 era, the public debate on the nature of culture sharpened. Around 1900, the prevailing and virtually unrivaled interpretation of Estonian culture was the traditional nationalist one, dating back to the time of Jakob Hurt and the national awakening era. It was reaffirmed and most forcefully advocated by Jaan Tõnisson, the energetic young editor of Postimees beginning in 1896, and could be summarized as follows. The Estonians formed a small, but distinctive nation, historically tied to the West, whose culture was based on a hardy agrarian tradition, the Lutheran Church and a system of strong moral values, and a vigorous commitment to the native language. Despite continuing urbanization, Tõnisson remained suspicious of city life, and he felt that the small number of Estonians rendered them immune to the social divisions and conflict that had come to plague larger peoples in modern times.

Politically, the polar opposite to the nationalists was Marxist social democracy, emerging on the eve of the Revolution of 1905 and constituting a powerful

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21 After a rereading of the Estonian press in the "high" Russification period, Ea Jansen argues that interest in the development of Estonian national culture remained stronger than is usually indicated in the existing literature, which tends to focus on exceptional figures such as Ado Grenzstein and Jakob Kõrv. Jansen, E. Eesti ajakirjanduse rahvuslikkusest, pp. 394–398.

force in the final years of the tsarist regime. The socialists stressed the superiority of urban over rural life and viewed Estonia as part and parcel of the international capitalist system, certainly not a world apart. Although there were differences among the social democrats, the more radical — such as Jaan Anvelt and Hans Pöögelmann — emphasized the dominant role of class divisions in Estonian society and the notion of two separate cultures, one “bourgeois” and the other “proletarian,” the gap between which remained by definition unbridgeable. In short, culture was socially determined, and the nationalist commitment to “Estonian culture” was merely a smokescreen for its assertion of hegemony. In this view it also followed that the role of language was merely instrumental and not a value in itself, as it was for the nationalists.23

Estonia, of course, was not alone in witnessing this fundamental confrontation between the two dominant ideologies of the early 20th century in Central and Eastern Europe, nationalism and socialism, and it is characteristic of this era that Estonian society faced such a wide range of pressing issues, whether political, social, or cultural, that it was not able to achieve any consensus on priorities for dealing with them. In the public debate Young-Estonia, in effect, moved beyond the politics of nationalism and socialism and raised the cultural issue to the forefront for the first time, suggesting — in Suits’s words in 1905 — that literature and art were the fields in which Estonia lagged farthest behind the European cultural standard. A year later, in Sihid ja vaated, Suits stressed that the watchwords of the new era were “emancipation” and “freedom,” criticizing both the obsolescence of traditional Estonian nationalism and the narrow dogmatism of socialism.24 The striking emergence of an art for art’s sake movement in what had been a cultural backwater of Europe until that time illustrates the great leap forward in international communication and awareness that had taken place in Estonia in only a few years. In 1910, Suits even used the term “intellectual modernization” (mõtte- ja tunde-elu moderniseerimine) to describe what was transpiring in Estonia.25

As Aino Kallas has suggested, Young-Estonia was both a product of the chaotic development of Estonian society at the beginning of the 20th century as well as a protest against that very society.26 It is important to bear in mind that Suits and the other leading figures in the Young-Estonia movement did not totally reject the Estonian past, but only those aspects that had lost their relevance for the


25 Suits, G. Toimetuse poolt. — Noor-Eesti, 1910, p. 3.

26 Kallas, A. Noor-Eesti: Nõopildid ja sõhtjooned. Tartu, 1921, p. 17.
present. In the same way, the Young-Estonians were not glib imitators of foreign models, as critics on the right alleged, but rather sought a synthesis of the Estonian spirit (vaim) and the best of European culture. The fact that Suits, Johannes Aavik, and Villem Ridala all spent at least five years studying at the University of Helsinki, not to speak of Tuglas’s years in Finnish exile, underscores the crucial role of Finland for Young-Estonia and via Finland connections to Scandinavia, but part of Young-Estonia’s success clearly was its openness to any stimulating influences from the outside. Among the leading Young-Estonians Bernhard Linde perhaps put it best when he argued that only through engagement with European models could Estonian intellectuals really find what was native and “Estonian” about themselves and their culture.

