This paper discusses the normative structure of principles that require belief-revision in the face of disagreement, the role of self-trust in our epistemic lives, and the tensions that arise between the two. Section 2 argues that revisionary principles of disagreement share a general normative structure such that they prohibit continued reliance upon the practices via which one came to hold the beliefs under dispute. Section 3 describes an affective mode of epistemic self-trust that can be characterised as one’s having an attitude of optimism about the reliability of the practices via which one forms beliefs. The availability of affective self-trust is crucial to being able to rationally resist doubts about those practices. However, as argued in the final section of the paper, following revisionary principles of disagreement can render such trust psychologically unavailable. Consequently, attempts to follow such principles can have doxastic consequences that predictably exceed their normative implications.
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