THE PHILOSOPHY OF NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION/NON-PROLIFERATION: WHY STATES BUILD OR FORGO NUCLEAR WEAPONS?; pp. 371–382Full article in PDF format
Nuclear proliferation is the biggest challenge posing direct threat to international peace, security and strategic stability. International community’s endeavor to halt proliferation of nuclear weapons or related technology is simultaneously a difficult mission. Central objective of this paper is to understand and explain the phenomenon of nuclear proliferation and non-proliferation by applying different theoretical models including liberalism, realism and nuclear deterrence theory. Paper highlights how liberalism directs states to cooperate and accrue benefits from international anarchic system. It sheds light on the strength of liberal philosophy in convincing states to forgo nuclear weapons. Attempt is also made to explain reasons of nuclear proliferation through the prism of security needs. The realism was therefore applied in attempt to explain nuclear proliferation behavior. Further, attempt is made to explore how possessions of nuclear weapons enable states to achieve national interests? Realism and liberalism helped assess aforementioned aspects of the study carefully.
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