The tripartite division suggested above into nationalists, socialists, and the “culturalists” led by Young-Estonia is useful for purposes of analysis, but it does not do justice to the complexity of the situation. These categories were not as discrete as they might appear, and various intellectuals often had a foot in more than one camp. For example, the Young-Estonians did not condemn nationalism per se, but only the way in which the older generation had made a fetish of it. After all, their commitment to the modernization of Estonian culture clearly indicated a strong belief in the future of the Estonian nation. In political and social terms, Young-Estonia empathized much more with the left than the right, and it is characteristic that some of its members were involved in the publication of the radical monthly Vaba Sõna (The Free Word) in Tartu in 1914–1916. Although it espoused socialism, Vaba Sõna refused to endorse any party, and its authors often took a position critical of both Tõnisson’s Estonian Progressive People’s Party (Eesti Rahvameeline Eduerakond) and the more extreme social democrats. For example, in an article in 1915, Jüri Vilms denounced both Tõnisson’s social conservatism and what he called the “naive cosmopolitanism” of the social democrats who failed to perceive that Estonian workers were subject to national pressure in the Russian empire.

A final issue that can be raised here is the question of the impact of Young-Estonia, the prime mover in the cultural clash of the early 20th century, on contemporaries. On the one hand, Suits noted that in its propagation of aestheticism and the modernization of Estonian culture, Young-Estonia, born at a time when Estonian public life was rapidly becoming more diverse and pluralistic, moved more quickly than its potential base in educated society could follow. On the other hand, already in 1911 he also observed that more had been

27 Suits, G. Noorte püüded, pp. 6, 19.
30 Suits, G. Sihid ja vaated, pp. 8–9.
31 Toimetuse poolt. – Vaba Sõna, 1914, 1, pp. 3–4; Suits, G. Kiri Kiirle, ibid., 1914, 2, pp. 56–63; Vilms, J. Eesti naiivne kosmopolitanism ja rahuusus, ibid., 1915, 1, pp. 10–11, 14, 16.
written about Young-Estonia than by it and that it had become a cultural force to be reckoned with in Estonian life. By initiating the public debate on culture, Young-Estonia forced educated Estonians to come to terms with yet another aspect of modernization, predictably drawing criticism from both the political right (for Young-Estonia’s seeming internationalism) and the left (for its alleged apolitical individualism). Although more research is needed on this topic, there can be no doubt that the Young-Estonia movement had considerable and immediate influence on Estonian public opinion. For example, in March 1911, the mainstream daily Päevaleht asserted that the Estonians were fully capable of cultural achievements comparable to those of the Norwegians and the other small peoples of Scandinavia. It is highly doubtful that Päevaleht would have made such a statement before the appearance of Young-Estonia.

In conclusion, this article has argued that the origins of the cultural conflict in Estonia at the beginning of the 20th century deserve more analysis than they have received up to now, especially with regard to cultural factors and to the impact of the immediately preceding Russification era. It is no accident that the cultural pluralism stimulated by the Russification years also contributed to a firmer basis for national identity among Estonian intellectuals, particularly those whose formative years began around the turn of the 20th century. Nevertheless, how Young-Estonia acquired the daredevil confidence to try to make “the impossible possible” in Estonian cultural life, in the words of Gustav Suits, remains to be fully explained. In addition, further systematic research is needed to assess the impact of Young-Estonia’s cultural mission on contemporary Estonian intellectuals and on public opinion in general. The clash of cultural views in the concluding tsarist decades also reflected the increasing role of international stimuli in Estonian life, a trend which served to enhance the growing cultural pluralism.


34 Päevaleht, March 17, 1911, p. 1.

35 Suits, G. Lõpusõna, p. 637.

“KULTUURISÕJAD” EESTIS 20. SAJANDI ALGUL

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Kultuuriline moderniseerimine Eestis 20. sajandi algul vajab veel põhjalikkku uurimist, eriti arvestades kultuurilise pluralismi kiiret teket 1905. aasta revolutsiooni kūnnisel. Selle nähtuse põhjusi tuleb otsida järgmistes tegurites:
sotsiaal-majandusliku moderniseerimise mõju, eriti linnade elanikkonna jätkuv eestistumine; eesti soost keskkooliõpilaste ja üliõpilaste arvu kiire kasv; laienevad rahvusvahelised kontaktid ja tsaarivalitsuse kultuurilise venestamise paradoksaalne efekt (tegelikult mõjus venestamine eesti kultuuri arengule ergutavalt).